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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal from the
judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Beaver County, State of Utah,
signed January 5, 2000 and entered the same date, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3)0(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court, relying on Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, erred in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice for failure to
move for substitution within 90 days of the suggestion of death, when the 90-day
limitation period was not triggered because the suggestion of death was not tiled
by a party or a representative of the deceased party, was not served upon
nonparties pursuant to Rule 4, and did not identify the party to be substituted as
required by Rule 25?

1

Standard of Review. This appears to be a matter of first impression before
the Utah Supreme Court. The review of a motion to dismiss is a question of law
and is reviewed for correctness. Robertsons v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499
(UtahCt.App. 1992).
Issue preserved below.

This issue was preserved

in

Plaintiffs

Memorandum Supporting Donahue's Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider or.
Alternatively, Rule 59(e)Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Lrror of Law
(Record at 183.)
2.

Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Donahue's Complaint

with prejudice when the grounds for dismissal were failure to join an indispensable
party, which under Rule 41(b) U.R.C.P. is only grounds for dismissal without
prejudice.
Standard of Review. The review of a motion to dismiss, and the
characterization of relief and remedy therein, is a question of law and is reviewed
for correctness. Robertsons v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
Issue Preserved Below.

Donahue moved for post-judgment relief

requesting that the court characterize the dismissal without prejudice in his Rule
59(e) Motion of June 16, 1999. (Record at 99).
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff s

motion for an enlargement of time to file a motion for substitution when the
enlargement was requested in good faith and upon excusable neglect and when a
2

personal representative had not yet been appointed who could be substituted for
the deceased Defendant?
Standard of Review.

An extension of time is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard.1 Crossland v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994) (holding that
Utah Supreme Court's review of the trial court's decision to deny party's motion
to extend time to reply to summary judgment was conducted under abuse of
discretion standard).
Issue preserved below.

This issue was preserved in

Plaintiffs

Memorandum Opposing Defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting
Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time. (Record at 72).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES
The determinative statutes and rules in this case are reproduced herein in
the Addendum.

1

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) provides:
Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order
of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with
or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefore is
made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52 (b), 59 (b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73 (a) and (g),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them (emphasis added).

(Bold added.)
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order dismissing Plaintiff Brian Donahue's claim
for personal injury with prejudice. That order was entered on January 5, 2000.
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below
During the litigation, the Defendant Seth Albert Smith died. Alter he died.
the Fifth District Court, Judge Eves presiding, dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint lor
failure to substitute a party defendant within 90 days after the Suggestion of Death
filed on December 28, 1998, regardless of the fact that: 1) the 90-day limitation
period under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25 was not triggered by the December
28th Suggestion of Death, 2) Plaintiff demonstrated excusable neglect in not
moving for substitution, and 3) no personal representative had been appointed who
could have been substituted for the deceased Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 5, 1998, Plaintiff Donahue filed a Complaint against Defendant
Seth Albert Smith for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. (Record at 5.)
The law firm of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson (hereinafter "the law firm")
represented Defendant Smith in that action. (Record at 13.)
After Defendant Smith's death on December 23, 1998, the law firm filed a
"Suggestion of Death" on December 28, 1998, which was signed by S. Baird
Morgan and S. Brook Millard as "Attorneys for Defendant, Seth Albert Smith."
(Record at 50.)
4

On March 26, 1999, the law firm—appearing on behalf of the deceased
Defendant—moved the Fifth District Court to dismiss Donahue's Complaint under
Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Record at 61.) This motion to
dismiss was based upon Donahue's failure to file a motion for substitution within
90 days of his service of the Suggestion of Death. (Record at 65-62.) In response
on April 2, 1999, Donahue filed a Rule 6 Motion to Enlarge the time for filing a
motion to appoint a personal representative. (Record at 67.)
On June 3, 1999, the district court issued a Memorandum Opinion denying
Donahue's motion to enlarge the Rule 25 time and dismissing his Complaint with
prejudice. (Record at 96.) Following the dismissal on June 3, 1999, Donahue filed
a Rule 59(e) Motion. (Record at 99.) In that motion Donahue argued that the
dismissal should have been without prejudice, as it was in reality a dismissal for
failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 41(b). Later, Donahue joined
with a Rule 59(e) Motion filed in a companion case, Stoddard v. Smith (Record at
106), and then filed an additional motion under Rule 59(e) and 54(b). (Record at
183). In that motion, Donahue argued that the Suggestion of Death filed by the
law firm was not valid and was not sufficient to begin the 90-day limitation period
of Rule 25 because: (1) the Suggestion of Death was a nullity because the law firm
was not a party, nor was it a representative of the deceased party since the
attorney-client relationship between the law firm and Defendant Smith terminated
upon his death; (2) the Suggestion of Death was not served upon Defendant

5

Smith's representatives in compliance with Rule 4; and (3) the Suggestion of
Death did not identify any person who could be substituted as a party.
The district court, after hearing oral arguments, entered an Order ruling on
the Rule 59(e) motions, dated January 5, 2000. (Record at 243.)

A Notice of

Appeal from the January 5 Order was filed on the 18th of January, 2000. (Record
at 255.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal arises from the death of Defendant Seth Albert Smith during the
litigation and the subsequent dismissal of Plaintiff Brian Donahue's Complaint
with prejudice. After Defendant Smith's death, the law firm which had formerly
represented him filed a Suggestion of Death on December 28, 1998. The law firm
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint approximately 90 days thereafter. The
Fifth District Court, Judge Eves presiding, dismissed Donahue's Complaint with
prejudice, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The dismissal
was based upon Plaintiffs failure to move for substitution within 90 days of the
law firm's filing of the suggestion of death.
The dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint was error for two reasons. First, the
dismissal should have been without prejudice because it was in reality a dismissal
for failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 41(b).
Second, the 90-day time period under Rule 25 was not triggered by the law
firm's suggestion of death filed on December 28, 1998. The law firm's suggestion
of death failed to comply with Rule 25 because (1) it was not filed by a party or a
6

representative of the deceased party; (2) it was not served upon nonparties
pursuant to Rule 4; and (3) it did not identify any person who could be substituted
as a party.
(1) The law firm's suggestion of death did not trigger the 90-da\ period
because the law firm was not a party or a representative of the deceased party. The
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 25 reveals that Rule 25 intended to
limit the entities who may suggest death upon the record to those who may move
for substitution—a party or a representative of the deceased party. Rende v. Kay,
415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Prohibiting the decedent's attorney from
moving for substitution or suggesting the death upon the record serves policy
reasons. It prevents the decedent's attorney from taking actions which might
prejudice the rights of a successor party to whom the decedent's attorne) bears no
legal relationship. Hoffman v. Cohen. 538 A.2d 1096. 1099 (Dei. 1988). Because
the attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship, the relationship and the
attorney's ability to act on behalf of the client terminates upon the death of the
client. Certainly, the law firm Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson was not a party.
The law firm also could not have been a representative of the deceased Defendant
when it filed the suggestion of death on December 28, 1998 because it did not
represent the Defendant's estate. Accordingly, the 90-day limitation period did not
begin running on December 28, 1998, and the denial of Plaintiffs motion to
enlarge time and the dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint were error as a matter of
law.
7

(2) The law firm's suggestion of death did not trigger the 90-da\ time
period because it was not served on nonparties pursuant to Rule 4. By its plain
language, Rule 25 requires that the suggestion of death and the motion for
substitution both be served upon parties pursuant to Rule 5, and upon nonparties
pursuant to Rule 4 for the service of summons. The Tenth Circuit has defined the
"nonparties" referred to in Rule 25 as "specifically

the successors or

representatives of the deceased party's estate." Grandbouche v. Lovell 913 F.2d
835, 837 (10th Cir. 1990). Requiring a suggestion of death to be personally served
upon nonparties in order to trigger the 90-day time period assures that the nonparty
will be aware of the need to act. Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir.
1994). It is undisputed that the law firm's suggestion of death was not served upon
Defendant Smith's representatives or successors, as indicated by the certificate of
service. Therefore, the 90-day time period was not triggered by the law firm's
suggestion of death and the denial of Plaintiffs motion to enlarge time and the
dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint were error as a matter of law.
(3) The law firm's suggestion of death did not trigger the 9()-da\ lime
period because it failed to identify the person who could be substituted for the
deceased Defendant. Because Rule 25 plainly requires a suggestion of death to be
personally served upon nonparties, Rule 25 implicitly requires the suggestion of
death to identify the successors or representatives of the estate. Fehrenbacher v.
Quackenbush. 759 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Kan. 1991). Requiring the suggestion
of death to identify the person who could be substituted prevents a tactical
8

maneuver to place the unduly heavy burden upon a plaintiff of locating the
representative of the estate within 90 days. Such a burden can lead to the absurd
result of having the plaintiff appointed as the representative of the estate of the
very person he had sued. Wick v. Waterman, 421 N.W.2d 872. 873 (Wis. App.
1988). In the present case, Donahue was presented with an unduly heavy burden,
as the personal representative of Defendant Smith's estate was not appointed until
June 2, 1999.2 Because the law firm's suggestion of death failed to identify the
person who could be substituted, the 90-day time period was not triggered.
Consequently, the denial of Plaintiff s motion to enlarge time and the dismissal of
Plaintiffs Complaint were error as a matter of law.
In addition, the denial of Plaintiff s motion to enlarge time was an abuse of
discretion because Plaintiff requested the enlargement in good faith and with a
showing of excusable neglect. There was no showing of prejudice or dela\ as a
result of filing the motion to appoint in 99 days as opposed to 90 days. Moreover,
as explained above, the denial was an abuse of discretion because the 90-day time
period had not expired when Plaintiff requested the enlargement.

2

Donahue notes that the appointment of a personal representative on June 2, 1999
was only after such request was acted upon in the companion case of Stoddard v.
Smith, 98-CV-125, (currently before this Court on appeal) in which Mr. Stoddard
requested to appoint his uncle, Clair Jaussi, a member of the Utah State Bar, as
personal representative. (Record in 98-CV-125 at 98-97.)
9

ARGUMENT

I.

THE 90-DAY LIMITATION PERIOD UNDER RULE 25 WAS NEVER
TRIGGERED BECAUSE THE LAW FIRM'S SUGGESTION OF
DEATH: 1) WAS NOT FILED BY A PARTY OR REPRESENTATIVE
OF A THE DECEASED PARTY, 2) WAS NOT SERVED UPON
NONPARTIES, AND 3) DID NOT IDENTIFY WHO MAY BE
SUBSTITUTED AS A PARTY. THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO SUBSITUTE
WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE LAW FIRM'S SUGGESTION OF
DEATH.

A.

The 90-day Limitation Period Was Not Triggered Because the
Law Firm Was Not a Party and Was Not a Representative of the
Deceased Defendant When It Filed the Suggestion of Death on
December 28.1998.

On December 28, 1998, the law firm filed a Suggestion of Death, which
was signed by S. Baird Morgan and S. Brook Millard as "Attorneys for Defendant,
Seth Albert Smith." Plaintiff does not dispute that the law firm has a duty to notify
the court and opposing parties of the death of its client.

However, Plaintiff

contends that better-reasoned analysis follows the numerous federal and state
courts, which hold that a suggestion of death filed by the decedent's former
attorneys does not trigger the 90-day limitation period in which to move for
substitution of parties under Rule 25. See Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller. 757 F.
Supp. 206 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); Campbell v. Campbell. 878 P.2d 1037 (Okla. 1994);
Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry. 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985); Hilsabeck v. Lane
Co.. Inc.. 168 F.R.D. 313 (D. Kan. 1996); Hoffman v. Cohen. 538 A.2d 1096 (Del.
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1988); Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 725 P.2d 836 (N.M. App. 1985);
Rende v. Kav, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Smith v. Planas. 151 F.R.D. 547
(S.D.N. Y. 1993).
These courts have so held for two reasons.

First, the attornex-client

relationship terminates upon the death of the client. Therefore, the decedent's
attorney no longer represents the party. Second, a decedent's attorney is not a
party, nor is the decedent's attorney a representative of the deceased party. Rule 25
makes no provision for the filing of a suggestion of death by the attorney who had
formerly represented the deceased. Hence, any filing of a suggestion of death by
such an attorney is not sufficient under Rule 25 to begin the running of the ninetyday period. Because an attorney no longer represents his or her decedent client,
and because an attorney who formerly represented the deceased is not a party to
the lawsuit, any suggestion of death by such an attorney is invalid and docs noi
trigger the running of the ninety-day limitation period for the substitution oi
parties. As thoroughly explained below, this interpretation of Rule 25 is well
reasoned and has been adopted in numerous federal and state courts.
1.

Rule 25 Intends that the Suggestion of Death Will Only Be
Filed by a Party or Representative of the Deceased Party.

Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt the persuasive and logical reasoning of
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Rende v. Kay. 415 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1969). In Rende, the plaintiffs brought an action individually and on
behalf of their infant son who was injured by the defendant while driving his car.

11

Id. at 984. During the proceedings, the defendant died. The defendant's attornex
filed a suggestion of death. The attorney later moved in his own name to dismiss
the action on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not substituted a proper party
within 90 days of the suggestion of death. The case was dismissed. Id. On
appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal
and held that the 90-day period did not begin to run when the attorney filed the
suggestion of death because: 1) the attorney was not a party or a successor or
representative of the deceased, and 2) the suggestion of death did not identify the
successor or representative of the deceased party who could be substituted. Id at
985-986.
The court in Rende based its holding, that the former attorney for the
deceased could not file the suggestion of death, upon the Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 25. The court explained that the 1963 amendment to Federal Rule
25 changed the measuring of the time limit for making a substitution from the time
of death to the time the death is suggestion on the record. Id at 984. The
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 provides
Present Rule 25(a)(1), together with present Rule (6)(b),
results in an inflexible requirement that an action be
dismissed as to a deceased party if substitution is not carried
out within a fixed period measured from the time of death.
The hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement
plainly appear from the cases.
**#

The amended rule establishes a time limit from the motion to
substitute based not upon the time of death, but rather upon
12

the time information of the death is provided by means of a
suggestion of death upon the record . . .
A motion to substitute may be made by any party or by the
representative of the deceased party without awaiting the
suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion will usually be so
made. If a party or the representative of the deceased part}'
desires to limit the time within which another may make the
motion, he may do so by suggesting the death upon the
record.
Id. at 985 (emphasis added). The court stated that Rule 25 cannot fairly be
construed to make the suggestion of death filed by the deceased defendant's
attorney "operative to trigger the 90-day period" because the attorney "was neither
a successor nor representative of the deceased" and because the suggestion of
death "gave no indication of what person was available to be named in substitution
as a representative of the deceased." Id at 986. The court concluded:
Counsel's construction would open the door to a tactical
maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden of locating
the representative of the estate within 90 days.
Id; see also Wick v. Waterman, 421 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Wis. App. 1988). The
court further stated that no injustice results from the requirement that the
suggestion of death identify the representative or successor who may be
substituted for the deceased before Rule 25(a)(1) may be invoked by those who
represent or inherit from the deceased. Id
The reasoning in Rende was adopted by the Supreme Court of Delaware in
a case precisely on point, Hoffman v. Cohen. 538 A.2d 1096, 1098 (Del. 1988). In
Hoffman, the defendant died. The defendant's former attorney filed a suggestion

13

of death. The court adopted the federal construction of Rule 25. explaining: "It
was clearly the view of the Federal Advisory Committee that the amendments to
Rule 25(a)(1) would limit entities who may suggest death upon the record to those
who may move for substitution''

Hoffman, 538 A.2d at 1099 (emphasis added).

The court held that "the deceased's (Cohen's) attorney was not authorized to
suggest Cohen's death pursuant to . . . Rule 25(a)(1)," and that the suggestion of
death filed by the attorney was "a nullity and ineffective to trigger the ninety-day
provision in Rule 25." Id. at 1100. The court found the reasoning of Rende
persuasive and compelling and explained: "This conclusion is entirely consistent
with the general rule that upon the death of a client, a pre-existing attorne\-client
relationship is completely severed and any action taken on behalf of the deceased
client is a nullity." Id.; see also, Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 757 F. Supp.
206, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Death withdrew from the attorney every iota of
authorization he had to act for or in [the defendant's] behalf); 7 Am.Jur.2d
Attorneys at Law § 171 (1980); 7A C J.S. Attorney and Client § 224 (1980).
The reasoning in Rende, that Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death to be
filed by a party or a representative of the deceased party in order to trigger the 90day period for substitution, has been adopted by numerous other jurisdictions. In
Fehrenbacher v. Ouackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Kan. 1991). the United
States District Court for Kansas held:
[T]he attorney for the deceased party may not make the
suggestion of death since he is not himself a party to the
action and, since his authority to represent the deceased
14

terminated on the death, he is not a 'representative of the
deceased party' of the sort contemplated by the rule.
Id. at 1518 (quoting 7C Wright & Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure,
Civil § 1955 at 545): see also Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.. Inc., 168 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D.
Kan. 1996). This reasoning has also been adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Fariss
v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985); by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Smith v. Planas, 151
F.R.D. 547, 549-550 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); by the South Dakota Supreme Court in
Ripple v. Wold, 572 N.W.2d 439, 443 (S.D. 1997); by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Campbell v. Campbell 878 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Okla. 1994); by the Nevada
Supreme Court in Barto v. Weishaar, 692 P.2d 498, 499 (Nev. 1985); and by the
Arizona Court of Appeals in Varela v. Roman, 753 P.2d 166, 168 (Ariz. App.
1987).
Moreover, prohibiting the decedent's attorney from moving for substitution
or suggesting the death upon the record is based on policy considerations. Simply
stated, actions taken by the decedent's attorney "could clearly prejudice the rights
of a successor party to whom that attorney bears no legal relationship." Campbell,
878 P.2d at 1043 (quoting In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390, 392 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
Because the holdings in Rende and the subsequent following cases are well
reasoned, Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt the federal construction of Rule 25 and
hold that a suggestion of death filed by the deceased's former attorneys does not
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trigger the 90-day limitation period in which to move for substitution undci Ruk
25.
2.

Adopting the Federal Construction of Rule 25 Would Be
Consistent with Utah Law.

The analysis in Rende, which holds that a suggestion of death filed by the
former attorney of a deceased party does not trigger the 90-day limitation period
because death severs the attorney's authority to act on behalf of the deceased, is
consistent with Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the attorneyclient relationship is an agency relationship. Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 1193,
1195 (Utah 1984). The general rule for agency relationships is that the authority
of the agent terminates upon death of the principle

3 Am lui 2d Agcm\ ^ ^

(1986); 2A CJ.S. Agency §§ 135, 137 (1973). Likewise, the relationship between
an attorney and his or her client terminates upon the death of the client.

7

Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 184 (1980); 7A CJ.S. Attorney and Client § 224
(1980). Thus, any action taken by the former attorneys on behalf of the deceased
client is a nullity.
Because the attorney-client relationship terminates upon the death of the
client, the law firm did not, and could not as a matter of law, represent Defendant
Smith when it filed the Suggestion of Death because Mr. Smith had died
Therefore, the law firm's suggestion of death was not filed by a part) oi a
representative of the deceased. Therefore, the 90-day period never began to inn.
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and the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with prejudice was error as
a matter of law.
3.

The Law Firm Was Not Representing Defendant Smith or
His Estate or Personal Representative When It Filed the
Suggestion of Death on December 28,1998.

The law firm may claim that when it filed the Suggestion of Death on
December 28, 1998, it was acting as counsel for Defendant Mr. Smith and as
attorney for the Defendant's estate and personal representative. This claim is
disingenuous for three reasons.
First, as explained above, the attorney-client relationship is an agency
relationship which terminated upon the death of Defendant Smith.

When the

Defendant died, the law firm which had previously represented him could not file a
suggestion of death or, for that matter, a motion to dismiss on his behalf. Stated
plainly, Defendant Smith was dead.
Second, the personal representative of Defendant Smith's estate was not
appointed until June 2, 1999. The law firm simply could not, as a matter of law,
have represented the personal representative until such person was appointed. See
Smith v. Planas. 151 F.R.D. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("before a motion to
substitute may be granted, a representative of [the deceased defendant's] estate
must be named as the proper party for substitution").
Finally, the law firm's representations to the trial court reveal that the law
firm was not representing the estate or the personal representative of the deceased
Defendant. The signature on the Suggestion of Death clearly demonstrates that it
17

was not filed by the successors of the deceased. The Suggestion of Death was
signed by S. Baird Morgan and S. Brook Millard as "Attorneys for Defendant,
Seth Albert Smith."

Additionally, the Motion to Dismiss and supporting

memorandum were submitted on behalf of "Defendant Seth Albert Smith/' by and
through his counsel of record. These filings were also signed by S. Baird Morgan
and S. Brook Millard as "Attorneys for Defendant, Seth Albert Smith." Based
upon the representations made by the law firm when it filed the Suggestion of
Death and the Motion to Dismiss, the law firm admits that it was not representing
Defendant Smith's estate. See Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.. Inc., 168 F.R.D. 313, 314
(D. Kan. 1996) (holding that 90-day period was not triggered because "Counsel
did not purport to make the suggestion of death on behalf of the decedent's heirs or
successor or as a representative of his estate").
Indeed, if the law firm had been representing the Defendant's estate at the
time it filed the Suggestion of Death on December 28, 1998, it would have been a
simple matter for the law firm to comply with Rule 25 by serving nonparties and
identifying the person who could be substituted for the deceased.3 However, the
3

See Points LB. and I.C. below. If the law firm had been representing the estate of
the deceased Defendant at the time it filed the Suggestion of Death on December 28,
1998, it appears that the dismissal for failure to substitute was error as a matter of law
because the substitution of parties had already occurred. By filing the suggestion of
death, the estate of Defendant Smith entered a general appearance. By moving the
court to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to substitute, the estate asked the
court for affirmative relief and subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the court. See
Barlow v. Crappo. 821 P.2d 465, 466-467 (Utah Ct. App.) ("by asking the court for
any affirmative relief, a defendant thereby submits himself or herself to that court's
jurisdiction"). Because the party to be substituted—the estate or personal
representative—had appeared as a party in the lawsuit, it appears that the dismissal
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law firm's arguments below reveal that the law firm was not representing the
estate of the deceased Defendant when it filed the Suggestion of Death on
December 28, 1998. First, the law firm argued that Rule 25 does not require the
suggestion of death to identify the person to be substituted as a party and that at the
time of Mr. Smith's death [December 23, 1998], his counsel was not aware of
whether

any testamentary

instrument

representative of Mr. Smith's estate.

existed

which

named

a personal

Second, the law firm argued that it was

unreasonable to require the law firm to serve the suggestion of death on ihe
representative. It argued that as counsel had no idea who the successor party
would be, it would not be reasonable to place the burden on the defendant to serve
an unknown person. The law firm also argued that it could not identify the person
to be substituted because at the time of Mr. Smith's death, decedent's counsel did
not know any details of his estate.4 The law firm's claim that it was acting as
attorney for the Defendant's estate and personal representative when it filed the
Suggestion of Death on December 28, 1998 places the law firm in an embarrassing
circumstance.5
of Plaintiff s Complaint for failure to substitute was error as a matter of law.
4

These arguments are from the law firm's Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule
59(e) Motion, dated June 28, 1999.

5

The law firm first claimed that it was representing the Defendant's estate on June 28,
1999, in its Notice of Authority of Appearance and the Affidavit of Phyllis Myers,
dated June 28,1999 (Record at 134). As noted in the previous footnote, this claim is
inconsistent with the law firm's June 28,1999 Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule
59(e) Motion, which unequivocally states that following the death of the defendant,
the law firm knew no details of the Defendant's estate and had no idea who the
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Because the law firm's ability to represent Defendant Smith terminated
upon his death and because the law firm was not representing the personal
representative of the estate of the deceased Defendant, the law firm was not a part}
nor was it representing a successor of the deceased when it notified the court of its
client's death. Therefore, the 90-day limitation period never began to run. and the
trial court's denial of Plaintiff s motion for an enlargement of time and dismissal
of Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to substitute within 90 days was error as a
matter of law.
B.

The 90-day Limitation Period Was Not Triggered Because the
Suggestion of Death Was Not Served on Nonparties as Required
by Rule 25.

It is undisputed that the Suggestion of Death filed by the law firm on
December 28, 1998 was not served upon the personal representative of the
deceased's estate, as indicated by the Certificate of Service attached to the
Suggestion of Death. Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death to be served upon
nonparties—specifically the successors or representative of the deceased's
estate—in order to trigger the 90-day limitation period.

Because Defendant

Smith's representative was not served with the Suggestion of Death filed on
December 28, 1998, the 90-day time period never began to run and the dismissal
of Plaintiff s Complaint was error.

personal representative was.
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1.

The Plain Language of Rule 25 Requires the Suggestion of
Death to Be Served upon the Personal Representative
before the 90-day Period Begins to Run.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) provides:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for
substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party, and together with the notice of
hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and
upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not
later than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record
by service of a statement of the fact of death as provided herein
for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the
deceased party.
(Bold added.)
Rule 25 explains that "death is suggested upon the record," or in other
words a suggestion of death is made, "by service of the statement of the fact of
death as provided herein for service of the motion." (Bold added.) The motion
referred to is the motion for substitution explained in the second sentence of Rule
25, which is to be served on parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not
parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of summons. Thus, Rule
25 clearly requires that the motion for substitution and the suggestion of death be
served upon parties and nonparties. The requirement of service upon nonparties
indicates that service should be made upon interested persons, most often the
personal representative or successors of the deceased party. Significantly, Rule 25
also provides that the 90-day period does not begin to run until after the suggestion
of death has been served upon parties and nonparties.
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Reading the plain language of Rule 25 as requiring service of both the
motion for substitution and the suggestion of death is consistent with the recent
holdings of the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the United States District Court
for Kansas, and the Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi, and South Dakota Supreme
Courts. Additionally, these courts have interpreted the requirement that service be
made upon "nonparties" by requiring service upon the personal representative of
the deceased's estate. As stated by the Tenth Circuit in Grandbouche v. Lovell
913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990),
the service required by Rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the
successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate, must be
service pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.
Id at 837 (bold added).
The above reasoning

is precisely

illustrated

Quackenbush. 759 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Kan. 1991).

in Fehrenbacher

v.

In Fehrenbacher, Dr.

Quackenbush died while a medical malpractice lawsuit against him was pending.
The law firm which had previously represented him filed a suggestion of death.
followed by a motion to dismiss after the plaintiff failed to substitute within 90
days. Id at 1517. The defendant's estate had not been served with the suggestion
of death. Id at 1518. The court held that "Rule 25 has not been satisfied as the
suggestion of death has not been served in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 of [the
defendant's] representatives." IcL Therefore, the court concluded that the ninetyday limitation period had not begun to run because the representatives had not
been served: "The time limit for substitution of parties "is measured from the time
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the suggestion of death has been served upon the parties to the action and other
interested parties." Id at 1519 (quoting 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moored
Federal Practice f 25.06 (2d ed. 1990)).

The court held that because the

defendant's "own estate had not been given proper notice of [the] pending action
. . . the ninety-day limitation [had] not yet started to run." Fehrenbacher. 759 F.
Supp. at 1518.
The better-reasoned view, which holds that the 90-day period does not
begin until nonparties have been served, is consistent with holdings in other courts
See Grandbouche v. LovelL 913 F.2d 835, 836-837 (10th Cir. 1990) (90-day period
did not begin to run because the personal representative of the decedent's estate
was not personally served a suggestion of death in accordance with Rule 25);
Barlow v. Ground. 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1994) (the 90-day period of Rule
25(a)(1) is not triggered "until the appropriate representative of the estate is served
a suggestion of death in the manner provided by [Rule] 4"); Fariss v. Lynchburg
Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985) (suggestion of death must be personally
served on nonparty representative of deceased, rather than on deceased's attorney);
United States v. Miller Brothers Constr. Co.. 505 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1974) (90day time limitation does not commence until proper service effectuated);
Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.. Inc.. 168 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D. Kan. 1996) (because the
suggestion of death was not served on representatives of deceased's estate, the
time for filing motion to substitute had not run); Ripple v. Wold. 572 N.W.2d 439,
443 (S.D. 1997) ("Even if the successor or representative had actual knowledge of
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[the] deaths, the ninety-day rule is not invoked absent formal suggestion of death"
served on that representative); Kissic v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.. 641 So.2d 250,
252-253 (Ala. 1994) (even if a cross-claim had been sufficient to constitute a
proper suggestion of death, "because the personal representative of [the
deceased's] estate was never served with it the limitations period would not have
begun to run"); Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc., 725 P.2d 836. 839
(N.M. App. 1985) (90-day period not triggered because new party to be substituted
was not served the suggestion of death under Rule 4; no representative had been
chosen when suggestion of death was filed).
There is an important policy reason behind the requirement in Rule 25 that
nonparties be personally served with the suggestion of death. As explained by the
Ninth Circuit:
[n]on-party successors or representatives of the deceased
party . . . may not be protected by the attorney of the deceased
party. It is entirely possible that no relationship will exist
between them, and that the successor or representative will be
represented by other counsel or no counsel at all. Because of
the nonparty's distance from the litigation, it may be that a
nonparty will be unaware of the need to act to preserve the
claim.
Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1994). By requiring nonparties to be
personally served with the suggestion of death, Rule 25 recognizes that nonparties,
specifically the successors or representative of the deceased party, may not
necessarily have the same interests as the deceased's personal attorney. The fact
that successors or representatives of the deceased may have actual knowledge of
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the death does not suffice for failure to personally serve the suggestion of death on
nonparties. As this Court has previously explained
Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of
the commencement of the action, which confers jurisdiction.... The proper
issuance and service of summons is the means of invoking the jurisdiction
of the court and of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant; these cannot
be supplanted by mere notice, by letter, telephone or any other such means.
Murdock v. Blake. 484 P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971): see also Garcia v. Garcia. 712
P.2d 288 (Utah 1986) (holding that the requirements of Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 4 relating to service of process are jurisdictional).
The law firm may contend that the cases relied upon by Donahue are not
relevant because many of the cases deal with the death of a plaintiff, rather than
the death of a defendant as in the present case. This argument fails for two
reasons. First, Rule 25 does not distinguish between the death of a plaintiff or a
defendant.

Rule 25 specifically states "If a party dies. . . "

(Bold added.)

Second, personal service of the suggestion of death upon the nonparty successors
or representatives of a deceased defendant

fulfills

an important policy

consideration. As previously explained, nonparties may not be aware of the need
to act to preserve a claim. It is reasonable to assume that the nonparty successors
or representatives of a deceased defendant's estate may need to act to preserve a
counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint for the estate. If the estate
does not act upon such claims, the estate will be bound by res judicata. The cases
relied upon by Donahue are relevant because Rule 25 requires personal service of
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the suggestion of death on nonparties in order to trigger the 90-day time period
regardless of whether a defendant or plaintiff has died.
In the present case, a plain reading of Rule 25 requires that nonparties be
served with the suggestion of death before the 90-day limitation period begins.
The better-reasoned view, which is consistent with numerous other courts, require^
that the suggestion of death be personally served upon the personal representative
or successor of the decedent's estate in order to trigger the running of the 90-day
time period. It is undisputed that the law firm's Suggestion of Death was onlyserved upon Donahue, as indicated by the Certificate of Service attached to the
Suggestion of Death. Because Defendant Smith's representative was not served
with the suggestion of death, the 90-day time period never started. Therefore, the
trial court erred as a matter in of law in denying Plaintiffs motion for an
enlargement of time and in dismissing Donahue's Complaint for failure to timely
substitute within 90 days.
2.

Plaintiff Has Standing to Challenge the Lack of Service
upon the Personal Representative as Required by Rule 25.

The trial court found below that Donahue lacks standing to complain about
lack of service upon the estate. A brief review of the requirements for standing set
forth by this Court in Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d
796 (Utah 1986) demonstrates that the trial court's finding is erroneous because
Donahue satisfies all three criteria for standing to challenge the lack of service
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upon the estate. This Court held in Terracor that a plaintiff has standing if he can
establish any one of three criteria.
First, the "plaintiff must show that he has suffered some distinct and
palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal
dispute." W., 716 P.2d at 799 (quoting, Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148
(Utah 1983)). Donahue satisfies the first criterion because the erroneous dismissal
with prejudice of his Complaint bars any possible recourse. Donahue certainly has
a personal stake in whether the service required by Rule 25 has been effectuated
and whether the 90-day time period under Rule 25 has been triggered.
Second, a plaintiff may have standing if "no one else has a greater interest
in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue." Terracor. 719 P.2d at 799
(quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah
1985)). Donahue satisfies this criterion as well. The estate is not a party to the
action.6 Consequently, Donahue has the greatest interest in the failure to serve the
suggestion of death upon the estate because Donahue has the greatest interest in
whether Rule 25 was complied with and whether the 90-day time period under
Rule 25 has began to run. Further, the issue of failure to serve the estate is
unlikely to be raised at all unless Plaintiff has standing.

6

If the estate is a party, then the dismissal for failure to substitute was certainly in
error because the need for substitution became moot the moment the estate entered
an appearance as a party.
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Finally, "a plaintiff may . . . have standing if the issues are unique and of
such public importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public
interest." Terracor. 719 P.2d at 799 (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150). Donahue
satisfies this criterion because the service required under Rule 25 is a matter of
first impression before the Court. In order to set precedent for future cases, a
decision in this area of the law ought to be decided in furtherance of the public
interest.
Because Donahue satisfies not only one, but all three criteria set forth for
standing in Terracon he has standing to complain about the lack of service upon
Defendant Smith's estate.
C.

The 90-day Limitation Period Was Not Triggered Because the
Suggestion of Death Did Not Identify Who May Be Substituted
as a Party.

Numerous federal and state courts have also held that a suggestion of
death must identify who may be substituted as a party in order to trigger the 90day period in which to move for substitution. These holdings are based on the
requirement in Rule 25 that a suggestion of death be served upon nonparties and
on a public policy desire to eliminate tactical maneuvering.

1.

Rule 25 Implicitly Requires the Suggestion ol Death to
Name the Person to Be Substituted,

Because Rule 25 requires the suggestion of death to be personally served
upon nonparties, it is reasonable to infer that Rule 25 also requires the suggestion
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of death to identify who may be substituted. This reasoning was explained b\ the
United States District Court in Fehrenbacher:
In reality, Rule 25 implicitly imposes such a requirement. B\
requiring service of the suggestion of death on parties and non-parties, the
rule implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the
party making the suggestion of death.
759 F. Supp. at 1519; see also McSurelv v. McClellan. 753 F.2d 88, 98 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Barto v. Weishaar. 692 P.2d 498, 499 (Nev. 1985) ("Because the
suggestion of death in the present case was neither filed by nor identified a
successor or representative of the deceased, we hold that the ninety-day limitation
in NRCP 25(a)(1) was never triggered"); Rende v. Kav. 415 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) ("No injustice results from the requirement that a suggestion of death
identify the representative or successor of an estate who may be substituted a^ a
party for the deceased before Rule 25(a)(1) may be invoked by those who
represent or inherit from the deceased. If the heirs or counsel fear that delay may
prejudice the litigation they may move promptly for appointment of a
representative, perhaps a temporary representative. . ."); Wick v. Waterman. 421
N.W.2d 872, 873 (Wis. App. 1988) (suggestion of death did not identify a proper
person to substitute and was insufficient to trigger the 90-day period; placing the
burden on the plaintiff to locate the representative of the estate within 90 days led
to the "absurd result of [plaintiff] having appointed himself as the representative of
the estate of the very person he had sued"').
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The law firm contends that Rule 25 does not implicitly require the
suggestion of death to identify the proper party to be substituted because Utah has
not adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Form 30. On this model form, the
suggestion of death identifies the party to be substituted. It is true that some cases
include discussion of Form 30. However, the law firm's emphasis on Form 30 is
misplaced. The implicit requirement that the suggestion of death identify the party
to substitute is not found in Form 30; rather the implicit requirement arises from
the mandate in Rule 25 that nonparties be personally served with the suggestion o(
death. This is the conclusion of the United States District Court in Fehrenbacher.
759 F. Supp. at 1519.
2.

Public Policy Requires a Suggestion of Death to Identify
the Person to Be Substituted in Order to Trigger the 90day Limitation Period.

In Rende, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals expressed
concern that failure to identify a party who could be substituted for the decedent
"would open the door to a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden
of locating the representative of the estate within 90 days." Rende, 415 F.2d at
986. See also, Wick. 421 N.W.2d at 872; BartQ, 692 P.2d at 499.
Such a tactical maneuver is precisely what happened in the case at hand.
The law firm filed a suggestion of death on December 28, 1998 without identifying
any individual who could be substituted on Mr. Smith's behalf. In fact, the law
firm later stated on June 28, 1999 that at the time of filing the suggestion of death,
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it did not know who the personal representative was. If the law firm's suggestion
of death had indeed triggered the 90-day limitation period, Plaintiff was presented
with an unduly heavy burden. The personal representative of Defendant Smith's
estate was not appointed until June 2, 1999. Therefore, it would would have been
impossible for Donahue to have moved to substitute the personal representative
before the running of the 90-day limitation period.
Indeed, requiring substitution of parties within 90 days of a suggestion of
death which does not identify the party to be substituted can lead to "absurd
results." In Wick, the defendant died. The suggestion of death was mailed to the
plaintiff by the defendant's former attorney, in his own name, but the suggestion
did not identify a person who could be substituted for the defendant. The plaintiff.
in order to preserve his claim, petitioned the court to be appointed personal
representative of the defendant's estate. 421 N.W.2d at 872. The Wisconsin Court
of Appeals agreed with the holding in Rende that allowing a suggestion of death
which fails to identify a proper party to substitute to trigger the 90-day time period
"'would open the door to a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden
of locating the representative of the estate within 90 days.'" id. at 873 (quoting
Rende, 415 F.2d at 986). The court explained:
Here that same burden led to the absurd result of Wick having himself
appointed as the representative of the estate of the very person he had sued,
no other person having been appointed or having sought appointment.
Id. Such result is not intended under Rule 25 and is contrary to public policy. In
order to obviate the tactical manuevers and public policy concerns, the better31

reasoned view holds that the 90-day limitation period does not begin to run if the
suggestion of death fails to identify the party to be substituted.7
Because the law firm's suggestion of death failed to identify a proper party
to be substituted, the suggestion of death did not trigger the 90-day period under
Rule 25. Therefore, the denial of Plaintiff s motion for an enlargement of time and
the dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint were error as a matter of law.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION i N DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH
TO MOVE FOR SUBSTITUTION BECAUSE THE 90-DAY PERIOD
HAD NOT EXPIRED, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT, AND BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED WHO COULD BE
SUBSTITUTED,
Plaintiff notes that a determination under Point I, that the 90-day limitation

period was not triggered by the law firm's Suggestion of Death filed on December
28, 1998, is dispositive of Point II. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has briefed Point II.

7

If a suggestion of death which fails to identify a proper person to be substituted
triggers the 90-day period under Rule 25, then the burden is placed upon the plaintiff
to appoint a personal representative of the deceased defendant's estate. In Stoddard
v. Smith (98-CV-125)(a companion to this case), Stoddard moved to appoint his
uncle, Clair Jaussi, as the representative of Defendant Smith's estate. The law firm
objected to Stoddard's suggested appointee, as Mr. Jaussi was a member of the law
firm which had previously represented Stoddard in that action. Requiring Donahue
to move for substitution when no personal representative had been appointed led to
the similar "absurd result" which occurred in Wick. 421 N.W.2d at 872.
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A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in the Denial of Plaintiffs
Motion to Enlarge Time Because the 90-dav Period Had Not
Expired.

As set forth in Point I of this brief, Plaintiffs motion to enlarge the time in
which to move for substitution was filed in a timely manner because the 90-day
period had not expired.

The Suggestion of Death filed by the law firm on

December 28, 1998, was not valid and did not trigger the running of the 90-day
period of Rule 25 because (1) the Suggestion of Death was not filed by a party or
representative of the deceased party, (2) the Suggestion of Death was not served
upon Defendant Smith's representatives pursuant to Rule 4, and (3) the Suggestion
of Death did not identify any person who could be substituted as a party.
Because the requirements of Rule 25 were not satisfied, the 90-day
limitation period had not expired, and Plaintiffs motion to enlarge time was made
before the expiration of the prescribed period. By denying Plaintiffs motion, the
trial court abused its discretion.
B.

Even Assuming that the 90-day Period Had Expired, the Trial
Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying Plaintiffs Motion to
Enlarge Time Because Plaintiff Demonstrated Excusable Neglect
in Failing to Move for Substitution within 90 days of December
28.1998.

1.

The Lower Court Erred in Denying Donahue's Rule 6
Motion.

Donahue filed a Rule 6 motion for an extension of time in which to file his
Rule 25 motion nine days after the time to do so expired. Apart from the
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appearance that defendant had lain in wait for all of these events to transpire, the
rules provide that the plaintiff should haved received an extension of time to file
the motion required under Rule 25. U.R.C.P. 6 provides that a party may request
an extension of time to make a filing after the deadline to do so has expired upon a
showing of "excusable neglect."
Here, there was excusable neglect. What is excusable neglect? In West v.
Grand County, 942 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court discussed
excusable neglect in the context of U.R.A.P. 4(e), which discussion equally applies
to U.R.C.P. 6. Once it is determined that neglect has occurred (presumably b\ the
missing of a deadline) the question becomes whether that neglect is excusable. In
addressing excusability, the court noted:
[T]he question of whether [neglect] is excusable
is an equitable one, and such a determination should
take into account all relevant circumstances
surrounding the party's neglect. !See Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. 507 U.S. 380, 395,
113 S.Ct. 1489, 1498, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)
(interpreting term "excusable neglect" in context of
late filing provision of bankruptcy law).
Both the United States Supreme Court and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
have articulated four factors relevant to a
determination of excusable neglect:
n

[i] the danger of prejudice to [the
nonmoving party], [ii] the length of the delay and its
potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the
reason for the delay, including whether it was
within the reasonable control of the movant, and
[iv] whether the movant acted in good faith."
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City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co.. 31 F.3d
1041, 1046 (10th Cir.1994) (bracket numbering added)
(quoting Pioneer. 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498),
cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1191, 115 S.Ct. 1254. 131
L.Ed.2d 135 (1995). While these factors are not
dispositive, they are helpful in determining the equities
of whether a finding of excusable neglect is warranted.
West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 340-41 (Utah 1997) (emphasis supplied).
The four West factors demonstrate that excusable neglect occurred below,
and that the plaintiff should have been granted an extension to file his motion now.
"THE

DANGER

OF

PREJUDICE

TO

[THE

NONMOVING

PARTY]."
Simply put, there was no prejudice to the defendant in granting the motion.
None.
"THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT
ON JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS."
There would have been no delay. Nine days had elapsed since the motion
deadline passed. That was simply not a delay.
"THE REASON FOR THE DELAY, INCLUDING WHETHER IT
WAS

WITHIN

THE

REASONABLE

CONTROL

OF

THE

MOVANT."
The motion was not filed earlier because of the inadvertence of counsel and
the press of other matters. This, combined with the relative obscurity of Rule 25's
requirements, accounts for why a motion was not filed earlier.
"WHETHER THE MOVANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH."
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The plaintiff clearly is acting in good faith, given the nine days that had
elapsed since the deadline passed and the one day that has passed between the time
of service (April 1, 1999) and the date of the motion.
A final overarching concern in this equitable determination, West, 942 P.2d
at 340, is the relative benefits and prejudices to each party. Defendant can only
point to an inconsequential nine-day delay that it made no attempt to cure.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, loses his entire cause of action. Denying plaintiffs
motion for extension of time would therefore be grossly disproportionate and
unfair.
2.

Defendant Suffered No Prejudice Because No Personal
Representative Had Been Appointed.

In Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah App. 1994), the Supreme Court
averred that unless a party bringing suit on the behalf of the deceased party has
"the capacity to sue on behalf of the 'real party in interest,' the suit is a nullity."
The Court further stated that "an executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee
of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's
name." Id at 880 (quoting Rule 17 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
In this case, the deceased Defendant's former attorneys acted improperly by
filing the Suggestion of Death on December 28, 1998. Because the law firm's
ability to represent Defendant Smith terminated upon his death and because the
law firm was not representing the personal representative of the estate of the
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deceased Defendant, the law firm was not a party nor was it representing a
successor of the deceased when it notified the court of its client's death.
Therefore, the law firm had no authority to move the trial court to dismiss
Plaintiffs Complaint.
Furthermore, no personal representative of Defendant Smith's estate had
been appointed within the 90 days following December 28. 1998. In fact, the
personal representative was not formally appointed until June 2. 1999. (Record at
91.)

Therefore, the deceased Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of

Plaintiff not moving for substitution, as it was impossible for Plaintiff to have
substituted the personal representative within 90 days of December 28, 1998. As a
result, the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs motion for an enlargement of time
amounts to abuse of discretion.
III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE DISMISSAL
FOR FAILURE TO FILE A RULE 25 MOTION AS A DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE, WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE
ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The lower Court's conclusion that dismissal in this matter would be with

prejudice is improper. Rule 25 clearly is a reflection of the principle that a dead
person can no longer proceed as a litigant in any action. A personal representative
is required to be substituted for the dead person in order for the action to continue.
For this reason, the personal representative is by definition a necessary party to the
action.

Consequently, any mandate issued by Rule 25 that a personal

representative be substituted is in effect a requirement that a necessary party be
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joined.

Under rule 41(b) of the Utah R. Civ.P., a dismissal for failure to join an

indispensable party is automatically without prejudice.
For these reasons, any dismissal under Rule 25 should be treated as a
dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party and that is automatically
without prejudice.

In this regard, the lower Court erred when it concluded that

failure to file an option for substitution of parties does not amount to failure to join
an indispensable party. Indeed, the very reason that this litigation cannot continue
renders the personal representative "indispensable."

Black's Law Dictionary

defines an indispensable party as "a party whose interest in the lawsuit is such that
a final decree cannot be issued without either affecting that interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience."
In this matter, the personal representative is such a party. The action cannot
proceed without him or her. Therefore, the failure to substitute (which is simply
another word for join) the personal representative for the decedent amounts to
failure to join an indispensable party.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the law firm's Suggestion of Death filed on
December 28, 1998 did not trigger the running of the 90-day limitation period.
The Suggestion of Death was not filed in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 25. The Suggestion of Death was not filed by a party or representative
of the deceased Defendant; was not served upon nonparties, specifically the
personal representative or successor of the deceased Defendant, pursuant to Rule
4; and did not identify the person who could be substituted as a party. Because the
90-day limitation period was never triggered, the trial court erred as a matter of
law in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to move for substitution within
90 days of December 28, 1998.
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to adopt the logical reasoning of
the numerous federal and state courts cited herein and hold that, in order to trigger
the 90-day time period under Rule 25, a suggestion of death must 1) be filed by a
party or representative of the deceased party, 2) be served upon the personal
representative or successor of the deceased party, and 3) identify the person who
can be substituted as a party. Therefore. Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court
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to reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint and remand this case
for further proceedings.
DATED this <J2_ day of May, 2000

CRAJ&--&L--S-NYDER anc
PHILLIP E. LOWRY,
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to the following, postage prepaid, this 3 ^

day of May, 2000.

S. Baird Morgan
Richard, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 S. Main, Seventh Floor
P.O. Box 2456
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465

ATTORNEY
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A. ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
B. NOTICE OF APPEAL
C. NOTICE OF AUTHORITY OF APPEARANCE and AFFIDAVIT OF
PHYLLIS MYERS
D. OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59(e) MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
E. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
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O. McSurelv v. McClellan. 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
P. Fehrenbacher v. Ouackenbush. 759 F.Supp. 1516 (D.Kan. 1991)
Q. Hilsabeck v.Lane Co.. Inc.. 168 F.R.D. 313 (D.Kan. 1996)
R. Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller. 757 F.Supp. 206 (W.D.N. Y. 1990)
S. Smith v. Planas. 151 F.R.D. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
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1985)
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(Utah 1986)
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Mini Spas. Inc., v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. Dept. of Employment
Sec. 733 P.2d 130 (Utah 1987)
Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952 (Utah
1984)
Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2d 878 (Utah 1976)
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S. BAIRD MORGAN (A2314)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

vs.
SETH ALBERT SMITH and DAVID R.
STODDARD,
Defendant.

Civil No. 98CV102
Judge: J. Philip Eves

A hearing on Defendant' s Motion to Dismiss came before the Honorable J. Philip Eves
on May 12, 1999. A hearing on Plaintiffs Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider, or Alternatively, Rule
59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Error of Law and Plaintiffs Joinder in Stoddard's
Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend the Findings and Conclusions came before the Honorable J. Philip Eves

J. Philip Eves on September 22,1999. Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Phyllis Meyers, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant also came before the Court on
September 22, 1999. The Court also heard arguments in the companion case of David Stoddard v.
Seth Albert Smith, Civil No. 980500125. The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, having
reviewed the pleadings on file and being otherwise duly informed, now rules as follows:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted based on Plaintiffs failure to

comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court prepared a Memorandum Decision which
provides the relevant facts, legal arguments, and analysis underlying the Court's decision. A copy
of the Court's Memorandum Decision from the May 12, 1999 hearing is attached hereto as
Exhibit " 1 " and expressly incorporated herein by this reference.
2.

Plaintiff s Motion pursuant to Rule 54(6) and/or Rule 5 9(e) to Alter or Amend

the Findings and Conclusions is denied. The Court issued a ruling which identifies the facts,
analysis and legal arguments underlying the Court's decision. A copy of the Court's ruling from the
September 22, 1999 hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
3.

Plaintiff s Motion to Substitute Phyllis Meyers as Personal Representative of

the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant is denied. The facts and legal arguments relied upon
in reaching this decision are incorporated in the Court's ruling. (See Exhibit "2").
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Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND
ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Seth Albert Smith be and is hereby
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this

t> -

day of^ctober, Igjfe.
BY THE COURT:

J. PHILIP EVES
Jistrict Court Judge

AS TO FORM:

CRAIG M) SNYDER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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"^ft

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was maiJed,
first-class, postage prepaid, on this / ^ f W a y of December, 1999 to the following:
Craig M. Snyder
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
P.O. Box 1248
120 East 300 North
Provo, UT 84603
Attorneys for Plaintiff

14041-0016
273548

4

r\

JUA/Q
JfeHft®.

4 7539 *. F

A*S5S!gp /

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
V.

SETH ALBERT SMITH and DAVID R.
STODDARD,
Defendants.

Civ. No. 980500102
Judge J. Philip Eves

This case comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss, filed Apr. 1, 1999, on behalf
of Defendant Seth Albert Smith who is deceased. On April 5,1999, Plaintiff Brian Keith
Donahue responded by filing a Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time, along with a Memorandum
Opposing Defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for
Extension of Time. Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and in
Opposition of [sic] Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time was subsequently filed on Apr. 14,
1999. Finally, a Reply Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of
Time was filed on Apr. 22, 1999. A hearing regarding the two motions occurred May 12, 1999.
Having reviewed the parties memoranda, having heard oral argument, and having
reviewed relevant law, the Court now rules as follows:

BACKGROUND
This dispute arises from the death of 88 year-old Defendant Seth Smith on Dec. 23, 1998.
Subsequent to Mr. Smith's death, the counsel of record for the decedent filed a Suggestion of
Death with the Court and mailed a copy to opposing counsel on Dec. 28, 1998, in accordance
with Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). Ninety four days later, on Apr. 1, 1999, counsel for Defendant
filed the present Motion to Dismiss, based on Plaintiffs failure to file a substitution of parties
within the 90 day time frame contained in Rule 25(a)(1).
ANALYSIS
In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) provides as follows:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties The motion for substitution may be made by any party
or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party
Unless the motion
for substitution is made not later than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the
record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein fcr the
service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party

The Rule raises at least three issues relevant to the Court's determination in this case.
Those issues are: (1) Does the "shall" language contained in Rule 25 prevent the Court from
considering Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time; (2) If not, has Plaintiff sufficiently
demonstrated excusable neglect to justify such an extension; and (3) if the Court does order
dismissal, is it "with" or "without" prejudice?
The Court now considers each issue in turn.
1 Rule 25
Utah R. Civ. P. 25 is based upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 25, and contains language which is
"substantially similar" to the Federal Rule. ( See Utah R. Civ. P. 25 compiler's note.) Therefore
analysis of the advisory committee's note to the Federal Rule is relevant to and helpful in the
Court's initial determination in this matter. The Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note
[citations omitted] provides as follows:
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The amended rule establishes a time limit for the motion to substitute based not
upon the time of the death, but rather upon the time information of the death is provided
by means of a suggestion of death upon the record, i.e. service of a statement of the
fact of death. The Motion may not be made later than 90 days after the service of the
statement unless the period is extended pursuant to Rule 6(b), as amended.

The advisory committee's note [citations omitted] continues:
. . . The only limitation of time provided for in amended Rule 25 is the 90-day period
following a suggestion upon the record of the death of a party within which to make a
motion to substitute the proper parties for the deceased party. It is intended that the
court shall have discretion to enlarge that period. (Emphasis added)

The Utah Supreme Court has applied this Federal standard to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
in the decision of Connelly v. Rathien, 547 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1976). In addressing the issue of
dismissal under Rule 25, the Court said:
"Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that for good
cause shown, the court may order an enlargement of time for any act which is by
the rules required to be performed within a specified time."
The Supreme Court then denied relief on appeal because "[t]he plaintiff never asked the court for
any enlargement of the 90 days in which to move for a substitution of parties," as well as on the
basis that the motion for substitution had not been brought within the required 90 days. (Id. at
1337-1338.)
In the present case, the Plaintiff failed to bring a motion for the substitution of parties
within the 90 day period required by Rule 25. In addition there was no motion to enlarge the
time for making the substitution of parties within the 90 day period. However, the court now
holds that the "shall" language contained in Rule 25 does not automatically prevent this Court
from considering Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of time. Consequently, the Court now
considers Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion.
2 Rule 6
In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) provides as follows:

When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court an
act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause
shown may at any time in its discretion . . . permit the act to be done where the failure to
act was the result of excusable neglect....

The Court is aware of no Utah case law which specifically addresses excusable neglect under
Rule 6(b)(2). However, the standard applied by Federal courts in addressing excusable neglect
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) is similar to the standard used by Utah Courts in addressing
excusable neglect under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). [ See Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation v.
Bank of America. 493 F.2d 1288, 1290-1291 (10th Cir. 1974Vciting 4 Wright & Miller Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1165 (1969)(weighing factors of good faith, prejudice and
reasonableness of excuse in determining excusable neglect under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2));
compare West v. Grand County. 942 P.2d 337, 340-341 (Utah 1997)(weighing factors of good
faith, prejudice, reason for the delay, and length of the delay in determining excusable neglect
under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)] Therefore, this Court will apply the standard of excusable neglect
used by the Utah Supreme Court in making determinations under Rule 60(b), and weigh the
factors of (A) good faith, (B) prejudice, (C) reason for delay, and (D) length of delay.
A. Good Faith
Plaintiff argues that he in asking for an extension of the time to file a substitution of
parties, he is "clearly is acting in good faith, given the nine days that have elapsed since the
deadline passed and the one day that has passed between the time of service (April 1, 1999) and
the date of [his] motion [for extension of time]." See Memorandum Opposing Defendant
Smith's Motion to Dismiss, and Supporting Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time, p. 4
[herinafter Plaintiffs Memo in Opposition].
In response, counsel for Defendant Smith asserts that Plaintiffs argument might "have
merit where a five or ten day filing deadline is at issue, [but the argument] is not adequate where
plaintiff had ninety days in which to respond to the Suggestion of Death with his motion." See
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Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to dismiss and in Opposition of [sic] Plaintiffs
Motion for Extension of Time, p. 2 [hereinafter Plaintiffs Reply Memo].
The Court agrees with the position expressed by counsel for Defendant Smith. The issue
at hand is not how promptly Plaintiff filed his Motion for Extension of Time after receiving
notice of Defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss. Rather, the issue at hand relates to Plaintiffs
good faith in waiting 99 days to take action on the Suggestion of Death, which was provided to
Plaintiff in December of last year. Plaintiff has offered no satisfactory explanation as to why
there was no filing of a substitution of parties, or at least a request to extend the time for filing
such a substitution, within the 90 day period. The Court cannot conclude that the delay in filing
the statutorily required motion for substitution of parties was made in good faith in the absence
of such explanation. It rather appears that plaintiff simply put this case on the back burner
because there were more pressing matters pending and chose to let the 90 day period lapse.
B. Prejudice
In addressing "the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party," ( See West, supra)
Plaintiff argues that "[s]imply put, there is no prejudice to the defendant in granting this motion."
( See Defendant's Memo in Opposition, p. 3.) Plaintiffs argument continues, "Defendant can
only point to an inconsequential nine-day delay that it made no attempt to cure. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, loses his entire cause of action. Denying plaintiffs motion for extension of time
would therefore be grossly disproportionate and unfair." (Id. at 4.)
Counsel for Defendant has not argued the issue of prejudice. And, given the fact that
Defendant has passed away, the Court is hard put to envision any prejudice which the defendant
himself would suffer if the extension of the 90 day time limit for substitution of parties was
granted. The only prejudice which the Court can envision relates to the potential delay which
further litigation may cause in the probate of Decedent's estate and the delay of this case while
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the 99 days has run since the Suggestion of Death was filed. It seems plain to the Court that the
purpose of the 90 day requirement in Rule 25 is to avoid such delay in the probate process, as
well as the proceedings in the pending civil case. However, given the apparent intent of the
Federal advisory committee in making allowance for the extension of the 90 day deadline in
some circumstances, as discussed above, the Court cannot rely upon any such speculative
prejudice to decedent's heirs. The defendant has failed to demonstrate that he would be
particularly prejudiced in this case by the granting of the Motion to extend the time for filing the
substitution of parties.
C Reason for Delay
Plaintiffs only justification for the delay is based on his assertion that "[t]he motion was
not filed earlier because of the inadvertence of counsel and the press of other matters." ( See
Plaintiffs Support Memo, p. 3.)
In response, Counsel for Defendant argues that Plaintiffs "plea[]s [of] inadvertence of
counsel, [and] the press of other matters . . . fail to demonstrate a reasonable basis for not
complying with the specified period . . . . " ( See Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 3.)
M

[F]ault in the delay is a very important factor—perhaps the most important single factor

in determining whether neglect is excusable[, and ijgnorance or carelessness of an attorney is
generally not cognizable" as an excuse. [ See Hilterman v. Furlong, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
22159 at *6-7 (10th Cir. Sep. 11, 1998)]. Consequently, the Court concludes that in the absence
of any statement of reason for the delay, other than the busy schedule of Counsel, the court must
conclude that there is no justification for the tardy motion requesting an extension of time in this
case.
D. Length of Delay
In this case the plaintiff failed to file a substitution of parties within the 90 day period
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contemplated by Rule 25. The plaintiff likewise failed to seek an extension of the time for such a
filing until the defendant had already filed a motion to dismiss the suit against the deceased
party. While it is true that the delay was brief, about 9 days, the delay was not insignificant, in
view of the fact that the plaintiff had 90 days to address the issue and did nothing.
Plaintiff has failed to offer a satisfactory explanation regarding the reason for its delay,
and if Rule 25 is to have any meaning, the Court cannot just disregard its provisions at will. In
the absence of a satisfactory reason for the delay, the court declines to consider even the most
brief delay by Plaintiff to be insubstantial or insignificant. Consequently, the Court finds that the
99 days which Plaintiff waited to act must be weighed against him in deciding the pending
issues.
E. Weighing the Results
In weighing the results of the four-pronged test applied above, the Court finds that
although there has been no showing of prejudice to the non-moving party, the length of the delay,
the absence of a showing of good faith, and most importantly the lack of a satisfactory reason for
the delay all combine to require the Court to rule in favor of Defendant Seth Smith, and against
Plaintiff Brian Keith Donahue on the pending Motions. Accordingly, the Motion seeking an
extension of time must be denied and the Motion seeking dismissal against the deceased party
must be granted.
3. Dismissal "with" or "without"prejudice
The final issue to be determined is whether the action against Defendant Smith should be
dismissed with or without prejudice. In pertinent part, Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides as follows:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. . .
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
7

The term "dismissal with prejudice" operates as an adjudication on the merits. It is a term which
by definition means that there has been such "an adjudication on the merits, and [that] a final
disposition [has been entered], barring the right to bring or maintain an action on the same claim
or cause. It is res judicata as to every matter litigated." See Black's Law Dictionary 325 (abr. 6th
ed. 1991). By contrast, the term "dismissal without prejudice" is generally used in association
with an adjudication which was not on the merits. "The effect of the words 'without prejudice' is
to prevent the decree of dismissal from operating as a bar to a subsequent suit." Id.
In the present case, there is no indication that anything other than an adjudication on the
merits is appropriate in this case. The Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendant Smith is not
based upon any "lack of jurisdiction," "improper venue," or "lack of an indispensable party."
[See Rule 41(b).] Rather, the Motion to Dismiss is based upon the "failure of the plaintiff to . . .
comply with the[] rules [of civil procedure]." (]d.) Specifically, the Motion to Dismiss is based
upon Plaintiffs failure "to file a motion for substitution of parties within the required time
frame" under Rule 25. ( See Defendant's Support Memo, p. 2.) Consequently, the Court finds
that the dismissal should be with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiffs Rule 6 Motion for Extension of Time is hereby
denied. Furthermore, deceased Defendant Seth Albert Smith's Motion to Dismiss is hereby
granted. The claims of the plaintiff against the deceased defendant are dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law cited above.

ORDER
Counsel for Defendant Smith is directed to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an
order dismissing the claim against Defendant Smith with prejudice, and submit it to opposing
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counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated this / -

day of Uey, 1999.

/fa..*. 'T..
J&AJ-&—

J.fflILIPEVES/7
STRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY
I certify that on this _j

day of May, 1999 I provided true and correct copies of the

foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION to each of the attorneys named below by placing a
copy in the United States Mail first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:

Craig M. Snyder
PO Box 1248
Provo UT 84603
Baird S. Morgan
PO Box 2465
SLC UT84110

'^>?^

n^w>t,

—

DEPUTY CLERK OF THE COURT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 980500102

SETH ALBERT SMITH,
Defendant.

Judge J. Philip Eves

_____________________________________________________________

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs "Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider, or
Alternatively, Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for Error of Law," filed with a
supporting memorandum on July 9, 1999. The motion was filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with a
"Joinder in Stoddard's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions," filed on
June 16, 1999. An "Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule 59(e) Motion" was filed by Defendant on
June 30, 1999. A hearing on the two motions occurred September 22, 1999. The plaintiff was
represented by Phillip Lowry, attorney of record. The defendant Smith was represented by S. Baird
Morgan, attorney of record. The defendant Stoddard was represented by Brent Young, attorney of
record.
Also before the Court is a "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant," filed by Plaintiff with a supporting memorandum on
July 9, 1999. An "Objection to Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Seth Albert Smith" was filed by Defendant on July 26,1999. A hearing on the matter also
occurred on September 22,1999.

This case was argued in conjunction with the companion case of Stoddard v. Smith, case
number 980500125. The issues raised by the parties in this case are the same as those raised in the
Stoddard case. Likewise, the facts are identical. However, in this case the court has not yet signed an
Order dismissing the case with prejudice because an Objection was filed by the Plaintiff to the
proposed Order prepared by Defendant's counsel. Likewise, no appeal has yet been filed in this case.
Having reviewed the parties Memoranda, exhibits and affidavits, having reviewed relevant
law, and having heard oral argument, the Court now rules in this case in the same fashion as it ruled
in the Stoddard case. The court incorporates, by this reference, the Stoddard ruling in this Ruling.
The Stoddard ruling will be attached hereto.

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERS
The Plaintiffs Motion under Rule 54 for reconsideration of the court's previous
Memorandum Decision is hereby denied. The Plaintiffs Motion to substitute Ms. Meyers as the
party defendant is this case is likewise denied. The Objection of the Plaintiff to the proposed Order
based on the court's Memorandum Decision is granted. Counsel for the Defendant is to submit to
this court for signature a revised Order of Dismissal, in keeping with the court's previous
Memorandum Decision and Rulings in this and the Stoddard cases. That Order of Dismissal is to
incorporate by reference and have attached the previous Memorandum Decision in this case, the
Ruling in the Stoddard case and this Ruling, which documents contain the reasoning of this court in
making its decision.
DATED this 12th day of October 1999.

Court Judge

-2-

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of October 1999,1 mailed true and correct copies of the
above and foregoing document,first-classpostage prepaid, to the following:
Brent D. Young, Esq.
IVIE & YOUNG
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, UT 84604
S. Baird Morgan, Esq.
Krista A. Weber, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, 7th Floor
P.O. Box 2456
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
Craig M. Snyder, Esq.
Phillip E. Lowry, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603

Deputy Court Clerk

-3-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID R. STODDARD,

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 980500125 PI

SETH ALBERT SMITH,
Defendant.

Judge J. Philip Eves

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs "Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or
Amend the Findings and Conclusions," filed with a supporting memorandum on June 7, 1999.
Defendant's "Objection to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and
Conclusions" was filed on June 21, 1999, and a "Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions" was filed by Plaintiff on July
6, 1999. A hearing on the motion occurred September 22, 1999. The Plaintiff was represented
by Brent D. Young, attorney of record. The Defendant was represented by S. Baird Morgan,
attorney of record.
Also before the Court is a "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant," filed with a supporting
memorandum on July 6,1999. An "Objection to Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith" was filed by Defendant on July 26, 1999. A
hearing on the matter also occurred on September 22, 1999.
This case is a companion case to Donahue v. Smith and Stoddard, case number
980500102. This issues presented in the two cases are identical. The facts are nearly identical in

all respects relevant to the issues presented by the pending Motions. Therefore, it is the intent of
the court that this Ruling apply to both the Stoddard and Donahue cases.
Having reviewed the parties Memoranda, exhibits and affidavits, having reviewed
relevant law, and having heard oral argument, the Court now rules as follows:

BACKGROUND
The present dispute is rooted in the Court's Aug. 4, 1999, memorandum decision and
subsequent order dismissing Plaintiffs personal injury claim against defendant Seth Albert
Smith, after Defendant's death on Dec. 23, 1999. The dismissal was based upon Plaintiffs
failure to file a motion for substitution of parties within 90 days after the filing on the record in
this case of a Suggestion of Death under Utah R. Civ. P. 25, and the Court's finding that an
extension of the 90 day deadline for filing a Motion To Substitute was unjustified under Utah R.
Civ. P. 6(b)(2) based on Plaintiffs failure to show the Court that the failure to comply with Rule
25 was based on "excusable neglect." See Court's previous Memorandum Opinion, pp. 1-2.
S. Baird Morgan, Counsel for Defendant, filed the Suggestion of Death on Dec. 28,
1999, after being informed of Defendant's death by Defendant's daughter, Phyllis Myers. "At
the time of [Defendant's passing, [Ms. Meyers and her brothers] knew and consented to Mr.
Morgan notifying the Court and parties of his death. [Ms. Myers and her brothers] understood
and agreed that Mr. Morgan would continue to represent the interest of [Defendant]'s estate and
[Ms. Myers] as Personal Representative

" See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers, pp. 1-2.

A copy of the Suggestion of Death was mailed to Plaintiff Stoddard. The Suggestion of
Death was not served upon Ms. Meyers, the personal representative of Defendant's estate. See
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Memorandum in Support of Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and
Conclusions, pp. 6-9 [hereinafter Amendment Support Memo].

ANALYSIS
The Court will first address Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. The Court will then discuss
Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute. However, the Court will not revisit the issue of excusable
neglect within this Ruling. A full analysis has already been provided by the Court in its former
Opinion in this case, including a review of relevant Utah law and a finding that there is an
insufficient basis under Rule 6(b)(2) for extension of the 90 day deadline for substitution of
parties set out in Rule 25.

1. Motion to Amend
Plaintiff argues that the dismissal of his case against Defendant should be reversed under
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) based on a mistake of law made by the Court—the mistake being that
because "[a] formal, valid Suggestion of Death has not been made on the record, therefore the
ninety-day limitations period has not yet begun to run." .See Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions, pp. 3-7 [hereinafter
Amendment Reply Memo]. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Suggestion of Death filed by
counsel for Defendant (1) "is not valid because the law firm did not, and in fact could not,
represent Defendant when the Suggestion was filed because Defendant had died;" (2) that "[t]he
Suggestion of Death filed by the law firm is not valid because it was not served on Defendant's
representatives;" and (3) that "Rule 25 implicitly requires that the suggestion of death identify
who may be substituted as a party." Id. See also Amendment Support Memo, p. 9.
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In response, Defendant argues that "[t]o prohibit an attorney from alerting the court and
counsel regarding the death of his client is not sound public policy. The more persuasive
reasoning is that an attorney who represents a client who dies, has a duty to notify the Court and
other parties in the action that his client has died." See Objection to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e)
Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions, pp. 4-5 [hereinafter Defendant's
Objection to Amendment]. Defendant also argues that "Rule 25 does not state that a Suggestion
of Death must identify a person to be substituted as a party," and the absence of Federal Form 30
(which contains such a requirement) from the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further indicates an
intent on the part of the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the Personal
Representative need not be named in the Suggestion of Death. Id. at 7. Finally, Defendant also
argues that "nothing in Rule 25 suggests that the suggestion of death must be served upon the
Decedent's Representatives," and that "[wjhether the defendant's successor is served with formal
notice does not effect the plaintiffs claim." Id. at 6-8.

A. Defendant's Death
Plaintiff first argues that the Suggestion of Death filed by the counsel for the deceased
defendant is not valid because the agency relationship between the defendant and his attorney
ended with the death. In deciding the issue of whether Defendant's death severed the attorneyclient relationship between Mr. Morgan and Mr. Smith, and in the absence of any relevant Utah
authority, this Court finds that there is a split in authority in other jurisdictions. This split pits
the sagacity of the Supreme Court of Colorado against that of the United States District Court for
the District of Kansas. Though the evaluations provided by both courts are interesting, for the
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reasons stated below the Court finds the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado to be the
more well-reasoned, and more applicable to the present conflict.
In Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F.Supp. 1516 (Dist. Kan. 1991)[hereinafter
Fehrenbacher] a patient, Fehrenbacher, sued a doctor, Quackenbush, for negligent prescription of
drugs. The doctor died during the pendency of the action, however, and after the plaintiff failed
to respond to a suggestion of death as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a), counsel for the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss. The Federal court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning in part that
"[t]he attorney for the deceased party may not make the suggestion of death since he is not
himself a party to the action and, since his authority to represent the deceased terminated on the
death, he is not a representative of the deceased party of the sort contemplated by [Rule 25]." Id.
at 1518 (citations omitted).
In Farmers Ins. Gr. v. Dist. Court of Sec. J.D.. 507 P.2d 865 (Colo 1973)[hereinafter
Farmers Ins.]. despite the fact that the plaintiff in a tort action failed to move for substitution of
parties within 90 days of the service of notification of death upon the plaintiffs attorneys as
required by Colo. R. Civ. P. 25(a), the trial court refused to dismiss the action. On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the ruling, and stated, "[i]n our view, an
attorney for a deceased defendant has a duty to notify the court and the other parties in the action
that his client has died." Id. at 867.
In analysis of the two rulings, this Court reviews Model Rule of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.3 cmt. [3], which provides as follows:
Unless the [attorney-client] relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16
[addressing whether an attorney must terminate representation because of crime or
fraud], a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If
a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when
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the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period
in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to
serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal.

It is apparent to the Court that the Rules of Professional Responsibility contemplate that
an attorney will finish the work which he has started, and terminate the relationship only "when
the matter has been resolved." Id. Although there are obvious practical limitations to an
attorney's ability to represent a deceased client, it seems to the Court that Rule 1.3 cmt. [3] at
least would allow an attorney to notify the adverse party of the death of his client. Again, as
counsel for Defendant persuasively articulates, "[t]o prohibit an attorney from alerting the court
and counsel regarding the death of his client is not sound public policy. The more persuasive
reasoning is that an attorney who represents a client who dies, has a duty to notify the Court and
other parties in the action that his client has died." See Defendant's Objection to Amendment,
pp. 4-5. Consequently, in keeping with such public policy, and also in keeping with the rules of
professional responsibility, the Court cannot find the Suggestion of Death to be invalid upon the
basis that the attorney for the dead party cannot file a valid Suggestion of Death under Rule 25.
The plaintiffs Motion is denied on that ground.
There is an additional reason for denying the Motion of the Plaintiff on the point that the
lawyer for the deceased Defendant cannot properly file a Suggestion of Death. At the time the
Suggestion of Death was filed in this case, S. Baird Morgan was acting both as attorney for the
Defendant and as attorney for the Defendant's estate and personal representative. Clearly he had
actual authority to file the Suggestion of Death, independent of any agency relationship with the
deceased party.

6

B. Identification of the Personal Representative
The plaintiff next argues that the Suggestion of Death filed by Mr. Morgan is invalid
because it does not identify the personal representative of the deceased party's estate. In analysis
of this second issue, the Court again contrasts the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Colorado
against that of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. In Rehrenbacher,
supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519, the Federal Kansas court noted that "Rule 25 does not explicitly
require the party making the suggestion of death to identify the decedent's representative." The
Court further reasoned, however, that "[i]n reality, Rule 25 implicitly imposes such a
requirement. By requiring service of the suggestion of death on parties and non-parties, the rule
implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the party making the
suggestion of death." Id.
In contrast to this view, in Farmer's Ins., supra, 507 P.2d at 867, the Colorado court
stated:
. . . we see nothing in our rules which could reasonably be a basis for requiring that
notification of death of a defendant should include the identity of the deceased
defendant's executor, administrator, or representative. It seems quite basic and
reasonable that a plaintiffs attorney who receives notification of the defendant's death
has the responsibility to promptly initiate the necessary inquiries to determine the
identity of a person to be substituted for the deceased defendant, and to file a motion for
substitution in accordance with our rules of Civil Procedure.

In analysis of the two arguments, this Court finds the reasoningjjfjhe Colorado Court to
be more in keeping with the Utah Rules of Civil ^Procedure and sound practice. After a careful
review of Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a), the Court is unable to find that the Utah Rule in any way
explicitly or "implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the party
making the suggestion of death." See Rehrenbacher, supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519. Rather, the
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Rule simply requires that there be a Suggestion of Death upon the record. This court is of the
opinion that it is more reasonable that the responsibility of determining the identity of the person
to be substituted should rest with the Plaintiffs attorney, who possesses the greater incentive to
preserve the claim, and who is already required under Rule 25(a) to file the motion for
substitution. Once someone becomes aware that the defendant has died, that person may not
know if there is, or will ever be, a personal representative. If a probate case is to be commenced
to identify a representative for the deceased party's estate, it seems reasonable to this court that
the responsibility for pursuing that action should rest with the party pursuing the claim. It would
be poor logic to require that no one can suggest that a party has died without first launching a
probate case to have the personal representative appointed. Rule 25 does not contain any such
requirement. Consequently, the Plaintiff's Motion is denied upon this ground.

C. Service upon the Personal Representative
Plaintiff next argues that the Suggestion of Death was invalid under Rule 25 because it
was not served upon the personal representative of the deceased party's estate. In Fehrenbacher,
supra, 759 F.Supp. at 1519, the Federal court found that the defendant's "own estate ha[d] not
been given proper notice of th[e] pending action, and in th[e] court's opinion the ninety day
limitation ha[d] not yet started to run." This reasoning was echoed by the Federal 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals In Grandbouche v. LovelL 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990), which found that
"because the personal representative of [the deceased plaintiff]'s estate did not receive service of
any purported suggestion of death [from the defendant], the ninety-day limitations period did not
begin to run." Id. at 837. Similar reasoning has also been espoused by the Federal 9th Circuit
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Court of Appeals in Barlow v. Ground. 39 F.3d 231,233-234 (9th Cir. 1994 (requiring personal
service upon the decedent's estate, rather than service by mail).
This Court understands and appreciates the requirements imposed by Federal courts
regarding service of the Suggestion of Death upon the personal representative of the Estate. This
Court is also aware that there is no Utah case law specifically addressing the issue. It does not
appear that the Utah courts have adopted any analogous requirement of service. Likewise, the
language of Utah R. Civ. P. 25 does not contain any such requirement. Rather, the Rule provides
that the death is to be suggested on the record and thereafter the surviving party is to file a
Motion to Substitute and notice of hearing which "shall be served on the parties as provided in
rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of
summons". See Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a). The purpose of such a requirement is quite clear: a
personal representative ought to receive notice of a potential claim against the decedent's estate,
or of a potential cause of action which she might be able to pursue on the decedent's behalf.
Without such notice, a personal representative would be unable to effectively perform her
responsibilities. However, under Utah's Rule, that notice comes to the personal representative
in the form of a Motion to Substitute and not a copy of the Suggestion of Death served under
Rule 4.
In addition, in the case before the court, the fact is that counsel for Defendant, Mr.
Morgan, himself obtained notice of his client's death from Phyllis Myers, Defendant's daughter
and personal representative of Defendant's estate. The fact is also that when Mr. Morgan filed
the Suggestion of Death, he was acting both as the lawyer for the deceased party and the lawyer
for the estate of that party. See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers, pp. 1-2. The personal representative
9

of the estate, Ms. Myers, and her brothers "understood and agreed that Mr. Morgan would
continue to represent the interest of [Defendant's estate and [Ms. Myers] as Personal
Representative . . . . " Id. Under these circumstances, where the personal representative already
had notice of Defendants death as well as the cause of action against him, imposing a
requirement that the personal representative be served with the Suggestion of Death when that
Suggestion came from her, would seem nonsensical. To comply with the Federal Courts'
interpretation of Rule 25 in these unique circumstances would effectively have led to the service
of notice upon the person who herself gave council for Defendant original notice. It also would
have meant providing personal service by an attorney upon his own client. Absent any
controlling Utah case authority, this Court is unwilling to impose such unreasonable constraints
upon what ought to be a simple filing of a Suggestion of Death upon the record..
Consequently, the court finds that because the personal representative of Defendant's
estate had already received real notice of Defendant's death, and had also hired counsel for
Defendant as the attorney for the Estate, the failure of that Counsel to serve the personal
representative with the Suggestion of Death did not here render the ^Suggestion of Death invalid.
There is another concern with the position taken by counsel for the plaintiff in this case.
Again there is no Utah authority on the point but the issue should be addressed in this decision.
This court does not find any language in Rule 25, nor has any case authority been cited, which
would give the Plaintiff any standing to complain about the lack of service of the Suggestion of
Death upon the personal representative. Plaintiff received appropriate service of that Suggestion.
The estate and the personal representative have not complained about the lack of service of that
Suggestion upon them. The court can find no basis for conferring standing on the Plaintiff to
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argue that the Suggestion of Death is invalid as to Plaintiff because it was not served upon the
personal representative. For that reason alone, the Plaintiffs Motion is denied as to this point.

D. Dismissal for "failure to join a necessary party"
Plaintiff next argues that the dismissal of this case under Rule 25 should have been
without prejudice, rather that with prejudice. At the oral argument in this matter, plaintiffs
counsel seemed to argue this issue by analogy to Rule 41, Utah Rules Civil Procedure. Though
the issue of whether Plaintiff ought to have been dismissed without prejudice under the
indispensable party prong of Rule 41(b) was not raised by the Plaintiff Stoddard in this case, the
Court will nonetheless address the issue because of the relationship between this case and the
corresponding case of Donahue v. Smith. 980500102 [heard in conjunction with the present
action for the limited purpose of addressing dismissal of both cases under Rule 25(a)].
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) directs that a dismissal should act as an "adjudication upon the
merits" unless it is for one of three reasons stated in the Rule, including "for lack of an
indispensable party". Dismissals for one of the three named exceptions are to be without
prejudice.
Relying on Black's Law Dictionary, Plaintiff Donahue contends that "the very reason that
this litigation cannot continue renders the personal representative 'indispensable.' . . . In this
matter the personal representative is such a[n indispensable] party [because t]he action cannot
proceed without him or her. Therefore, the failure to substitute (and that is simply another word
for join) the personal representative for the decedent amounts to a failure to join an indispensable
party." See Donahue v. Smith. Case No. 980500102, Memorandum Supporting Plaintiff
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Donahue's Rule 59(e) Motion, p. 2 [hereinafter Donahue Joinder Memo]. Plaintiff argues that
this dismissal should be treated like a dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party under
Rule 41(b), which would result in a dismissal without prejudice.
Responding to this argument, Defendant contends that Plaintiff confuses Utah R. Civ. P.
19 with Utah R. Civ. P. 25. "Had the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure considered
the substitution of a representative the same as the joining of an indispensable party," Defendant
declares, "they would not have created two separate rules. Furthermore, the personal
representative was not an indispensable party at the beginning of the lawsuit...." .See Donahue
v. Smith. Case No. 980500102, Objection to Plaintiffs Joinder in Rule 59(e) Motion, pp. 13-14
[hereinafter Defendant's Objection to Joinder].
In analysis of the parties arguments, the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to cite any
authority to support the assertion that a personal representative substituted as a party under Rule
25(a) should be considered the same as an indispensable party to be joined under Utah R. Civ. P.
Rule 19(a). Moreover, the Court finds no authority to support this assertion. The reason for this
lack of authority may lie in Plaintiff Donahue's erroneous assumption that the terms substitution
and joinder are synonymous in both meaning and effect, under the Rules of Civil Procedure. On
the contrary, this Court finds that the term "joinder," as outlined in Rule 19, refers to the process
of "uniting" two or more persons in a legal proceeding. See Black's Law Dictionary 581 (abr. 6th
ed. 199a). By contrast, the term "substitution" refers instead to "the replacement of one party to
an action by another party because of death . . . . " Id. at 998. There are two different Rules to
treat two different procedures.
In the present case, Ms. Myers, the personal representative, would not be "united" or
"joined" with the decedent as a second defendant. Instead, if she were to be made a party, she
12

would "replace"or "substitute" for the decedent as the defendant in this action. The drafters of
the Rules of Civil Procedure obviously appreciated the difference between joinder and
substitution. The presence of the word "join" in Rule 41(b) rather that "substitute" supports this
conclusion. It would have been an easy matter for the drafters to include "substitution of a
party" in Rule 41(b) as one of the dismissals which would be without prejudice, if that had been
their intent. Instead, a different Rule was created to treat the matter of substitution in the case of
the death of one or more parties.
Moreover, under ordinary rules of statutory construction, a statute or rule must be read
according to its plain meaning. An involuntary dismissal of an action under Rule 41(b) acts as
an adjudication upon the merits (dismissal with prejudice) unless it is a dismissal for one of three
specific reasons which are listed as exceptions to the general rule. Rule 41(b) does not list
"substitution of parties" as one of the three exceptions. The exceptions listed in the Rule are
"lack of jurisdiction," "improper venue," or "lack of an indispensable party." Consequently,
even if Rule 41 has application to this case, which this court does not find to be the case, this
dismissal would be with prejudice under the cleair provisions of that Rule, as the dismissal was
for failure to substitute a party for a deceased defendant under Rule 25, rather than for failure to
join an indispensable party under Rule 19.
As a final note, both Federal case law and case law from sister states contain examples of
Rule 25(a) claims which have been dismissed "with prejudice." See, e.g.. Frances v. Frances,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4257; See also, e.g.. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Price. 539
So.2d 202 (Ala. 1989)[hereinafter Price]. In explanation, such cases have reasoned that "[a]
dismissal for failure to substitute should do more than merely require a plaintiff to seek a new
13

place on the trial calendar; it should put an end to the litigation for all time." See Price, supra,
539 So.2d at 204. Likewise, as reflected in its prior Opinion, this Court continues to hold that if
Rule 25(a) is to have any meaningful effect, dismissal under its terms must be with prejudice.

2. Motion to Substitute
Because the Court can find no basis upon which to alter or amend its previous decision
dismissing this action, it does not reach Plaintiffs "Motion to Substitute Phyllis Myers as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Seth Albert Smith, for Defendant." That Motion is
mooted by the dismissal of the case for failure to comply with Rule 25.

CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court orders that Plaintiffs Motion Pursuant to 59(e) to
Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions be, and hereby is, denied. Likewise, plaintiffs
Motion to Substitute is denied.
Since Plaintiff has already filed an appeal in this case, and since the parties entered into a
stipulation at the oral argument that the court should enter the following order, the clerk of this
court is hereby instructed to accept the filing fee already paid as the fee for an appeal from this
decision, which will be the final decision of the court. Counsel for Defendant is ordered to
prepare and submit an Order incorporating this Ruling and the court's previous Memorandum
Decision and again ordering this case dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 12th day of October 1999.
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Our File No 24,030

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
Case No. 98-CV-102
Judge Phillip J. Eves

vs.
SETH ALBERT SMITH and DAVID R.
STODDARD,
Defendants.

Plaintiff, Brian Donahue, here appeals that final order entered in this matter on January
5, 2000. The appeal is from all adverse rulings in this case previous to and including the order
of January 5, 2000, and is against any and all defendants in this matter and their successors in
interest.

DATED this / /

day of January, 2000

PHILLIP E.^LQWRY, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this
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day of January, 2000.

Baird S. Morgan, Esq.
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main Street, #700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
Brent D. Young, Esq.
Ivie & Young
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, UT 84604
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S. BAIRD MORGAN (A2314)
KRISTA A. WEBER (A8019)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

^b

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,

NOTICE OF AUTHORITY OF
APPEARANCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
SETH ALBERT SMITH,

Civil No. 98CV102
Judge Philip Eves

Defendant.

S. Baird Morgan of and for the lawfirmof Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson and
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-33, hereby responds to Plaintiffs Motion to Demonstrate By
What Authority Counsel Appears.
S. Baird Morgan represented Mr. Smith in the above entitled matter. Counsel was
notified of Mr. Smith's passing by his heirs. At that time, there was no known representative of Mr.
Smith's estate. Mr Smith's heirs, and trustees of his trust, consented and agreed to counsel's

continued representation of the estate in this matter. Additionally, Phyllis Myers, the Personal
Representative in this matter, has also consented to counsel's representation of the estate in the
above entitled matter. (See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated
herein by reference).
DATED this ^ '£Jfr- day of June, 1999.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

S. BAIRD MORGAN
Attorneys for D^efendzjft, Seth Albert Smith
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed,
first-class, postage prepaid, on this 2% day of June, 1999 to the following:
Craig M. Snyder
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North St.
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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S. BARD MORGAN (A2314)
KRISTA A. WEBER (A8019)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &. NELSON
AttorneysforDefendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
SO South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake dry, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) S31-2000
Fax No.: (S01) 532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,
I

AFFIDAVIT OP PHYLLIS MYERS

Plaintiff;
vs.
Civil No. 98CV1Q2
Judge Philip Eves

SETH ALBERT SMITH,
Defendant.

,

STATE OF tTTAH

)

as.

COUNTY OF *&E4ri)iat, )
Phyllis Myers, beingfirstduly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

My father was the defendant in the above-entitled matter at the time of his

death in December 1998.
2,

Although I have not seen, say legal document to the effect, I understand that

the Court reomtiy appointed me Pergonal Representative of my father's estate.

3.

As Personal Representative of my father's estate, I approved and consented

to 5. Baird Morgan and the lawfirmof Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson representing the interest
of the estate in this matter.
4.

At the time ofrayfather's death, I was aware that he and my mother had

created a trust. However, I had not seen a complete copy of the Trust document, Additionally,
neither my brothers nor I knew whether my father left a will.
5.

My mother is incapacitated and is incapable of participating in any aspect of

the legal proceedings involving my father's estate.
6.

My brothers and I knew that we were co-trustees of my father and mother's

trusts. However, we did not know whether my father had also appointed a personal representative
of his estate.
7.

In December 1998,1 called Mr. Morgan and informed him of my father's

death. At the time of my father's passing, my broth*** and I knew and consented to Mr. Morgan
notifying the Court and parties of his death We understood and agreed that Mr. Morgan wouid
continue to represent the interest of my father's estate and me as Personal Representative with
respect to the two lawsuits.
DATED this 2£_

2

day of ()y^<?

,

1999.

STA2E0FUTAH

)

COUNTY OF

)

&&Ai>cA-

On the 2&-~day of ~TI^**UL^
1999, personally appeared before me,
Phyllis Myers, whose identity has been proven on tbe basis of satisfactory evidence, being first
duly sworn, acknowledges that she executed theforegoinginstrument, for the purposes stated
therein, of her own voluntary act
MICHAEL F OALTON
B60 NORTH 100 WEST
BFAVfrR UT 84713

NOTARY PUBLIC
}Jiy Commission Expires:

COMU EXP 10-10-2001

CXBTEFtCATE OF SEBVTCE
I HHRKRY CERTIFY that a trae and correct copy of theforegoinginstrument was
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this
day of June, 1999 to the following:
Craig ML Snyder
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North St
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
AttorneysforPlaintiff
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S. BAIRD MORGAN (A2314)
KRISTA A. WEBER (A8019)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
JOINDER IN RULE 59(E) MOTION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 98CV102
Judge Philip Eves

SETH ALBERT SMITH,
Defendant.

Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, S. Baird Morgan and Krista A.
Weber, of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, hereby submits the following Memorandum in
opposition to Plaintiffs Joinder in Stoddard's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings
and Conclusions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Donahuefileda lawsuit against the Defendant Mr. Smith on or about June

5, 1998, for personal injured arising out of an automobile accident. (See Court File.)

2.

The law firm of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson represented Mr. Smith in

the above entitled action at the time of his death in December 1998.
3.

Phyllis Myers, Mr. Smith's daughter, was recently appointed Personal

Representative of her father's estate. (See Affidavit of Phyllis Myers attached as Exhibit "A.")1
4.

As Personal Representative of her father's estate, Mrs. Myers approved and

consented to S. Baird Morgan and the law finn of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson representing
the interest of the estate in this matter. (Exhibit "A" at If 3).
5.

At the time of her father's death, Mrs. Myers was aware that Mr. Smith and

her mother had created a trust. However, she had not seen a complete copy of the Trust document.
Additionally, none of the Smith children knew whether their father left a will. (Exhibit "A" at ^ 4).
6.

Mrs. Smith, the decedent's spouse is incapacitated and is incapable of

participating in any aspect of the legal proceedings involving Mr. Smith's estate. (Exhibit "A" at

115).
7.

Mr. Smith's three children knew that they were co-trustees of their father and

mother's trusts. However, they did not know whether their father had also appointed a personal
representative of his estate. (Exhibit "A" at ^ 6).
8.

In December 1998, Mrs. Myers called Mr. Morgan and informed him of Mr.

Smith's death. At the time of their father's passing, the Smith children knew and consented to Mr.
Morgan notifying the Court and parties of Mr. Smith's death. They understood and agreed that Mr.

A copy of Mrs. Myers' Affidavit is attached hereto. The original affidavit will be filed with the Court
upon receipt.
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Morgan would continue to represent the interest of their father's estate and Mrs. Myers as Personal
Representative with respect to the two lawsuits. (Exhibit "A" at f 7).
9.

Counsel filed a "Suggestion of Death" on December 24, 1998. (See Court

10.

On March 26, 1999, counselfileda Motion to Dismiss for failure to comply

File.)

with Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Court File.)
11.

On June 1, 1999, this Court issued a "Memorandum Opinion" dismissing the

Plaintiffs claims in this case. (See Court File.)
12.

On or about June 14, 1999, Plaintiff filed a joinder in Rule 59(e) Motion to

Alter or Amend the Findings and Conclusions. (See Court File.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59(E) ARGUMENTS ARE NOT A BASIS TO OVERTURN THE
COURT'S RULING
A.

Plaintiff Has Not Satisfied Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff has presented the Court with the unusual situation of joining in a motion
filed by a party in a different civil suit. In any event, this plaintiffs motion fails to present a
compelling reason for the Court to reconsider it's ruling. A Rule 59(e) motion must be based on one
of the grounds set forth in Rule 59(a). Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City. 590 P.2d 309,
310-11 (Utah 1979). Rule 59(a) provides:
(a)
. . . [A] motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional
3

testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct entry of a new judgment:
(1)
Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party
was prevented from having a fair trial.
(2)
Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the
jurors have been induced to any general or specific verdict, or to a finding on
any questions submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3)
Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4)
Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at trial
(5)
Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6)
Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against the law.
(7)

Error in law.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59.
Plaintiffs memorandum does not include any suggestion as to the basis for his Rule
59 Motion. Admittedly, plaintiffs motion is not based on subsections (1), (2), (3) or (4) as a motion
pursuant to one of these sections must be supported by an affidavit. (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 59(c)). Sections (5) and (6) are not applicable considering the facts in this case. Finally,
plaintiflf does not cite any Utah case law in his memorandum which would suggest his motion was
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filed pursuant to section (7) As plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of this provision,
plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment should be denied
B

Plaintiff Improperly Attempts to Reargue the Motion to Dismiss

All of plaintiff s arguments, even if proper, could have and should have been raised
in response to defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff has not cited any Utah case law or other
persuasive authority to suggest that the Court's ruling was in error Plaintiff cannot now try to raise
new arguments from other jurisdiction and ask the Court reconsider the Motion to Dismiss under
the guise of a Rule 59 motion Consequently, plaintiffs Rule 59(e) motion should be denied
POINT H
A VALID SUGGESTION OF DEATH WAS FILED WITH THE COURT.
Plaintiffs argument that the Suggestion of Death filed with the Court is invalid is
unpersuasive, not based on controlling Utah law and could have been argued in response to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Assuming arguendo that this motion is timely and states a proper
basis under Rule 59(e) it is till not persuasive to set aside this Court's prior ruling

Plaintiffs

argument contains essentially three points none of which merit reconsideration of the Court's ruling
First, plaintiff contends that counsel for Mr Smith may not make the Suggestion of Death as
authority terminated upon a death of the client Second, plaintiff argues that Rule 25(a)(l)of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure2 was not satisfied as a Suggestion of Death was not served on Mr
Smith's successor Third, plaintiff argues that Rule 25 implies that the Suggestion of Death must

2

All references to Rule 25 in this memorandum will refer to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise noted
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identify who may be substituted as a new party Plaintiffs arguments are neither supported by Utah
case law nor persuasive Therefore, plaintiffs motion should be denied
A

Counsel for Mr Smith Appropriately Entered the Suggestion of Death

Rule 25 states in part "Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than
ninety days after the death is suggested on the record by service of a statement of the fact of death
as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased
party"

Nothing in this language suggests that a decedent's former counsel is prohibited from

entering a Suggestion of Death

Furthermore, there is no Utah case law that supports such a

proposition To prohibit an attorney from alerting the court and counsel regarding the death of his
client is not sound public policy Furthermore, at the time of Mr Smith's death, his heirs consented
to counsel's continued representation in this matter (See Exhibit "A" -Affidavit of Phyllis Myers)
The more persuasive reasoning is that an attorney who represents a client who dies, has a duty to
notify the Court and other parties in the action that his client has died (See e g Farmers Ins Group
v District Court of the Second Judicial District of Denver. 507 P 2d 865, 867 (Colo 1973), Mullis
v Bone. 238 S E 2d 748, 750 (Ga Ct App 1977), Brown v Wheeler. 437 So 2d 521 (Ala 1983)
(overruled on other grounds))
In Farmers, the defendant died during the course of litigation and the attorney who
represented him in the matter mailed notification of the death to plaintiffs attorney and to attorneys
for the co-defendants When plaintiff did not move to substitute a party within the ninety day time
limit, decedent's attorney filed a motion to dismiss

In response, plaintiff filed a Motion for

Extension of Time and Motion to Substitute Plaintiff alleged that its failure to substitute a new

6

party was due to excusable neglect on the part of counsel

Plaintiffs counsel received the

notification of the defendant's death but it was placed in the attorney's file and overlooked.
Additionally, plaintiff argued that upon the death of the defendant, the attorneys who represented
him in the personal injury matter no longer represented him for any purpose and did not have
standing to make notification of the death. Farmers. 507 P.2d at 866.
The Court held that the "failure to tact due to carelessness and negligence is not
excusable neglect" and dismissed the plaintiffs Complaint as to the deceased party. Id. at 867. The
Court also rejected plaintiffs argument that the decedent's former counsel could not file the
suggestion of death. The Court stated, "[i]n our view, an attorney for a deceased defendant has a
duty to notify the court and other parties in the action that his client has died. . . ." Id. at 867.
Similar reasoning was followed in dismissing the action as to the deceased in MuUis.
Mullis v. Bone. 238 S.E.2d. 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977). In that case, the defendant died and the
attorney who represented him filed and served on the parties notice of the date of decedent's death.
Plaintiff did not move to substitute a new party until after the time had expired. Plaintiff argued in
part that because the Suggestion of Death was filed by decedent's former counsel, the notice was
invalid. Id. at 750. The Court rejected this argument and noted:
While the statute provides that the motion for substitution may be made by
'. . . any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party
. . .,' it is silent as to the identity of the appropriate person to suggest death
on the record.
Id. at 751.
Neither Rule 25 nor Utah case law supports plaintiffs argument that the Suggestion
of Death was inappropriately filed in this matter. Mr. Smith did not leave a will identifying a
personal representative or successor. All of Mr. Smith's assets passed by trust to his wife who is
7

incapacitated. As the adverse party, it was against plaintiffs interest to file a Suggestion of Death.
Decedent's former counsel was the most appropriate party to alert the Court and counsel of Mr.
Smith's death. This counsel, as indicated by the affidavit of the subsequently appointed Personal
Representative, had authority and consent of the heirs to proceed under Rule 25. The Suggestion
of Death was appropriately filed in this matter and plaintiffs motion should be denied.
B.

Nothing in Rule 25 Suggests That the Suggestion of Death Must be Served
Upon the Decedent's Representative

Plaintiff does not cite any Utah authority in support of his argument that the
Suggestion of Death needed to include the name of the person to be substituted in this matter. Rule
25 does not state that a Suggestion of Death must identify a person to be substituted as a party. At
the time of Mr. Smith's death, his counsel was not aware of whether any testamentary instrument
existed which named a personal representative of Mr. Smith's estate.
The cases cited by the plaintiff in support of this argument can be distinguished from
the current case in several ways First, none of the cases involve Utah State law. Second, many of
the cases involve the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule is similar to the federal counterpart. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
include a model form for a suggestion of death

It appears from this form that the drafters

anticipated that a suggestion of death would identify the proper party to be substituted. Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Form 30. Where the successor is named on the Suggestion of Death, it

3

See e g. Barlow v Ground 39 F 3d 231 (9th Cir 19941 Fanss v Lynchburg Foundry. 769 F.2d 958 (4th
Cir. 1985V United States v Miller Brothers. 505 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir 1974), Grandbouche v Lovell 913 F.2d 835
(10th Cir 19901 Fehrenbacher v Ouackenbush. 759 F S>upp 1516 (Dist Kan 1991)
8

may be reasonable to require the notice to be served on that individual However, Utah elected not
to adopt this form and does not require that the successor party be named Consequently, federal
law is not persuasive on this issue As counsel had no idea who the successor party would be, it
would not be reasonable to place the burden on the defendant to serve an unknown person
Third, a majority of the case law involved the death of the plaintiff which raises
concerns not present in the current case4 The primary concern when a party dies during litigation
is that the person with the ultimate burden of substituting a party receive notice of the death When
the plaintiff dies, the plaintiffs successor has the burden of deciding whether to preserve plaintiffs
claim by substituting a new plaintiff Therefore, it is reasonable to require a Suggestion of Death
to be served on the plaintiffs successor However, when the defendant dies, the plaintiff has the
burden of moving the court to substitute a party Whether the defendant's successor is served with
formal notice does not effect the plaintiffs claim In this case, plaintiffs counsel, the party with the
responsibility of substituting a party for the deceased, received notice of the death Consequently,
there has been no prejudice to plaintiff
Finally, in two of the cases cited by plaintiff, no Suggestion of Death was filed with
the court or served on any party (See ejj Kissic v Liberty National Life Ins Co , 641 So 2d 250
(Ala 1994), United States v Miller Brothers Constr Co . 505 F 2d 1031 (10th Cir 1974)) In sum,
plaintiff has not presented any persuasive authority in support of the argument that the Suggestion

4

See e_g, Kissic v Liberty- National Life Ins Co . 641 So 2d 250 (Ala 1994), Ripple v Wold 572 N W 2d
439(SD 1997 V Hilsabeck v Lane Co . Inc . 168 F R D 313(DistKan 1996V Grandbouche v Lovell. 913 F 2d
835 (10th Or 1990V Barlow v Ground. 39 F 3d 231 (9th Or 1994 V Fanss v Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F 2d 958
(4th Or 1985)
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of Death filed in this case should have been served upon decedent's representative. The policy
rationale behind serving the deceased's successor is not present in this case as the decedent's
successor did not bear the burden of moving the court for a substitution. Plaintiff, the party with the
burden of substituting a person for the deceased defendant, received notice of the Suggestion of
Death. As plaintiff failed to substitute a party within ninety days of receiving notice of the
defendant's death, the Court's Order of Dismissal is appropriate.
C.

Rule 25 Does Not Implicitly Require that the Suggestion of Death Identify
Who May Be Substituted as a Party.

As stated above, the federal counterpart to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure includes a model "suggestion of death" form. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Form
30. The federal form suggests identifying and naming the person who may be substituted as a party.
Consequently, it is reasonable that cases involving federal law require that the Suggestion of Death
filed by the decedent's counsel identify who may be substituted as a party. However, Utah has not
adopted any form similar to Form 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nothing in Rule 25
alerts a party that a Suggestion of Death must include the name of the person to be substituted in the
action. Utah law does not require the identity of the representative to be included within the
Suggestion of Death and the notice in this case was valid.
The plaintiffs in Farmers and Mullis. supra, presented arguments that the Suggestion
of Death was invalid because the notice did not name the proper party to be substituted. Farmers.
507 P.2d at 865; Mullis. 238 S.E.2d at 748. In Farmers, the Court refused to impose a duty on the
decedent's counsel to name an appropriate future representative. The court stated:

10

. . . [W]e see nothing in our rules which could reasonably be a basis for
requiring that notification of death of a defendant should include the identity
of the deceased defendant's executor, administrator, or representative. It
seems quite basic and reasonable thai a plaintiffs attorney who receives
notification of a defendant's death has the responsibility to promptly
initiate the necessary inquiries to determine the identity of a person to be
substitutedfor the deceased defendant, and to file a motion for substitution
in accordance with our Rules of Civil Procedure.
Farmers Ins. Group. 507 P.2d at 867-868 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Mullis. the Court rejected a similar argument:
Although our legal tradition places a premium on fairness, litigation still
involves an adversary system. The burden of ascertaining the proper party
to be substitutedfor a deceased litigant is properly placed on the party who
would effect the substitution. We hold, therefore, that'. . . the statement of
the fact of the death . . .' which includes the name of the deceased and the
date of the death is a sufficient suggestion of death. . ..
Mullis. 238 S.E.2d at 750 (emphasis added).
In this case, at the time of Mr. Smith's death, decedent's counsel did not know any
details of his estate. While counsel had the authority of Mr. Smith's heirs to continue representation,
none of the heirs knew if their father appointed a personal representative in a will or trust. (See
Affidavit of Phyllis Myers' filed herewith). Plaintiff asks the Court to impose a duty on the
opposing party to investigate and ascertain the proper party to be substituted in the matter so that
plaintiffs suit against the defendant could be maintained. This is contrary to the adversarial system
of justice. After the Motion to Dismiss was filed, Mr. Stoddard's counsel readily petitioned the
Probate Court for the appointment of personal representative without the assistance of decedent's
counsel. Nothing prevented Mr. Stoddard of plaintiff from initiating this proceeding less than ninety
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days after receiving notice of defendant's death.

Plaintiffs argument is unpersuasive.

Consequently, plaintiffs motion to amend the judgment should be denied.

POINT m
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN
EXTENSION OF TIME.
"Failure to fact due to carelessness and negligence is not excusable neglect." Farmers.
507 P.2d at 867. Consequently, the trial court appropriately denied plaintiffs Motion for Extension.
Plaintiff relies on United States v. Miller Brothers Constr. Co.. 505 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1974), as
support that the court should have granted an extension of time in this case. However, the facts of
case plaintiff relies upon are completely inapposite to the current case.
In Miller, the defendant died during litigation. A Suggestion of Death was filed on
March 13, 1972. On June 5, 1972, prior to the expiration of 90 days, the plaintiff moved for an
extension of time to file a motion for substitution because the hearing on the appointment of a
representative was not scheduled until June 13, 1972. On June 9, 1972, the defendant moved to
dismiss the action. On June 26, 1972, plaintiff moved to substitute the representative as a party. Id.
at 1033-34. The defendant argued that the Court should not have granted an extension to the
plaintiff because the plaintiff had notice of the defendant's death prior to receiving formal notice.
The Court disagreed with defendant's argument and permitted the plaintiff to substitute a new
defendant. Id. at 1034.
Contrary to the plaintiff in Miller, in the current case, plaintiff did absolutely nothing
during the 90-day period after receiving the notice of death. Plaintiff did not take any action to
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substitute a party for the deceased until after defendant's counselfileda Motion to Dismiss. As the
Court noted in it's Ruling,
Plaintiff has offered no satisfactory explanation as to why there was
nofilingof a substitution of parties, or at least a request to extend the
time for filing such a substitution within the 90 day period. The
Court cannot conclude that the delay infilingthe statutorily required
motion for substitution of parties was made in good faith in the
absence of such explanation. It rather appears that plaintiff simply
put this case on the back burner because there were more pressing
matter pending and chose to let the 90 day period lapse.
See Court Ruling of June 1. 1999 at 5. The trial court appropriately denied plaintiffs request for
an extension under Rule 25 in which the substitute of any party defendant.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THIS MATTER WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiffs argument that defendant's Rule 25 Motion to Dismiss was actually a Rule
19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party is not persuasive. Had the drafters
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure considered the substitution of a representative the same as the
joining of an indispensable party, they would not have created two separate rules. Furthermore, the
personal representative was not an indispensable party at the beginning of the lawsuit and Plaintiff
ignores the fact that, pursuant to Rule 25, he was compelled to act within a specified period of time
to preserve his claim. His failure to act within the ninety day period after receiving the Suggestion
of Death was the basis of defendant's motion. As the Court held:
[t]he Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendant Smith is not based
upon any "lack of jurisdiction," "improper venue" or lack of
indispensable party." [See Rule 41(b)]. Rather, the Motion to
Dismiss is based upon the "failure of the plaintiff to . . . comply with
the [] rules [of civil procedure]." (Id.) Specifically, the Motion to
13

Dismiss is based upon Plaintiffs failure to "file a motion for
substitution of the parties within the required time frame" under Rule
25. (See Defendant's Support Memo, p.2) Consequently, the Court
finds that the dismissal should be with prejudice.
See Court Ruling at 8. The Court's ruling was appropriate and the Plaintiffs motion should be
denied.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has presented no compelling arguments for the Court to amend its prior
ruling. Therefore, defendant respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion.
DATED this

2$

day of June, 1999.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

S.BAIRD MORGAN
KRISTAA WEBER
Attorneys for Defendant, Seth Albert Smith

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed,
first-class, postage prepaid, on this 'Zt day of -Jkjunu
, 1999, to the following:

Craig M. Snyder
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North St.
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Plaintiff

xU'%nApKj.
14041-16
258631
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S. BATRD MORGAN (A2314)
KPJSTA A. WEBER (A8019)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Silt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (SOI) 531-2000
Fa* No.: (801) 532-5506
TK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER. COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIAN KEITH DONAHUE,
AFFIDAVIT OF PHYLLIS MYERS
Fhinttff;
vs.
Civil No. 98CV102
Judge Philip Eves

SFTH ALBERT SMITH,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF TkE^u C/L )

as.

Phyllis Myers, beingfirstduly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

My father was the defendant in the above-entitled matter at the time of his

death in December 1998.
2.

Although I haveftotteen anylegal document to the effect, I understand that

the Court recently appointed me Personal Representative of my father's estate.

3.

As Personal Representative of my father's estate, I approved and consented

to 5. Baird Morgan and the lawfirmof Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson representing the interest
of the estate in thia matter.
4.

At the time ofrayfather'* death, I was aware that he u d my mother had

created a trust. However, I had not seen a complete copy of the Trust document. Additionally,
neither my brothers nor I knew whether my father left a will
5.

My mother is incapacitated and is incapable of participating in any aspect of

the legal proceedings involving my father's estate.
6.

My brothers and I knew that we were co-trustees of my father and mother's

trusts. However, we did not know whether my father bad also appointed a personal representative
of his estate.
7.

In December 1998,1 called Mr. Morgan and informed him of my father's

death. At the time of my father's passing, my brothers and I knew and consented to Mr. Morgan
notifying the Court and parties of his death, We understood and agreed that Mr. Morgan would
continue to represent the interest of my father's estate and me as Personal Representative with
respect to the two lawsuits.
DATED this < g £ . day of Cjy^a

2

„

1999.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF

)

ss.
fe&droc/L.

.U

, 1999, personally appeared before me,
On the -2.y^-day of T f iL^-^os^
Phyllis Myers, whose identity has been proven an the basis of satisfactory evidence, being first
duty sworn, acknowledges that she excepted the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated
therein, of her own voluntary act
MICHAEL F OALTON
neTWUBJC'SnittttlTAh
B60 NORTH f 00 WEST
•BMVtfl UT B4713

NOTARY PUBLIC
ySy Commission Expires:

COMM EXP 10-10-2001

Lo-io-aoo)
OFSEttVTCr
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this
day of June, 1999 to the following:

Craig M. Snyder
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
120 East 300 North St.
P.O. Box 1241
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorneys for Plaintiff

14M1.U
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3

'.H!B!T A
BRENT D. YOUNG (3S84)

CI I E
r | f c > c

TVTE&. YOUNG
Attorney for Petitioner Seth Atben Smith
226 West 2230 North

P.O. Box 6:7

JUN 0 2 1999

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT

Provo,UT 84603
Telephone (801) 375-3000
ES THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DC THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:
SETII ALBERT SMITH,

APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE
Probate No.-983^0591

Deceased.

Judge: zrP^^f

913f**oof

&*

Upon consideration of the Appointment of Personal Representative filed by
CLAIR JAUSSI, on May 12,1999, the Court finds, upon hearing, that a qualified person
has petitioned for appointment of personal representative, that venue is proper, that
required notices were given or waived, that allrequirementsfor appointment under the
Utah Uniform Probate Code have been met, and that the best interest of&e estate of Seth
Albert Smith will be served by the appointment of CLAIR. JAUSSI, as personal
representative.

^^

THEREFORE, CLi\m JAUSSI is hereby appointed personal representative, to act
without bond and upon' qualification and acceptance, letters of administration shall be

issued, to tlic said pcibuual rcprc^cuUiLivc.

DatedC^X^g. Z.

1771

BY THE COURT
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RCP Rule 25, RULE 25. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
*52 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF
COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART IV PARTIES
Current with amendments received
through 11-1-1999

RULE 25 SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
(a) Death
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order substitution of
the proper parties The motion for substitution
may be made by any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party and, together
with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the
parties as provided m Rule 5 and upon persons
not parties m the manner provided m Rule 4 for
the service of a summons Unless the motion for
substitution is made not later than ninety days
after the death is suggested upon the record by
service of a statement of the fact of the death as
provided herein for the service of the motion, the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of
the plaintiffs or of one or more of the defendants
m an action m which the right sought to be
enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs
or only against the surviving defendants, the
action does not abate
The death shall be
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suggested upon the record and the action shall
proceed m favor of or against the sur\i\ing
parties
(b) Incompetency
If a party becomes
incompetent, the court upon motion served as
provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule ma\ allou
the action to be continued b> or against his
representative
(c) Transfer of Interest In case of am transfer
of mterest, the action ma\ be continued b\ or
against the original party, unless the court upon
motion directs the person to whom the mterest is
transferred to be substituted m the action or jomed
with the original party Service of the motion
shall be made as provided m Subdivision (a) of
this rule
(d) Public Officers, Death or Separation From
Office When a public officer is a party to an
action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be
contmued and maintained by or against his
successor, if within 6 months after the successor
takes office, it is satisfactorily shown to the court
that there is a substantial need for so continuing
and maintaining it Substitution pursuant to this
rule may be made when it is shown by
supplemental pleading that the successor of an
officer adopts or contmues or threatens to adopt or
contmue the action of his predecessor Before a
substitution is made, the party or officer to be
affected, unless expressly assentmg thereto, shall
be given reasonable notice of the application
therefor and accorded an opportunity to object
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*5 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF
COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART II. COMMENCEMENT
OF ACTION; SERVICE OF
PROCESS, PLEADINGS,
MOTIONS AND ORDERS
Current with amendments received
through 11-1-1999

RULE 4. PROCESS
(a) Signing of Summons. The summons shall
be signed and issued by the plaintiff or the
plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be
signed and served.
(b) Time of Service. In an action commenced
under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a
copy of the complaint shall be served no later than
120 days after the filing of the complaint unless
the court allows a longer period of time for good
cause shown. If the summons and complaint are
not timely served, the action shall be dismissed,
without prejudice on application of any party or
upon the court's own initiative. In any action
brought against two or more defendants on which
service has been obtained upon one of them within
the 120 days or such longer period as may be
allowed by the court, the other or others may be
served or appear at any time prior to trial.
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of
the court, the address of the court, the names of
the parties to the action, and the county in which it
is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant,
state the name, address and telephone number of
the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the
plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall
state the time within which the defendant is
required to answer the complaint in writing, and
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to
do so, judgment by default will be rendered
against the defendant. It shall state either that the
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complaint is on file with the court or that the
complaint will be filed with the court within ten
days of service.
(2) If the action is commenced under Rule
3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the
defendant need not answer if the complaint is not
filed within 10 days after service and shall state
the telephone number of the clerk of the court
where the defendant may call at least 13 days after
service to determine if the complaint has been
filed.
(3) If service is made by publication, the
summons shall briefly state the subject matter and
the sum of money or other relief demanded, and
that the complaint is on file.
*6 (d) By Whom Served. The summons and
complaint may be served in this state or any other
state or territory of the United States, by the
sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by
a United States Marshal or by the marshal's
deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or
older at the time of service, and not a party to the
action or a party's attorney.
(e) Personal Service. Personal service shall be
made as follows:
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered
by subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) below, by
delivering a copy of the summons and/or the
complaint to the individual personally, or by
leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house
or usual place of abode with some person of
suitable age and discretion there residing, or by
delivering a copy of the summons and/or the
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process;
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14
years) by delivering a copy to the infant and also
to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if
none can be found within the state, then to any
person having the care and control of the infant, or
with whom the infant resides, or in whose service
the infant is employed;
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(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to
be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting his
own affairs, b> delivering a copy to the person and
to the person's legal representative if one has been
appointed and in the absence of such
representative, to the individual, if any, who has
care, custody or control of the person,
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or
committed at a facility operated by the state or any
of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy
to the person who has the care, custody, or control
of the individual to be served, or to that person's
designee or to the guardian or conservator of the
individual to be served if one has been appomted,
who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the
process to the individual served,
(5) Upon any corporation, not herem otherwise
provided for, upon a partnership or other
unincorporated association which is subject to suit
under a common name, by delivering a copy
thereof to an officer, a managing or general agent,
or other agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process and, if the agent
is one authorized by statute to receive service and
the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to
the defendant If no such officer or agent can be
found within the state, and the defendant has, or
advertises or holds itself out as havmg, an office
or place of business within the state or elsewhere,
or does business within this state or elsewhere,
then upon the person m charge of such office or
place of business,
*7 (6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by
delivering a copy thereof to the recorder,
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the
county clerk of such county,
(8) Upon a school district or board of education,
by delivering a copy to the superintendent or
business administrator of the board,
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by
delivermk a copy to the president or secretary of
its board,
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(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as b\
law are authorized to be brought against the state,
by delivering a copy to the attorney general and
any other person or agency required b> statute to
be served, and
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state
of Utah, or upon any public board, commission or
body, subject to suit, b> delivering a copv to am
member of its governing board, or to its executive
employee or secretary
(f) Service and Proof of Service in a Foreign
Countrv Service in a foreign countrv shall be
made as follows
(1) In the manner prescribed b> the law of the
foreign countrv for service m an action in an> of
its courts of general jurisdiction, or
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery,
and upon a corporation, partnership or
association, by delivering a copy to an officer or a
managing general agent, provided that such
service be made by a person who is not a party to
the action, not a party's attorney, and is not less
than 18 years of age, or who is designated by
order of the court or by the foreign court, or
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the
clerk of the court to the party to be served as
ordered by the court Proof of service in a foreign
country shall be made as prescribed in these rules
for service within this state, or by the law of the
foreign country, or by order of the court When
service is made pursuant to subpart (3) of this
subdivision, proof of service shall include a
receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence
of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the
court
(g) Other Service
Where the identity or
whereabouts of the person to be served are
unknown and cannot be ascertained through
reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the
individual parties is impracticable under the
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to
believe that the person to be served is avoiding
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service of process, the party seeking service of
process may file a motion supported by affidavit
requesting an order allowing service by
publication, by mail, or by some other means
The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts
made to identify, locate or serve the party to be
served, or the circumstances which make it
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties
If the motion is granted, the court shall order
service of process by publication, by mailfromthe
clerk of the court, by other means, or by some
combination of the above, provided that the means
of notice employed shall be reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise the
interested parties of the pendency of the action to
the extent reasonably possible or practicable The
court's order shall also specify the content of the
process to be served and the event or events as of
which service shall be deemed complete A copy
of the court's order shall be served upon the
defendant with the process specified by the court
*8 (h) Manner of Proof In a case commenced
under Rule 3(a)(1), the party serving the process
shall file proof of service with the court promptly,
and m any event within the tune during which the
person served must respond to the process, and
proof of service must be made within ten days
after such service Failure to file proof of service
does not affect the validity of the service In all
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule
3(a)(2), the proof of service shall be made as
follows
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, Umted
States Marshal, or the deputy of any of them, by
certificate with a statement as to the date, place,
and manner of service,
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit
with a statement as to the date, place, and manner
of service, together with the affiant's age at the
tune of service,
(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of
the publisher or printer or that person's designated
agent, showing publication, and specifying the
date of the first and last publications, and an
affidavit by the clerk of the court of a deposit of a

copy of the summons and complaint in the Umted
States mail, if such mailing shall be required under
this rule or by court order,
(4) If served by Umted States mail, by the
affidavit of the clerk of the court showing a
deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint
in the Umted States mail, as may be ordered by
the court, together with any proof of receipt,
(5) By the written admission or wai\er of
service by the person to be served, duly
acknowledged, or otherwise proved
(I) Amendment At any time in its discretion
and upon such terms as it deems just, the court
may allow any process or proof of service thereof
to be amended, unless it clearly appears that
material prejudice would result to the substantial
rights of the party against whom the process
issued
(j) Refusal of Copy If the person to be served
refuses to accept a copy of the process, service
shall be sufficient if the person serving the same
shall state the name of the process and offer to
deliver a copy thereof
(k) Date of Service to Be Endorsed on Copy
At the time of service, the person making such
service shall endorse upon the copy of the
summons left for the person bemg served, the date
upon which the same was served, and shall sign
his or her name thereto, and, if an officer, add his
or her official title
*9
(1) Designation of Newspaper for
Publication of Notice In any proceeding where
summons or other notice is required to be
published, the court shall, upon the request of the
party applying for such publication, designate the
newspaper and authorize and direct that such
publication shall be made therein, provided, that
the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of
general circulation m the county where such
publication is required to be made and shall be
published m the English language
[Amended effective April 1,1996 ]
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*14 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 6
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART II. COMMENCEMENT OF
ACTION; SERVICE OF PROCESS,
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND
ORDERS
Current with amendments received through
11-1-1999
RULE 6. TIME

(a) Computation. In computing any period of
time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the
local rules of any district court, by order of
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of
the act, event, or default from which the
designated period of time begins to run shall not
be included. The last day of the period so
computed shall be included, unless it is a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which
event the period runs until the end of the next
day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday. When the period of time prescribed or
allowed, after including any additional time
under subsection (e), is less than 11 days,
intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a
notice given thereunder or by order of the court
an act is required or allowed to be done at or
within a specified time, the court for cause
shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with
or without motion or notice order the period
enlarged if request therefor is made before the
expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order or (2) upon
motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where
the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect; but it may not extend the time for
taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b),
59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g),
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except to the extent and under the conditions
stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by Expiration of Term. The
period of time provided for the doing of any act
or the taking of any proceeding is not affected
or limited by the continued existence or
expiration of a term of court. The continued
existence or expiration of a term of court in no
way affects the power of a court to do any act or
take any proceeding in any civil action which
has been pending before it.
(d) For Motions-Affidavits. A written motion,
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than 5 days before the time specified for
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by
these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of the
court. Such an order may for cause shown be
made on ex parte application. When a motion is
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be
served with the motion;
and, except as
otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing
affidavits may be served not later than 1 day
before the hearing, unless the court permits
them to be served at some other time.
*15 (e) Additional Time After Service by Mail.
Whenever a party has the right or is required to
do some act or take some proceedings within a
prescribed period after the service of a notice or
other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added
to the prescribed period.
[Amended effective November 1, 1997; April
1, 1999.]
Advisory Committee Note
The 1999 amendment to subdivision (a)
conforms the state rule to the federal rule. The
amendment also makes it clear that weekends
and holidays will be included in the
computation of time only if the relevant period,
including the three-day mailing period under
subsection (e), is 11 days or more.
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*38 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17
(c) Guardian Ad Litem, How Appomted A
guardian ad litem appomted by a court must be
appomted as follows

WEST'S UTAH RULES OF
COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART IV PARTIES
Current with amendments received
through 11-1-1999
RULE 17 PARTIES
DEFENDANT

PLAINTIFF

AND

(a) Real Party in Interest Every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party m mterest
An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or
m whose name a contract has been made for the
benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that person's name without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is brought, and
when a statute so provides, an action for the use 01
benefit of another shall be brought m the name of
the state of Utah No action shall be dismissed on
the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of
the real party m mterest until a reasonable time
has been allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or jomder or
substitution of, the real party in mterest, and such
ratification, jomder, or substitution shall have the
same effect as if the action had been commenced
m the name of the real party in mterest
(b) Mmors or Incompetent Persons A minor or
an insane or mcompetent person who is a part/
must appear either by a general guardian or by a
guardian ad litem appointed m the particular case
by the court m which the action is pending A
guardian ad litem may be appomted m any case
when it is deemed by the court m which the action
or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent
the minor, insane or mcompetent person in the
action or proceeding, notwithstanding that the
person may have a general guardian and may have
appeared by the guardian In an action m rem it
shall not be necessary to appomt a guardian ad
litem for any unknown party who might be a
minor or an mcompetent person

(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the
application of the minor, if the minor is of the age
of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the
application of a relative orfriendof the minor
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the
application of the minor if the minor is of the age
of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after
the service of the summons, or if under that age or
if the minor neglects so to appl>, then upon the
application of a relative orfriendof the minor, or
of any other party to the action
*39 (3) When a minor defendant resides out of
this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall
be entitled to an order designating some suitable
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor
defendant, unless the defendant or someone m
behalf of the defendant within 20 days after
service of notice of such motion shall cause to be
appomted a guardian for such minor Service of
such notice may be made upon the defendant's
general or testamentary guardian located in the
defendant's state, if there is none, such notice,
together with the summons m the action, shall be
served m the manner provided for publication of
summons upon such minor, if over fourteen years
of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such
service on the person with whom the minor
resides
The guardian ad litem for such
nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days
after appointment m which to plead to the action
(4) When an insane or mcompetent person is a
party to an action or proceeding, upon the
application of a relative orfriendof such insane or
mcompetent person, or of any other party to the
action or proceeding
(d) Associates May Sue or Be Sued by
Common Name When two or more persons
associated m any business either as a joint-stock
company, a partnership or other association, not a
corporation, transact such business under a
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common name, whether it comprises the names of
such associates or not, they may sue or be sued b>
such common name Any judgment obtained
against the association shall bind the jomt
property of all the associates m the same manner
as if all had been named parties and had been sued
upon their jomt liability The separate property of
an individual member of the association may not
be bound by the judgment unless the member is
named as a party and the court acquires
jurisdiction over the member
(e) Action Against a Nonresident Doing
Business in This State When a nonresident
person is associated m and conducts business
within the state of Utah in one or more places m
that person's own name or a common trade name,
and the business is conducted under the
supervision of a manager, superintendent or agent
the person may be sued m the person's name in
any action arising out of the conduct of the
business
(f) As used m these rules, the term plaintiff
shall mclude a petitioner, and the term defendant
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shall mclude a respondent
[Amended effective April 1,1998 ]
*40 Advisory Committee Note
Paragraph (d) has been changed to conform to
the holding in Cottonwood Mall Co \ Sine, 767
P2d 499 (Utah 1988), which allows an
unincorporated association to sue m its own name
The rule continues to allow an unincorporated
association to be sued m its own name The final
sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm
that the separate property of an individual member
of an association may not be bound b\ the
judgment unless the member is made a party
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the rule
make the terminology gender neutral In part (c)
the word "minor" has replaced the word "infant,"
m order to maintain consistency with recent
changes made m Rule 4(e)(2) In Rule 4 an infant
is defined as a person under the age of 14 years,
whereas the mtent of Rule 17(c) is to mclude
persons under the age of 18 years
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other grounds, 158 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.1946), cert, denied, Senderowitz v Fleming, 330
U.S. 848, 67 S.Ct. 1091. 91 L.Ed 1292 (1947); cf LaSalle Nat. Bank v 222 East
Chestnut St. Corp., 267 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 836, 80 S.Ct. 88, 4
L.Ed.2d 77 (1959). But see Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 257
F.2d 162 (5th Cir 1958); Genuth v National Biscuit Co., 81 F.Supp 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), app. dism., 177 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1949); 3 Moore's Federal Practice 115.01[5]
(Supp.1960); 1A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure 820-21 (Wright
ed 1960). Thus plaintiffs have sometimes been needlessly remitted to the difficulties of commencing a new action even though events occurring after the commencement of the original action have made clear the nght to relief
Under the amendment the court has discretion to permit a supplemental
pleading despite the fact that the original pleading is defective As m other
situations where a supplemental pleading is offered, the court is to determine in the
light of the particular circumstances whether filing should be permitted, and if so,
upon what terms. The amendment does not attempt to deal with such questions as
the relation of the statute of hmitations to supplemental pleadings, the operation of
the doctrine of laches, or the availability of other defenses All these questions are
for decision in accordance with the principles applicable to supplemental pleadings
generally Cf. Blau v. Lamb, 191 F.Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y.1961); Lendonsol Amusement Corp. v. B. & Q. Assoc., Inc., 23 F.R.Serv. 15d.3, Case 1 (D.Mass.1957).

Rule 24.

Intervention

(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a
motion to intervene upon all the parties affected thereby as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall
be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for
which intervention is sought. The same procedure shall be followed when a statute of the United States gives a right to intervene. When the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting
the public interest is drawn in question in any action to which the
United States or an officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a
party, the court shall notify the Attorney General of the United
States as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 2403.
Advisory Committee's Note

This amendment conforms to the amendment of Rule 5(a). See the Advisory
Committee's Note to that amendment.

Rule 25. Substitution of Parties
(a) Death.
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court within 2 years after the death may order
substitution of the proper parties. If substitution is not BO
made, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
The motion for substitution my be made by any party or by the
successors or representatives of the deceased party or by any
New matter is shown in italics; matter to be omitted is lined through
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party and, together with the notice of hearing; shall be served
on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not
parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a
summons, and may be served in any judicial district. Unless
the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after
the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement
of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
Advisory Committee's Note

Present Rule 25(a)(1), together with present Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible
requirement that an action be dismissed as to a deceased party if substitution is not
carried out within a fixed period measured from the time of the death. The
hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement plainly appear from the
cases. See, e. g., Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed. 436
(1947); lovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (1959). cert, denied, Carlin v. Sovino, 362
U.S. 949, 80 S.Ct. 860, 4 L.Ed.2d 867 (1960): Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.
1956); Starnes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 26 F.R.D. 625 (E.D.N.Y.), affd per curiam,
295 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 369 U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 688, 7 L.Ed.2d 612
(1962); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 28 F.R.D. 346 (S.D.N.Y.1961). See also 4 Moore's
Federal Practice % 25.01[9] (Supp.1960); 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice &
Procedure, § 621, at 420-21 (Wright ed. 1961).
The amended rule establishes a time limit for the motion to substitute based not
upon the time of the death, but rather upon the time information of the death is
provided by means of a suggestion of death upon the record, i. e. service of a
statement of the fact of the death. Cf. IU.Ann.Stat., c. 110, § 54(2) (Smith-Hurd
1956). The motion may not be made later than 90 days after the service of the
statement unless the period is extended pursuant to Rule 6(b), as amended. See the
Advisory Committee's Note to amended Rule 6(b). See also the new Official Form
30.
A motion to substitute may be made by any party or by the representative of the
deceased party without awaiting the suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion will
usually be so made. If a party or the representative of the deceased party desires to
limit the time within which another may make the motion, he may do so by
suggesting the death upon the record.
A motion to substitute made within the prescribed time will ordinarily be
granted, but under the permissive language of the first sentence of the amended rule
("the court may order") it may be denied by the court in the exercise of a sound
discretion if made long after the death—as can occur if the suggestion of death is not
made or is delayed—and circumstances have arisen rendering it unfair to allow
substitution. Cf Anderson v. Yungkau, supra, 329 U.S. at 485, 486, 67 S.Ct. at 430,
431, 91 L.Ed. 436, where it was noted under the present rule that settlement and
distribution of the estate of a deceased defendant might be so far advanced as to
warrant denial of a motion for substitution even though made within the time limit
prescribed by that rule. Accordingly, a party interested in securing substitution
under the amended rule should not assume that he can rest indefinitely awaiting the
suggestion of death before he makes his motion to substitute.

Rule 26. Depositions Pending Action
(e) Objections to Admissibility. Subject to the provisions
of Rules 28(b) and 32(c), objection may be made at the trial or
New matter is shown in italics; matter to be omitted is lined through
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Cite as 913 F-2d 835 (10th Clr. 1990)

John E. GRANDBOUCHE; John Voss,
Personal Representative of the Estate
of John Grandbouche, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

Larry LOVELL; Kenneth Batson; Vernon Pixley; Kathleen Budd; Alan
Dougan; Dave Black; Tim Fortune;
Nick Difalco; John Ottinger; Bob Ely,
all special agents for the Internal Revenue Service; Steve Simmer; Bob Glenn,
Inspectors for the Internal Revenue
Service; Larry Hyatt, Chief of Internal
Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation Division, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 89-1359.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 6, 1990.

Action was brought against officials of
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), alleging violation of constitutional rights. Following remand, 825 F.2d 1463, defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to file timely
motion to substitute proper party for deceased plaintiff, and personal representative of decedent's estate filed motion to
substitute. Motion for substitution was den
*ed and motion to dismiss was granted by
toe United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, Jim R. Carrigan, J.,
ai
>d plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) request during prior
a
PPeal that parties file supplemental briefs
^dressing the effect of the death of the
Plaintiff did not constitute a sufficient suggestion of death to trigger 90-day limitations period for filing motion to substitute,
an
o (2) service of such suggestion on nonparties, such as representative of deceased
Pontiffs estate, had to be pursuant to
ule 4, relating to process, and thus limita10ns
period did not begin to run where
^sonal representative did not receive noCe
°f any purported suggestion of death.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*363
Sufficient suggestion of death to trigger limitations period on filing motion for
substitution was not made when Court of
Appeals, during prior appeal, requested the
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the death of the plaintiff.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25<aXD, 28 U.S.
C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363
Running of 90-day limitations period
on filing motion for substitution is not triggered unless formal suggestion of death is
made on the record, regardless of whether
parties have knowledge of a party's death,
and mere reference to a party's death in
court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for
filing motion for substitution. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365
While service of suggestion of death
on counsel will satisfy requirement of rule
for service of parties to the litigation, service required on nonparties, specifically the
successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate, must be service pursuant to Rule 4, relating to process. Fed.
Rules Civ.ProcRules 4, 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.
C.A.
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363
Ninety-day limitations period for filing
motion for substitution did not begin to run
where personal representative of decedent's estate did not receive service of any
purported suggestion of death. Fed.Rules
Civ.ProcRules 4, 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
Jennifer A. Greene and William A. Cohan, Cohan & Greene, Denver, Colo., for
plaintiffs-appellants.
Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Gary R. Allen, Kenneth L. Greene, and
Howard M. Soloman, Tax Div., Dept. of
Justice, Washington, D.C. (Michael J. Norton, U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., of Counsel),
for defendants-appellees.
Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY and
EBEL, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order
dismissing this action for failure to file a
timely motion for substitution pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1).1 The district court
initially dismissed this action when plaintiff
Grandbouche failed to comply with a discovery order. See Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1464 (10th Cir.1987).
While the appeal of that decision was before this court, plaintiff Grandbouche died.
See id. at 1465. This court, after requesting that the parties file supplemental briefs
addressing the effect of the death of plaintiff Grandbouche on the instant action, ultimately determined that the action survived
plaintiffs death, vacated the district
court's order of dismissal, and remanded
the action to the district court. Id. at 1465,
1467.

ment of the fact of the death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
Prior to its amendment in 1963, RU]e
25(a)(1) required a court to dismiss an action if no motion for substitution had been
filed within two years of the death of a
party. See, e.g., Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d
983, 984 (D.C.Cir.1969). In order to alleviate the inequities caused by the inflexibility
of this rule, see id. at 984, Rule 25(a)(1) was
amended to require a motion for substitution to be filed within ninety days from the
time a suggestion of death is filed in the
district court and properly served. See
United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co.,
505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir.1974); see
also 7C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1955 (2d ed. 1986).

Or, September 5, 1989, defendants filed
with the district court a motion to dismiss
this action for failure to file a timely motion to substitute a proper party for the
deceased plaintiff. Immediately thereafter
the personal representative of decedent's
estate filed a motion to substitute himself
as a party-plaintiff in this action. The district court denied the motion for substitution and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal.

[1] Defendants assert that a sufficient
suggestion of death was made under Rule
25(a)(1) in the appellate proceedings addressing the effect of plaintiffs death on
this action.
The suggestion of the decedent's death
was spread on the record approximately
two years earlier by this Court's order
requiring supplemental briefs, the supplemental brief of the defendants, this
Court's decision in Grandbouche I, [825
F.2d 1463], and the docket entry thereof.
Each of these documents was entered in
the record of the case and was served on
counsel for the estate. Under these circumstances, the purpose of requiring
that a party's death be suggested on the
record was clearly satisfied.
Appellees' Brief at 9. We disagree.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1)
provides that
[i]f a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.
The motion for substitution may be made
by any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing,
shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons, and may be served
in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after the death is suggested
upon the record by service of a state1. After examining the briefs and appellate
record, this panel has determined unanimously
that oral argument would not materially assist
the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.

[2] The running of the ninety-day limitations period under Rule 25(a)(1) is not
triggered unless a formal suggestion of
death is made on the record, regardless of
whether the parties have knowledge of a
party's death. See Miller Bros., 505 F.2d
at 1034-35. Mere reference to a party's
death in court proceedings or pleadings is
not sufficient to trigger the limitations pe
App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case i$
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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nod for filing a motion for substitution.
See, e.g., Kaldawy v. Gold Serv. Movers,
Inc., 129 F.R.D. 475, 477 (S.D.N.Y.1990)
(court's order noting plaintiffs death and
placing case on suspended calendar, which
was mailed to counsel for all parties, including decedent's counsel, insufficient to
trigger the ninety-day limitations period);
Tolliver v. Leach, 126 F.R.D. 529, 530-31
(W.D.Mich.1989) (defense counsel's state
ment concerning defendant's death, made
on record during discovery conference, insufficient to trigger limitations period);
Gronowicz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 624,
626-27 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (letter from party's
attorney to court notifying court of party's
death insufficient suggestion of death to
trigger limitations period).

The order of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado denying
plaintiffs' motion for substitution and
granting defendants' motion to dismiss is
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED
to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

(O

| KEY NUMBER SYST£M>

Esley E. SCHMIDT and Mildred R.
Schmidt, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

Clarence M. KING, Jr., District Director,
Max J. Kennedy, Revenue Officer, In[3] Further, a suggestion of death must
ternal
Revenue Service, Commissioner
be served in accordance with Rule 25(a)(1).
of the Internal Revenue Service, United
See Miller Bros., 505 F.2d at 1034-35. DeStates of America, Does I Through X
fendants argue that the requirement of
Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.
service was satisfied in the instant case
during the initial appellate proceedings beNo. 89-3240.
cause the supplemental briefs and this
United States Court of Appeals,
court's order were served on the attorneys
Tenth Circuit.
for the parties, including decedent's attorney who is also the attorney for decedent's
Sept. 6, 1990.
estate. While service of a suggestion of
Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1990.
death on counsel will satisfy the requirement of Rule 25(a)(1) for service of parties
to the litigation, the service required by
Taxpayers brought action which they
Rule 25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the
characterized as an action to quiet title
successors or representatives of the deunder statute providing for action affecting
ceased party's estate, must be service purproperty on which United States has a lien.
suant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. See Fariss v.
The United States District Court for the
Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961
District of Kansas, Dale E. Saffels, J., held
(4th Cir.1985) (to satisfy Rule 25(a)(1), mothat government's levy on taxpayers' proption for substitution or suggestion of death
erty was procedurally proper. Taxpayers
must be personally served on nonparty repappealed. The Court of Appeals held that
resentative of deceased, rather than detaxpayer's action characterized as one to
ceased's attorney); see also 7C Wright &
quiet title was actually challenging a defiMiller, Federal Practice and Procedure
ciency assessment and collection of taxes
§ 1955 (2d ed. 1986).
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
f4] In the instant case, because the per- thus the district court lacked jurisdiction
s
°nal representative of decedent's estate over the action.
did not receive service of any purported
Vacated and remanded.
Su
ggestion of death, the ninety-day limitations period did not begin to run. See
filler Bros., 505 F.2d at 1034-35. Plain- 1. Internal Revenue <s»4804
tiffs' motion for substitution was thus
If a taxpayer seeks to quiet title to
timely filed.
property upon which the United States has
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UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MILLER BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY et al., Defendants,
Rapidways, Inc., Defendant-Appellant
No. 74-1028.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Argued Sept. 10, 1974.
Decided Nov. 13, 1974.
United States brought action to foreclose federal tax liens against certain real
property, the ownership of which was
m dispute. The United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, Earl
E. O'Connor, J., ordered tax liens foreclosed, and holder of legal title to real
property appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hill, Circuit Judge, held that evidence which included, inter alia, taxpayer's deposition to effect that land
was conveyed as a security interest and
not as an absolute sale and testimony
of an employee of the holder of legal title
who stated that his employer acquired
the land as a means of making a loan to
the taxpayer was sufficient to sustain
district court's finding that taxpayer
was the equitable owner of the land
ar
*d that legal title thereto was held by
others only as a security interest subject
to the tax liens.
Affirmed.

*• Federal Civil Procedure <S=*364
The trial court properly dismissed
Arty's motion to dismiss pursuant to
rule governing substitution of parties
w
hich required Government to substitute
taxpayer's administrator within 90 days
after suggestion of taxpayer's death
w
here party failed to comply with servlc
e and filing requirements for suggestion of death of taxpayer notwithstandln
£ party's contention that formal suggestion of death was not required bemuse Government was aware of taxpay-

er's death. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rules 5,
25, 25(a)(1), 28U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <S=>363
A discretionary extension of time
for the filing of motion of substitution
of parties should be liberally granted absent a showing of bad faith on the part
of movant or undue prejudice to other
parties to the action. Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc. rules 5, 6, 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure @=>363
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion granting Government a 15day extension of time for filing substitution of taxpayer's administrator as
party to tax lien foreclosure proceeding
in absence of showing of bad faith attributable to the Government or prejudice to other parties, despite delay in
initiation of probate proceedings to appoint an administrator. Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc. rules 5, 6, 25, 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Internal Revenue @»1721.6
Although court must determine
merits of all claims to property subjected
to tax liability, district court committed
no error in refraining to rule on respective rights of parties to any surplus
proceeds from tax forclosure sale where
none of parties made any claims to surplus proceeds and matter was not raised
at trial. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) §
7403(c).
5. Judgment ^=>251(1)
Parties to action are entitled only
to a determination of issues raised before
the court.
6. Federal Civil Procedure 0=»366
Where taxpayer died during pendency of action, not after rendition of
judgment, and administrator of taxpayer's estate was substituted as a party,
there was a continuance of the original
action foreclosing tax lien on real property and a separate proceeding against
the substituted party was not necessary
notwithstanding contention of holder of
legal title to such property that Government's judgment must be revived against
administrator before the tax liens could
be foreclosed. K.S.A. 60-2405; Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc. rule 25, 28 U.S.C.A.
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7. Evidence C=>222(10)
Entire deposition of taxpayer in
which he stated that land was conveyed
as a security interest and not as an absolute sale was admissible into evidence
in tax lien foreclosure action against
land in which taxpayer, since deceased,
allegedly retained equitable ownership
on ground that deposition tended to show
fraud in taxpayer's conveyances of such
land notwithstanding contention of holder of legal title that portions of deposition concerning it should have been excluded because there was no evidence that
it was involved in or had knowledge of
the fraud.
8. Evidence 0=265(7)
Mortgages C=>38(1)
Evidence which included, inter alia,
taxpayer's deposition to effect that land
was conveyed as a security interest and
not as an absolute sale and testimony of
an officer of the holder of legal title who
stated that his employer acquired the
land as a means of making a loan to the
taxpayer was sufficient to sustain district court's finding that taxpayer was
the equitable owner of the land and that
legal title thereto was held by others
only as a security interest subject to tax
liens.
9. Internal Revenue 0=>1721.5
Evidence was sufficient to establish
that legal titleholder, in which legal title
was placed by previous titleholder at direction of taxpayer when legal titleholder
made loan to taxpayer and paid off loan
made by previous titleholder and which
then entered into rental and purchase
option agreement with taxpayer, had
actual knowledge of taxpayer's equitable
interest in land for purpose of tax lien
foreclosure proceedings against taxpayer's interest in such land.

Robert L. Boyce, Jr., Kansas City,
Kan. (Howard Washburn, Kansas City,
Kan., on the brief), for defendant-appellant.

Daniel F. Ross, Washington, D. C
(Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen.
Meyer Rothwacks, Michael L. Paup
Dept. of Justice, Robert J. Roth, U. S
Atty., James A. Pusateri, Asst. U. S
Atty., Washington, D. C, on the brief)
for plaintiff-appellee.
Before LEWIS and HILL, Circui
Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,* Distric
Judge.
HILL, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment o
the United States District Court for th
District of Kansas ordering foreclosur
of federal tax liens against certain rea
property, the ownership of which is i
dispute.
The facts leading up to this appeal ar
complex and may be summarized as fol
lows. Anthony Sielman owned certai
land in Kansas City, Kansas. In 1952
Wilmer Miller (taxpayer) purchased thi
land but directed Sielman to deed it t
Edward and Nellie Schmidt.
Th
Schmidts, taxpayer's brother-in-law an
sister-in-law, had no interest in the Ian
but held it solely as taxpayer's nomine
Taxpayer, in 1959, negotiated a morl
gage of the land to Anchor Savings <
Loan Company (Anchor) as security fc
a note evidencing the loan. The mori
gage was arranged by taxpayer for hi
benefit and the Schmidts executed th
mortgage at his request.
During this period of time taxpayc
and his brother were partners in Milk
Brothers Construction Company (Milk
Brothers). The partnership failed 1
pay certain income and FICA taxes i
1959. Deficiencies were assessed again!
it and notice of tax liens was filed i
1959 and 1960.
Taxpayer became delinquent in h
payments to Anchor and refinanced tl
loan through Investments, Inc. (Inves
ments) in 1961. Investments paid o
the delinquent note held by Anchor, to<
title to the land from the Schmidts, ai
gave taxpayer an option to purchas
Taxpayer again refinanced the loan

* Of the District of Utah, sitting by designation.
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1962 through Union Mortgage & Investment Company (Union). Union paid off
Investments, took title to the land, and
gave taxpayer an option to purchase.
Sometime before May, 1963, Miller
Brothers, already burdened with tax
problems, encountered several financial
setbacks culminating in foreclosure of
its Small Business Administration loan
and liquidation.
In May, 1963, taxpayer organized Fairfax Hauling, Inc. (Fairfax) to take over
a hauling contract from the defunct Miller Brothers. Taxpayer was not^an officer, director or stockholder in Fairfax, but he nevertheless exercised managerial control over the corporation.
At around the same time, taxpayer
contacted Wilford Sublett, an officer of
Rapidways, Inc. (Rapidways), a leasing
corporation. Rapidways had previously
leased trucks and heavy equipment to
Miller Brothers and taxpayer wanted it
to do the same for Fairfax. After mesne
negotiations it was decided that Rapidways would lease trucks and equipment
to Fairfax and loan it $5,000 for operating capital. Rapidways was to acquire
legal title to the land in question and
lease it to Fairfax with an option to purchase.
On June 7, 1963, Rapidways paid
Union approximately $10,400, which
amount Union used to close out taxpayer's option contract. Taxpayer was present at the closing and directed Union to
place legal title in Rapidways* name.
That same day Rapidways and Fairfax
entered into a rental and option to purchase agreement which provided, inter
alia, that Fairfax would receive legal title
to the land after eleven months if it made
all lease rental payments and paid Rapidways $10,400 plus interest.
Fairfax never used the land. It encountered financial problems after a few
months of operation and became unable
to fulfill its agreement with Rapidways.
Rapidways took possession of the leased
equipment, but not of the land. Al-

though it pays taxes and insurance on
the land, it has never used it or tried to
sell it.
Since its purchase in 1952, taxpayer
has exercised the rights of ownership
over the land. He built improvements
on it, occasionally rented the house to
others, and his family used the land for
recreation purposes. Taxpayer began
using the land as a permanent residence
in 1963.
On May 26, 1965, the government filed
this suit against Miller Brothers and
taxpayer. 1 The complaint stated, inter
alia, that Miller Brothers was defunct
and without assets and requested that
taxpayer's real and personal property be
sold to satisfy the tax liens. An amended
complaint was filed on October 26, 1969,
adding Rapidways as a defendant and the
land to which it held legal title as property subject to the tax liens. The government claimed taxpayer was the equitable owner of the land and that Rapidways' interest therein was subject and
inferior to the tax liens. Rapidways answered and asserted it acquired the land
free and clear of any federal tax liens
On May 5, 1971, taxpayer died. On
November 23, 1971, Rapidways filed a
motion to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction on the grounds the government had failed to move for substitution
of taxpayer's representative as a party
to the action within 90 days after suggestion of death, as required by Rule 25
F.R.Civ.P. The district court denied the
motion because a formal suggestion of
taxpayer's death had not been made.
Rapidways filed a formal suggestion of
death on March 13,1973.

1- Several other parties were also named as
defendants but all of the government's claims
against them were determined by judgments

rendered February 0, 1967, and March 30,
1970.

505 F 2d—65Va

The government, on June 5, 1972,
successfully moved for a fifteen day extension of time to file its Rule 25 motion
for substitution for the reason that a
hearing for the appointment of taxpayer's administrator was not to be held until June 13, 1972. On June 9, 1972,
Rapidways again filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds the government had
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failed to comply with Rule 25. Thereafter, on June 26, 1972, the government
moved to substitute taxpayer's administrator as a party to the action. Following a hearing, the district court denied
Rapidways' motion and granted the government's motion.
Subsequent to trial the district court
made findings of fact and conclusions
of law, including the following: (1) the
conveyances in issue were methods of
loaning taxpayer money and taking title
to the land as a security interest; (2)
taxpayer possessed the equitable ownership of the laid; (3) Rapidways was
aware
tax* er's tax problems and of
his ownership in the land, and took title
thereto as security for the cash advance
and equipment lease; (4) Rapidways
took legal title to the land subject to the
2. Rule 25(a) (1) provides :
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for
substitution may be made by any party or by
the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of
hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties
in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of summons, and may be served in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after the
death is suggested upon the record by service
of a statement of the fact of death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the action
shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
3. Rule 5 :
(a) Service: When required. Except as
otherwise provided in these rules, every order
required by its terms to be served, every
pleading subsequent to the original complaint
unless the court otherwise orders because of
numerous defendants, every paper relating
to discovery required to be served upon a
party unless the court otherwise orders, every
written motion other than one which may be
heard ex parte, and every written notice,
appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal, and similar paper
shall be served upon each of the parties.
No service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for
relief against them shall be served upon them
in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.

tax liens. Accordingly, the district court
ordered the tax liens foreclosed on the
land. Rapidways* subsequent motions
for a new trial and for amendment or
alteration of the judgment were denied,
and it appeals.
[1] Rapidways first contends its
February 23, 1972, motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 25, F.R.Civ.P., should
have been sustained. 2 Specifically, it
contends a formal suggestion of death
was not necessary for the Rule's 90 day
time limitation to take effect because the
government was fully aware of taxpayer's death.
Rule 25 provides that suggestion of
death on the record is made by service
of a statement of the fact of the death
on the parties as provided in Rule 5t
F.R.Civ.P. 3 3B Moore, Federal Practice
In an action begun by seizure of property,
in which no person need be or is named
as defendant, any service required to be made
prior to the filing of an answer, claim, or
appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its seizure.
(b) Same: How made. Whenever under
these rules service is required or permitted
to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless the service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to
him at his last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of
the court. Delivery of a copy within this rule
means: handing it to the attorney or to the
party; or leaving it at his office with his
clerk or other person in charge thereof; or,
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a
conspicuous' place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has
no office, leaving it at his dwelling house
or usual place of abode with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing.
(c) Same: Numerous Defendants. In any
action in which there are unusually large
numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion
or of its own initiative, may order that service
of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between
the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense contained therein shall
be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other
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f 25.06[2.-l] and [3] (2nd ed. 1974).
The 90 day time limitation does not
commence until this has been done. Id.
Since Rapidways failed to comply with
the service and filing requirements of
Rule 5, there was no suggestion of death
on the record and the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss.
[2,3] Rapidways next contends the
district court abused its discretion in
granting the government an extension
of time to file a motion for substitution because the government, aware of
taxpayer's death in 1971 delayed initiation of probate proceedings to appoint
an administrator for his estate until May,
1972. We disagree. A discretionary extension should be liberally granted absent
a showing of bad faith on the part of
the movant for substitution or undue
prejudice to other parties to the action,
See Rule 6, F.R.Civ.P.; 3B Moore, Federal Practice fl 25.06[3] (2nd ed. 1974).
We find no bad faith attributable to the
government and Rapidways has not
shown that it was unduly prejudiced.
[4, 5] Rapidways next contends the
district court was required to determine
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof ui>on the plaintiff
constitutes due notice of it to the parties.
A copy of every such order shall be served
upon the parties in such manner and form as
the court directs.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint
required to be served upon a party shall be
filed with the court either before service or
within a reasonable time thereafter.
(e) Filing With the Court Defined. The
filing of pleadings and other papers with the
court as required by these rules shall be made
by filing them with the clerk of the court,
except that the judge may permit the papers
to be filed with him, in which event he shall
note thereon the filing date and forthwith
transmit them to the office of the clerk.
L

26 U.S.C. § 7403(c) provides in part:
The court shall, after the parties have been
duly notifjed of the action, proceed to adjudicate all matters involved therein and finally
determine the mer:t<j of all claims to and liens
upon the properrv. and, in all cases where a
claim or interest o. the United States therein
is established, may decree a sale upon such
Property
and a distribution of

the respective rights of the parties to
any surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. Although a court must determine the merits of all claims to the
property subjected to tax liability,4 none
of the parties to the instant action made
any claims to surplus proceeds. The malter was never raised, the sole issue being whether, in view of the competing
claims of the government and Rapidways,
the property was subject to tax liability.
since parties are entitled only to a determination of issues raised before the
court, 5 the district court committed no
e r r o r i n refraining to rule on the matter.
[6] Relying upon First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Liebert, 195 Kan.
100, 403 P.2d 183 (1965), and Kan.Stet.
Ann. § 60-2405,6 Rapidways argues the
government's judgment must be revived
against taxpayer's representative before
the tax liens can be foreclosed. We disagree. Liebert concerns revival of a dormant judgment against a deceased debtor's personal representative and § 602405 concerns substitution of a deceased
or incompetent judgment holder's personal representative as a successor in interest.
the proceeds of such sale according to the
findings of the court
5. See, c. g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. Lyons,
366 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1966) ; Daniels v.
Thomas, 225 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1955),
cert, den'd. 347 U.S. 1139, 70 S.Ct. 867,
98 L.Ed. 1139; 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§
42. 49 (1947).
6. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60^-2405 (1964) states:
Any person who claims to have succeeded to
the interest of the holder of a judgment by apl>ointment as personal representative for a
deceased or incompetent judgment holder, by
assignment, by operation of law, or otherwise,
shall file with the clerk a copy of his letters
as personal representative, assignment, or proceedings effecting such transfer, and thereafter such successor in interest shall be entitled to all the rights and remedies available
to his predecessor and may proceed to enforce
the same in his own name as such successor. If the validity of any such transfer be
controverted by any party affected thereby,
the court shall, on reasonable notice to all interested parties whose whereabouts are
known, determine the respective rights and liabilities of all the parties.

1036

505 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

In the instant case taxpayer died during pendency of the action, not after rendition of a judgment, and the administrator of his estate was substituted as a
party pursuant to Rule 25. Since a substituted party steps into the same position as the original party there is a continuance of the original action and a
separate proceeding against the substituted party is not necessary. Seet e. g.t
Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert, den'd, 403 U.S. 904, 91
S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed.2d 680; 3B Moore,
Federal Practice ff 25.05 (2nd ed. 1974).

[8] We find no merit in Rapidwayj
position. It is clear that the option cor
tracts given to taxpayer were part c
more complex refinancing arrangement
in which he remained the equitable owr
er of the land. Taxpayer stated, in hi
deposition, that the land was conveyed a
a security interest and not as an absc
lute sale. This is supported by the tes
timony of a Union employee who state
Union acquired the land as a means c
making a loan to taxpayer. And, th
president of Fairfax testified that ta:
payer "put his farm up" to get the coi
poration going.

[7] The next issue concerns the admission into evidence of taxpayer's deposition. It was admitted on the grounds
it showed fraud, an exception to the
parol evidence rule. Rapidways now contends those portions of the deposition
not concerning it should have been excluded, because there was no evidence it
had knowledge of or was involved in the
fraud. Because testimony may take a
wide range where fraud is alleged we believe the entire deposition was admissible. See, e. g.t 3 Jones on Evidence
§ 16:2 (6th ed. 1972). Those portions of
the deposition objectionable to Rapidways showed the extent and purpose of
taxpayer's scheme.

The option contracts themselves a]
pear to have been given in recognition c
taxpayer's interest in the land. Sublet
for example, testified he thought th
land was worth about $15,000 but Y
nevertheless gave taxpayer an option t
purchase for $10,400 plus interest, a]
proximately the same amount Rapic
ways paid to Union for the land. Fina
ly, the fact taxpayer exerted dominio
and control over the land from 195
until his death in 1971 is indicative <
his ownership. The record does not di
close that Rapidways or any prior legi
title holder used the land or interfere
with taxpayer's use of the land,,

The paramount issue on appeal concerns taxpayer's interest in the land in
question. The government contended,
and the district court found, that taxpayer was the equitable owner of the land
and that legal title thereto was held by
others, including Rapidways, only as a
security interest. Rapidways asserts
that taxpayer never had an interest in
the land that could be reached by the government. It takes the position that the
conveyances were merely option to purchase agreements under which a purchaser who makes negligible or no payments acquires no interest therein. Since
the government's interest in the land can
rise no higher than taxpayer's, Rapidways contends the government acquired
no interest in the land whatsoever.

[9] The government, Rapidways ai
serts, failed to prove it had actual know
edge of taxpayer's interest in the Ian
We do not agree. Taxpayer's son, pre,
ent at a May, 1963, meeting betwee
Sublett and taxpayer, testified that Sul
lett agreed to take legal title to the Ian
as collateral. And taxpayer stated, i
his deposition, that Rapidways was awai
of his interest in the land. Furthermor
Rapidways did not purchase the lar
directly from Union as such but acquire
it by paying off taxpayer's option coi
tract with Union. Taxpayer then d
rected that legal title be placed in Rapi<
ways' name. These facts are incoi
sistent with Rapidways' contention thj
it was unaware of taxpayer's intere
in the land.
Affirmed in all respects.
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mentary to § 1B1.2 provides "[wjhen a particular statute proscribes a variety of conduct
that might constitute the subject of different
offense guidelines, the court will determine
which guideline section applies based upon
the nature of the offense charged in the
count of which the defendant was convicted."
U.S.S.G. § IB12 cmt The district judge is
therefore not precluded from concluding that
a guideline other than § 2T1.5 is more applicable to the offense conduct in this case.
Specifically, the district judge determined
that § 2J1.2, Obstruction of Justice, was the
most analogous guideline to the offense conduct The commentary to the Guideline indicates that obstructing a civil or administrative proceeding or evading legal process is
considered obstruction of justice under the
Guideline. Unlike Hanson, Van Krieken's
behavior of filing false Forms 1099, filing
false returns and seeking a tax levy on innocent taxpayers, as well as filing a groundless
lawsuit and police theft report could be considered on par with obstruction of justice.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court
correctly concluded that in this instance the
most applicable guideline to the offense conduct was obstruction of justice.2
IV
Van Krieken's waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The district judge cor^rtty applied the applicable guideline when
sentence was imposed on count four.
AFFIRMED.
[ O I «Y NUMBER SYSTEM/

" e district court also correctly noted that the
fctutory Index to the Guidelines was amended
^sequent to Van Krieken's offense conduct,
°ugh pnor to sentencing, to cross reference
e
sentencing judge to Guideline §§ 2J1.2 or
dm f ° r v l o l a t l o n s o f § 7212(a) Generally, a
time J U d g e a p p l i e s t h e G u i d e l m e s m e f f e c t a t
the r s e n t e n c i n g unless amended versions of
Guidelines are ex post facto United States v
ck?J' 9 8 ° F 2 d 1 3 0 0 ' 1 3 0 4 < 9th Cir.1992). cert
s
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Brian BARLOW, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
George GROUND, Officer #9129; L.O.
Oberlies, Officer # 1706; A. Tucker, Officer # 9363; Ray Shay, Officer # 3269,
et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 93-55339.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 15, 1994.
Decided Nov. 3, 1994.

On remand after appeal of civil rights
action, 943 F.2d 1132, city moved for dismissal based on failure to file timely motion to
substitute plaintiffs estate as party after
plaintiff died. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of California,
Earl B. Gilliam, J., granted motion, and estate appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wallace, Chief Judge, held that service by mail of
suggestion of death was insufficient to trigger running of 90-day period for moving to
substitute estate as party.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Federal Civil Procedure ®=>363.1
Formal suggestion of death must be
served by suggesting party in same manner
as that required for service of summons, in
order to trigger running of 90-day period in
which to file motion to substitute estate for
late the Ex Post Facto Clause " United States v
Johns, 5 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir 1993) Rather,
"there can be no ex post facto problem if an
amendment to the Guidelines merely clarifies its
existing substance as opposed to changing its
substance " Id at 1269 (citations omitted)
The Statutory Index is characterized "as an
interpretative aid " United States v Cambra, 933
F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir 1991)
Specifically,
"[r]ather than establishing immutably the exclusive list of available offenses for given offenses,
the Index merely points the court in the right
direction " Id at 755 Considered in that light,
the amendment to the Index can be considered
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deceased party. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
25(a)(1), 28 U.S.CA
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s»363.1
Service by mail of suggestion of death
was ineffective to trigger 90-day period for
plaintiffs estate to move to substitute itself
for plaintiff as party; such service did not
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, absent acknowledgement of service,
with applicable state law governing effective
service of summons. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rules 4(e), 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.CA.; West's Ann.
Cal.C.C.P. § 1016.

George Weingarten, San Diego, CA, for
plaintiff-appellant.
James M. Chapin, Deputy City Atty., San
Diego, CA, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California.
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge,
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, and
TANNER,* District Judge.
WALLACE, Chief Judge:
[1] The estate of Brian Barlow appeals
from an order of the district court dismissing
Barlow's civil rights action for failure to substitute the estate within the 90 day period
provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25(a)(1). The district court had jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and we
have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and
remand.

district court. Barlow v. Ground 943 F26
1132,1137-39 (9th Cir.1991), cert, denied —U.S.
, 112 S.Ct 2995, 120 L.Ed^d 872
(1992).
While the case was on appeal, Barlow died
Thereafter, his attorney, Weingarten, continued to pursue settlement with the City. The
City alleges Weingarten made statements
that indicate he had secured authorization tc
settle from the personal representative ol
Barlow's estate. Weingarten disputes this,
After the prior appeal was final and the
City's writ of certiorari was denied, the City
suggested Barlow's death on the record and
served the suggestion on Weingarten by first
class mail. The suggestion of death, along
with notice of service by mail, was filed on
June 25, 1992. On October 2, the City
moved to dismiss the case for failure to substitute the proper party within the 90 day
period established by Rule 25(a)(1). Weingarten, now representing Barlow's father and
acting as legal representative of Barlow's
estate, moved on October 8 to have Barlow's
father substituted as plaintiff. The district
court denied the motion to substitute and
dismissed the action pursuant to Rule
25(a)(1).
II

Barlow was the plaintiff in a civil rights
action against the City of San Diego and five
of its police officers (City). In an earlier
appeal, we held that the warrantless seizure
of Barlow's blood violated the Fourth
Amendment, and remanded the case to the

Barlow's estate asserts that the suggestion
of death was not properly served upon Barlow's estate and, therefore, that the 90 day
period under Rule 25(a)(1) was never triggered. The estate also maintains that even if
service of the suggestion was proper, the
district court nevertheless should have allowed substitution pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b) on the ground that
the estate's failure to file timely the motion
to substitute constituted "excusable neglect'1
Because we dispose of this appeal on the first
issue, we do not reach the question of excusable neglect.

merely clarifying and therefore applicable to Van
Krieken. The Statutory Index, however, still requires the district judge to determine the most
applicable guideline to the offense conduct
where more than one guideline is identified.

The district judge properly did so in this instance.
* Honorable Jack E. Tanner, United States District
Judge, Western District of Washington, sitting by
designation.

I
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He proper interpretation of Rule 25(a) is non-party successors or representatives of
, question of law that we review de novo. the deceased party must be served the sugJenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, gestion of death in the manner provided by
7S6 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 918, 107 Rule 4 for the service of a summons. GrandS.O. 324, 93 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986). Factual bouche, 913 F.2d at 837 ("the service refinding? relevant to the application of Rule quired by Rule 25(a)(1) on non-parties, spe25(») are reviewed for clear error. Fed. cifically the successors or representatives of
the deceased party's estate, must be served
R.CTV.P. 52(a); Insurance Co. of Penn. v.
Anociated Ml Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 516, 520 pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4"); Fariss v.
Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961-^2
(9th Cir.1991).
(4th Cir.1985) (Fariss) (successors and repRule 25(a)(1) provides that:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby resentatives of the deceased party must be
extinguished, the court may order substi- personally served the suggestion of death);
tuuon of the proper parties. The motion 3B Moore's Federal Practice H25.06[3] (2d
for substitution may be made by any party ed. 1991) ("service of the suggestion of death
or by the successors or representatives of upon parties is to be effected in accordance
the deceased party and, together with the with Rule 5, and upon non-parties as providnotice of hearing, shall be served on the ed in Rule 4").
parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon
An important function is fulfilled by reprions not parties in the manner provid- quiring different methods of service upon
ed in Rvk k for the service of a summons, parties and nonparties. Rule 5 permits serand may be served in any judicial district. vice upon a party by ordinary mail addressed
Inless the motion for substitution is made to his or her attorney. Since the notice can
not later than 90 days after the death is be addressed to the attorney, there is no
suggested upon the record by service of a guarantee that the party personally will retatentent of the fact of death as provided ceive notice. It can generally be presumed,
ker
^n for the service of the motion, the however, that a party's attorney will notify
•ttion shall be dismissed as to the de- the party of important developments and
take appropriate action to protect the party's
ceased party.
interests. Non-party successors or repreFed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1) (emphasis added).
sentatives of the deceased party, however,
Although Rule 25(a)(1) could be clearer, a may not be protected by the attorney of the
owul reading of the rule coupled with an deceased party. It is entirely possible that
Z*rstanding ° f i t s ^ ^ ^ lea <k to the no relationship will exist between them, and
^ u s l o n that the rule requires two affirmathat the successor or representative will be
W r d e r to t r i g e r t h e
represented by other counsel or by no counthe <*I? °
^
"«""«£ of
„J;
'v P^od- First, a party must for- sel at all. Because of the nonparty's distance
from the litigation, it may be that a nonparty
th* ree S or¥ e V he d e & t h o f t h e ^ar^ u P ° n
v
9->7 ^,LAluknon
- Aurotek, 774 F.2d will be unaware of the need to act to preWi 9lVro C i r - 1 9 8 5 ) ; Grandbouche v. Lo- serve the claim. As the court in Fariss
bouclvt %p ^ ( 1 0 t h Cir.1990) {Grand- explained, "[pjersonal service of the sugges' S o f i i i / o ^ M o o r e ' s Federal Practice tion of death alerts the nonparty to the conof deTlhJ [^ *d- !99D ("a formal suggestion sequences of death to a pending suit, signal^ nuW/„f S l U t e l y n e c e s s a r y to ^ger ing the need for action to preserve the claim
if so desired." Fariss, 769 F.2d at 962.
Indeed, the present Rule 25 was designed "to
Serve other p a r
Ues and n o n
'
inform all interested persons of the death so
ttves
n rty s u c c e s s o r j o r
of thp '!f
representa^
in lh e c e a s e d with a suggestion of that they may take appropriate action." 3B
8
Moore's Federal Practice H25.06[2] (2d ed.
ervice 0f t) S a m e m a n n e r as requ -ed for
R
mot
CK.p g / *
»on to substitute Fed. 1991) (discussing the 1963 amendments to
! ^ *e S J « ! \ . Thus * a P ^ y may be Rule 25). Thus, we hold that the 90 day
period provided by Rule 25(a)(1) will not be
^orhera7r U°nofdeathby
service on triggered against Barlow's estate until the
wrn
ey, Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b), while

^ 8 u ^ 4 P ^r evays,,)-,Second-
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appropriate representative of the estate is
served a suggestion of death in the manner
provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4.
The City points to Yonofsky v. Wernick,
362 F.Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D.NT.1973), in
which the district court held that the suggestion of death need not be served upon the
nonparty successors or representatives of the
estate when the appropriate persons could
not be ascertained at the time the suggestion
of death was made. But see Kaldawy v.
Gold Service Movers, 129 F.R.D. 475, 477
(S.D.N.Y.1990) (the 90 day period cannot be
triggered until a representative of the estate
is appointed and served the suggestion of
death). We need not reach this question
because clearly the City knew the identity of
the executor of Barlow's estate. Weingarten
provided the City with a copy of Barlow's will
that identified the name and address of Barlow's executor.
Ill
[2] Barlow's estate asserts that the 90
day period was not triggered because the
estate was never served with the suggestion
of death in the manner provided by Rule 4.
The City maintains, however, that Weingarten was acting as attorney for the estate, and
that service upon him satisfied the requirement that the nonparty successors or representatives of the estate be served the suggestion of death. We need not reach the question whether service on the attorney for the
nonparty estate satisfies Rule 25(a)(1). Even
if Weingarten was acting as attorney for the
estate and service upon the executor of the
estate was not also required by Rule 25(a)(1),
the service made upon Weingarten by mail
clearly did not comply with Rule 4.
The relevant sections of Rule 4(e) provide
that service may be effected:
(1) pursuant to the law of the state in
which the district court is located, or in
which service is effected, for the service of
a summons upon the defendant in an action brought m the courts of general jurisdiction of the State; or
(2) by delivering a copy of the summons
. . . to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwell-

ing house or usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein or by delivering a
copy of the summons . . . to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) (emphasis added). Service
was neither personally delivered nor left at
Weingarten's dwelling. Likewise, no waiver
of service was obtained pursuant to Ruie
4(d). Thus, service would have been valid
only if it complied with "the law of the state
in which the district court is located, or in
which service is effected, for the service ofa
summons.'1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(1) (emphasis
added). Because the district court was located in California and service was attempted in
California, service will be valid under Ru]e
4(e)(1) only if it complies with California law
governing the service of a summons.
The service made upon Weingarten did not
comply with California law governing service
of a summons. The City filed a "Declaration
Of Service By Mail" which recites that the
suggestion of death was mailed to Weingarten. Although service of the suggestion of
death on Weingarten may have complied
with California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1013(a), this provision of California law
applies not to service of a summons, but only
to service of a notice or other paper. Cal.
Civ.Proc.Code § 1016 (Deering 1994) ("The
foregoing provisions of this Chapter do not
apply to the service of a summons or other
process/'); Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal.App.3d 808, 821, 109 CaLRptr.
402 (1973) (Cal.Civ.Proc.Code §§ 1013 and
1013(a) do not apply to the service of a
summons). Although California law does
permit service of a summons by mail, such
service is valid only if a signed acknowledgment is returned and other requirements are
complied with, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 415.30
(Deering 1994); Tandy Corp. v. Superior
Court, 117 CaLApp.3d 911, 913,173 CaLRptr.
81 (1981) (service by certified mail does not
constitute constructive service where acknowledgment not executed and returned
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.30), or a copy is also left at the
person's office or dwelling. Cal.Civ.Proc.
Code § 415.20. That did not occur here.
Thus, service of the suggestion of death was
not made "pursuant to the law of the state

DELAYE v. AGRIPAC, INC.
Cite i s 39 F3d 235 (9th Ctr. 1994)

for the service of a summons." Fed.
R.CIV.P. 4(e)(1).
Because service of the suggestion of death
vis not made pursuant to Rule 4, as provided for in Rule 25(a)(1), the 90 day period was
not triggered. Therefore, the order of the
district court dismissing the action is reined and the case is remanded to the district court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

S?

: « Y NUMBER SYSTEM
- ^ * ^ ^ ^ i

Dennis DELAYE, Individually & on Behalf of the Agripac, IncVDennis Delaye
"Employment Contract", Plaintiff-Appellee,

235

erned by ERISA, and (2) district court
lacked jurisdiction over dispute.
Appeal dismissed; cause remanded.

1. Pensions <8=»139
Employer did not waive argument that
president and chief executive officer's
(CEO's) contract was not "plan" under
ERISA since it did not involve ongoing administrative scheme, even though district
court focused on whether one-person contract could be "plan" under ERISA, where
employer raised issue whether president/CEO's employment contract was
ERISA plan. Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, §§ 2^*402, as amended,
29 U.&CA §§ 1001-1461.
2. Pensions @=>23

AGRIPAC, INC., an Oregon corporation,
Defendant-Appellant (Two Cases).
Dennis DELAYE, Individually & on Behalf of the Agripac, Inc/Dennis Delaye
"Employment Contract", Plaintiff-Appellant,

AGRIPAC, INC. an Oregon corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
N o s 93 35257
~
. 93-35398 and 93-35578.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
^ e d and Submitted Sept. 13, 1994.
Decided Nov. 3, 1994.
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ERISA is designed to protect employees
from losing their pensions and benefits due
to employer mismanagement. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 24022, as amended, 29 U.S.CA §§ 1001-1461.
3. Pensions @=»28
Provisions for severance pay may constitute employee welfare benefit plan within
meaning of ERISA. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 2-4022, as
amended, 29 U.S.CJL §§ 1001-1461.
4. Pensions @=>28
Employment contract of president and
chief executive officer (CEO) of company did
not implicate ongoing administrative scheme,
and thus was not "plan" under ERISA,
where once company decided to terminate
president/CEO, severance calculation became
straightforward computation of one-time obligation. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 2-4022, as amended, 29
U.S.CA §§ 1001-1461.
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5. Federal Courts @=>205
Employment contract of president and
chief executive officer (CEO) of company was
not "plan" governed by ERISA, and thus his
claim that his contract was breached did not
present federal question and district court
lacked jurisdiction to resolve dispute. 28
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interpreted to require such corroboration in
future cases not before me.
I am satisfied to join the district court
which held that, considering the record as a
whole, there were insufficient "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," as required by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100
S.Ct 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), to ensure
that the hearsay statements were reliable,
and I would affirm solely on that ground.

of life insurance coverage would be limited
to amount employer would have paid had
employee not been terminated, rather than
proceeds of policy; (3) lump-sum pension
benefits received by employee would be
offset against claimed damages; (4) liquidated damages would be assessed only
upon net loss after offsets; and (5) offset
for lump-sum pension benefit exceeded
claimed damages, and thus, no relief could
be awarded.
Affirmed.

| KEY NUMBII SYSTEM >

1. Federal Courts <s=>18
Where district courts dismissed federal
claim prior to trial, dismissal of pendent
state law contract claim was proper.
Marguerite FARISS, Administratrix of
the Estate of Ewell W.
Fariss, Appellant,
v.
LYNCHBURG FOUNDRY, a Mead
Corporation, Appellee.
Ewell W. FARISS, Appellee,
v.
LYNCHBURG FOUNDRY, a Mead
Corporation, Appellant
Nos. 84-2137, 84-2169.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit
Argued April 1, 1985.
Decided Aug. 5, 1985.
In action under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, administratrix of employee's estate was substituted for employee upon his death, and employer moved for
summary judgment The United States
District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, at Lynchburg, 588 F.Supp. 1369,
James C. Turk, Chief Judge, granted motion for summary judgment, and administratrix appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that; (1)
substitution of administratrix for employee
was properly allowed; (2) damages for loss

2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»363
Service of suggestion of death on counsel for decedent in age discrimination action was inadequate to commence running
of 90-day substitution period allowed by
Rule 25(aXl), and thus, substitution of decedent's personal representative, who never received such service, was timely. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 25(aXD, 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure «=»365
Where personal representative has
been appointed following death of party in
civil action, suggestion of death must be
personally served on such representative in
order to commence running of 90-day substitution period allowed by Rule 25(aXl).
FedRules Civ.Proc. Rule 25(aXl), 28 U.S.
C.A.
4. Federal Civil Procedure e»365
Under Rule 25(aXl), which governs substitution of proper successor or representative of deceased party, suggestion of death
may be served upon party through his attorney, but nonparties must be personally
served. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rules 4(dXl),
5(b), 25(aXD, 28 U.S.C.A.
5. Abatement and Revival «=>52, 72(2)
Claim under the Age Discrimination
and Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq.,
29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq., survives death of
original plaintiff and is subject to revival

FARISS v. LYNCHBURG FOUNDRY
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Cite u 769 F.2d 958 (1985)

by legal representative as a matter of federal law.

have been in but for unlawful discrimination.

S. Federal Courts <&=»401
Where federal question is presented,
federal law, rather than state law, governs
survival of action after death of plaintiff.

13. Civil Rights e»46(18)
Proceeds of employer-provided life insurance policy may not be claimed as damages for termination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq , 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; rather, only the premiums that employer would
have paid to maintain coverage had employment continued are recoverable; declining
to follow Merkel v. Scoville, Inc., 570
F.Supp. 141; Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool
Corp., 550 F.Supp. 432; aff d in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds 717 F.2d 114;
Willet v. Emory & Henry College, A21
F.Supp. 631, affd, 569 F.2d 212.

7. Attorney and Client <3=>76(2)
Attorney's agency to act ceases with
death of client, and he has no power to
continue or terminate an action on his initiative.
8. Civil Rights <s=>46(18)
"Amounts owing" which are recoverable by employee under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b),
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b), are legal damages,
unlike equitable remedies directing employment, reinstatement and promotion, and
such amounts include both items of pecuniary or economic loss such as wages, fringe
and other job-related benefits, and liquidated damages for nonpecuniary losses.
9. Abatement and Revival e=>60
Age discrimination claim for lostfringe benefits survives death of employee
who originally brought action. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
10. Civil Rights «=>46(18)
Employers guilty of age discrimination
are liable for fringe benefits they would
have provided to employee, as well as back
wages, under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
11. Civil Rights ^46(18)
Value of health or life insurance provided by employer is recoverable by employee under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
12. Civil Rights <3»46(17)
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et sea., 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 621 et seq. demands most complete relief
possible towards putting victim of age discrimination back into position he would

14. Civil Rights <s=>46(18)
Where employee elects to obtain substitute insurance following termination, the
"make whole" concept underlying damages
pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.
C.A. § 621 et seq., would permit full recovery of any additional premiums for comparable individual policy beyond what employer would have paid for group insurance.
15. Civil Rights G=>46(18)
Employee bringing action under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
has general duty to mitigate his damages
by seeking other available employment
with reasonable diligence; it is equally appropriate to require employee to purchase
substitute insurance, if he wishes to claim
any damages for loss of coverage above
employer-paid premiums.
16. Civil Rights <3»46(18)
In age discrimination action brought
by administratrix of estate of terminated
employee, who died two years after termination, employer was not liable for proceeds of employee life insurance policy
which was cancelled upon termination, absent any evidence that employee attempted
to obtain substitute coverage; therefore,
recovery would be limited to $1,337.70 that
employer would have paid in premiums had
termination not occurred. Age Discrimina-
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tion in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et
seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.

from employer both of working and not
working.

17. Civil Rights <s=>46(18)
If an employer's payment to employee
would not have been made had employee
not been terminated and such payment exceeds damages necessary, under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq., to
make employee whole, failure to offset
payment would lead to unjustified windfall.

21. Civil Rights *=>46(18)
Liquidated damages awarded under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b), for
nonpecuniary loss in an amount equal to
the pecuniary loss should be assessed only
upon plaintiffs net loss after offsets, rather than in relation to damages claimed before any offset

18. Civil Rights <s=>46(18)
Payment made entirely by employer
directly to employee is not a "collateral
benefit" so as to be exempt from offset
against damages in action under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.; rather, collateral benefits are those received
from a source distinct from employer which
are not offset because they do not discharge an obligation of employer, but serve
an independent social policy.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

22. Civil Rights <s=»46(18)
Punitive damages are not available under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621
et seq.
23. Civil Rights <3=>46(18)
Administratrix of estate of terminated
employee could recover no liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 626(b), where benefit employee received
as result of termination, in form of lumpsum pension payment he would not otherwise have received, exceeded claimed pecuniary damages as a result of termination.

19. Civil Rights <s=»46(18)
Lump-sum pension payment employee
received upon termination would be offset
from damages claimed in action brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 621 et seq., where payment would not
have been made at all if employee had
continued working until his death two
years following termination, because he
had declined survivorship option offered by
employer.

24. Civil Rights **46(17)
Even if employer's termination of employee violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq., administratrix of
employee's estate was not entitled to relief,
where damages claimed were more than
offset by lump-sum pension benefit employee received as a result of his termination,
which would not have been paid had he
died while employed.

20. Civil Rights <s=>46(18)
Where pension benefits are wrongly
withheld due to termination, benefits may
be claimed as damages in an action under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et
seq., and if such benefits would not have
been granted but for termination, it is
equally appropriate to offset them from an
award for back pay and benefits, because
employee would otherwise enjoy rewards

Nate L. Adams, III, Roanoke, Va. (Donald W. Huffman, Bird, Kinder & Huffman,
Roanoke, Va., on brief), for appellant
Edmund M. Kneisel, Atlanta, Ga.
(Charles M. Rice, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Ga., Robert C. Wood, III, Edmunds &
Williams, Lynchburg, Va., on brief), for
appellee.
Before HALL, WILKINSON and SNEEDEN, Circuit Judges.
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Ewell W. Fariss, the original plaintiff in
this action under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621
(1982) et seq.j brought suit against defendant Lynchburg Foundry Company, alleging
he had been terminated from employment
because of his age. He sought reinstatement, back pay and punitive damages.
Mr. Fariss died and his widow, Marguerite S. Fariss, was appointed administratrix
of his estate. Defendant thereafter filed a
Suggestion of Death Upon the Record,
serving a copy on the deceased plaintiffs
attorney. Mrs. Fariss was never personally served. After obtaining new counsel,
Mrs. Fariss moved to substitute herself as
plaintiff, which the district court permitted
over defendant's objection. As amended,
her complaint alleged a "willful" violation
of the ADEA, and sought only monetary
relief, with a pendent state law contract
claim.
The district court, 588 F.Supp. 1369,
granted summary judgment for defendant.
It held that plaintiff lacked a claim for
monetary relief because pension benefits
Mr. Fariss received from defendant after
his termination exceeded defendant's liability for back wages and life insurance premiums. Plaintiff appeals from the summary
judgment for defendant, while defendant
cross-appeals from the substitution of Mrs.
Fariss as plaintiff.
[1] We affirm. Mrs. Fariss was properly substituted as plaintiff under Fed.R.
Civ.P. 25(a). Plaintiff, however, would be
entitled to no monetary relief even if she
were to prevail on the merits. The proceeds of an employer-provided life insurance policy may not be claimed as the damages from a wrongful termination, but only
the premiums that would have been paid to
maintain coverage had the plaintiff remained employed. These premiums, together with back pay, are more than offset
by the pension benefits Mr. Fariss received
as a result of his termination, which must
1. Because the district court dismissed the federal claim prior to trial, it also correctly dismissed
the pendent state law contract claim. United

be deducted from any possible damages
award.1
I
Before addressing the damages issues,
we must determine whether Mrs. Fariss
was substituted as plaintiff for her deceased husband in a timely fashion. Defendant contends that because Mrs. Fariss
did not move for substitution until more
than 90 days after service of the suggestion of death on Mr. Fariss's original counsel, and no "excusable neglect" has been
shown, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(bX2), this suit must
be dismissed.
[2,3] We hold that service on decedent's counsel alone was inadequate to
commence running of the 90-day substitution period allowed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1).
Where, as here, a personal representative
has been appointed following the death of a
party, the suggestion of death must be
personally served on that representative.
Because Mrs. Fariss never received such
service, the substitution was timely.
[4] Rule 25(a)(1) governs substitution of
the proper successor or representative of a
deceased party:
If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.
The motion for substitution may be made
by any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing,
shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons, and may be served
in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after the death is suggested
upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided
here for the service of the motion, the
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 VS. 715, 726. 86
S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
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action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
The rule imposes no time limit for the
substitution other than that commenced by
proper service of a suggestion of death
upon the record.2 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice II 25.06 [2.-1]
(2d ed. 1982). As the suggestion of death
is served in the same manner as the motion
to substitute, a party may be served
through his attorney, Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b), but
nonparties must be personally served.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(1).
[5,6] The nonparties for whom Rules
25(a)(1) and 4(d)(1) mandate personal service are evidently the "successors or representatives of the deceased party." This
conclusion follows both from the language
of Rule 25(a)(1), which refers to no other
nonparties, and from the rule's underlying
policies. Rule 25(a)(1) directs that both
parties and appropriate nonparties be
served with the suggestion of death to
commence the 90-day substitution period,
for the rule seeks "to assure the parties to
the action and other concerned persons of
notice of the death so that they may take
appropriate action to make substitution for
the deceased party." 3B J. Moore & J.
Kennedy, supra. The "successors or representatives of the deceased party" contemplated by the rule are those empowered
to assert any legal claims of the decedent
not extinguished by death,3 or to defend
the estate against others' claims. Personal
service of the suggestion of death alerts
the nonparty to the consequences of death
for a pending suit, signaling the need for
action to preserve the claim if so desired.
[7] Service on decedent's attorney alone
was inadequate. The attorney's agency to
act ceases with the death of his client, see
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 120(1)
(1958), and he has no power to continue or
2. The 1963 amendment to Rule 25(a)(1) abolished the prior inflexible time limit of two years
after the death for substitution. 3B J. Moore &
J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice H 25.01[14], [15] (2d ed. 1982).
3. It is clear that an ADEA claim survives death
of the original plaintiff and is subject to revival

terminate an action on his own initiative.
Because the attorney is neither a party, nor
a legal successor or representative of the
estate, he has no authority to move for
substitution under Rule 25(a)(1), as the
courts have repeatedly recognized. See,
e.g., Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897,
900 (3d Cir.1976); Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d
983, 985 (D.C.Cir.1969); AUJundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246 (W.D.N.Y.1980).
But see Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp.
1005, 1011-12 (S.D.N.Y.1973) (suggestion
of death held properly served on decedent's
attorney where successor or representative
unknown only two days after death).
Personal service on the successor or representative is hardly an onerous burden
where, as here, the administratrix had already been appointed when service occurred. In some instances, it may prove
more difficult to determine whom to serve,
see Rende, 415 F.2d at 986; Yonofsky, 362
F.Supp. at 1011-12, but it is generally appropriate to require the serving party to
shoulder that burden, rather than permitting the absence of notice to decedent's
representative to lead to forfeiture of the
action. Absent personal service, there is
no reason to presume that the successor or
representative, who must decide whether to
pursue the claim, is aware of the substitution requirement The administratrix may
well, as here, be represented by different
counsel. Either a motion to substitute, see
Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 518-19
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 403 U.S. 904, 91
S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed.2d 680 (1971), or the
suggestion of death should have been
served on the nonparty representative of
the deceased, not merely on the deceased's
attorney, to satisfy Rule 25(a)(1). Because
Mrs. Fariss was never personally served,
the 90-day substitution period never began,
by his legal representative as a matter of federal
law. Asklar v. Honeywell Inc., 95 F.R.D. 419,
424 (D.Conn.1982). Where a federal question is
presented, federal law, rather than state law,
governs survival. 7A C. Wright & A Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1952 at 642
(1972).
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and the district court properly allowed the
substitution.
II
The principal question before us is
whether plaintiff could recover anything if
she were to prove age discrimination.
Thus, the substantive issue of discrimination, which the district court did not r e
solve, is not relevant to this appeal, and we
consider only what damages may be
claimed.
Mr. Fariss worked for Lynchburg Foundry from August 23, 1941 until his termination on April 30, 1981 at the age of 61.
He continued to receive full salary and
benefits from his employer until September
1, 1981, enabling him to retire at age 62
with no reduction in pension benefits. Had
Mr. Fariss remained employed from September 1, 1981 until his death on September 13, 1983, he would have earned, according to plaintiff, approximately $42,000 in
salary including projected increases.4 This
amount may be claimed as back pay.
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potential damages from other sources exceeding that sum.5
Plaintiff attempts to identify such damages by reference to employer-provided life
insurance coverage. Mr. Fariss was entitled to fringe benefits of employer-paid
group medical and life insurance. Full
medical coverage continued after retirement. Life insurance would have paid
twice Mr. Fariss's annual salary, or $42,000
by plaintiffs estimate, had he died while
employed, but declined to only $2,000 after
retirement. Plaintiff seeks to recover the
difference as damages. Defendant expended $5,085.28 in premiums to continue full
medical and reduced life insurance coverage from September 1, 1981 until Mr. Fariss's death. Had Mr. Fariss remained employed, defendant would have paid
$6,422.98 in premiums, an additional
$1,337.70, to insure him for the same period. In defendant's view, accepted by the
district court, plaintiff is at most allowed to
recover the cost of these additional premiums, which are insufficient to create a
claim for monetary relief.

Upon his retirement, however, Mr. Fariss
received a lump sum pension payment of
$64,742.85 from the employer-funded company retirement plan. Because Mr. Fariss
declined a survivor benefit option in July
1981 in favor of the lump sum, no pension
benefits would have been paid had he remained employed until his death. If the
lump sum pension payment is offset from
back wages, plaintiff falls $22,742.85 short
of having a claim for monetary relief. To
maintain this action, she must thus identify

Lynchburg Foundry employees could
elect to convert their group life insurance
to an individual policy, thereby preserving
full coverage after retirement by paying
the additional premium costs. No evidence
has been presented that Mr. Fariss ever
sought to purchase any substitute life insurance.6

4. Defendant contends that Mr. Fariss's back
wages would be only $39,500, based upon his
monthly salary of $1,580. For summary judgment purposes, we accept plaintiffs calculation,
as did the district court.

lief. A similar refusal to indulge in speculation
about discretionary promotions underlay this
circuit's decision in Curl v. Reavis, 740 F.2d
1323, 1330 & n. 6 (4th Cir.1984).

5. After Mr. Fariss's termination, defendant offered in late 1981 and 1982 an enhanced package of retirement benefits as an incentive to
early retirement. Mr. Fariss would have been
eligible for these benefits had he remained employed and chosen to retire rather than continue working until his death. Whether Mr. Fariss
would have elected early retirement, however, is
necessarily speculative, and accordingly we do
not consider these benefits in determining
whether plaintiff has a claim for monetary re-

6. Mary A. Dodgion, Lynchburg Foundry's Manager of Compensation and Benefits, offered in
her affidavit the following undisputed evidence:
"All employees are advised of their conversion
options in the life insurance portion of their
benefits booklets. I had several meetings
with Mr. Fariss and his wife about his retirement; however, he never asked about life
insurance and never expressed any desire to
convert his life insurance coverage after terminaition of his employment."

Ill
To avoid summary judgment, plaintiff
must offer some evidence that, were she to
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establish discrimination, monetary relief
would be due. Three damages issues are
thus presented: 1) whether plaintiff may
recover the proceeds of the life insurance
policy that Mr. Fariss would have received
had he died while employed, or only the
premiums the employer would have paid
for full coverage up to Mr. Fariss's death;
2) whether pension benefits received as a
result of the termination should be offset
from plaintiffs losses; and 3) whether
plaintiff could recover liquidated damages
under the ADEA. We hold that only the
premiums may be claimed as damages and
that no liquidated damages are available,
while the pension benefits must be offset
from back pay and other fringe benefits
due. Thus, no claim for monetary relief
exists.
A. We first consider what damages are
due in an ADEA case for loss of a life
insurance policy provided to employees by
the employer as a fringe benefit.
[8] Congress clearly intended that
fringe benefits be available as monetary
damages under the ADEA, along with back
pay. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) provides
that "[i]n any action brought to enforce
this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief
as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter, including without
limitation judgments compelling employ7. Because the ADEA incorporates the enforcement "powers, remedies, and procedures" of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 211(b), 216 (except subsection (a)), and 217,
the "amounts owing" under the ADEA are
deemed to be the "unpaid minimum wages" or
"unpaid overtime compensation" referred to in
§ 216(b) of the FLSA, as 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
indicates. Of course, the "amounts owing" under the ADEA and the relief available under the
FLSA are not the same, but Congress's decision
to link the two statutes is nonetheless relevant.
This court has held that Congress intended to
preclude any award of general damages for pain
and suffering under the ADEA, and that reimbursement and reinstatement are sufficient to
alleviate any injury from age discrimination.
Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F.2d
1292, 1295-96 (4th Cir.1979).
8. Even if fringe benefits were to be characterized as equitable in the sense of being discre-

ment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to
be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section."7
The "amounts owing" under the ADEA,
§ 626(b), are legal damages, unlike the equitable remedies directing employment, reinstatement and promotion. Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 n. 11, 98 S.Ct 866,
871 n. 11, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). These
"amounts owing" include both "items of
pecuniary or economic loss such as wages,
fringe, and other job-related benefits," and
liquidated damages for nonpecuniary losses. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong.
& Ad.News 504, 528, 535.
[9-11] It follows that a claim for lost
fringe benefits survives the death of an
employee and is proper here.8 Overwhelming judicial authority recognizes that employers guilty of discrimination are liable
for fringe benefits they would have provided to employees as well as back wages
under the ADEA. See, e.g. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 978 (9th
Cir.1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d
1003, 1021 (1st Cir.1979); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F.Supp. 1161, 1164
(S.D.N.Y.1983); Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated Merchandising Corp., 551 F.Supp.
544, 549 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Loubrido v. Hull
Dobbs Co., 526 F.Supp. 1055, 1059 (D.P.R.
tionary, as the Eighth and Second Circuits have
indicated in dealing with pension benefits under
the ADEA, see Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276. 279 n. 2 (8th Cir.1983);
Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093,
1100 (8th Cir.1982); Geller v. Markham, 635
F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir.1980), cert, denied, 451
VS. 945, 101 S.Ct. 2028, 68 L.Ed.2d 332 (1981);
Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 594 F.2d 638,
640 (8th Cir.1979), there is no reason to suppose
that a monetary claim for fringe benefits would
not survive death. Defendant, arguing that equitable claims do not survive, misleadingly cites
authorities dealing only with injunctive relief.
See Hamilton v. Rogers, 573 F.Supp. 452, 454
(S.D.Tex.1983); Mixon v. Grey Drug Stores, Inc.,
81 F.R.D. 413. 414 (N.D.Ohio 1978). By contrast, monetary claims are ordinarily not mooted by death. See, e.g., Yablonski v. United Mine
Workers, 459 F.2d 1201, 1202-03 (D.CCir.1972).
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1981); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 335 F.Supp. 231, 234-35 (N.D.Ga.
1971). Thus, the value of health or life
insurance provided by the employer, see
Coates v. National Cask Register Co., 433
F.Supp. 655, 663 (W.D.Va.1977); Combes v.
Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F.Supp. 841,
844 (W.D.Okla.1976), is recoverable where
age discrimination has occurred.
The question, of course, concerns the
proper measure of value. We reject plaintiffs contention that the proceeds of the
insurance are the appropriate measure of
value here. Typically, as in this case, the
insurance proceeds are paid not by the
employer but by a third party insurer with
whom the employer contracts.9 By electing this method of protecting its employees, the employer manifests an intent to
limit its own expenditures to definite and
regular premiums, which ordinarily provide
the basis for a damages calculation. See
Combes, 421 F.Supp. at 844. But see
Merkel v. Scoville, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 141,
146 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (refusing recovery of
premiums paid by employer but allowing
insured medical expenses).
We do not think Congress intended, as a
general rule, to transform employers into
insurers merely because an insurance policy is part of the compensation for employment. Although the insurance policy is the
benefit an employee contracts to receive,
the employer does not undertake to cover
personally risks of loss of life or illness by
purchasing a policy for employees. A
large disparity exists between what the
employer would actually have paid as premiums had Mr. Fariss remained on the job,
$1,337.70, and the liability for the entire
face value of the policy arising upon his
death, an additional $40,000. In many instances, an obligation to pay the full proceeds of a life or health insurance policy
could be staggering, amounting to many
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The disincentives to providing employees insurance as a fringe benefit are evident; faced
9. Where an employer chooses to act as insurer
for its employees, as certain businesses do rather than paying increasing premiums, a different

with such enormous potential liability, employers could be expected to consider compensating employees entirely in cash.
[12,13] We decline to follow those decisions plaintiff cites favoring recovery of
insurance proceeds or covered expenses.
See Merkel, 570 F.Supp. at 146; Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 550 F.Supp. 432, 433
(W.D.N.C.1982), ajfd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 717 F.2d 114 (4th
Cir.1983); Willett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F.Supp. 631, 633 (W.D.Va.1977),
affd, 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.1978) (Title
VII). Those courts prepared to place on
the employer the risk that an employee will
have an insured loss after termination misconstrue the "make whole" function of the
ADEA. As this court has stated, the
ADEA demands " 'the most complete relief
possible' toward putting the victim of age
discrimination back into the position he
would have been in but for the unlawful
discrimination." Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool
Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 118 (4th Cir.1983),
quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764, 96 S.Ct. 1251,
1264, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). Had Mr. Fariss not been terminated, he would have
been covered by a life insurance policy with
a $42,000 face value for the two years
before his death. This insurance coverage,
not the proceeds, is the benefit for which
the employer must be held liable. Here the
employer would in no event have been liable to the employee for the $42,000, but
only for the continuing payment of premiums. The value of being insured for a
given period is precisely the amount of the
premiums paid. To require the employer
to pay the face value of the policy would be
to compel assumption of a risk not undertaken on behalf of any other employee.
[14,15] Nor is it sufficient to respond
that an employer who discriminates in violation of the ADEA deserves to bear such a
sizable and unanticipated penalty, for in
most instances, the employee can easily
avoid the risk of being uninsured by purcase may be presented. We need not and do
not decide that question here.
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chasing an individual policy of comparable
value. Where the employee elects to obtain substitute insurance, the "make
whole" concept underlying ADEA damages, see Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
689 F.2d 481, 490 (4th Cir.1982), would permit full recovery of any additional premiums for the comparable individual policy
beyond what the employer would have paid
for group insurance. Merkel, 570 F.Supp.
at 146; Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription
Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 936, 951
(D.Colo.1979) (Title VII). An ADEA plaintiff has a general duty to mitigate his
damages "by seeking other available employment with reasonable diligence."
Cline, 689 F.2d at 488. It is equally appropriate to require a plaintiff to purchase
substitute insurance, if he wishes to claim
any damages for loss of coverage above
the employer-paid premiums. See Syvojck
v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d
149, 161 (7th Cir.1981); Buchholz v. Symons Manufacturing Co., 445 F.Supp. 706,
713 (E.D.Wis. 1978) (cases denying recovery
of lost insurance benefits where alternate
coverage not purchased by plaintiff.) This
rule of mitigation both assures a plaintiff
that he will recover the full cost of purchasing comparable insurance should he
prevail on his substantive claim, and serves
to reveal whether the employee actually
desired insurance protection, thereby avoiding a windfall recovery. Because there is
no evidence here that Mr. Fariss attempted
to obtain any substitute coverage, plaintiff
can recover only the premiums the employer would have paid. We need not consider
the measure of damages had he earnestly
attempted to procure substitute individual
coverage and found insurance unavailable
for a person of his age and health.
[16] We thus reject any employer liability for the proceeds of the employee life
insurance policy here. Plaintiffs recovery
10. A payment made entirely by the employer
directly to the employee is not a "collateral
benefit" within the meaning of NLRB v. Gullett
Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364, 71 S.Ct. 337, 339, 95
L.£d. 337 (1951) (holding unemployment compensation benefits collateral and exempt from
offset in labor case). Collateral benefits are

could only encompass the $1,337.70 that
defendant would have paid in premiums
had the termination not occurred. These
premiums, added to the $42,000 claimed in
back wages, do not exceed the $64,742.85
lump sum pension Mr. Fariss received.
[17,18] B. We agree with the district
court that the pension benefits received in
a $64,742.85 lump sum by Mr. Fariss following his termination should be offset
from the damages plaintiff claims. An
ADEA damages award "should only make
the wrongly discharged employee monetarily whole under his employment contract; it
should not provide a windfall.,, Cline, 689
F.2d at 490. If an employer's payment
would not have been made had the employee continued working, it exceeds the damages necessary to make the plaintiff whole,
and failure to offset it would necessarily
lead to a windfall. EEOC v. Sandia
Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626 (10th Cir.1980)
(severance pay).10
[19,20] Such is the case here. Had Mr.
Fariss continued working until he died, the
pension would not have been paid at all,
since he had declined the survivorship option offered by the employer. Therefore,
he received the full benefit in direct consequence of his termination. Employer-provided pensions received as a result of termination have been generally offset from
back pay claims under the ADEA. See e.g.
Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d
76, 87 (2d Cir.1983); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept, 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, — U.S.
, 104 S.Ct
484, 78 L.E<L2d 680 (1983); Wise v. Olan
Mills, Inc., 495 F.Supp. 257, 260 (D.Colo.
1980). But see McDowell v. Avtex Fibers,
Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217-18 (3d Cir.1984),
vacated on other grounds, — U.S.
,
105 S.Ct. 1159, 84 L.Ed.2d 312 (1985).
When pension benefits are wrongfully
withheld due to termination, they may be
those received from a source distinct from the
employer, they are not offset because they do
not discharge an obligation of the employer, but
serve an independent social policy. See Gullett
Gin, 340 US. a: 364, 71 S.Ct. at 339; EEOC v.
Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624-26 (10th Cir.
1980).
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claimed as damages in an ADEA action.
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1021. If such benefits
would not have been granted but for the
termination, it is equally appropriate to offset them from an award for back pay and
benefits. Otherwise, plaintiff would enjoy
the rewards from the employer both of
working and not working. Similarly, in
NLRB v. Baltimore News American Division, 590 F.2d 554, 556 (4th Cir.1979), this
court held that employees improperly retired in violation of labor laws who elected
to return to work should have pension benefits received deducted from back wages
due. In this case, Mr. Fariss had a substantial financial gain from his termination.
Whether or not he suffered discrimination,
he was more than $20,000 ahead at the
time of his death. We cannot ignore the
reality of his position in resolving plaintiffs claim.
C. Liquidated damages are available
under the ADEA in an amount equal to
other damages where the employer is
guilty of "willful violations." 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b). As recently interpreted by the
Supreme Court, this standard requires at
least a "reckless disregard" by the employer of whether his conduct is prohibited by
the ADEA. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, — U.S.
, 105 S.Ct. 613, 624,
83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). Here plaintiff alleged a "willful" violation in her amended
complaint, and accordingly has grounds for
claiming liquidated damages if the Trans
World test is satisfied. The district court
did not address this issue.
We are concerned, however, not with
substantive liability but with a question of
calculation. Liquidated damages under the
ADEA for nonpecuniary losses are to be
"calculated as an amount equal to the pecuniary loss." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 950, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad.News 528, 535. The
question is whether the liquidated damages
should be assessed only with relation to
damages claimed before any offset, or in an
11. Punitive damages are not available under the
ADEA. Walker v. Pettit Construction Co., 605
F.2d 128, 130, modified on reh'g on other

amount equal to the net loss after offset.
Under the former view, plaintiffs claim for
$43,337.70 in back wages and insurance
premiums would be doubled before deducting the $64,742.85 lump sum pension, creating a monetary claim for relief; under the
latter, nothing would exist to be doubled.
[21] We hold that liquidated damages
should be assessed only upon the net loss
after offsets. Losses arising from a termination ought not to be artificially segregated from gains. Where there has been no
overall pecuniary loss, we do not believe
that Congress intended plaintiffs to receive
a windfall liquidated damages award.
[22,231 Our method of calculation does
not "unfairly penalize" plaintiffs under a
duty to mitigate, as asserted in EEOC v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 511 F.Supp. 309,
31^-12 (N.D.I11.1983), modified and dismissed, 755 F.2d 94 (7th Cir.1985). Rather,
it is just to withhold liquidated damages for
presumed nonpecuniary losses where a
plaintiff has fortuitously had a financial
gain from termination. Liquidated damages are not punitive in nature but compensatory. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 950 at 14, supra. Unlike punitive damages, they are
not designed to serve the independent purpose of deterring employer misconduct,11
and we see no reason to provide a compensatory award where there is no injury to
compensate. We therefore determine that
plaintiff could recover no liquidated damages here.
IV
[24] Plaintiffs damages claim for $42,000 in back wages and $1,337.70 in life
insurance premiums arising from Mr. Fariss's termination in 1981 is more than offset by the $64,742.85 lump sum pension
benefit he received as a result of that termination, and which would not have been
paid had he died while employed in 1983.
Thus, there has occurred no injury even if
plaintiff should prevail on the substantive
grounds sub nom. Frith v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 611 F.2d 950 (4th Cir.1979).
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merits, and no relief can be awarded. We
accordingly affirm the district court's summary judgment for defendant
AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Jesus Amaya QUINTEROS, Appellant.
No. 84-5219.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
t
Argued April 5, 1985.
Decided Aug. 7, 1985.

Defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, James C. Cacheris, J., of
possession and knowing transfer of false
identification documents, and he appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Sprouse, Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) Social Security cards
were "identification documents" under federal criminal statute prohibiting knowing
transfer of stolen or false identification
documents, and (2) neither statutory nor
constitutional speedy trial right was violated by 33-day delay between arrest and
indictment.
Affirmed.

1. Forgery $=>7(1)
Receiving Stolen Goods e»l
Social Security cards were "identification documents" under federal criminal
statute prohibiting knowing transfer of stolen or false identification documents; evidence showed that Social Security cards

were commonly used for identification purposes. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(2, 6), (dXl).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Forgery «=*2
Receiving Stolen Goods ^ l
For purposes of crime of knowing
transfer of stolen or false identification
documents, statute defining "identification
document" as "document made or issued
by or under the authority of the United
States Government • • • which, when completed with information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or
commonly accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals" was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1028, 1028(d)(1).
3. Indictment and Information $=»7
Where initial complaint against defendant is dismissed within 30 days of original
arrest, statutory 30-day period within
which to bring indictment runs anew from
date of second complaint against defendant. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b), (d)(1).
4. Indictment and Information «=>7
Statute providing that, after dismissal
of initial complaint, 30-day period in which
to bring indictment was to run anew from
filing of second complaint effectively excluded from 30-day limitation any period of
delay during which charges were not pending against defendant; thus, where initial
complaint against defendant had been dismissed within 30 days of original arrest,
and no subsequent complaint was ever
filed, indictment of defendant 33 days after
he was arrested and charged did not violate
his statutory speedy trial right, absent any
bad faith on part of Government 18 U.S.
C.A. § 3161(b), (dXl).
5. Indictment and Information «=»7
Delay of 33 days between arrest and
indictment did not violate defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial, absent any
showing of prejudice caused by delay.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.

984

415 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and
BURGER and LEVENTHAJL, Circuit Judges.
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:

.

The District Court held that Rule
25(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure required dismissal of the
plaintiffs' tort action because defendant's counsel had filed a suggestion of
death of the defendant yet plaintiff had
not made any substitution of parties
within 90 days. We reverse on the
ground that the suggestion of death,
which was neither filed by nor identified a successor or representative of the
deceased, such as an executor or administrator, was ineffective to trigger the
running of the 90-day period provided
by the Rule.
Mr. and Mrs. John Rende filed an action in the District Court individually
and on behalf of their infant son who
had been struck and injured by Alfred
S. Kay while driving his car. On August 27, 1967, defendant Kay died. On
September 1, 1967, the defendant's attorney, a term used here to identify the
lawyer who had been retained by deceased to defend the action, and who had
duly entered an appearance as attorney
for defendant, filed a suggestion of
death in the District Court, giving notice to plaintiffs' attorney. That same
day there was filed in the Orphans
Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, residence of the deceased, his will
naming his widow as executrix, but the
will had not been probated, nor any legal
representative appointed for the estate
at the time of the filing of this appeal.
Plaintiffs' attorney was injured on
October 14, 1967. On returning to practice early in 1968, he learned that no
successor to defendant Kay had yet been
appointed, and he moved to certify the
1. See, e. g.f Anderson v. Yungkaut 329 U.S.
482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed. 436 (1947).
2. 4 Moore's Federal Practice, 1 25.01 [7],
510 (2a ed. 1950).
3. Rule 6. TIME * * *
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules
or by a notice given thereunder or by order

case to the ready calendar. The defendant's attorney opposed this on grounds
that discovery procedures had not been
completed. The case was delayed and
placed on the ready calendar as of June
7, 1968.
However, in April 1968, the defendant's attorney moved in his own name to
dismiss the action on the ground that
Rule 25(a) (1) required plaintiffs to
move to substitute a proper party for
the deceased within 90 days of the suggestion of death. Plaintiffs filed an opposition and motion for substitution of
the proper party, and sought an extension of the time for substitution as allowed by Rule 6(b). At argument,
plaintiffs' counsel asserted the "suggestion of death was defective in that it did
not list the name of the proper party;
that is the legal representative of the
defendant."
The court responded:
"That would not be his burden." The
court dismissed the action with prejudice.
Prior to its amendment in 1963, Rule
25(a) (1) required the court to dismiss
a case if no motion for substitution was
filed within two years after date of
death, and no extensions of this period
were allowed under Rule 6(b). The rule
was rigorously applied, often with harsh
results, 1 and was called "easily the poorest rule of all the Federal Rules." 2 In
1955 the Advisory Committee on Rules
for Civil Procedure recommended that
the two-year period be changed to a
"reasonable time" standard. In 1961
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
again suggested the Rule be made more
flexible. In 1963 the Supreme Court
made changes in Rule 25(a) (1) and in
Rule 6(b) so as to provide a 90-day time
limit from the filing of a suggestion of
death, and to give the court discretion to
extend that time. 3
of court an act is required or allowed to
be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time
in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged
if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed
or as extended by a previous order, or

BENDS v. EAT
Cite as 415 F.2d 963 (1000)

ported by these salient considerations:
(1) Applicant is seeking a patent on the
basis of tests viewed solely by him and
his consultants. (2) The testing which
took place was limited in extent—necessarily limited, says the applicant, in
view of the shortage of "sensitives," but
limited none the less. (3) The data show
the subjects performed substantially better simply by entering the cage, without
the benefit of the electrical charge,
which appellant posits as the crucial contribution of his invention—a point beyond applicant's power to explain.
The judgment of the District Court reflects application of principles that are
sound and fair, and it must be
Affirmed.

Denis RENDE et aL, Appellants,
v.
Alfred S. KAY, Appellee.
No. 22110.
United States Court of Appeals
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 11, 1969.
Decided June 4, 1969.
Action for injuries sustained by minor who was struck by an automobile
driven by defendant.
The District
Court for the District of Columbia, Edward M. Curran, J., dismissed the action
because defendant's counsel had filed a
suggestion of death of defendant yet
plaintiff had not made any substitution
rf parties within 90 days, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Leventhal, Circuit Judge, held that attorney retained to "represent" defendant
as this counsel was not a "representative
rf the deceased party" within rule prodding that motion for substitution may
be made by representative of the deceased party, and hence suggestion of
ieath made by attorney, which sugges-
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tion was neither filed by nor identified
a successor representative of deceased
defendant, such as an executor or administrator, was ineffective to trigger
the running of the 90-day period provided by the rule.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
L Federal Civil Procedure G=>364
Attorney retained to "represent"
defendant as his counsel was not a "representative of the deceased party"
within rule providing that motion for
substitution may be made by representative of the deceased party, and hence
suggestion of death made by attorney,
which suggestion was neither filed by
nor identified a successor representative
of deceased defendant, such as an executor or administrator, was ineffective to
trigger the running of the 90-day period
provided by the rule. Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc. rule 25(a) (1), 28U.S.C.A.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Federal Civil Procedure €=»364

Amendment to effect that unless
motion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after death is suggested,
action shall be dismissed as to deceased
party was intended to be given liberal
effect. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 25(a)
(1),28U.S.C.A.
8. Federal Civil Procedure G=>364
Rule providing for dismissal of action as to deceased party unless motion
for substitution is made not later than
90 days after death is suggested upon
record is not intended to act as a bar to
otherwise meritorious actions.
Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc. rule 25(a) (1), 28 U.S.
C.A.

Mr. Arthur M. Wagman, Washington,
D.C., for appellants.
Mr. Edward J. Gorman, Jr., Washington, D. C, with whom Mr. Arthur V.
Butler, Wheaton, Md., was on the brief,
for appellee.
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fendant's attorney argues, to make his
suggestion of death operative to trigger
the 90-day period even though he was
neither a successor nor representative of
the deceased, and gave no indication of
what person was available to be named
in substitution as a representative of the
deceased.4 Counsel's construction would
open the door to a tactical maneuver to
place upon the plaintiff the burden of
locating the representative of the estate
within 90 days.
We can conceive of cases wherein even
the lawyer retained to represent a defendant might know the defendant had
died, yet not readily know where his estate would be administered. In the
present case, plaintiffs attorney did
know the court of probate, but he did
not know whether probate of the will
might be contested, or who would be appointed representative of the estate.
The tactic of the defendant's attorney
would place on plaintiff the burden,
where no conventional representative
was appointed for the estate in probate
court, of instituting machinery in order
to produce some representative of the
estate ad litem, pending appointment of
the representative contemplated by law
of the domicile of the deceased.
[2,3] The amendment to Rule 25(a)
(1) was intended to dispel unwarranted
rigidity and allow more flexibility in
substitution. "It was intended that liberal effect be given to the 1963 amendment." Roscoe v. Roscoe, 126 U.S.App.
D.C. 317, 322, 379 F.2d 94, 99 (1967).
"[T]he 90 day period was not intended
to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious
actions." Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co.,
359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1966).
No injustice results from the requirement that a suggestion of death identify
the representative or successor of an estate who may be substituted as a party
for the deceased before Rule 25(a) (1)
may be invoked by those who represent
or inherit from the deceased. If the
heirs or counsel fear that delay may
4. Different considerations would be involved if the movant were a "party" in-

prejudice the litigation they may move
promptly for appointment of a representative, perhaps a temporary representative, either under the law of the
domicile or by special order in the court
wherein the litigation is pending.
The judgment is reversed and remanded to the District Court with directions
that plaintiffs' action be reinstated.
So ordered.

O

I KIT HUMIft STSTEM

TRUCK DRIVERS AND HELPERS LO
CAL NO. 728, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Petitioner,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, Respondent,
Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
Intervenor.
GEORGIA HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, Respondent,
Truck Drivers and Helpers Local No. 728,
Intervenor.
Nos. 21969, 22095.
United States Court of Appeals
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 24, 1969.
Decided June 23,1969.
Petition for Rehearing Denied
Oct. 10, 1969.
Proceeding on petition for review
and cross petition for enforcement of
order of National Labor Relations Board
upholding certification of union as bargaining agent, directing employer to barstead of someone acting for a deceased
defendant.

RENDE v. EAT
Cite as 415 F.2d 963 (1969)

The Committee Notes explaining the
amendments state:
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[1] The Advisory Committee, in outlining that suggestion of death could be
made by "the representative of the deceased party" plainly contemplated that
the suggestion emanating from the side
of the deceased would identify a representative of the estate, such as an executor or administrator, who could be substituted for the deceased as a party,
with the action continued in the name of
the representative. The addition of
"successor" in the Rule would take care
of the case of, say, the distributee of an
estate that had been distributed, but
would not make a material difference in
the aspect under consideration. Form
30, for suggestion of death, which was
provided in order to expedite and facilitate implementation of the amendment,
provides:

Present Rule 25(a) (1), together with
present Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible requirement that an action be
dismissed as to a deceased party if
substitution is not carried out within
a fixed period measured from the time
of death. The hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement
plainly appear from the cases.
* * * The amended rule establishes a time limit for the motion to substitute based not upon the time of the
death, but rather upon the time information of the death is provided by
means of a suggestion of death upon
the record. * * * A motion to
substitute may be made by any party
or by the representative of the deA.B. [described as a party, or as
ceased party without awaiting the
suggestion of death. Indeed, the mo- executor, administrator, or other reption will usually be so made. / / a resentative or successor of CD., the departy or the representative of the de- ceased party] suggests upon the record,
ceased party desires to limit the time pursuant to Rule 25(a) (1), the death
within which another may make the of C D . [describe as party] during the
motion, he may do so by suggesting pendency of this action. Added Jan. 21,
the death upon the record. (Empha- 1963, eff. July 1, 1963. [Emphasis
added.]
sis added.)
Under the amended Rule either a pary or "the successors or representatives
)f the deceased party" may avoid delay
n effecting substitution for the deceased party either by filing a motion
or substitution or by suggesting death
>n the record and thus triggering the
K)-day period which begins with suggesion of death.
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the
act to be done where the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect; but
it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b),
(d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in
them.
Rule 25. SUBSTITUTION
OF PARTIES
(a) Death.
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties. The
motion for substitution may be made by
any party or by the successors or repre415 F.2d—62V2

Although the attorney for the defendant
was retained to "represent" the deceased
as his counsel, he is not a person who
could be made a party, and is not a "representative of the deceased party" in
the sense contemplated by Rule 25(a)
(1).
In our opinion the Rule, as amended,
cannot fairly be construed, as the desentatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be
served on the parties as provided in Rule
5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a
summons, and may be served in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days
after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact
of the death ns provided herein for the
service of the motion, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party.
Prior to the amendment, Rule 6(b)
provided it could not be used to extend
time under Rule 25.

McSURELY v. McCLELLAN
Cite a* 753 Fid 88 (1985)

4. United States $=>50
Doctrine of qualified immunity required dismissal of plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment claims for damages against
United States Senator, general counsel of
Senate subcommittee, and subcommittee investigator, arising from defendants' investigative use of private papers seized by
Kentucky authorities in connection with sedition charges, because the state of the law
as to whether such use trespassed on a
constitutional right was not "clearly established" at the time, as evidenced by fact
that, nine years later, five members of
Court of Appeals felt that the investigative
activity remained wholly within the law.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
5. Civil Rights ®=>13.13(3)
In action for damages against United
States Senator and two members of his
staff, arising out of their investigative use
of private papers seized by Kentucky authorities in connection with sedition
charges, plaintiffs failed to prove allegations that defendants violated their First
Amendment rights by using subcommittee
investigation to harass, intimidate and stigmatize them in order to prevent them from
continuing political and civil rights activity
in eastern Kentucky, as evidence plaintiffs
introduced tended to show that senator's
interest in investigating them related to
private feud senator had with newspaper
columnist, and they produced no evidence
suggesting that real purpose of subcommittee investigation was curtailment of their
political activities. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
1.
6. United States <s=>12
Speech or debate clause extends absolute immunity to members of Congress for
voting, conduct at committee hearings,
preparation of committee reports, authorization of committee publications and their
internal distribution, and issuance of subpoenas concerning a subject on which legislation could be had. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1,
§ 6, cl. 1.
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7. United States <3=>12
Speech or debate clause immunity shelters field investigations by a senator or his
staff. U.S.C.A. Const. Art 1, § 6, cl. 1.
8. United States e=>12
Even if plaintiffs had proved allegations that Senator and members of his staff
used instrumentality of subcommittee investigation to harass, intimidate and stigmatize them in order to prevent them from
continuing their political activity, in connection with subcommittee's use of private
papers seized from their home by Kentucky
authorities in connection with sedition
charges, recovery was precluded by immunity conferred by speech or debate clause.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1; Amend. 1.
9. Torts G=>2
Under District of Columbia choice of
law rules, Kentucky law governed commonlaw violation of privacy claim against Senate investigator arising from investigator's
use of plaintiffs' private papers taken from
their home by Kentucky law enforcement
agents in connection with sedition charges,
as Kentucky was the place from which
documents were taken and to which they
were returned, it was plaintiffs' domicile,
and place where wrong was done and harm
was initially felt.
10. Torts <3=»8.5(4, 5)
Conduct of Senate subcommittee investigator in forcing husband of owner of certain personal papers seized by Subcommittee to read through each and every
document page-by-page as investigator
watched, thereby compelling husband to
discover intimate details of owner-wife's
premarital relationships, was actionable under Kentucky law, whether construed as an
invasion of each spouse's seclusion or, in
wife's case, as publication of embarrassing
private facts.
11. Torts <3=>27
Evidence was such that reasonable jury
couid find Senate subcommittee investigator liable for invasion of privacy in connection with his conduct in forcing husband of
owner private papers appropriated by subcommittee to go through documents individ-
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Alan McSURELY and
Margaret McSurely
v.
John K. McCLELLAN, et al.,
Appellants,
Thomas Ratliff, Individually and as
sometime Commonwealth Attorney
For Pike County Kentucky.
No. 83-1444.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 9, 1984.
Decided Jan. 18, 1985.
Husband and wife brought action
against state prosecutor, United States senator, former general counsel of senate subcommittee, and former subcommittee investigator, alleging violations of constitutional
rights arising from seizure of private documents by Kentucky authorities in connection with sedition charges and their later
use by the federal defendants in connection
with a congressional investigation. All
three federal defendants died while case
was pending, and parties were substituted.
Order staying all proceedings in suit until
final disposition of a contempt prosecution
initiated by Senate against plaintiffs was
reversed and case was remanded, 426 F.2d
664. Denial of motion of federal defendants to dismiss for summary judgment was
affirmed in part and reversed in part, 553
F.2d 1277, on rehearing of 521 F.2d 1024.
Denial of motion of state prosecutor for
dismissal or for summary judgment was
affirmed, 697 F.2d 309. On remand, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, William B. Bryant, J.,
entered judgment on jury verdicts in favor
of plaintiffs. All four defendants appealed, but following a settlement agreement,
state prosecutor's appeal was dismissed.
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) party
substitution was properly effected; (2) doctrine of qualified immunity required dismissal of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment

claims; (3) there was insufficient evidence
to support jury verdicts against defendants
on First Amendment claims; (4) there was
sufficient evidence to support finding that
senate investigator unlawfully interfered
with plaintiffs' right to privacy, but there
was insufficient evidence to connect general counsel and senator to investigator's
conduct; and (5) no immunity doctrine
barred verdict against investigator for invasion of privacy.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

1. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*363
Defendants' petition for certiorari
which made reference to deaths of two of
the defendants, but which did not identify
any "representative" or "successor" plaintiffs could substitute did not start running
of 90-day time period within which motion
for substitution must be made, and thus
motion for substitution which was filed
within two weeks after defendants informed plaintiffs of whereabouts of surviving widows was timely. Fed.Rules Civ.
ProcRule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363
Limitation period of 90 days within
which one must file motion for substitution
may be subject to extensions or exemptions
when good cause is shown therefor and
party opposing substitution has not been
prejudiced by the delay. Fed.Rules Civ.
ProcRule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure e=>362
Widows of deceased defendants were
"proper parties" within meaning of rule
providing that if a party dies and claim is
not thereby extinguished, court may order
substitution of proper parties, notwithstanding that neither widow was ever designated "legal representative" of her husband's estate, since they were distributees
of the unprobated estates. Fed.Rules Civ.
ProcRule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
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Cite mi 753 F UJ88 (1985)

Opinion for the Court PER CURIAM.
PER CURIAM:
INTRODUCTION

On the evening of August 11, 1967, local
law enforcement officials of Pike County,
Kentucky, entered Alan and Margaret
McSurely's home and seized a huge quantity of books, papers, and other personal
effects. The officials arrested the McSurelys and charged them with violation of
Kentucky's anti-sedition statute. Thus began the McSurelys' seventeen-year odyssey
through the courts. They have been involved in four lawsuits here and in the
Sixth Circuit, all of which arose from the
events of August 11. This court alone has
rendered five decisions involving the
McSurelys and has issued nine separate
opinions filling nearly one hundred and fifty pages of the Federal Reporter. Today
we seek to end another episode in the
McSurelys' quest for judicial relief and
compensation stemming from the events
that began on that night seventeen years
ago.

the McSurelys' knowledge or consent,
Brick looked through the material and took
back to Washington copies of over two
hundred items, including papers of a highly
personal nature.
The McSurelys also named Thomas Ratliff as a defendant in this suit Ratliff was
the Kentucky official who gave Brick access to the McSurelys' papers. Because of
a recent settlement agreement between
him and the McSurelys, however, Ratliff
has been removed as a party defendant on
appeal.
The jury returned verdicts against each
Senate defendant for violating the McSurelys' first and fourth amendment rights under the United States Constitution and
their right to privacy under the common
law. The Senate defendants appeal from
those verdicts. The allegedly unlawful
conduct that underlay the verdicts against
all three defendants was Brick's inspection
and transportation of the documents back
to Washington, and the manner in which he
ultimately returned personal papers to the
McSurelys. The McSurelys alleged that
Senator McClellan and General Counsel
Adlerman entered into a conspiracy with
Brick to violate the McSurelys' rights and
that, as coconspirators, they are liable for
Brick's conduct.
Although the McSurelys' factual allegations are fairly straightforward, the legal
issues surrounding their claims are extremely complex, as this opinion and prior
decisions of this court indicate. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm the verdict
against the investigator, John Brick, for
violation of the McSurelys' right to privacy
under the common law. We reverse, however, all of the other verdicts.

At issue in this appeal are the McSurelys' claims for damages against three federal government officials—a Senator and
two members of his staff—for alleged violations of certain of the McSurelys' constitutional and common law rights. Those
officials are Senator John McClellan, former chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate
Government Operations Committee (the
Subcommittee), Jerome Adlerman, former
general counsel of the Subcommittee, and
John Brick, a former Subcommittee investigator. (All three defendants died while
this case was pending. 'Although parties
were substituted when deaths occurred, for
convenience we will refer to the three officials collectively as the Senate defendants
and discuss them as if they were still the
named defendants here.) The Senate defendants became embroiled in this controversy when John Brick went to Kentucky
in October 1967 to inspect the material
seized from the McSurelys' home. Without

We have narrated the factual background of this case on numerous occasions.
The appendix to this opinion sets forth a
list and brief description of the federal
court decisions that have affected the

* While this opinion is per curiam, Judge Ginsburg was primarily responsible for Parts I, II,

and III, and Judge Mikva was primarily responsible for the remaining parts.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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ually and in detail prior to their return, thus
compelling him to discover intimate details
of owner-wife's premarital relationships;
moreover, jury could reasonably conclude
that investigator's actions hanmed husband
and wife seriously both as individuals and
as a family unit, given subjective testimony
about emotional injury and objective evidence of subsequent divorce.
12. Torts <s=»27
Evidence in action seeking damages
from Senator, general counsel of senate
subcommittee, and subcommittee investigator in connection with their investigative
use of private papers seized in state prose
cution was insufficient to sustain finding
that Senator and general counsel actually
or impliedly ordered, directed, authorized
or otherwise approved tortious manner in
which investigator carried out assignment
to return documents to their owners.
13. United States e=>12
"Absolute immunity" of the speech or
debate clause cannot be used as a talisman
to insulate all conduct of all legislative
branch personnel at all times, and thus it
only protects conduct necessary to perform
duties within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6,
cl. 1.
14. United States e=»12
Employment of unlawful means to implement an otherwise proper legislative objective is not "essential to legislating," and
thus is not protected by the speech or debate clause. U.S.C.A. Const. Art 1, § 6, cl.
1.
15. United States e»12
Senate subcommittee investigator was
not protected by the absolute iimnunity afforded by the speech or debate clause from
common-law violation of privacy claim arising from his conduct in forcing husband of
owner of private papers appropriated for
investigative use to go through the documents individually and in detail, prior to
returning papers, thus compelling husband

to discover information about the premarital relationships of owner-wife, since converting what should have been a simple physical return of documents into a sadistic and
voyeuristic exercise did not fall under mantle of necessary legislative conduct. U.S.
C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
16. United States <s=>50
Doctrine of qualified immunity did not
provide any protection for Senate subcommittee investigator with regard to his violation of common-law right to privacy arising
from his conduct in forcing husband of owner of private papers appropriated for investigative use to go through the documents individually and in detail, prior to their return,
thus compelling husband to discover information about premarital relationships of
owner-wife, since doctrine does not shelter
from common-law tort liability behavior
that plainly steps beyond even extreme
edge of an official's authority.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia (Civil
Action No. 516-39).
Marc Johnston, Atty. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom J. Paul
McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty. and
Barbara L. Herwig, Atty., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Washington, D.C., were on brief,
for appellants.
Morton Stavis, Hoboken, NJ., with
whom Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin,
Charles N. Mason, Jr., Washington, D.C.,
was on brief, for appellees, Alan and Margaret McSurely.
Philip A. Lacovara, Thomas D. Goldberg
and John D. Echeverria, Washington, D.C.,
were on brief, for appellee, Thomas Ratliff.
Before MIKVA, GINSBURG
STARR, Circuit Judges.
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to organize young people to engage in
violence and demonstrations/' Trial Transcript (Tr.) of Dec. 2, 1982, at 79, reprinted
in J.A. 825, Lavern Duffy, a Subcommittee
staff member, contacted Ratliff by telephone on September 25. During that conversation, Duffy (who is not a party to this
suit) set up an appointment to come to
Kentucky to inspect the documents. The
next day, Duffy wrote a memorandum to
defendant Adlerman stating that Ratliff
"would arrange to have the [ ] records
turned over to the subcommittee upon receipt of a subpoena
" Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 35, reprinted in J.A. 1843.
On October 8, pursuant to directions
from Adlerman, defendant Brick, a Subcommittee investigator, went to Kentucky
in place of Duffy. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No.
36, reprinted in J.A. 1844. Brick inspected the material being held in Ratliff s custody at the Pike County courthouse and
took copies of 234 documents back to
Washington with him. There is conflicting
evidence in the record concerning how
Brick ultimately came to possess those particular documents. The jury could have
found either that he was given them by one
of Ratliff s assistants or that he selected
them himself while at the courthouse.
Among the documents were numerous personal letters and notes, including a love
letter from columnist Drew Pearson to
Margaret McSurely that was addressed
"Dearest Cucumber."
Upon his return to Washington, Brick
conferred with Adlerman and with Senator
McClellan, then-chairman of the Subcommittee. Brick showed McClellan only one
of the documents—the "Dearest Cucumber" letter. Both McClellan and Adlerman
agreed to Brick's suggestion that Brick go
back and inspect more of the seized material. On October 12-13, Brick inspected the
material in Kentucky and took notes on
what he found. He then returned to Washington and prepared subpoenas for Senator
McClellan's signature.
On October 18, Brick personally served
congressional subpoenas on the McSurelys
for numerous documents that had been

seized from their home in August Because the documents were not in the
McSurelys' possession, Brick also served
subpoenas on Ratliff and the U.S. Marshal.
Upon service of the subpoenas, the
McSurelys learned, for the first time, that
the Subcommittee was interested in their
material. They immediately filed a motion
in the district court to prevent Ratliff and
the U.S. Marshal from complying with the
subpoenas.
The McSurelys' effort to block Ratliff
and the U.S. Marshal from complying with
the subpoenas lasted several months and
included two trips to the United States
Supreme Court The history of that litigation is chronicled in more detail in the appendix. The three-judge court ordered
Ratliff and the U.S. Marshal to comply
with the subpoenas, but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
ordered instead that the material be returned to the McSurelys. McSurely v.
Ratliff, 398 F.2d 817 (6th Cir.1968). The
court held that the documents must be
returned because the district court's right
to retain the material had expired once the
time for taking an appeal had elapsed. The
court, however, declined to rule on the validity of the subpoenas. It reversed "without prejudice to the right of the Senate
Committee to proceed with the enforcement of the subpoenas against Mr. and
Mrs. McSurely." Id at 818.
The documents were finally returned to
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968, over
three months after the Court of Appeals
decision. Pursuant to a request by Adlerman, Ratliff arranged to coordinate return
of the documents with issuance of new
subpoenas on the McSurelys.
Alan McSurely testified as to the manner
in which he ultimately received the documents: he stated that Brick handed the 234
copies to him, one by one, and asked him to
read through them to verify that the copies
were, in fact, identical to the originals.
This was the first time the McSurelys
learned which documents had been in the
Subcommittee's possession. Those documents included the "Dearest Cucumber"
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McSurelys over the last seventeen years.
We summarize that history only briefly
here.
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely
were field organizers in Pike County, Kentucky, for a civil rights organization known
as the Southern Conference Educational
Fund, Inc. On August 11 of that year
(unless otherwise stated, all dates refer to
1967), county officials obtained an arrest
warrant charging Alan McSurely with sedition against the state under Ky.Rev.Stat.
§ 432.040. They also obtained a warrant
to search the McSurelys' home for "seditious matter.'' Pursuant to that warrant,
over a dozen men, many of them armed,
came to the McSurelys* home and seized all
of their papers, several hundred books, and
some of their clothing. Both Alan and
Margaret McSurely were arrested and
charged with sedition.
The Pike County prosecutor at the time,
Thomas Ratliff, helped to organize the
search and arrests. Ratliff had responsibility for prosecuting the McSurelys under
the sedition statute. His involvement in
this case is chronicled in more detail in
McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C.
Cir.1982). The day after the search, Ratliff
stated publicly that he intended to make
the McSurelys1 materials available to congressional committees.
Five days after their arrest, and while
they were still in jail, the McSurelys filed
suit in federal court to have the Kentucky
statute declared unconstitutional and to enjoin the threatened prosecution. Because
the suit sought to enjoin enforcement of a
state statute, a three-judge district court
was convened to consider the McSurelys*
claims. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§ 1, 62 Stat. 968 (repealed 1976). At a
hearing on September 1, the McSurelys*
attorney asked the court, either to seal the
seized material or to place it in the exclusive custody of the U.S. Marshal. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 44, reprinted in Joint
Appendix (J.A.) 1863. Following this request, the attorneys for both sides met
with the judges in chambers. There was
no record entry as to what took place in

chambers, except as was indicated ten days
later in a court order. In that order, the
court stated, in relevant part, that "[t]he
parties having agreed thereto ... the material, literature and all objects seized herein
shall be kept in the custody of ... Thomas
B. Ratliff, and that same shall be made
available to the United States Marshal
. . . . " Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 7, reprinted
in J.A. 1782-83. The court further ordered
the U.S. Marshal and Ratliff to make an
inventory of the material, and ordered Ratliff to return "such personal articles and
property as he does not deem material to
the investigation and prosecution herein."
Id, at 1783. Ratliff prepared the inventory, but never returned any of the property
Three days later, on September 14, the
three-judge court, one judge dissenting, issued an order declaring the Kentucky sedi
tion statute unconstitutional. The fina
paragraph of that order directed Ratliff tc
retain custody of the seized material pend
ing appeal of the judgment. That para
graph, referred to throughout these pro
ceedings as the "safekeeping order," stat
ed:
It is further ordered that all books, pa
pers, documents and other material nov
in the custody of the Commonwealth At
torney of Pike County, Ratliff, reflects
by the Inventory filed in this action cor
tinue to be held by him in safe keepinj
until final disposition of this case by aj
peal or otherwise.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 9, reprinted in J.A
1796. One month later, the court issued a
opinion setting forth its rationale for d«
daring the sedition statute unconstitutioi
al. The opinion made no mention of th
"safekeeping ordfer." McSurely v. Ratlij%
282 F.Supp. 848 (E.D.Ky.1967).
The Senate defendants first became ii
volved with the McSurely material som<
time in September, over a month after tt
McSurelys' home was searched. The Sul
committee was conducting a wide-rangir
investigation into civil and criminal diso
ders throughout the country. After beir
notified by a Washington attorney th
Ratliff had information regarding effor
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The Senate defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment claiming that the
Speech or Debate Clause of the United
States Constitution, art. I, § 6, cl. 1, immunized them from liability, but the district court denied their motion. Following
the Supreme Court's decision in Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct 2018, 36
L.Ed.2d 912 (1973), the Senate defendants
moved for reconsideration or certification
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of the issue of
legislative immunity. After the district
court denied this motion, the Senate defendants filed the second interlocutory appeal in this case. The district court stayed
all pretrial discovery pending resolution of
those claims on appeal.
A divided panel of this court agreed with
the Senate defendants that the Speech or
Debate Clause immunized them from liability for most of the McSurelys' claims.
McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024
(D.C.Cir.1975). The full court vacated the
panel decision and agreed to rehear the
case en banc. The court's en banc decision
established the framework for the subsequent trial against the Senate defendants
and for the issues raised on this appeal.
McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277
(D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc) (McSurely II)
B. The En Banc Opinions
The ten judges sitting en banc in
McSurely II agreed on several issues. The
court unanimously agreed to dismiss four
of the seven claims against the Senate defendants. First, because there was no factual allegation in the amended complaint
that the Senate defendants were involved
in any way in the raid of the McSurelys'
home, the court dismissed all claims based
on the initial search and seizure in August
1967. Id. at 1288, 1303 n. 2. Second, the
full court also agreed that three claims
were based on protected legislative conduct
and, therefore, had to be dismissed. Those
claims involved the inspection of the 234
documents by the Subcommittee staff in
Washington, the use of the documents as
the basis for issuing the subpoenas, and
the use of the documents to procure the
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contempt citations against the McSurelys.
Id. at 1296-98, 1303 n. 2.
The court, however, denied the Senate
defendants' motion for summary judgment
as to the remaining three claims. The
court unanimously agreed that dissemination of the documents outside the Congress
would not be protected by the doctrine of
legislative immunity. Id. at 1285-86, 1303.
The court was equally divided, however,
over whether Brick's inspection of the
seized material and transportation of the
234 copies to Washington was protected
activity. Because the judges split five-five
over the availability of Speech or Debate
immunity for Brick's conduct, the district
court's denial of the defendants' summary
judgment motion was given effect insofar
as it pertained to the claims arising from
Brick's inspection and transportation of the
documents.
With regard to those claims, all ten
judges agreed that immunity is not available under the Speech or Debate Clause
when illegal means are used to achieve an
otherwise legitimate legislative purpose.
Id. at 1287-88, 1303 n. 3. The issue that
divided the court was whether, under any
conceivable set of facts, the Subcommittee
violated the McSurelys' fourth amendment
rights. Specifically, the court was divided
over the question of whether Brick's inspection and transportation of the documents constituted a violation of the fourth
amendment, independent of the initial seizure by Kentucky officials.
C. Proceedings Subsequent to the En
Banc Rulings
Following issuance of the en banc opinions, the defendants filed a petition for writ
of certiorari which the Supreme Court
granted. McClellan v. McSurely, 434 U.S.
888, 98 S.Ct. 260, 54 L.Ed.2d 173 (1977).
Following briefing and oral argument, however, the writ was dismissed. McAdams v.
McSurely, 438 U.S. 189, 98 S.Ct. 3116, 57
L.Ed.2d 704 (1978).
On remand a question arose concerning
substitution of parties for Brick and Adlerman. Both men had died while the Speech
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letter and Margaret McSurely's personal
diary, neither of which Alan McSurely had
seen before. The papers revealed the details of a love affair between Drew Pearson
and Margaret McSurely several years earlier, before the McSurelys had met. Alan
McSurely learned of that affair for the
first time when he read the documents
handed to him by Brick. Alan McSurely
testified: "Brick got, he kept pushing me
to keep on reading this stuff. He would
give me these letters and say, 'Make sure
they are the same now, read them all the
way through/ " Tr. of Nov. 23, 1982, at
107, reprinted in J.A. 612.
Once the documents had been returned
to the McSurelys, Brick had new subpoenas
served on them. That night, after preparing their own inventory of the 234 documents, the McSurelys destroyed the documents without notifying the Subcommittee.
After the McSurelys appeared before the
Subcommittee on March 4, 1969, and refused to produce the subpoenaed documents,
the full Senate approved a resolution authorizing the Justice Department to prosecute the McSurelys for contempt of Congress. S.Res. 191, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
Jury verdicts were returned against the
McSurelys on the contempt charges, but
this court reversed those convictions.
United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178
(D.C.Cir.1972). A majority of the panel
held that the exclusionary rule barred admission of the subpoenas at trial because
they were based on information derived
from an unconstitutional search and seizure by the Kentucky officials and by
Brick. Id. at 1194. Judge Wilkey concurred in the result, but disagreed with the
majority's reliance upon the exclusionary
rule and its fourth amendment analysis.
He would have reversed the convictions on
the ground that the government had failed
"to establish one of the necessary elements
of its case: pertinency of its demands to
the valid subject of the legislative inquiry."
Id. at 1203.

THE SUIT FOR DAMAGES

A. The Initial Proceedings
The initial complaint in this action was
filed on March 4, 1969, the same day the
McSurelys appeared before the Subcommittee. The suit was initially brought by the
McSurelys and four organizations against
all members of the Subcommittee, the Subcommittee^ chief counsel, and the Subcommittee's general counsel. The complaint
was based on various first and fourth
amendment claims. The plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the McSurelys did not have
to comply with the subpoenas, an injunction to restrain the institution of any criminal proceedings against the McSurelys for
failing to comply with the subpoenas, and
damages. The district court stayed all proceedings in the suit until thirty days after
final resolution of the criminal case against
the McSurelys. In the first of three interlocutory appeals in this case, we reversed
that order as overbroad and remanded for
further proceedings McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664 (D.C.Cir.1970) (McSurely
/).
The district court granted the McSurelys
leave to file an amended and supplemental
complaint in 1971. See R. 33, reprinted in
J.A. 143. In the amended complaint, the
four organizations were dropped as plaintiffs and all Subcommittee members, except for McClellan, were dropped as defendants. The amended complaint added
Ratliff and Brick as defendants who, along
with Adlerman, McClellan and Donald
O'Donnell, chief counsel of the Subcommittee, were sued individually and in their
official capacities. The McSurelys dropped
their claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief but retained their claims for damages. They sought compensatory and punitive damages against each defendant for
violation of their constitutional rights under the first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth
amendments. The theory of the case was
that the unlawful actions of the defendants, both individually and collectively, resulted in the McSurelys* loss of employment, invasion of privacy, and humiliation
and embarrassment.
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U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396
(1982), requires dismissal of the McSurelys'
fourth amendment claims. In Part III, we
hold that there is insufficient evidence—admissible within the limitations imposed by
the Speech or Debate Clause—to support
the jury verdicts against the Senate defendants on the first amendment claims. In
Part IV, we hold that there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding that Bnck
unlawfully interfered with Alan McSurely's
and Margaret McSurely's right to privacy
under established common law precedents,
but that there was insufficient-evidence to
connect Adlerman and McClellan to Brick's
conduct. We also conclude that no immunity doctrine bars the verdict against Brick.
PART I: Substitution of Parties
The Senate defendants preliminarily contend that the district court should have
dismissed the McSurelys' claims against
Brick and Adlerman "because plaintiffs did
not seasonably effect substitutions of
'proper parties' after Brick's and Adlerman's deaths," as required by FED.R.CIVP.
25(a)(1).1 Brief for the Senate Appellants
at 65 (section heading).2 The district court,
relying on our decision in Rende v. Kay,
415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.1969), granted the
McSurelys' motion to substitute parties and
rejected the Senate defendants' request to
dismiss plaintiffs' claims for failure to comply with Rule 25(a)(1). McSurely v. McAdams, No. 516-69 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1979)
("Memorandum and Order"), reprinted in
J.A. 209. We affirm this aspect of the
district court's decision.
Defendant Brick died on October 15,
1973; defendant Adlerman, on October 1,

1975. Each had named his surviving
spouse executor of his estate and provided
for her to receive all his assets. The Brick
and Adlerman wills were not probated,
however. Therefore, neither widow was
ever designated "legal representative" of
her husband's estate. See J.A. 207-08 (affidavits of Mary Brick and Evelyn Adlerman).
Rule 25(aXD of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governs substitution of parties
on death; it reads:
If a party dies and the claim is not there
by extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties. The
motion for substitution may be made by
any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall
be served on the parties as provided in
Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons, and may be served
in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after the death is suggested
upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
Appellants assert that the McSurelys did
not satisfy Rule 25(a)(l)'s terms in two
principal respects: they contend that the
substitution motion was untimely and that
the parties substituted—decedents' widows—were improper because they were not
"legal representatives." Neither contention has merit.3

1. The text of Rule 25(a)(1) is set out infra p.
97.

3. Appellants conceded, in response to this
court's December 4, 1974, inquiry, that the
McSurelys' claim against Bnck (and presumably
Adlerman as well) survived his death and was
maintainable against representatives of his estate. See McSurely 11 553 F.2d at 1280 n. 1.
Appellants withdrew the concession on remand,
but the district court rejected their survivability
contention on the merits. See Memorandum
and Order, reprinted in J.A. 209. On return to
this court, appellants do not press the claim
survival issue with any vigor, see Brief for the
Senate Appellants at 65 & n. 46, and we find no

2. Senator McClellan also died during the pendency of this case. His death occurred after the
Senate defendants filed their certiorari petition,
however, and they substituted a proper party in
his place pursuant to Supreme Court rule. See
Brief for the Senate Appellants at 65 n. 47.
Thus, appellants' Rule 25(a)(1) contention pertains only to Brick and Adlerman. We note that
Rule 25(a)(1) permits the successors or representatives of any deceased party to effect substitution without awaiting a motion by the adverse
Part}.
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or Debate appeal was pending in this court
See McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 1280 n. 1. In
their petition for writ of certiorari, the defendants noted that Brick and Adlerman
had died and that their estates had not
been probated, but that the assets of
those estates had been distributed to their
respective widows. The McSurelys subsequently filed a motion with the district
court requesting that the widows be substituted as parties defendant in place of
their late husbands. Over the government's vigorous objections, the district
court granted that motion. The government here appeals from that order, claiming that the widows are not proper parties
to this suit and that, in any event, any
claims that the McSurelys may have had
against the widows have long since abated.
(Adlerman's widow died while this case was
pending and her estate was named as a
party defendant in her place.)

against Ratliff, McClellan, Adlerman, and
Brick as to each plaintiff under three separate theories: violation of the McSurelys'
first amendment rights; violation of the
McSurelys' fourth amendment rights; and
violation of the McSurelys' common law
right to privacy. The jury returned verdicts and assessed damages in favor of the
plaintiffs on each count, and awarded the
McSurelys approximately $1.6 million in
damages, most of it against Ratliff. The
total damages assessed against the Senate
defendants were approximately $200,000
against McClellan, $84,000 against Adlerman, and $105,000 against Brick. All four
defendants appealed. Following the settlement agreement, however, see supra p. 91,
we dismissed Ratliff s appeal.

D. Issues on Appeal
Defendants have raised numerous issues
on appeal. Those not discussed in this
Following the Supreme Court's dismissal opinion have been considered by the court
of the writ of certiorari, the McSurelys and rejected. We also have rejected the
amended their complaint to include, inter defendants' request to reconsider the legal
alia, a claim for violation of their common issues resolved by the en banc court in
law right of privacy and a request for 1976. Although the opinions of an equally
reasonable attorneys' fees. R. 341, re- divided court may not be cited for preceprinted in J.A. 311. At the close of dis- dential value in this circuit, Judge Levencovery, Ratliff moved for dismissal or, in thal's opinion for the prevailing judges conthe alternative, for summary judgment on stitutes law of the case. His opinion was
grounds of absolute and qualified prosecu- considered to be the "majority" opinion for
torial immunity. The district court denied the court and, significantly, it established
his motions and, in the third interlocutory the framework for the conduct of the trial.
appeal taken in this case, we affirmed that We refuse to remand now on the basis of a
denial. McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d new theory of Speech or Debate immunity
309 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (McSurely or fourth .amendment law, for "[a]s matters wend closer to final disposition, stabiliIII).
ty takes on increased importance." 18 C.
The McSurelys' case finally went to trial Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
in the fall of 1982 and lasted for two Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 792
months. During the course of the trial, the (1981).
district court entered directed verdicts elimOur opinion is divided into four parts. In
inating the McSurelys' claim against
Part
I, we hold that party substitution was
O'Donnell and their claim regarding the
properly
effected in this case. In the redefendants' alleged dissemination of documaining
sections,
we deal with each of the
ments outside the Subcommittee. The
McSurelys have not appealed from those substantive claims against the defendants.
In Part II, we hold that, because the state
directed verdicts.
of the law was unclear at the time in quesThe verdict forms submitted to the jury tion, the doctrine of qualified immunity
required separate findings of liability enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
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alize the Rule and to allow flexibility in
substitution of parties"); Kilpo v. Bowman
Transportation, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 26, 27
(N.D.Ga.1980) (same); National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Whitecrafi Unlimited, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507, 509 (E.D.N.Y.1977)
(same). Several courts, including our own,
have stated that the distributee of a distributed estate is a "proper party" for substitution under Rule 25(a)(1). See, e.g., Rende
v. Kay, 415 F.2d at 985; Ashley v. Illinois
Central Gulf Railroad Co., 98 F.R.D. 722,
724 (S.D.Miss.1983); cf. Kilgo v. Bowman
Transportation, Inc., 87-F.R.D. 26, 27
(N.D.Ga.1980) (person named as executor
in plaintiffs will, but who does not become
executor because he elects statutory share
rather than probating will, is a substitute
ble "proper party").8 Sensibly construing
Rule 25(a)(1), we hold that Mary Brick and
Evelyn Adlerman were "proper parties"
for the McSurelys to substitute.
PART II: Fourth Amendment Claims
[4] In 1976, in McSurely II, this court,
sitting en banc, divided evenly (five-five) on
the question whether, under any conceivable set of facts, the Senate defendants
could be found to have violated the
McSurelys' fourth amendment rights. The
even division resulted in a remand for trial,
The trial of the fourth amendment claims
yielded jury verdicts in favor of the
McSurelys against all three Senate defendants.7 Guided by the Supreme Court's
1982 restatement of the qualified immunity
defense sheltering government officials
from civil liability, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396
(1982), we overturn those verdicts and direct dismissal of the claims.

Judge Leventhal's McSurely II opinion,
representing the views of five members of
this court, declared that a congressional
investigation utilizing means prohibited by
the fourth amendment warrants no Speech
or Debate Clause protection. See 553 F.2d
at 1287-88. In holding that the McSurelys'
fourth amendment claims were subject to
further proceedings, Judge Leventhal stated
that the record afforded "more than
me
rely colorable substance" to the McSure&' charge that Brick "did indeed violate
the Fourth
Amendment by his inspection
and transportation back to Washington of
documents that were under a court-imP° Sed 'safekeeping order.' " Id at 1289.
Furthermore, Judge Leventhal said that
™e McSurelys had made a prima facie
show
ing that Brick's investigative activity
™b*e& the three-judge court's safekeepllig arder
- /d a t 129L
On the other hand, Judge Wilkey's opinion
' presenting the views of five different
members of the court, stated that Brick s
actions "could never, on all logic and precedent, be held an 'unreasonable search and
secure' within the [meaning of the] Fourth
Amendment." Id at 1305 <Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey preliminarily attempted, in great detail, to demonstrate
that Brick's conduct did not violate the
three-judge court's safekeeping order. See
id. at 1310-15. But even a violation of the
safekeeping order, in Judge Wilkey's view,
at most would have rendered Brick subject
to a contempt of court citation; under
Judge Wilkey's analysis, the asserted violation would not have exposed Brick to liability in damages for a fourth amendment
violation. Id. at 1311 n. 41. Judge Wilkey
questioned most insistently "how the in-

6. Appellants cite Mallonee v. Fahey, 200 F.2d 7. Recovery from the Senate defendants on
fourth amendment grounds was premised on
918, 919 (9th Cir.1952) (Douglas, Circuit Justice)
the charge that Brick violated the three-judge
as support for their claim that a "proper party"
court's safekeeping order by inspecting, selectunder Rule 25(a)(1) must be a decedent's "legal
ing, and retrieving 234 xerox copies of docurepresentative." Brief for the Senate Appellants
ments seized in the August 11, 1967, raid of the
at 67. That decision, however, held only that
McSurely home and held by Ratliff.
Rule 25(a)(1) requires substitution of a "legal
The jury awards against all defendants for
representative" as opposed to a mere
fourth amendment violations were as follows:
"successor!] in office" 200 F.2d at 919 (emphaRatliff McClellan Adlerman Brick
sis added); the court was not attempting any
distinction between legal representatives and Alan McSurclv
$61,720 $39,280 $19,846 $23,320
distributees of unprobated estates.
Margaret McSurely $51,280 $53,360 $14,000 $18,800
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We turn first to the timeliness question.
The deaths of Brick and Adlerman were
noted for the first time in litigation papers
submitted in this case in the McSurely II
petition for certiorari, filed May 20, 1977.
The reference to the deaths made in the
certiorari petition, however, did not identify
the decedents' "successors" or "representatives." By letter dated July 29, 1977, the
McSurelys asked the Department of Justice
for the surviving widows' "whereabouts".
See Letter from Morton Stavis to Daniel M.
Friedman, Acting Solicitor General (July
29, 1977), reprinted in J.A. 194. On August 17, 1977, after the plaintiffs moved
for an order directing disclosure, appellants
supplied the requested information. See
J.A. 191-200. Within two weeks thereafter, the McSurelys moved, successfully,
to substitute widows Mary Brick and Evelyn Adlerman as parties defendant. See
Motion for Substitution (Aug. 30, 1977),
reprinted in J.A. 201.4
[1,2] Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir.1969), as the district court recognized,
instructs that a suggestion of death does
not set in motion Rule 25(aXl),s ninety-day
limitation unless the suggestion "identifies] the representative or successor ...
who may be substituted as a party." 415
F.2d at 986. It would hardly be consistent
with "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of civil actions, FED.R.CIV.P. 1,
Rende v. Kay makes plain, "to place upon
the plaintiff the burden of locating the
representative of the estate within 90
days." 415 F.2d at 986; accord Al-Jundi
v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 247 (W.D.N.
Y.1980). Appellants' argument that the
May 20, 1977, petition for certiorari, although it did not identify any "representative" or "successor" plaintiffs could substitute, nonetheless started the running of
warrant for disturbing the district court's disposition of it.
4. Evelyn Alderman died on June 22, 1980. The
district court thereafter substituted representatives of her estate as parties defendant. See
McSurely v. McAdams, No. 78-1916 (D.D.C.
Sept. 8, 1980) (Memorandum and Order granting motion for substitution), reprinted in J.A.
216.

Rule 25(aXl)'s ninety-day time period, is
impossible to reconcile with Rende i\ Kay.
We follow that pathmarking precedent, and
accordingly hold that no time ran against
the McSurelys under Rule 25(a)(1) before
August 17; their August 30 motion, there
fore, was well within the Rule's time
frame.5
[3] Nor is there greater weight in appellants' alternative objection, their claim
that the widows of Brick and Adlerman
could not be "proper parties" within the
meaning of Rule 25(a)(1) because no court
with "jurisdiction over the decedent's estate" had ever named them the deceased
party's "legal representative." Brief for
the Senate Appellants at 67. This argument too is incompatible with our Rende v.
Kay decision. In essence, appellants say
that no "proper party" could exist to be
substituted for Brick and Adlerman unless
the McSurelys themselves assumed the
burden of qualifying such a party. Id. at
68. This the McSurelys could have done,
appellants maintain, by "securfing] the appointment of representatives ad litem for
the estates of Brick and Adlerman." Id. at
69. But in Rende v. Kay, we stated that
compelling a plaintiff to "institute] machinery in order to produce some representative of the estate ad litem" would contravene the purpose of amended Rule 25(a)(1)
"to dispel unwarranted rigidity and allow
more flexibility in substitution." 415 F.2d
at 986.
Appellants, in short, urge an inequitable
application of Rule 25(a)(1) that finds no
support in the rulemakers' design. See,
e.g., Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897,
900 (3d Cir.1976) (purpose of the 1963
amendments to Rule 25(a)(1) was "to liber5. The 90-day limitation, we note, may be subject
to extensions or exemptions when good cause is
shown therefor and the party opposing substitution has not been prejudiced by the delay. See,
e.g.. Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292,
296 (2d Cir.1966); AUJundi v. Rockefeller, 88
F.R.D. 244, 247 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Yonofsky v.
Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1014-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
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The McSurelys first emphasize the deposition testimony of Judge Moynahan (one
of the members of the three-judge court
convened to consider the McSurelys' constitutional attack upon Kentucky's sedition
statute). They claim the judge's testimony
renders "very doubtful" "Ratliffs version"
of events "upon which the dissenters r e
lied," id.; according to that version, Ratliff
contacted Judge Moynahan before affording Brick access to the documents, and the
judge gave Ratliff permission to make the
papers available to Brick. But Judge Wilkey twice stated that his interpretation of
the safekeeping order did not depend upon
the Moynahan-Ratliff interchange. See
553 F.2d at 1308 n. 27, 1312. We note,
furthermore, that Judge Moynahan's trial
testimony did not contradict Ratliffs view
of the timing sf their conversation. See
Tr. of Dec. 10, 1982, at 141, reprinted in
J.A. 1099.
The McSurelys next contend that the en
banc dissenters would have altered their
construction of the September 14 safekeeping order in light of Judge Combs' trial
testimony. Judge Combs (another member
of the three-judge court), the McSurelys
insist, refused to express an opinion as to
whether the safekeeping order required
Ratliff at least to notify the McSurelys
before permitting third party access to
their papers. See Brief for Appellees at 87
(referring to Tr. of Dec. 10, 1982, at 104,
reprinted in J.A. 1087). Judge Combs'
hesitancy in this regard is significant, the
McSurelys suggest, because it undercuts
Judge Wilkey's reliance on the three-judge
court's October 30 and December 13, 1967,
rulings that the safekeeping order did not
inhibit Senate Subcommittee access to the
McSurely materials.10
A complete reading of Judge Combs' testimony, however, reinforces the McSurely
II dissenters' view that the safekeeping
principally relating to the meaning of the threejudge court's safekeeping order, would affect
the conclusions of Judge Wilkey and his colleagues, who contemplated no fourth amendment transgression even if they could agree that
there had been a violation of the three-judge
court's command. See id. at 1311 n. 41.
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order permitted Brick's examination and
copying of the McSurely documents.
Judge Combs repeatedly stated at trial his
view that "the [safekeeping] order would
permit and did permit the Commonwealth's
Attorney to permit an authorized agent of
the Sentate [sic] Subcommittee to look at
these documents, and to make copies of
them." Tr. of Dec. 10, 1982, at 102, reprinted in J.A. 1085; accord id. at 49,
51-52, 55-56, 85, partially reprinted in
J.A. 1065, 1067-68, 1071-72. He said specifically that he would have ruled Ratliff in
contempt had any violation of the safekeeping order occurred. Id. at 107, reprinted
in J.A. 1089. Judge Moynahan's testimony
further confirmed the McSurely II dissenters' interpretation of the three-judge
court's order. See id. at 139-40, 171, reprinted in J.A. 1097-98, 1111. Indeed, he
stated unequivocally that, as he read the
safekeeping order, it did not entitle the
McSurelys even to notice prior to third
party inspection of the documents in Ratliffs possession. See id. at 174-76, reprinted in J.A. 1114-16.
The McSurelys also contend that "the
dissenters [did not] have the benefit of the
September 1, 1967 transcript ... explaining
the origin of the orders of September 11
and 14, 1967." Brief for Appellees at 88.
Since they stipulated to the September 11
order only after expressing concern about
widespread distribution of their personal
papers, the McSurelys argue, "it could
hardly be presumed that [they] were agreeing to an order which authorized exactly
what they were seeking to prevent." Id. at
50 (emphasis in original). This is unconvincing argument.
The McSurelys plainly requested a sealing order at the September 1 hearing, see
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 44, at 87, reprinted
in J.A. 1863; they did not receive one. The
three-judge court knew the difference be10. The McSurelys sought at trial to establish a
difference between subpoenaed access, challengeable in court, and informal, ex parte access, unchallengeable because unknowable. See
Tr. of Jan. 3, 1983, at 39-42 (closing argument).
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spection by one authorized government
agent of documents in the custody of another can be characterized as an unconstitutional search/' Id. at 1318-19; accord
id. at 1316-17, 1321-24.
Six years after our McSurely II en banc
opinions, the Supreme Court, restated the
standard governing public officials' qualified "good faith" immunity from civil damages actions:
[Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818, 102
S.Ct. at 2738 (citations omitted); see also
Davis v. Scherer, — U.S.
, 104 S.Ct.
3012, 3018, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). By barring claims that do not involve "clearly
established" statutory or constitutional
rights, even if the defendant official acted
with malice, see 457 U.S. at 817-18, 102
S.Ct. at 2738, Harlow substantially broadened the qualified immunity defense.
It is irrelevant at this juncture that
Judge Leventhal's opinion for five members of the court in McSurely II qualifies
as law of the case (albeit not law of the
circuit) on whether the Senate defendants
independently violated the McSurelys'
fourth amendment rights. The inquiry
Harlow makes critical is whether in 1967,
at the time Brick inspected the documents
and transported them to Washington, D.C.,
one could fairly describe that conduct as
trespassing on a "clearly established" con-

stitutional right. The answer must be
"No" when, nine years later, in 1976, five
members of this court thought it manifest
that the Senate defendants' investigative
activity remained wholly within the law.
It would be flatly inconsistent with Harlow to strip away the Senate defendants'
immunity in this case simply because
"[they were] not more perceptive of constitutional principles ... than [five] federal
judges of this Circuit.,, Ward v. Johnson,
690 F.2d 1098, 1112 (4th Cir.1982) (en banc).
Public officials, Harlow and Davis underline, "must not be held to act at [their]
peril" when maneuvering in legal realms
governed by rules "that even learned and
experienced jurists have had difficulty in
defining." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir.
1972) (on remand); accord id. at 1349
(Lumbard, J., concurring) ("[F]ederal officers cannot be expected to predict what
federal judges frequently have considerable difficulty in deciding and about which
they frequently differ among themselves.").8
In a desperate effort to preserve their
fourth amendment jury verdicts, the
McSurelys identify purportedly "serious
differences between the record now and
that available at the time of the 1976 decision," Brief for Appellees at 87 (emphasis
added); they suggest that Judge Wilkey
and his colleagues, if confronted with the
trial record, would not have rejected the
fourth amendment claims. The suggestion
does not withstand close inspection.9

8. Our recent decision in Zweibon v. Mitchell
720 F.2d 162 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert, denied, —
U.S.
, 105 S.Ct. 244, 83 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984),
reinforces the Senate defendants' claim to qualified immunity. In Zweibon, this court, after
several preliminary rounds, affirmed the dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of a
civil action for damages against a former Attorney General alleging electronic surveillance
conducted in violation of the fourth amendment. Our initial foray into the case produced
six separate opinions, all finding the Attorney
General's actions illegal, but disagreeing on the
rationale. Our latest Zweibon decision ruled
the former Attorney General entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

Central to that holding was the confusion evident in the en banc decision—confusion indicating "that the Court [had not been] confronted
with a simple issue automatically controlled by
earlier decisions." Id. at 169 (quoting appellee
Mitchell's brief).
9. We note that the McSurelys fail, initially, to
explain how additional factual evidence adduced at trial could alter Judge Wilkey's conclusion "as a matter of law that [Brick's] inspection
and copying [of the McSurelys' documents] did
not violate the custody order." 553 F.2d at 1304
(emphasis added). Nor do appellees demonstrate how their latest additions to the record,
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show that Senator McClelland interest in
investigating the McSurelys related to a
private feud McClellan had with newspaper columnist Drew Pearson; the McSurelys produced no evidence suggesting that
the real purpose of the Subcommittee investigation was curtailment of their political activities.
Plaintiffs introduced considerable evidence indicating that Commonwealth Attorney Ratliff s August 11, 1967, arrest of the
McSurelys, his search of their home, his
seizure of their books and papers, and his
attempt to prosecute them under Kentucky's sedition statute, stemmed from
Ratliff s opposition to the McSurelys* political activities and his wish to drive them out
of Pikeville. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Exhibit
No. 26 at 2-3, reprinted in J.A. 2081-82;
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 56 at 3, reprinted in
J.A. 2090; Tr. of Nov. 23, 1982, at 161,
reprinted in J.A. 547; Tr. of Nov. 30,1982,
at 80-81, reprinted in J.A. at 741-42; Tr.
of Dec. 6, 1982, at 98, reprinted in J.A.
974; cf McSurely v. Ratliff 282 F.Supp.
848, 852 (E.D.Ky.1967) (three-judge court)
("[TJhe conclusion is inescapable that the
criminal prosecutions were instituted, at
least in part, in order to stop plaintiffs'
organizing activities in Pike County.").
The McSurelys have not, however, alleged
any involvement by the Senate defendants
in the August 11, 1967, ransacking of the
McSurely home or in Ratliff s subsequent
attempt to prosecute plaintiffs. See
McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 1299; Tr. of Jan.
5, 1983, at 38-39, reprinted in J.A. 170203 (jury instructions); id. at 105, reprinted
in J.A. 1744 (same); Tr. of Jan. 6, 1983, at
10-11, reprinted in J.A. 1747-48 (same).
Thus, evidence suggesting that Ratliff violated the McSurelys' first amendment
rights provides no support for the jury's
first amendment verdicts against the Senate defendants.
Plaintiffs did seek to demonstrate at trial
an improper motive for the Subcommittee's
14. On the Drew Pearson-Margaret McSurely relationship, see, e.g., Tr. of Dec. 2, 1982, at 14346, 150-52, reprinted in J.A. 846-49, 853-55
(Margaret McSurely's testimony).
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investigation of the McSurelys. The
McSurelys presented evidence of a long
time feud between Senator McClellan and
newspaper columnist Drew Pearson. See
Tr. of Dec. 3, 1982, at 37-62, partially
reprinted in J.A. 910-33 (Margaret
McSurely's testimony and court-counsel
colloquy); id. at 119-20 (Margaret McSurely's testimony); Tr. of Dec. 6, 1982, at
27-29, reprinted in J.A. 968-70 (Jack Anderson's testimony); see also Plaintiffs' Response to Senate Defendants' Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict at
32-33 (Feb. 8, 1983). Senator McClellan's
principal objective in investigating the
McSurelys, plaintiffs contended at trial,
was to discover intimate correspondence
between Drew Pearson and Margaret
McSurely which could be used to embarrass, indeed to blackmail, Pearson. See,
e.g.f Tr. of Jan. 3, 1983, at 48-50 (closing
argument); see also Amended and Supplemental Complaint at 12 (No. 28(bXii)), reprinted in J.A. 154.14
We need not determine whether plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to substantiate their blackmail contention or
whether the Speech or Debate Clause permits this sort of motive-based inquiry.15 It
suffices for the purpose at hand to point
out that the McSurelys' proof concerning
an illicit investigatory motive on Senator
McClellan's part—his alleged wish to embarrass or blackmail Drew Pearson—is irrelevant to the plaintiffs' charge, as tendered in their complaint, of first amendment violations by the Senate defendants.
The McSurelys' complaint-tendered first
amendment claims against the Senate defendants, we repeat, rested on allegations
that the Subcommittee's purpose in investigating plaintiffs was to harass and stigmatize them to deter their political activities.
The evidence of Senate defendant motivation presented by the McSurelys at trial,
however, was unrelated to that charge.
Cf United States v. Ross, 719 F.2d 615,
15. For discussion of the limitations the Speech
or Debate Clause places on a first amendment
motive-based inquiry, see infra p. 106.
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tween a sealing and a safekeeping order.
See Tr. of Dec. 10, 1982, at 47, 50-51, 55,
reprinted in J.A, 1063, 1066-67, 1071
(Judge Combs' testimony); id. at 140, 171,
reprinted in J.A. 1098, 1111 (Judge Moynahan's testimony). The September 11 order agreed to by all parties gave the
McSurelys less protection than they desired, but more than they would have had
without any order in place. Litigants not
uncommonly settle for something in between where they are and where they
would like to be.11
In sum, we hold only that public officials
performing discretionary functions need
not be "more perceptive of constitutional
principles" than half the judges of this
circuit The Senate defendants did not violate any "clearly established" fourth
amendment rights and thus are immune
from civil liability for their investigative
activity. We reverse the district court's
judgment against the Senate defendants on
the fourth amendment claims, and order
those aspects of the McSurelys' complaint
dismissed.
PART III: First Amendment Claims
[5] The McSurelys' first amendment
claims against the Senate defendants, as
stated in the complaint, rested on allegations that these defendants "[u]se[d] the
instrumentality of the Subcommittee investigation" "to harass, intimidate and stigmatize the plaintiffs in order to prevent plaintiffs from continuing their political, poverty
and civil rights activity in Eastern Kentucky." Amended and Supplemental Complaint at 6 (Nos. 18(a), (c)) (Sept. 7, 1971),

reprinted in J.A. 148; accord id. at 11
(No. 28(bXi)), reprinted in J.A. 153; Complaint at 12-13 (So. 34), 13-14 (No. 35), 17
(No. 37(i)) (Mar. 4, 1969), reprinted in J.A.
6&-S7, 67-68, 71. The jury returned verdicts for the McSurelys against both Ratliff and the Senate defendants on the first
amendment claims.12 For two reasons,
each independently sufficient, we overturn
the verdicts against the Senate defendants
and direct dismissal of the McSurelys' first
amendment claims against them. First, review of the record reveals that the McSurelys failed to prove the first amendment
contentions their complaint put forward regarding the Senate defendants. Second,
even if the evidence had borne out those
contentions, the Speech or Debate Clause 15
would preclude recovery.
Plaintiffs' original and amended complaints plainly charge the Senate defendants with conduct outlawed by the first
amendment. See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson,
737 F.2d 1, 27 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("[I]t is never
permissible [under the first amendment for
Government] to impede or deter lawful civil
rights/political organization, expression or
protest with no other direct purpose and no
other immediate objective than to counter
the influence of the target associations.")
(emphasis in original);^ id. at 29. Plaintiffs'
proof at trial, however, did not bear out the
McSurelys' allegations that the Senate defendants acted, as the McSurelys claimed
Ratliff did, to chill plaintiffs' expression,
organizational endeavors, or associations.
Instead, the evidence plaintiffs introduced
concerning the Senate defendants tended to

11. We find insignificant the other allegedly "serious differences" between the post-trial and
1976 records highlighted by the McSurleys. For
example, the McSurelys point to trial testimony
contradicting Judge Wilke/s statement that
Brick "played no part" in the selection of documents he transported from Pikeville to Washington, D.C. See Brief for Appellees at 88 (quoting 553 F.2d at 1328). Judge Wilkey, however,
mentioned Brick's role as document selector
only in his discussion of plaintiffs' privacy
claim. See 553 F.2d at 1326 (section introduction).

and intimidating [plaintiffs] in the exercise of
their freedom of speech and association when
he allegedly planned and arranged for an unlawful search of their home, and the arrest of
their person.** Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, at 35, reprinted in J A. 1699 (jury instructions).
The jury awards for first amendment violations were as. follows:

12. Recovery from Ratliff on first amendment
grounds was premised on the charge that he
"acted for the unlawful purpose of disrupting

Ratliff McClellan Adlerman Brick
Alan McSurely
$61,720 $39,280
Margaret McSurely $51,280 $53360

$19,846 $23,320
$14,000 $18,800

13. The text of the Speech or Debate Clause is set
out infra note 16.
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11, 1967, do constitute violations of their
rights under the amendment
Tr. of Jan. 6, 1983, at 11, reprinted in J.A.
1748 (emphasis added). The Senate defendants objected to this ambiguous instruction.
Id. at 12-14, partially reprinted in J.A.
2069. On two prior occasions the court had
delivered the identical instruction; at those
times, it expressly referred to the "fourth"
amendment. See Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, at 39,
105-06, reprinted in J.A. 1703, 1744-45.
Acknowledging that plaintiffs* first amendment claim against the Senate defendants
was less *'clearly delineated* - than their
fourth amendment theory, the district
judge nonetheless determined that the jury
should consider the first amendment theory
of liability. Tr. of Jan. 6, 1983, at 19,
reprinted in J.A. 2074.
We do not cite the confusing instructions
and counsel-court colloquies relating to the
first amendment as indicators of the Senate
defendants' entitlement to a new trial.
Rather, we point them out as illustrative of
the fog generated at trial concerning the
nature of plaintiffs* first amendment case
against the Senate defendants. The root
problem, more readily perceived with the
entire record at hand for close review, is
that plaintiffs set out on one track, then
switched to another. With the first amendment in mind, they asserted in their pleadings that the Senate defendants sought to
silence their political expression. When trial time came, they attempted to prove
something else—Senator McClelland interest in pursuing a private feud with a newspaper columnist. The proof adduced, however, was unrelated to the first amendment
theory of their pleading and did not support any recovery for the constitutional
violations alleged in their complaint.

[6,7] But even if plaintiffs had proved
the first amendment claims their complaint
stated against the Senate defendants, they
could not have gained relief; the Speech or
Debate Clausel6 would bar the way. That
separation of powers safeguard "secure[s]
against executive or judicial interference
the processes of the nation's elected representatives leading up to the formulation of
legislative policy and the enactment of
laws." Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 928
(D.C.Cir.1984) (citation omitted), cert denied, — U.S.
, 105 S.Ct 512, 83
L.Ed.2d 402 (1984). The Clause, as interpreted in court decisions, extends absolute
immunity to members of Congress for
"voting, conduct at committee hearings,
preparation of committee reports, authorization of committee publications and their
internal distribution, and issuance of subpoenas concerning a subject 'on which "legislation could be had"/ " McSurely II, 553
F.2d at 1284-85 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 506, 95 S.Ct.
1813, 1823, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975)). It is
specifically the law of this case, established
by our 1976 en banc decision, that Speech
or Debate Clause immunity shelters "field
investigations by a Senator or his staff/'
McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 1286.

16. The Clause provides:
The Senators and Representatives shall ...
for any Speech or Debate in either House ...
not be questioned in any other Place.

lys. A riot had occurred on April 8-9, 1967,
in Nashville, Tennessee. The McSurelys have
stipulated that they attended a meeting of the
Southern Conference Educational Fund in
Nashville immediately before the April, 1967,
riot. Commonwealth Attorney Ratliff advised
Brick in Pikeville on October 8 that some of
the materials seized from the McSurelys'
home contained reference to that meeting.
McSurely II, 553 F.2d at 1287 (footnotes omitted).

U.S.CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.

17. The en banc court explained:
The Senate Resolution of August 11, 1967 authorized an investigation into the causes of
civil and criminal disorder that were racking
the nation during this period. And there was
reason for investigative focus on the McSure-

Senator McClellan's Subcommittee unquestionably had authority to investigate
the causes of civil and criminal disorder
throughout the country in general and the
McSurelys' involvement in the 1967 Nashville riots in particular. See id. at 1287; n
cf Eastland, 421 U.S. at 506, 95 S.Ct. at
1823 ("The propriety of making [plaintiff) a
subject of the investigation ... is a subject

104

753 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

620 (2d Cir.1983) (allegation that plaintiffs ly, plaintiffs9 counsel, in response to a
criminal prosecution was partially motivat- question from the bench, stated his belief
ed by his refusal to become a government that plaintiffs' first amendment allegations
informant states no constitutional claim be- applied only to Ratliff, Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983,
cause "selection was [not] based on at 14, reprinted in J.A. 1679; he quickly
grounds generally forbidden to government recanted, however. Id. at 15, reprinted in
such as race, religion, or the exercise of a J.A. 1680.
constitutionally protected right"); see also
The court's jury instructions on the staTr. of Dec. 29, 1982, at 232, reprinted in
tus
of plaintiffs' first amendment claims
J.A. 1645 (concession by McSurelys' counsel that seizure of McSurelys' private pa- against the Senate defendants were far
from clear. The initial first amendment
pers does not violate first amendment).
charge referred clearly to Ratliff, not othThe mismatch between the first amenders, see Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, at 35, reprinted
ment claims plaintiffs pleaded against the
in J.A. 1699; that charge was followed by
Senate defendants and the proof offered at
trial resulted in confused discussion be- fourth amendment instructions unequivotween counsel and court concerning pro- cally including both Ratliff and the Senate
posed jury instructions. The Senate de- defendants. See id. at 35-39, reprinted in
fendants consistently and emphatically ob- J.A. 1699-1703. No instructions delivered
jected to any proposed first amendment before the jury began deliberations explicitjury instruction implicating them; they ly mentioned any first amendment claim
maintained repeatedly that "there is no evi- against the Senate defendants.
dence in the record that the Senate DefendWhen the jury requested clarification of
ants did anything in any way to involve or the standards applicable in determining a
infringe upon the McSurelys' First Amend- first amendment violation, the district court
ment rights." Tr. of Dec. 29, 1982, at 230, again described the first amendment
reprinted in J.A. 1643; accord id. at 231, branch of the case as pertinent to Ratliff
reprinted in J.A. 1644; Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, alone. See Tr. of Jan. 5,1983, at 102. And
at 73; Tr. of Jan. 6, 1983, at 18, reprinted again, the court followed up first amendin J.A. 2073.
ment instructions spotlighting Ratliff with
The district court, several times, sig- fourth amendment instructions encompassnalled agreement with the Senate defend- ing both Ratliff and the Senate defendants.
ants. At one point, the court stated it saw See id. at 102-06, partially reprinted in
"some basis" in the Senate defendants' J.A. 1744-45. When the court reminded
contention that Ratliffs first amendment the jury that plaintiffs made "separate and
violation was a fait accompli by the time distinct claims against the Senate defend"they [the Senate defendants] came into ants," it discussed only the fourth amendthe picture," Tr. of Dec. 29, 1982, at 232, ment aspect of the case. Id. at 115-16.
reprinted in J.A. 1645; the court, at that
Only one instruction even arguably contime, declined "to give [the first amendnected
the Senate defendants with plainment] instruction as to the Senate Defendtiffs'
charges
of first amendment violaants." Id. Later, when the Senate defendants objected to a proposed instruction that tions. On January 6, 1983, in response to a
"lump[ed] all of the defendants together," jury request, the court read aloud the porthe district judge remarked that "of course, tions of the first amendment relevant to
there is no First Amendment claim against the McSurelys' claims. Four paragraphs
some defendants." Tr. of Jan. 3, 1983, at later, the Court instructed:
Plaintiffs [sic] do claim ... that the ac177-78. The following day the court inditivities
between Ratliff and [Brick] and
cated it intended to give a first amendment
the other Senate defendants insofar as
instruction regarding Ratliff only, and not
they affected their private papers which
the Senate defendants. Tr. of Jan. 4, 1983,
were in Ratliff s custody after August
at 82, reprinted in J.A. 1675. Subsequent-
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appointed day, the McSurelys—accompanied by Joe and Karen Mulloy, another
couple whose home had been searched and
whose effects had been seized—brought a
van to the federal building to pick up their
papers. The materials had been deposited
in two jail cells located inside the building.
Alan McSurely testified about what happened when the McSurelys and the Mulloys
proceeded down the hall toward the cells:
Just as we were starting down there,
this guy, John Brick, said to me, "Hey,
Alan, come here, I want to say something to you." So I went over to one
side with him and he said, "I have this
box here full of your documents, and I
want to go over them with you and have
you check it off to make sure you received them."
Tr. of Nov. 23, 1982, at 95, reprinted in
J.A. 601. Alan McSurely then followed
Brick over to an area in front of a large
window and, in accordance with Brick's instructions, began going through the contents of the box piece by piece.
The documents that had been in the Subcommittee's possession included both Alan
and Margaret McSurely's personal correA. Invasion of the McSurelys9 Right to spondence with friends and relatives.
Privacy Under the Common Law.
Among the papers were a diary written by
1. The Return of the McSurelys' Pa- Margaret McSurely and personal letters
written to her by men with whom she had
pers
In July 1968, the Court of Appeals for been intimately involved. Brick pressed
the Sixth Circuit decided that Ratliff and Alan McSurely to read through each and
the U.S. Marshal had to return the docu- every document and verify that the xerox
ments seized from the McSurelys. After copies were the same as the originals. It
several unsuccessful attempts to secure was this incident which provides the eviRatliff s compliance with the decision, the dence on which the jury verdict for the
McSurelys obtained a court order directing McSurelys properly rests. We quote from
Ratliff to turn over the documents to them Alan McSurely's testimony at length conat the U.S. Marshal's office in Pikeville on cerning the manner in which the docuNovember 8,1968. Adlerman sent a memo ments—including the items that clearly beto Ratliff requesting that Ratliff coordi- longed solely to Margaret McSurely—were
nate return of the documents with the Sub- shown to him:
committee's efforts to serve new subpoeWhen I got down to number six on the
nas on the McSurelys. Plaintiffs' Exhibit
list, ... it was a series of notes that
No. 38, reprinted in J.A. 1851. On the
Margaret had made back in 1963 and '64

harassment, intimidation, and stigmatization of the plaintiffs in order to squelch
exercise of their first amendment rights.
PART IV: The Privacy Claims
Following the decision of the en banc
court in 1976, the McSurelys amended their
complaint to include a claim that their right
to privacy under the common law had been
violated. See McSurely II, 553 F.2d at
1294-96, 1302-03. At trial, testimony was
taken on the manner in which Brick gave
Margaret McSurely's diary, letters and other highly personal papers, not to her, but to
Alan McSurely and on the effect that this
had on the McSurelys* marriage. We hold
that there was more than sufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdicts against
Brick for interfering with the McSurelys'
right to privacy and that neither the Speech
or Debate Clause nor the doctrine of qualified immunity shields Brick from liability
for his conduct. The McSurelys, however,
did not produce any evidence that could
sustain the jury verdicts against McClellan
and Adlerman for invasion of privacy. We
uphold the privacy verdicts as to Brick, but
reverse as to the other Senate defendants.19

19. The jury awards for violations of the right of
privacy under common law were as follows:
753 F.2d—5

Ratliff McClellan Adlerman Brick
Alan McSurely
$30,860 $19,640 $9,923 $11,660
Margaret McSurely $25,640 $13,340 $7,000 $ 9,400
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on which the scope of our inquiry is narrow.") (citations omitted). Court review, it
is true, encompasses "the manner and
methods [by which a congressional committee] obtainfs] certain information." United
States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2cl 213, 225 n. 20
(4th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert denied,
414 U.S. 823, 866, 94 S.Ct. 124, 132, 38
L.Ed.2d 56, 118 (1973); see McSurely II,
553 F.2d at 1287 ("[A] Member of Congress
or congressional employee is not free to
use every conceivable means to obtain investigatory materials, without fear of criminal prosecution or civil suit.") (emphasis
added). But plaintiffs' first amendment
complaint here heads into tightly protected
territory.

377, 71 S.Ct. at 788; accord Eastland, 421
U.S. at 508, 95 S.Ct. at 1824.
Two Supreme Court precedents plainly
indicate Speech or Debate Clause coverage
of the claims plaintiffs stated (but failed to
prove) against the Senate defendants: Tenney, supra and Eastland, supra. In Tenney, plaintiff sued members of a state legislative committee,18 alleging they had deprived him of constitutional rights by summoning him to appear at a hearing convened, not for any legislative purpose, but
rather to intimidate him and deter his exercise of first amendment rights. 341 U.S. at
370-71, 71 S.Ct. at 785. The Court ordered
the complaint dismissed; judicial examination of the committee's motives for questioning plaintiff, the Court declared, was
[8] The McSurelys contend that the not "consonant with our scheme of governSubcommittee's investigation of them was ment." Id. at 377, 71 S.Ct. at 788. The
not "bona fide "; the Subcommittee, the judiciary's proper role in a case such as
McSurelys allege, was merely "using the Tenney, the Court wrote, is limited to "deinstrumentality of an investigation to ha- termining that a committee's inquiry may
rass those whose views [were] at variance fairly be deemed within its province." Id.
with views of the members of the Senate at 378, 71 S.Ct. at 789.
Subcommittee." Complaint at 17 (No.
In Eastland, a congressional subcommit37(i)), reprinted in J.A. 71. Allegations of tee had subpoenaed the United States Serimproperly motivated legislative action, vicemen's Fund's (USSF) bank records. On
however, are "precisely what the Speech or first amendment grounds, the USSF
Debate Clause generally forecloses from sought an injunction against release of the
executive and judicial inquiry." United subpoenaed records;- the USSF charged
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180, 86 that the purpose of the subpoena was to
S.Ct. 749, 755, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); see chill the organization's free speech. The
also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 508-09, 95 S.Ct. Court declared first that congressional inat 1824; Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. vestigation generally is sheltered by the
606, 629, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2629, 33 L.Ed.2d Speech or Debate Clause and next deter583 (1972); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. mined that the USSF was a proper subject
367, 377, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019 for subcommittee investigation. See 421
(1951). Once a court determines, as we U.S. at 505-06, 95 S.Ct. at 1822-23. The
have, that a congressional committee was Court then stated that "in determining the
"apparently" performing a legitimate in- legitimacy of a congressional act we do not
vestigative function, the court may not look to the motives alleged to have promptpress on and inquire into "the propriety ed it." Id. at 508, 95 S.Ct. at 1824 (citaand the motivation for the action taken." tions omitted). Instructed by Tenney and
United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d at 226 Eastland, we must disallow pursuit it
(emphasis in original). A "claim of an un- court of the charge that the McClellan Sub
worthy purpose," in short, "does not de- committee's investigation, in targeting th«
stroy the privilege." Tenney, 341 U.S. at McSurelys, in fact had as its objective
18. The Tenney Court ruled that the 1871 Civil
Rights Act did not abrogate the immunity traditionally extended to state lawmakers acting

within the sphere of legislative activity. See 34
U.S. at 376, 71 S.Ct. at 788.
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looked out the window, and I remember
Karen came up and put her arm around
me. And I would go back and see what
else they had taken and I saw him give
back an address list, and it was like my
worst fears, my worst, worst fear.
Tr. of Dec. 3, 1982, at 11-12, reprinted in
J.A. 890-91. Margaret McSurely testified
that she was conscious of the impact the
revelation was having on her husband and
feared for the future of their relationship.
I noticed he was trying to control his
anger, and that frightened me because I
didn't know what effect all of this stuff
was going to have, what it was going to
mean to him. It was like all these things
were happening at once and it was almost more than I could take in. I have
never been so humiliated.
Tr. of Dec. 3,1982, at 12, reprinted in J.A.
891. Margaret McSurely testified that after the couple got home with their papers,
Joe and Karen, Al and I sat down and
he took the stuff out of the box and put
my things in one pile and gave it to me,
and said, "Here, these are yours, is what
Brick took to Washington."
And I took my stuff in another room
because I didn't want anybody else to see
me and I ran through and saw what they
had taken, and I was devastated.
Tr. of Dec. 3,1982, at 15, reprinted in J.A.
at 894. After the return of the papers, she
continued to feel "very frightened," Tr. of
Dec. 3, 1982, at 63, reprinted in J.A. at
934, and was plagued by "a sense of foreboding, a sense of doom." Id. She
"couldn't sleep" and "looked over [her]
shoulder all the time." Id. While her husband was at work, she stayed home alone
and "cried just about every day." Tr. of
Dec. 3, 1982, at 64, reprinted in J.A. 935.
Alan McSurely asserted that he believed
there had been "an assault on the trust and
love between Margaret and me, which I am
not sure we ever overcame." Tr. of Nov.
23, 1982, at 137, reprinted in J.A. 640.
Margaret McSurely testified that the
feelings of injury and embarrassment persisted and eventually poisoned the McSurelys' marital relationship. Even at the trial,
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years later, she found the matter painful
and difficult to articulate:
If I could find the words, I will try to
tell you
[TJhere were some seeds of
mistrust that came between Al and me,
... and ultimately our marriage broke
up.
... [I]t was an insidious thing that ...
faded away our relationship.
Tr. of Dec. 3, 1982, at 16-17, reprinted in
J.A. 937-40. Pressed again to describe the
emotional damage she had suffered, Mrs.
McSurely testified
I have not been able to develop any
other relationships with men since Al
left.
And the worse thing is the marriage
breaking up, the affect it had on the
family.
Tr. of Dec. 3, 1982, at 18, reprinted in J.A.
941.
The district judge gave the jury a general instruction concerning invasion of privacy under the common law. He told them:
Now, the right of privacy is generally
recognized as the right to be left alone.
That is to say, the right of a person to be
free from unwarranted publicity, or the
right to live without unwarranted interference by the public about matters with
which the public is not necessarily concerned. A person who unreasonably and
seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to
others, is liable to that person. Disclosure to the general public is not necessary to complete the wrong of invasion
of privacy.
Jury Instructions, Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983, at
24-25, reprinted in J.A. 1703-04. The
jury returned verdicts against all three defendants for invading Alan and Margaret
McSurely's right to privacy under the common law.
2. Choice of Law
[9] The people and events involved in
the McSurelys' privacy claim were affiliated with two jurisdictions: the District of
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when she was working for Drew Pearson.
As I was reading it, I realized that this
was the famous diary that we heard
about. I had never seen it before. I
never looked at it before. I was, you
know, just totally stunned by what I saw
there. It was the most intimate details
of her relationship with Mr. Pearson, and
I wasn't stunned by what I was reading,
but I was stunned by the fact that, you
know, it just dropped on me like a pipe, a
lead pipe right on my shoulders, that
these guys, this guy standing right here
in front of me, I mean, we were only
standing maybe a foot apart, had taken
this stuff, taken it up to the Senate and
kept it up there for a year, and said that
they were investigating the riots.
I couldn't hardly think or feel, I was
just totally numb by that. I looked at
him, and he, I mean, he was watching
and he knew which thing I was reading
and he wouldn't look at me, he would
look out the window and look down, and
then—so I put those aside and I started
reading a couple more and got to number
II and 12, I think it was, somewhere in
the 11, 12, 13, and these were very romantic, beautifully-written love letters
that Margaret had gotten from a guy
that I knew, he was a friend of mine,
that she was going with when she went
south and worked with SNEC.
And I had never known that, about
this affair. I didn't have any right to
know about it, it happened a long time
before I met her, but I felt, you know,
like an intruder, like I was getting into
reading something that I had no business
to read about Margaret and her past life.
If she wanted to tell me about that, it
was her business, but she apparently
hadn't wanted to tell me about it up till
then.

this was the, this was another letter that
Pearson had written to Margaret when
she was in Mississippi, in October of '64,
and it was addressed, "Dearest Cucumber," which I had never heard or called
that before.
It made me sick. I was so furious that
I really couldn't concentrate on looking
at that stuff. My basic thought was to
smash him in his face. That was the
way I felt I have been trained as a
psychologist and be cool and to help people figure out ways of expressing their
hostility in a constructive manner, et cetera, but at that time the only thing I
could think about was to hit this guy.
This guy—in the back of my mind, it
wasn't just him, it was like a gang rape,
he had raped my wife right there while,
right in front of me—
Id. at 104-08, reprinted in J.A. 609-13.
Joe Mulloy also testified about the exchange of documents between Brick and
Alan McSurely: "Mr. Brick—I remember
him being—it seemed like to me that he
knew something that Alan didn't know, and
he appeared smug and he would grin from
time to time, and Alan was having to read
these documents, and this was—it was a
tense day, certainly, for all of us." Tr. of
Dec. 2, 1982, at 46, reprinted in J.A. 810.
Alan McSurely, Mulloy recalled, "was holding some of [the documents] in his hands
like this . . . and just like he was getting
rigid ... this was his first opportunity to
see the things." Id. at 46-47, reprinted in
J.A. 810-11.

Margaret McSurely herself testified to
her feelings of violation and mortification,
and to her belief that the treatment given
her personal papers, including the display
of each and every one of them to her
husband, had undermined and ultimately
Brick got, he kept pushing me to keep destroyed her marriage.
Yes. I watched and . . . I saw they
on reading this stuff. He would give me
had
taken some love letters of mine.
these letters and say, "Make sure they
And
I
was really embarassed. I couldn't
are the same now, read them all the way
believe that they would do anything that
through." . . . But the thing I remember
dirty, and I kind of walked away and
the most was when we got to 201, and
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the right of privacy actually comprised
Four years later, Kentucky held wiretapfour distinct torts:
ping actionable as an invasion of privacy.
1) intrusion into an individual's seclusion Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d
or private affairs;
46 (1931). The court there concluded:
2) publication of embarrassing private
A person is entitled to the privacy of his
facts about an individual;
home as against the unwarranted inva3) publications that place an individual in
sion of others, and a violation thereof
a false light in the public eye, but do not
will give rise to an action. It is the legal
constitute defamatory statements; and
right of every man to enjoy social and
4) appropriation of an individual's name
business relations with his friends, neighor likeness for commercial advantage.
bors, and acquaintances, and he is entiId. at 389. The Restatement has adopted
tled to converse with them without moProsser's four-pronged delineation of the
lestation by intruders.
invasion of privacy tort. See Restatement
Id. at 228, 37 S.W.2d at 47.
(Second) of Torts § 652A (1977).
Kentucky has continued to adhere to the
Kentucky was among the first states to
hold invasion of privacy an actionable tort. principles set forth in these early opinions.
See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 770- For example, in 1967, the year that the
74, 299 S.W. 967, 969-71 (1927); see also McSurelys' papers were seized, the court
Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, again reviewed the development of the pri432, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (1909) (citing Pave- vacy tort, describing the doctrine as "well
sich v. New England Life Insurance Co., established" despite the paucity of cases
122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)); see general- and asserting that the privacy tort's purly Bunch, Kentucky's Invasion of Privacy pose is "primarily to recover for a hurt to
Tort—A Reappraisal, 56 Ky.LJ. 261 the feelings of the individual." Wheeler v.
(1968).
P. Sorenson Mfg. Co., Ky., 415 S.W.2d 582,
In Brents, the defendant placed a notice 584 (1967). The court stated that the docin the show window of his place of business trine was an evolving one, not wedded to
announcing that the plaintiff owed the de- rigid rules or standards: "[T]he right of
fendant money, had promised often to pay, privacy is relative to the customs of the
but had failed to do so. The court held time and place, and it is determined by the
that the plaintiffs claim of mental pain, norm of the ordinary man." Id. at 585.
humiliation, and exposure to public ridicule
Three years ago, Kentucky adopted the
resulting from the notice was actionable.
privacy
tort analysis set forth in the ReIn so holding, the court explained that the
statement
(Second) of Torts as a means of
right of privacy
furthering
the principles enunciated in its
has not been concretely defined, and
probably is not subject to a concrete defi- prior opinions. See McCall v. Couriernition, but it is generally recognized as Journal & Louisville Times Co., Ky., 623
the right to be let alone, that is, the right S.W.2d 882, 887 (1981); Ausness, Kenof a person to be free from unwarranted tucky Tort Laws: Defamation and the
publicity, or the right to live without Right to Privacy (Book Review), 72 Ky.LJ.
unwarranted interference by the public 199, 205 (1983-84); see generally D. Elder,
about matters with which the public is Kentucky Tort Law: Defamation and The
Right to Privacy § 3.01 (1983). In McCall,
not necessarily concerned.
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. at 770, 290 S.W. the court quoted the Restatement's fourat 969-70. The court made clear that the part breakdown of the privacy tort, but
plaintiff "is entitled to recover substantial also repeated its statement in Brents that
damages, although the only damages suf- the tort of invasion of privacy is "not subfered by him resulted from mental an- ject to precise definition." McCall, 623
S.W.2d at 887.
guish." Id. at 774, 290 S.W. at 971.
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Columbia and the State of Kentucky. The
suit was brought in the District and several
of the defendants were associated with the
United States Senate when the alleged tort
occurred. On the other hand, most of the
allegedly tortious conduct occurred in Kentucky at a time when both plaintiffs were
Kentucky residents.
The privacy claim has been pursued in
this case under the wing of the federal
court's pendent jurisdiction. McSurely II,
553 F.2d at 1303. In such cases, by analogy to cases entertained under diversity jurisdiction, federal courts have applied the
rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed.
1477 (1941). See Rohm and Haas Co. v.
Adco Chemical Co., 689 F.2d 424, 428-29
(3d Cir.1982); Systems Operations, Inc. v.
Scientific Games Development Corp., 555
F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir.1977). Klaxon directs us in this case initially to District of
Columbia choice of law rules.

We discern no substantial disparity in the
premises underlying privacy tort law in the
two jurisdictions. Delineation of an invasion of privacy tort is a fairly recent development at common law. Elaborative case
law is sparse in both jurisdictions. Kentucky, however, recognized the tort approximately forty years before its existence
was acknowledged in the District. Compare Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 77374, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (Ky.1927) with AfroAmerican Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366
F.2d 649, 653 (D.C.Cir.1966) (en banc).
Kentucky, therefore, has had longer experience in this evolving area. We turn, therefore, as we think local courts in the District
would, to Kentucky law to govern our analysis of the privacy invasion asserted by the
McSurelys.

3. The Right to Privacy under Kentucky Law
In a seminal Harvard Law Review article, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. BranWe believe that in the situation at hand, deis laid the groundwork in 1890 for the
the District's choice of lav/ analysis would development of a "new" tort designed to
identify Kentucky as the state most con- protect individuals from unwarranted intercerned with the claim and best equipped to ference in their personal affairs. Warren
provide the regulating substantive rule. & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.
Cf Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 222 L.Rev. 193 (1890). Their theory was predi(D.C.Cir.1968); McCrossin v. Hicks Chev- cated on recognition that the scope of legal
rolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917, 920-21 (D.C.Ct. protection available to individuals had alApp.1969); see also Loge v. United States, ready expanded to cover not only batteries
662 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir.1981); Semler on persons and trespasses to property, but
v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, also intangible injuries to feelings and senD.C., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 924 (D.C.Cir.1978). sibilities. Warren and Brandeis urged that
Both the nature of each jurisdiction's inter- the law go further and respond to "modern
est in the claim and the state of develop- enterprise and invention [which] have,
ment of privacy law lead us to this conclu- through invasions upon [an individual's]
sion.
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and
distress,
far greater than could be inflicted
As we have noted, Kentucky was the
by
mere
bodily injury." Id. at 196.
place from which the documents were taken and to which they were returnad. It
Beginning with Pavesich v. New Engwas also the McSurelys' domicile atn more land Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50
to the point, the place where the wrong S.E. 68 (1905), state courts gradually recogwas done and the harm was initially felt. nized the new tort, and, by 1960, the majorFurthermore, we held in McSurely II that ity of jurisdictions acknowledged the right
any use of the documents by Subcommittee of privacy, "in one form or another."
members and their staffs while the papers Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif.L.Rev. 383, 386
were in the District came within the shelter (1960). In 1960, William Prosser analyzed
evolving privacy law and concluded that
of the Speech or Debate Clause.
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instructions presented to the jury in this
case.
4. Liability of Brick
Although the trial court might have given a more detailed privacy charge, we cannot say that the formulation given was not
an adequate statement of Kentucky law.
The jury had more than sufficient evidence
from which it could conclude that John
Brick "unreasonably and seriously interfere^] with [the McSurelys'] interest in not
having tfheir] affairs known to others."
Alan McSurely's right to be "let alone"—
to not have John Brick stand by his side
and pressure him to read about the intimate details of his wife's premarital relationships and to not have his marriage maliciously disrupted—is the type of privacy
interest protected by the tort of intrusion.
Brick's conduct, which indisputably was
"highly offensive to a reasonable person,"
constituted an intrusion into Alan McSurely's "private affairs and concerns"—in this
case, his marital relationship.
Margaret McSurely's right to be let
alone was at least as invaded when Brick
intruded into her marriage, dredging up
her past, directing her husband's attention
to matters about which he neither needed
nor wanted to know, and creating problems
in a relationship which had up until then
been satisfactory.
The drafters of the Restatement noted
that it is "possible and not infrequent" for
a particular act to constitute more than one
of the four types of privacy torts. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A comment d.
Such is the case here. As to Margaret
McSurely, Brick's conduct also constituted
a tortious publication of private facts. By
giving Margaret McSurely's private papers
to Alan McSurely and pressing him to read
them, Brick published to the most significant possible audience embarrassing facts
about Margaret McSurely's private life before her marriage. A rational jury could
very readily find that Brick's conduct
served no legitimate public interest and
was highly offensive by the standards of
ordinary people.

113

[10,11] Given the nature of Margaret
McSurely's papers, Brick's conduct in giving them to Alan McSurely and—under the
guise of conducting official business—
pushing Alan to read each and every one
through, page by page, as Brick watched invaded both Alan and Margaret McSurely's
privacy. Whether construed as an invasion
of a "private seclusion that [the McSurelys]
ha[d] thrown about [their] person or affairs" under the "intrusion" tort, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B comment c
(1977), or, in Margaret McSurely's case, as
the publication of embarrassing private
facts, see id. § 652D, we believe that
Brick's conduct would be actionable under
Kentucky law. In light of the content of
the papers and of Alan and Margaret
McSurely's relationship as husband and
wife, the evidence at trial was such that a
reasonable jury could find Brick liable for
invasion of privacy.
Finally, the jury could conclude reasonably that Brick's actions had harmed the
McSurelys seriously both as individuals and
as a family unit. For this latter point, the
jury had not only the subjective testimony
about emotional injury but also the objective evidence of the McSurelys' divorce.
5. Liability of McClellan and Adlerman
[12] Since no one contends that either
McClellan or Adlerman personally took
part in the return of the documents, they
must be liable vicariously if at all. The
district judge gave the jury general instructions on vicarious liability: if McClellan or
Adlerman had "ordered or directed or authorized or approved" Brick's conduct, they
could be liable for that conduct "the same
as if [they] had done those acts personally." Jury Instructions, Tr. of Jan. 5, 1983,
at 29, reprinted in J.A. 1708. Although
McClellan and Adlerman apparently instructed Brick to return the documents to
the McSurelys, there is no evidence that
McClellan or Adlerman ordered, directed,
authorized, or approved the manner in
which he performed that task.
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Under the Restatement, an intrusion is
tortious when it involves intentional interference with the "solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns"
and "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652B. The intrusion tort "does not
depend on any publicity given to the person
whose interest is invaded or to his affairs."
Id. comment a; see, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd,
410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C.Cir.1969); Fowler v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 343 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.1965). The
defendant is subject to liability "when he
has intruded into a private place, or has
otherwise invaded a private seclusion
that the plaintiff has thrown about his
person or affairs.'1 Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 652B comment c (emphasis added).
The Restatement defines the publication
of private facts tort as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy, if the matter publicized is
of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public.
Id. § 652D. The publication of private
facts doctrine usually applies to communications made to the public at large, rather
than a few individuals. See id. comment a.
However, the publication requirement also
may be satisfied by proof of disclosure to a
very limited number of people when a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the "public" to whom the information has been disclosed.
In Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80,
257 N.W.2d 522 (1977), for example, the
court emphasized the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the recipient of the communication:
Communication of embarrassing facts
about an individual to a public not concerned with that individual and with
whom the individual is not concerned obviously is not a "serious interference"

with plaintiffs right to privacy, although
it might be "unnecessary" or "unreasonable". An invasion of a plaintiffs right
to privacy is important if it exposes private facts to a public whose knowledge
of those facts would be embarrassing to
the plaintiff. Such a public might be the
general public, if the person were a public figure, or a particular public such
as fellow employees, club members,
church members, family, or neighbors,
if the person were not a public figure.
Id. at 104-05, 257 N.W.2d at 531 (emphasis
added). Declining to place a numerical requirement on the "publication" element of
the tort, the court, simply noted that "[h]ere
we have developed the criterion of a particular public, whose knowledge of the private
facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff . . . . " Id. at 105, 257 N.W.2d at 531.
Moreover, the court observed that there
was respectable opinion supporting the idea
that "publication of the embarrassing facts
to only one person alone was unlawful publication." Id. at 100, 257 N.W.2d at 529.
The closest Kentucky has come to an
analysis of the publication requirement occurred in Voneye v. Turner, Ky., 240
S.W.2d 588 (1951). The court held that,
given the particular facts of the case, Voneye's privacy had not been violated but
made it clear that the size of the "public"
was not relevant to whether a disclosure of
embarrassing facts was tortious.
Two other Kentucky cases, Gregory v.
Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d
510 (1943), and Sellers v. Henry, Ky., 329
S.W.2d 214 (1959), also indicate that the
size of the public is irrelevant, and such is
the conclusion of the most recent treatise
on Kentucky tort law, see D. Elder, supra,
§ 3.04.
In sum, Kentucky has adopted the Restatement's
articulation of privacy tort
principles but has continued to emphasize
the need for flexibility in the application of
theory to conduct. Egregious conduct has
been found actionable even where the fit to
the recognized privacy tort categories has
not been exact. It is with these points in
mind that we look at the evidence and
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ristic exercise described at trial cannot fall
under the mantle of necessary legislative
conduct. In sum, Brick's behavior—the
manifestly excessive means he used when
he returned the McSurelys' private papers
—"offend[s] even hardened sensibilities."
Cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172, 72 S.Ct 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952).
It surely constitutes the kind of interference that the highest court of Kentucky
would consider "unwarranted" and "highly
offensive." It is not even arguably within
the outer perimeter of a public official's
line of duty. See McKinney v. Whitfield,
supra.
116] Nor does Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396
(1982), provide any protection for Brick's
violation of the McSurelys' right to privacy
under the common law. That case defined
"qualified immunity" for various federal
officials in situations in which they could
not lay claim to absolute immunity. While
this court has said that qualified immunity
may apply to legislative branch personnel,
Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d at 932, that
doctrine has never been held to shelter
from common law tort liability conduct of
the kind at issue here—behavior that plainly steps beyond even the extreme edge of
an official's authority.
PART V:

Conclusion
If hard cases make the law bad, then
ancient cases make the law confusing.
This ancient controversy first saw the light
of a courtroom in Kentucky in 1967. Since
then the McSurelys have litigated in the
district courts of the Eastern District of
Kentucky and the District of Columbia, the
Courts of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit and
the District of Columbia Circuit, and in the
United States Supreme Court. The
McSurely matter has occasioned seven
Court of Appeals decisions, including one
en banc opinion. In addition the various
litigants have made four motions before
the Supreme Court and filed a petition for
certiorari, which was ultimately dismissed
as improvidently granted.
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Every source of law, from the United
States Constitution to Kentucky common
law, has been probed and pressed for solutions to the questions presented. The divisions among judges have been substantial—this court divided six to four, and
even five to five, on some of the most
fundamental legal questions raised by the
disputants. Three of the defendants have
died during the long pendency of this lawsuit, and, in one instance, the party substituted for a deceased defendant has also
died.
The curtain ought to be drawn. The
legal world will little note nor long remember the fine lines that have been drawn in
this opinion or in any of the four previous
opinions rendered by this court It will be
enough if our opinion finally ends this sorry chapter of investigative excess. The
McSurelys cannot be made whole, nor can
they be vindicated. Those parts of the
district court's judgment that we uphold
today can only stand as a small reaffirmation of the proposition that there are
bounds to the interference that citizens
must tolerate from the agents of their
government—even when such agents invoke the mighty shield of the Constitution
and claim official purpose to their conduct.
APPENDIX
The McSurelys were involved in the following related lawsuits:
1) Challenge to the Validity of the Kentucky Sedition Statute. Shortly after
they were arrested, the McSurelys brought
suit in federal district court to prevent the
Kentucky prosecutor, Thomas Ratliff, from
proceeding with any prosecution of the
McSurelys under the state sedition statute,
Ky.Rev.Stat. § 432.040. A three-judge
panel, one judge dissenting, found the statute unconstitutional on its face. McSurely
v. Ratliff 282 F.Supp. 848 (E.D.Ky.1967).
The court ordered Ratliff and the U.S. Marshal to retain possession of the seized material pending appeal. No appeal was ever
taken.
2) Suit to Enjoin Ratliff and the U.S.
Marshal from Complying with the Senate
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An instruction to return documents nor- 92 S.Ct 2614, 2627, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972).
mally means restoring the documents to Gravel applied this protection to legislative
their rightful owner, not giving them to a staff as well as members of Congress, and
third party. From the testimony, the jury thus the question of absolute immunity is
could reasonably have inferred that McClsl- appropriately raised by Brick who was, at
lan had a grudge against Drew Pearson, the time, a member of Senator McClellan's
desired to place Pearson in a compromising staff and a Subcommittee investigator.
position, and attempted to exploit the
[13] The "absolute immunity" of the
McSurelys for that purpose. But evidence
of McClellan's motivation, even if the Speech or Debate clause, however, cannot
Speech or Debate Clause did not bar its be used as a talisman to insulate all conadmission, see supra p. 103 n. 15, p. 106, duct of all legislative branch personnel at
would serve only to connect McClellan with all times. The Supreme Court has instructthe wrongs alleged by the McSurelys under ed that absolute immunity for members of
the first and fourth amendments and, we Congress only protects "conduct necessary
have held, supra pp. 99-106, that those to perform their duties within the sphere of
claims cannot be sustained. Because we legitimate legislative activity." Davis v.
here find liability only for the manner in Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235 n. 11, 99 S.Ct.
which the documents were returned, the evi- 2264, 2271 n. 11, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979).
dence is insufficient to sustain a finding
[14,15] We recently outlined the limitathat McClellan actually or impliedly ortions of the immunity secured by the
dered, directed, authorized, or otherwise apSpeech or Debate Clause in Walker v.
proved the tortious manner in which Brick
Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert
carried out his assignment. The evidence
denied, — U.S.
, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83
similarly fails to connect Adlerman to the
L.Ed.2d 402 (1984). In determining whethtort.
er an activity is protected by Speech or
6. The Immunity Defense as to Brick Debate immunity:
The key consideration, Supreme Court
In Barr v. Matteot 360 U.S. 564, 575, ?9
decisions teach, its the act presented for
S.Ct. 1335, 1341, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), the
examination, not the actor. Activities inSupreme Court held that federal officials
tegral to the legislative process may not
have absolute immunity from common law
be examined, but peripheral activities not
tort liability for actions taken "within the
closely connected to the business of legisouter perimeter of [their] line of duty/'
lating do not enjoy Speech or Debate
Barr v. Matteo sets forth a judge-macfe
shelter.
immunity doctrine that applies to executive
branch officials acting within the scope of Id. at 929 (citation omitted). Acts " 'casutheir employment. Our recent decision in ally or incidentally related to legislative
McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766 (D.C. affairs' but'not 'part and parcel of the
Cir.1984), indicates the doctrine's continu- legislative process' are outside the realm of
ing vitaffty. Protection sunifar to that af- Speech or Debate protection." Id. (quoting
forded executive officials by Barr is sup- Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 626,
plied to members of Congress and their 92 S.Ct. at 2627). As Judge Leventhal said
staffs through the Speech or Debate in his opinion in McSurely II, "[t;]he emClause of the Constitution. While Barr v. ployment of unlawful means to implement
Matteo establishes absolute immunity few- an otherwise proper legislative objective is
executive branch activity "within the out^r simply not 'essential to legislating'" and,
perimeter" of an executive official's line of therefore, is not protected by the Speech or
duty, the Speech or Debate Clause provides Debate Clause. 553 F.2d at 1288. Conabsolute immunity for conduct that is "part verting what should have been the simple
and parcel of the legislative process," physical return of documents to their reGravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626, spective owners into the sadistic and voyeu-
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was whether the claims should have been
APPENDIX—Continued
the Court dismissed the writ 438 U.S. 189, considered by the arbitrators, not simply
98 S.Ct. 3116, 57 L.Ed.2d 704 (1978).
whether they could have been dealt with in
McSurely III: On remand, Thomas Rat- arbitration.
liff filed his own motion for summary judgReversed and remanded.
ment, which the district court denied. We
affirmed the denial of Ratliffs summary
judgment motion in a per curiam opinion. 1. Arbitration G=»7
Arbitration agreement is a contract,
697 F.2d 309 (D.C.Cir.1982).
and
the court will not rewrite it for the
McSurely IV: Following a trial and jury
parties.
verdicts in favor of the McSurelys, the
defendants brought this appeal. After 2. Arbitration $»82(5)
Thomas Ratliff entered into a settlement
Although courts recognize strong fedagreement with the McSurelys, we dis- eral policy in favor of voluntary commermissed his appeal.
cial arbitration and will generally bar
claims falling under an arbitration clause
even if those claims were not actually
( O | IEY NUMBER SYSTEM>
raised in the arbitration proceeding, arbitration cannot be raised as a bar to claims
falling outside the arbitration agreement.
Clarence WILLIAMS, Jr., Appellant
v.

E.F. HUTTON & COMPANY, INC.
No. 84-5244.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit
Argued Oct. 18, 1984.
Decided Jan. 22, 1985.
Investor brought action against brokerage firm, alleging various violations of
federal securities laws in the handling of
his account. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, John
Garrett Penn, J., dismissed the complaint,
and investor appealed. The Court of Appeals, Mikva, Circuit Judge, held that the
district courts dismissal of investor's complaint solely on the basis of prior arbitration of claims under securities laws could
be sustained only if the claims were clearly
identical or if they were clearly such that
they necessarily would have been decided
in the course of resolving other claims
properly submitted to arbitration; crucial
inquiry in determining whether bar existed

3. Arbitration <e=>82(3)
Arbitrators' decision would not be entitled to any deference if they were found to
have exceeded their authority by reaching
out to decide matters not consigned to their
discretion by the arbitration agreement.
4. Arbitration e=>l.l, 29
There is no duty to arbitrate matters
not subject to the arbitration agreement
and no authority on the part of arbitrators
to consider matters not necessary to resolution of disputes actually submitted.
5. Exchanges <s=»ll(ll)
District court's dismissal of investor's
complaint solely on the basis of prior arbitration of claims under securities laws
could be sustained only if the claims were
clearly identical or if they were clearly
such that they necessarily would have been
decided in the course of resolving other
claims properly submitted to arbitration;
crucial inquiry in determining whether bar
existed was whether the claims should
have been considered by the arbitrators,
not simply whether they could have been
dealt with in arbitration. Fed.Rules Civ.
ProcRule 12(bXl, 5, 6), 28 U.S.C.A.; Securities Act of 1933, §§ 22(a), 322, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77v(a), 77vw; Public
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APPENDIX—Continued
Subpoenas. As soon as the McSurelys received the Senate subpoenas for documents
held in Ratliffs custody, they asked the
three-judge district court to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent compliance with the subpoenas. This is the chronology of their effort to block compliance
with the subpoenas:
October 18, 1967: The McSurelys filed
their motion for a temporary restraining
order in the district court.
October 23, 1967: The three-judge court
denied the motion and ordered all parties to
cooperate with the Subcommittee.
November 10, 1967: The Supreme Court
stayed the district court order on condition
that the McSurelys obtain a ruling on the
validity of the subpoenas. 389 U.S. 949, 88
S.Ct. 313, 19 L.Ed.2d 358 (1967).
December 5, 1967: A hearing was held
before the district court on the validity of
the subpoenas. At that hearing, the
McSurelys learned, for the first time, that
John Brick, a Subcommittee investigator,
had taken copies of 234 documents to
Washington and that those copies were still
in the Subcommittee's possession. Brick
refused to tell the McSurelys which documents the Subcommittee had.
December 13, 1967: The district court
again ordered compliance with the subpoenas.
January 29, 1968: The Supreme Court
granted another stay, reserving for future
determination whether it had jurisdiction of
the appeal from the district court. 390
U.S. 914 (1968).
March 18, 1968: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction,
but continued the stay so that the McSurelys could seek review in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 390 U.S. 412
(1968).
July 29, 1968: The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court's order that Ratliff comply with cne
subpoenas. In a short per curiam opinion,
the court held that the material mu^* be
returned to the McSurelys because th. district court's right to retain the material

expired once the time for appeal had
elapsed. McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F.2d 817
(6th Cir.1968).
3) Contempt Proceedings. After the
McSurelys refused to comply with the subpoenas, the Senate approved a resolution
authorizing the Justice Department to prosecute them for contempt of Congress.
S.Res. 191, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
They were convicted in district court, but
this court reversed their convictions on appeal. United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d
1178 (D.C.Cir.1972).
4) Suit for Damages. The McSurelys and
several other plaintiffs initially brought the
instant suit against various Senate defendants to prevent them from proceeding with
the criminal contempt prosecution and to
seek damages. This court considered three
interlocutory appeals arising from this lawsuit.
McSurely I, 426 F.2d 664 (D.C.Cir.1970):
The district court stayed all proceedings in
the suit until final disposition of the contempt prosecution. We reversed that order
as overbroad and remanded for further
proceedings.
McSurely II: Following this court's decision in McSurely I, the McSurelys amended
their complaint to proceed on the damages
claims against various Senate defendants
and Thomas Ratliff. The Senate defendants sought dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that they were immune from
liability under the Speech or Debate
Clause. The district court denied their motion. A panel of this court reversed in part
and affirmed in part. That panel decision,
which is reported at 521 F.2d 1024, was
vacated by the en banc court. This court,
sitting en banc, unanimously agreed to dismiss most of the claims against the Senate
defendants, but was equally divided over
certain other claims. Those claims were
remanded to the district court. 553 F.2d
1277 (D.C.Cir.1976) (en banc). The Senate
defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Cour granted. 434
U.S. 888, 98 S.Ct. 260, 54 L.Ed.2d 173
(1977). Following oral argument, however,
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served upon physician's representatives.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 4, 25, 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>2515
Genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether patient's injuries were reasonably ascertainable and whether medical
malpractice action was brought within two
years of date at which injuries were reasonably ascertainable, precluding summary
judgment on issue of whether action was
barred by Kansas two-year statute of limitations. *K.S.A. 60-513, 60-513(a)(7), (c).
5. Damages <s=>93
Claim for punitive damages does not
survive wrongdoer's death under Kansas
law.
Jerry K. Levy, Topeka, Kan., for plaintiff.
William Tinker, Jr., McDonald, Tinker,
Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, Wichita, Kan.,
for defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CROW, District Judge.
This is a diversity of citizenship medical
malpractice case arising out of treatment
provided by Robert Quackenbush, M.D., to
Wayne Fehrenbacher, from mid-1973
through mid-1982, in St. John, Kansas.
Fehrenbacher claims that Quackenbush's
negligent prescribing of drugs has injured
him and caused him to become addicted to
various medications. Fehrenbacher also
claims that Quackenbush was negligent in
failing to refer him to other medical physicians. Fehrenbacher also alleges that
Quackenbush committed fraud. Fehrenbacher seeks both compensatory and punitive damages.
This matter comes before the court upon
Quackenbush's motion to dismiss based
upon Fehrenbacher's failure to move to
substitute, as a defendant, a representative
of the decedent or his estate within 90 days
of the filing of the suggestion of death as
required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a). In the alternative, Quackenbush moves for summary judgment. Fehrenbacher requests an
order allowing the substitution of Quackenbush's estate as a defendant. The court,
having considered the briefs of counsel and

applicable law is now prepared to rule on
the pending motions.
Motion to Dismiss
[1] Robert Quackenbush died during
the pendency of this action. On June 15,
1990, the firm representing Quackenbush
in this case filed a suggestion of death
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a). On November 1, 1990, the firm representing Quackenbush in this case filed a motion to dismiss
based upon Fehrenbacher's failure to file a
motion to substitute a representative of the
decedent or his estate. On November 13,
1990, Fehrenbacher responded to Quackenbush's motion to dismiss. In that response,
Fehrenbacher argues that Quackenbush
has failed to make a valid suggestion of
death due to the fact that the pleading does
not identify the representative of the successor who could be properly substituted.
In the alternative, Fehrenbacher asks the
court to extend the period of substitution
and allow Fehrenbacher to file a substituted party out of time based upon his "excusable neglect."
Quackenbush responds that Rule 25 does
not require the party filing the suggestion
of death to indicate the identity of the
substituted party. Quackenbush states
that "[i]n this case, defendant's counsel
could not have identified the person or persons to be substituted parties because such
persons have not been made known to defense counsel. No one claiming to be an
executor or administrator of Dr. Quackenbush's estate has contacted this counsel."
Quackenbush also contends that Fehrenbacher has not demonstrated excusable neglect.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1) provides:
If a party dies and the claim is not there
by extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties. The
motion for substitution may be made by
any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall
be served on the parties as provided in
Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons, and may be served
in any judicial district. Unless the mo-
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Likewise here, if as determined in VE
Holding, Congress intended § 1391(c) to
apply to § 1400(b) corporate defendants, it
is not unreasonable to assume that Congress was aware that the concept of partnership residence would be similarly construed.
I conclude that the first test for venue
under § 1400(b) with respect to a partnership defendant is whether it was subject to
personal jurisdiction in the district of suit
at the time the action was commenced.9
Polaris concedes that this court "has the
authority to exercise personal jurisdiction."
(See Polaris' additional briefing, p. 1, n. 1.)
Therefore, Colorado is an appropriate venue for the action.
//.

Case Transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Polaris has moved to transfer the case to
Minnesota pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Under that statute, a court may dismiss a
case when venue is improper, or may transfer it to a district where it could have been
filed originally. Because venue is proper in
Colorado, and there are no other persuasive
reasons for transfer, Polaris' motion to
transfer is denied.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) the defendant's motion to dismiss for
improper venue or to transfer the
case is denied; and
(2) the parties are ordered to meet and
confer within eleven days of this order in a good faith effort to settle
this matter and thereby avoid further
costly and time consuming litigation.
The parties shall consider alternate
dispute resolution. They shall report
the results of their negotiations in
writing to this court within fifteen
days, and shall state whether they
are pursuing alternate dispute resolution and whether a settlement conference before a Magistrate Judge
would facilitate settlement.

9. While this holding effectively moots
§ 1400(b)'s second test with respect to partner-

Wayne FEHRENBACHER, Plaintiff,
v.
Robert QUACKENBUSH, Defendant.
No. 89-1348-C.
United States District Court,
D. Kansas.
March 6, 1991.
Patient brought medical malpractice
action against physician. The District
Court, Crow, J., held that: (1) suggestion
of death filed following death of physician
was invalid; (2) patient's motion for substitution of parties was invalid; and (3) issues
of fact existed precluding summary judgment on issue of whether action was
barred by limitations.
Ordered accordingly.
1. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365
Suggestion of death filed in diversity
medical malpractice action following death
of defendant physician was invalid where
suggestion was made by attorney who represented physician in defense of medical
malpractice action but who did not represent his estate and suggestion was not
properly served on physician's estate. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 4, 25, 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <£»362
Rules governing substitution of proper
parties upon death of party implicitly imposes a requirement that to be valid, suggestion of death identify representative or
successor who may be substituted as a
party. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25, 28 U.S.
C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365
Medical malpractice plaintiffs motion
for substitution for defendant physician
who died was; deficient where motion did
not name representative of physician's estate nor did it appear that motion for substitution and notice of hearing had been
ships, that test remains operative as to defendants who are individuals.
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substitution of the proper parties in place
of the deceased party. However, 25(a)(1)
provides that the action is to be dismissed as to the deceased party, unless
substitution is made not later than ninety
days after the death is suggested upon
the record. Thus it is only when the
suggestion of the death upon the record
has been made that Rule 25(a)(1) now
provides a time limit upon substitution.
Moreover, the Rule provides for the service of suggestion of the death upon both
parties and non-parties to the action, attempting to assure the parties to the
action and other concerned persons of
notice of the death so that they may take
appropriate action to make substitution
for the deceased party. Thus, though a
time limit is still required for making this
substitution, it is measured from the
time the suggestion of the death has
been served upon the parties to the action and other interested persons, not
from the time the deceased party died.
3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice 1125.06 (2d ed. 1990). In
Quackenbush's brief, counsel states: "At
this point, the administrator or executor of
Dr. Quackenbush's estate has no information, at least to defense counsel's knowledge, regarding this action." Therefore it
is clear, in this unusual factual scenario,
that Quackenbush's own estate has not
been given proper notice of this pending
action, and in this court's opinion the ninety
day limitation has not yet started to run.
[2] As a final comment on this issue,
the court notes that Rule 25 does not explicitly require the party making the suggestion of death to identify the decedent's
representative. As the parties note, some
jurisdictions hold that a valid suggestion of
death must identify the representative or
successor who may be substituted as a
party. See McSurely v. McClellan, 753
F.2d 88, 98 (D.C.Cir.1985). In reality, Rule
25 implicitly imposes such a requirement.
By requiring service of the suggestion of
death on parties and non-parties, the rule
implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the party making the suggestion of death.
Quackenbush's motion to dismiss is denied.

Fehrenbacher's Motion for Substitution
[3] On November 15, 1990, Fehrenbacher filed a motion for substitution requesting the court to "enter an order substituting the estate of Robert Quackenbush as
the property [sic] party defendant." Fehrenbacher's motion for substitution is deficient under Rule 25 because the motion for
substitution does not name the representative of Quackenbush's estate nor does it
appear that the motion for substitution and
notice of hearing have been served upon
Quackenbush's representatives in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.
A motion for substitution for a deceased
party may be made by any party or by
the successors or representatives of the
deceased party. It is not necessary that
a suggestion of death be made on the
record before a motion for substitution
can be made.
The motion for substitution, together
with the notice of hearing on the motion,
must be served on all the parties to the
action, not just the opposing party, as
provided in Rule 5. It must be served on
persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Thus the procedures of Rule 4
must be followed in serving the motion
on the representative or successor of a
deceased party.
7C Wright & Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 1956 at 550551. Therefore, Fehrenbacher's motion for
substitution is denied. The court will consider a new motion for substitution if that
motion is made in compliance with Rule 25.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when
the movant can demonstrate that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S.
242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather
as an integral part of the Federal Rules as
a whole, which are designed 'to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
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tion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after the death is suggested
upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
Because it is a fairly infrequent occurrence
that one of the litigants to a case dies
during its pendency, Rule 25 has not been
the subject of much discussion in reported
cases.
Prior to its amendment in 1963, Rule
25(a)(1) required a court to dismiss an
action if no motion for substitution had
been filed within two years of the death
of a party. See, e.g., Rende v. Kay, 415
F.2d 983, 984 (D.C.Cir.1969). In order to
alleviate the inequities caused by the inflexibility of this rule, see id. at 984, Rule
25(a)(1) was amended to require a motion
for substitution to be filed within ninety
days from the time a suggestion of death
is filed in the district court and properly
served.
Grandebouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 836
(10th Cir.1990). See United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031 (10th
Cir.1974). See also 7C C. Wright & A.
Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Civil § 1955, at 542 (1986). In
In re McClay, slip no. 88-1069-C, 1990 WL
66605 (D.Kan. April 26, 1990), this court
had occasion to discuss and consider Rule
25 in the context of an appeal from the
bankruptcy court.
The court concludes that on the record
before it no valid suggestion of death has
yet been filed with the court. Two reasons
support this conclusion. First, the suggestion of death was made by the attorney
representing Quackenbush in defense of
this action. "[T]he attorney for the deceased party may not make the suggestion
of death since he is not himself a party to
the action and, since his authority to represent the deceased terminated on the death,
he is not a 'representative of the deceased
party' of the sort contemplated by the
rule." 7C C. Wright & A. Miller & M.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure,
1. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 84.

Civil §1955, at 545. See Faris* v r L
burg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 Z Cir f S "
It is apparent from Quackenh,,«,k- L .
of tins acton does not represent Q u a c k e r !
bush's estate. Therefore, the
sL^Z
of death was not made by a party o r
^
sentative as required by the rule. In fact*
is not entirely clear to the court how the
firm representing Quackenbush in this ac
tion continues to represent the decedent
It is possible that the firm representing
Quackenbush in this action was retained bv
Quackenbush^ insurer. However, even if
that assumption is correct, the insurance
company in this case is not a named party
While the insurance company may be contractually obligated to continue representing Quackenbush in this action, it is not
clear from the record as it exists that the
firm who made the suggestion of death
was in fact a "representative of the deceased party" within the meaning of Rule
25.
In any event, while the suggestion of
death in this case is written in conformity
with Form 30 found in the Appendix of
Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1 it is clear that Rule 25 has not been
satisfied as the suggestion of death has not
been served in compliance with Fed.R.
Civ.P. 4 on Quackenbush's representatives.
See Grandebouche, 913 F.2d at 837 (nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased party's estate,
must be served pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4).
[Rule 25] provides that the suggestion of
the death upon the record is made "by
service of a statement of the fact of
death as provide herein for the service of
the motion [for substitution]," i.e. by service upon parties to the action as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties
in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons; and such service
may be made in any judicial district. No
time limit is placed by the amended Rule
upon when the death must be so suggested. Nor is the suggestion of the death
upon the record a prerequisite to the
motion under amended Rule 25(a) for
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of action for medical malpractice is deemed
to have accrued under K.S.A. 60-513(c), the
matter becomes an issue for determination
by the trier of fact" 237 Kan. 410, Syl.
112, 701 P.2d 1301. The court also commented: "The symptoms of the injury were
known to the plaintiff, but the fact of injury was not reasonably or immediately ascertainable." 237 Kan. at 415, 701 P.2d
1301. The court concluded that the plaintiffs cause of action was timely filed.
The sole issue presented by this portion
of Quackenbush's motion for summary
judgment
is whether
Fehrenbacher
brought his cause of action within two
years of the date at which his injuries were
reasonably ascertainable. The court, having reviewed the submitted portions of the
depositions, concludes that the issue of
whether Fehrenbacher's injuries were reasonably ascertainable is a question of fact
and is not amenable to summary adjudication.
Quackenbush's motion for summary
judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied.
Punitive Damages
[5] Fehrenbacher alleges that Quackenbush committed fraud and seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. Quackenbush moves for summary judgment on
the issue of punitive damages. Quackenbush contends that the purpose of punitive
damages is to punish the wrongdoer.
Quackenbush contends that because he is
dead, he cannot be punished. Quackenbush contends that as a matter of law,
punitive damages cannot be entered
against a dead tortfeasor.
Fehrenbacher acknowledges that one of
the purposes of punitive damages is to
punish the wrongdoer. Fehrenbacher also
acknowledges that because Quackenbush is
dead, he cannot be punished by an award
of punitive damages. Fehrenbacher does
contend, however, that the ultimate purpose of punitive damages is to deter and
restrain others from the commission of like
wrongs and that an award of punitive damages in this case, albeit that the alleged
tortfeasor is dead, would serve that purpose.

Neither party has identified any case applying Kansas law that directly addresses
this issue. The majority rule is that a
claim for punitive damages does not survive the death of the wrongdoer. Barnes
v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 231 (10th Cir.1962);
see Annotation, Survival of Punitive Damages Claim, 30 A.L.R. 4th 707 (1984). A
minority of states allow a claim for punitive damages to survive the death of the
wrongdoer. See, e.g., Ellis v. Zuck, 546
F.2d 643 (5th Cir.1977) (applying Alabama
law).
Recently, this court, applying Kansas
law, was presented with the issue of
whether a claim for punitive damages survives the wrongdoer's death. In Elam v.
Williams, 753 F.Supp. 1530, 1541 (D.Kan.
1990), the alleged wrongdoer died and his
representative moved for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages,
making the same arguments that Quackenbush presents in this case. The plaintiff in
Elam did not respond to the defendant's
argument. This court concluded: "Since
the case law in defendants' brief supports
the propositions for which they were cited
and plaintiffs do not counter with any arguments or authority, the court grants this
motion as uncontested/' Id. at 1541.
In Wisker v. Hart, 244 Kan. 36, 766 P.2d
168 (1988), the Supreme Court of Kansas
restated the law governing the award of
punitive in Kansas.
Punitive damages may be awarded whenever the elements of fraud, malice, gross
negligence, or oppression mingle in the
controversy. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins
Co., 241 Kan. [441] at 481 [738 P.2d 1210
(1987) ]. Punitive damages are awarded
to punish the wrongdoer for his malicious, vindictive, or willful and wanton
invasion of another's rights, with the ultimate purpose being to restrain and deter
others from the commission of similar
wrongs.
244 Kan. at 41, 766 P.2d 168.
The court concludes that Kansas would
follow the majority rule and not allow an
award of punitive damages against the estate of the wrongdoer. Awarding punitive
damages would vicariously punish the heirs
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trett, All U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.
Civ.P. 1). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Statute of Limitations
[4] The parties stipulate that the law
governing all issues of this case is the law
of the State of Kansas.
Fehrenbacher commenced his first
screening panel review on May 15, 1984.
Quackenbush moves for summary judgment, contending that Fehrenbacher did
not bring this cause of action within the
two-year statute of limitations governing
medical malpractice actions in Kansas.
Quackenbush contends that the uncontroverted facts indicate Fehrenbacher failed to
bring this cause of action within two years
following the date he was aware of his
drug addiction. Quackenbush contends
that Fehrenbacher was aware of his injury
in the early spring of 1982.
Fehrenbacher responds that summary
judgment is inappropriate for several reasons. Fehrenbacher contends that Quackenbush is, at most, only entitled to partial
summary judgment. Fehrenbacher contends that he is seeking compensation for
injuries beyond those suffered due to drug
addiction, and therefore even if he was
aware of his injury before May 15, 1984, he
is still entitled to proceed with his other
claims. Fehrenbacher also contends that
he has brought his cause of action for drug
addiction within the two-year statute of
limitations.
Generally, a medical malpractice action
must be brought within the two-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(7)
and (c).2 White v. VinZant, 13 Kan.App.2d
467, Syl. 1!1, 773 P.2d 1169 (1989). K.S.A.
60-513 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The following actions shall be
brought within two (2) years:
(7) An action arising out of the rendering
of or failure to render professional services by a health care provider, not arising on contract.
2. K.S.A. 60-513 was amended on July 1, 1987.
See L.1987, ch. 222, § 1. The amendment effected no substantive change in the relevant

(c) A cause of action arising out of th
rendering of or the failure to render pro*
fessional services by a health care provider shall be deemed to have accrued at
the time of the occurrence of the a ,*
giving rise to the cause of action, unless
the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial
act, then the period of limitation shall not
commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall such an
action be commenced more than four (4)
years beyond the time of the act giving
rise to the cause of action.
In Cleveland v. Wong, 237 Kan. 410, 701
P.2d 1301 (1985), the plaintiff sued the defendant, Dr. Wong, alleging that Dr. Wong
had negligently performed surgery resulting in incontinence and impotency. The
jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs favor.
On appeal, Dr. Wong contended that the
plaintiffs cause of action was barred by
the statute of limitations.
Dr. Wong contended that the plaintiff
was aware of his injuries more than two
years before commencing his suit. The
initial surgery was performed on May 19,
1978; the plaintiff filed his cause of action
on August 14, 1980. The issue of whether
the plaintiffs cause of action was barred
by the statute of limitations was submitted
to the jury. Dr. Wong contended that because the plaintiff knew he was incontinent
and impotent immediately after surgery,
the fact of injury was reasonably ascertainable to him. The evidence also indicated,
however, that incontinence and impotence
were normal immediately following TUR
surgery. "Thus, while plaintiff knew that
he was both incontinent and impotent immediately after surgery, he had no reason
to suspect that those conditions were permanent or that those conditions were the
result of any negligence or malpractice on
the part of the defendant." 237 Kan. at
414, 701 P.2d 1301.
The court concluded that "[wjhere there
is conflicting evidence as to when a cause
portions of the statute, and in any event the
amendment is not relevant to this case.
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of the wrongdoer and would not serve to
deter potential tortfeasors. See Thompson
v. Estate ofPetroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn.
1982) (court rejects argument that potential
tortfeasor will be deterred from committing an intentional tort by fear that his
heirs will be deprived of part of his estate
as a result of estate's liability for punitive
damages).
Quackenbush's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of punitive damages
is granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
Quackenbush's motion to dismiss (Dk. 65)
is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
Quackenbush's motion for summary judgment (Dk. 51) based on the statute of limitations is denied. Quackenbush's motion
for partial summary judgment (Dk. 51) on
the issue of punitive damages is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fehrenbacher's motion for substitution (Dk.
67) is denied.

Louis A. WHITTEN, Larry J. Warren,
Alan T. Fenstemaker, and Carl A.
Bonham, Plaintiffs,
v.
FARMLAND INDUSTRIES,
INC., Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 88-2637-0.
United States District Court,
D. Kansas.
March 19, 1991.
Discharged employees brought action
against former employer alleging age discrimination, breach of contract, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Employer moved
for summary judgment. The District
Court, Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, held
that: (1) discharged employees established
prima facie case of age discrimination; (2)
genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether employer's stated reason for preferring to keep younger employees over

discharged employees during reduction-inforce was a mere pretext for age discrimination, precluding judgment; (3) genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether
employer's stated reason for failing to rehire discharged employees was a pretext
for age discrimination, precluding summary judgment; and (4) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether there was
an implied contract of employment which
was violated by termination of employees,
precluding summary judgment.
Motion granted in part and denied in
part.
1. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>2544
If party moving for summary judgment does not bear burden of proof, he
must show that there is absence of evidence to support nonmoving party's case
and that burden is met when moving party
identifies those portions of record which
demonstrate absence of material fact.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*2544
Once party moving for summary judgment shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists, burden shifts to party resisting motion who must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial, and it is not enough for party
opposing properly supported motion to rest
on mere allegations or denials of his pleading. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.
C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <8=>2470.1
To preclude summary judgment, genuine factual issues must exist that can be
resolved only by finder of fact because
they may reasonably be resolved in favor
of either party. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
4. Civil Rights <s=>168
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) is remedial and humanitarian legislation and should be liberally interpreted to
effectuate congressional purpose of ending
age discrimination in employment. Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq.
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David P. Madden, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith. Overland Park, KS, Richard F.
Kane, Blakeney & Alexander, Charlotte, NC,
for defendant Lane Company Inc.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
VAN BE3BER, Chief Judge.
This case is before the court upon the
plaintiffs motion to dismiss without prejudice
(Doc. 9) and upon the defendant's motion to
dismiss with prejudice (Doc. 10). For the
reasons stated below, both motions are denied.
This wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and retaliatory discharge case was nied
in October 1995 and removed to federal
court. On March 13. 1996. counsel for plaintiff fled a suggestion of death, notifying the
court of the plaintiffs death.
Cross-motions for dismissal have been
nied. Counsel for the deceased plaintiff argues that the dismissal should be without
prejudice to be fair to the plaintiffs heirs.
The defendant argues that dismissal should
be with prejudice because no motion for substitution of party was filed within 90 days of
the filing of the suggestion of death and
because the plaintiffs claims should not survive him.
[1] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25(a)(1), which governs substitution of parties
in the event of death, provides:
If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper parties. The
motion for substitution may be made by
any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be
served on the parties as provided in Rule 5
and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a
summons, and may be served in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after
the death is suggested upon the record by
1.

In Fehrenbacher. 739 F.Supp. at 1519, Judge
Crow noted: "Rule 25 does not explicitly require
the party making the suggestion of death to identify the decedent's representative— In reality.
Rule 25 Lrnplicidy imposes such a requirement.

service of a statement of the fact
death as provided herein for the se-^ ?^
the motion, the action shall be aismisLjr,f
to the deceased party.
'4 •*
The 90-day time limit for Sling a mot:
substitute begins to run after a valid s u ^
tion of death has been made. Gmndta^
v. LovelL 913 F.2d S35, S36-37 (lOflTj*
1990); Enfingerv. WolfCreek Nuclear•(>!"*'
azing Corp., No. 95-4071. 1996 WL *>?^
•3, n. 3 (D.Kam Apr. 12, 1996); Hi^*'
Griffiths, No. 90-2024.1991 WL 132333 "•* \
(D.Kan. Jul. 9, 1991).
'' "2
[2] For purposes of the pending rr.0Kf .
the suggestion of death on record.
^tiic.*:
counsel for the deceased plaintiff 2eti. is»
valid. Counsel did not purport to inake *
suggestion of death on behalf of the dec*
dent's heirs or successors or as a repress-tive of his estate. * 4[77ne attorney for ^
deceased party may not make the suggest
of death since he is not himself a parr.* to ^
action and, since his authority to repress
the deceased terminated on the death, he ••
not a "representative of the deceased parr.-'
of the sort contemplated by the role.'" f&
renbacherv. Quackenbusk, 759 F.Supp. 15^
1518 (D.Kan.1991) (quoting 7C Charles JL
Wright et aL, Federal Practice & Procedun
§ 1955, at 545 (2d ed. 1986)); see Emngn.
1996 WL 254609 at *3, n. 3; Hipperi 1991
WL 152S33 at •!. Additionally, the sugg*
tion of death does not appear to have bes
served on the successors or representative
of Steve Hiisabeck who are not parties u
this action in the manner provided by Fed
R.Ch\P. 4, as Rule 25(a)(1) requires. See
GmTidbouche, 913 F.2d at 837; Fehmbather, 759 F.Supp. at 1518. Accordingly, the
time for filing a motion to substitute a proper
party has not run.1
[3] The defendant also argues that the
plaintiff's causes of action should not sunt*
him because they are personal in nature and
because the plaintiff had not testified prior a
his death. See Carter v. City of Emp<m
Kan., 543 F5upp. 354, 356 (Diani92)
By requiring service of the suggestion of doffl
on parties and non-parties, the rule impuea?
allocates the burden of identifying the subsao*
party to the party making the suggesnon *
death."

BDDLSABECK v. L A N E C O - INC.
ClicatlM FJU>. 313 (DJCaa. 1M*)

li A party seeking attorneys' fees must
comply with the requirements of D.Kan Rule
5t2 and FedJl.Civi > . 54(d)(2) in order to be
entitled to a fee award. Law v. National
Coikcicte Athletic Assyru No. 94-2Q53-KHV,
1956 WL 10432S, at "5 (D.Kan. Jan. 5,1996).
[3] On July 19. 1996, the court directed
Lie defendants to show cause by July 29 t
1996. why their morion should not be discussed for failure to file a statement of consuitanon and memorandum in support of
tneir motion. As of this date, the defendants
have not responded.
IT IS THEREFORE B Y T H E COURT
ORDERED that the defendants' Motion for
ATOU of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses
(Doc. 69) is denied.

Co

|trr»«UMBL?SYSTlM>

Steve ffiLSABECK, Plaintiff
v.
LANE COMPANY, INC., Defendant
Civil Action No. 95-2516-GTV.
United States District Court,
D.Kansas.
Aug. 19, 1996.
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tiff would be denied, where there was nothing in the record to establish the authority of
or authorization for counsel to file any pleadings in case.
Motions denied.
1. Federal Civil Procedure <5=>363.1
Ninety-day time limit for filing a motion
to substitute for deceased pany beg^-ns to
run after valid suggestion of death has been
made. Fedituies Civ.Proc.Ruie 25(a)(1), 28*
U.S.CA.
2. Federal CMl Procedure c=»363.1
Suggestion of death filed by counsel for
deceased plaintiff was not vaiic. and thus
time for filing motion to substitute had not
run, where counsel did not purport to make
suggestion on behalf of decedent's heirs or
successors or as representative of his estate;
moreover, suggestion of death was not
served on successors or representatives of
deceased plaintiff, who were not parties to
actior. in manner required by evil procedure
rule. Fed.?vules CivProcRuies 4, 25(a)(1),
28 U.S.CA.
3. Abatement and Revival <s=>58(.5)
Under Kansas law, causes of action for
wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and
retaliatory discharge brought under the Kansas Act Against Discrimination and Title VII
survived death of plaintiff. Civil Rights Act
of 1964. § 701 et seq.. 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e e t
seq.; 1LSA. 44-1001 et seq., 60-1801.

F
°nner employee brought suit in state 4. Attorney and Client o=>63, 76(2)
tour.
^ against employer, alleging wrongful
Attorney-client relationship is one of
T / ^ e , breach of contract, and retaliatory agency and terminates upon client's death.
^ ^ under Title VII and the Kansas
^ gainst Discrimination. After removal, 5. Federal Civil Procedure <3>1825
^ j ^ l for plaintiff Sled suggestion of death.
Motion to dismiss without prejudice filed
£ m ° v ed to dismiss -without prejudice. by counsel for deceased plaintiff would b e
^Plover
to dismiss -with prejudice. denied, where there was nothing in the recTb» m moved
M , c t Court, Van Bebber, Chief ord to establish authority of or authorization
I j 3 ^eld that: (1) suggestion of death for counsel to file any pleadings in case.
^ -v counsel for deceased plaintiff was not
V y * ^ ^ n o t trigger running of 90-day
^ ^ l for filing motion to substitute; (2)
Rodney K. Murrow, Herron & Lewis, KanHw Kansas law, plaintiffs causes of action sas City, MO, Donald P. Herron, Herron &
^ e d his death; and (3) motion to dismiss Lewis, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiff Steve
ut
Prejudice filed by counsel for plain- HQsabeck.

Ha?)

WALCO INVESTMENTS, INC T. THENEN
Cite u 168 FJLD. 315 (S.DJ^IJL 1996)

(§ 19S1 claim is personal in nature and does
no: survive plamuffs death under K.S-A.
§ 60-1801, statute for survival of actions in
Kansas;
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WALCO INVESTMENTS, INC.
et aJL Plaintiffs,

v.
The court finds the argument unpersuaKenneth THENEN, et al„ Defendants.
sive In his complaint, the plamnff alleged
wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and
No. 93-25S4-Ch\
rerahatory discharge under the Kansas Act
United States District Court,
Agamst Discnrr.inanon, K.SA. § 44-1001 et
S.D. Florida.
sec and Title VIL 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
See, eg., Anspach v. Tomkins Indus., /TIC,
June 27, 1996.
817 F.Supp. 1499, 1510 (DJian.1993) (Title
VII ^um survives plaintiffs death under
Kansas survival of acuons^ statute, KS.A.
Representatives of putanve class of in§ 60-1801), afd. 51 F.3d 2S5 (lOtn Cir.1995)
vestor's
brouent action against promoters,
(Taoie;, Price v Holmes. 198 Kan. 100, SyL
law
firm,
and numerous other parnes related
6.422 P.2d 976 (1967) ("At common law, and
to
operation
of alleged Ponza scneme for seU2 tms state, a cause of acnon sounding in
curines
fraud.
Racketeer Influenced and
contract survives the death of either part}*
Corrupt
Organizacons
(RICO) violations,
*r.ere uie breach thereof results in loss or
injury to a property right."); Pntman v. and common-! "v fraud. On plaintiffs* monon
McDowell Rice & Smith, Chartered 12 Kan. for class cer-iication, the District Court,
App.2d 603, 611, 752 PJ2d 711 (contract claim Moreno, J., held that: (1) plaintiffs estabsurvives plaintiffs death), rev. denied, 243 lished numerosity requirement for global
class; (2) plaintiffs established commonality
Kan. 780 (198S).
requirement for global class; (3) plaintiffs
The defendant's motion to dismiss with met typicality requirement for global class;
prejudice is denied.
(4) plaintiffs met requirement of adequate
representauon for global class; (5) plaintiffs
&5] There is nothing in the record to were enntled to presumpnon of reliance on
establisn the authority of or authonzation for securities fraud claims; (6) common issues
^unse! for the deceased plaintiff to file any regarding securities fraud, RICO, and comPleadings in this case, including the pending mon-law fraud rflflfms predominated action;
Motion to dismiss. The attorney-client rela- (7) plaintiff's established superiority requireonsnip is one of agency and terminates ment for global class; and (8) representaupon the client's death. State v. Dickens, tives met certification requirements for five
44
Kan. 98, 102, 519 PJ>d 750 (1974). Ac- subclasses to litigate secunnes registration
fQingiy, counsel for the decedent s motion and prospectus violations.
^nuss without prejudice is denied.
Monon granted.
T
|
IS,
THEREFORE,
BY
THE
COURT
0]
, ER ED that the plaintiffs and the dec
*nt's cross-motions to dismiss (Doc. 9 & 1. Federal Civil Procedure o»l72
10,j
^e denied.
Party seeking to certify class bears burden
of proof on all certificanon issues. Fed.
^ ^ SO ORDERED.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28 U.S.CJL
( O | W NU*B!F SYSTEM >

2. Federal Civil Procedure C=>176
Each putative subclass must independently meet requirements for certification of
class. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23, 28
TLS.CJL

AWUNDI v. ESTATE OF ROCKEFELLER
Cite a* 757 F.Supp. 206 (WJD.N.Y. 1990)

Michael McCarthy, Buffalo, N.Y., Elizabeth Fink, Brooklyn, N.Y., Michael
Deutsch, Chicago, 111., for plaintiffs.
Jerome Rosenberg, Napanoch, N.Y., pro
se.
Herbert Blyden, Buffalo, N.Y., pro se.
John Stenger, Buffalo, N.Y., Joshua Effron, Delmar, N.Y., Richard Moot, Irving
Maghran, Jr., Buffalo, N.Y., Donald Berens, Jr., Albany, N.Y., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
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tertainment of an appeal from an interlocutory order may run from the date of the
amendment or resettlement of a district
court's order so as to include therein the
requested 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) statements.
See, Rule 5(a) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Thus, while section 1292(b)
still requires that such statement be "in
writing in such order"—viz., the order
from which the appeal is sought to be
taken—, it can be embodied in an amended
or resettled version thereof.

That an immediate appeal from this
Court's granting of the plaintiffs' motion
and denying of defendant Keller's motion
may materially advance this litigation is
patent given the current status of this lawsuit. The litigation has been ongoing for
an exceedingly and unduly long time and
had finally reached the point where this
Court on December 14, 1989 set June 5,
1990 as the day certain for the start of
what is projected as a jury trial of three or
four months. Three of the four remaining
defendants then—sequentially—moved to
dismiss on the basis of each's qualified
immunity. Due to such motions this Court
on May 10, 1990 changed the trial-comMr. Keller, represented by the attorney
mencement
date to July 10, 1990. Qualiw
ho had represented Monahan during his
fied immunity having been denied June 26,
lifetime and Monahan's daughter in her
1990 copies of such three defendants' noopposition to the appointment of an admintices
of appeal were received July 3rd. On
istrator ad litem, now has asked this Court
July
10th the trial date was tentatively
to state that said Order involves a controlshifted
to August 7th although an earlier
ling
question or questions of law as to order (on July 5th) had stayed the trial
w
hich there is substantial ground for dif- pending dispositions of the appeals.
ference of opinion and that an immediate
The order now sought to be appealed
a
PPeal therefrom may materially advance
kept defendant Monahan's estate in the
toe ultimate disposition of this long-pendcase but the litigation could not proceed
^g litigation.
due to the pending appeals. For the appelll] Although the rule contemplates that
late court to consider also whether this
Su
ch statements by a court shall be writCourt's decision of August 2nd can be upten—that is, embodied—in the order from
held would work no hurt to the progressing
which an immediate appeal is sought, it
of the lawsuit. If such decision should be
lo
ng has been settled in the Second Ciroverturned and qualified immunity be ac^it-Brown
v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415
corded
one or two or all three of the re(19
6l); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Bell Telemaining defendants there will have been
P^one Laboratories, Inc., 272 F.2d 29
no wasting of this Court's time or efforts;
U959); Mueller v. Rayon Consultants, Inonly the plaintiffs (who have not been free
corporated, 271 F.2d 591 (1959)—and since
of fault for the lengthy delays in bringing
1967 generally that the 10-day period for
this case to trial) are damaged and, even
a
PP!ying to the appellate court for the enELFVIN, District Judge.
On August 2, 1990 this Court by Memorandum and Order granted the plaintiffs'
motion to substitute John S. Keller, Commissioner of Finance of Orange County, as
the Administrator of the Estate of John
Monahan, Deceased, in the place and stead
of defendant John Monahan. Sub silentio
but by necessary implication, said Order
denied the motion made on behalf of defendant Monahan to dismiss the action as to
him on the ground that the plaintiffs had
failed to observe the temporal parameters
of Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

757 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

206

versity of citizenship is absent (see 3A
Moore's Federal Practice fl20.07[5.-2] [2d
ed. 1990]). Accordingly, even apart from
the new section 1367, pendent-party jurisdiction was held inapplicable to diversity
actions under section 1332. As such, it
appears that the Court does not have the
power to exercise discretion in entertaining
the claim asserted against Ticor.
The Court also notes that the claim
against Ticor for the $36,000 in this case is
wholly separate and apart from any of the
other claims. The only claim asserted
against Ticor is the seventh cause of action.
Liability as to the other causes of action is
not joint and several with Ticor. Thus,
even if this Court had the power to exercise
pendent-party jurisdiction over this claim,
in its discretion, the Court would decline to
do so under the circumstances presented in
this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion of the defendant Ticor Title Insurance
Company to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.
Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (h)(3), is granted. The
complaint is therefore dismissed as against
the defendant Ticor Title Insurance Company.
SO ORDERED.

Akil AL-JUNDI, a/k/a Herbert Scott Deane, et al., on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
The ESTATE OF Nelson A.
ROCKEFELLER, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CIV-75-L32E.
United States District Court,
W.D. New York.
Sept. 4, 1990.
Defendant substituted for original deceased defendant moved to have interlocu-

tory order certified for immediate appellate
review. The District Court, Elfvin, J., held
that interlocutory determination that plaintiffs' motion to substitute, following defendant's death, was timely or, if untimely,
was delayed as result of excusable neglect
without any undue prejudice to defendant's
heirs or distributees, would be certified for
immediate appellate review.
Motion granted.

1. Federal Courts <s=>660.30
Ten-day period for applying to appellate court for entertainment of appeal from
interlocutory order may run from date of
amendment or resettlement of district
court's order so as to include therein statements, embodied in amended or resettled
order, certifying interlocutory order for immediate appeal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b);
F.R.A.P.Rule 5(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365
Deceased defendant's attorney's statement of defendant's death was a nullity,
and thus did not start running of clock for
plaintiffs' motion to substitute; attorney's
representation of defendant ceased upon
defendant's death, and attorney's statement failed to identify person who had
been named as representative of decedent's
estate. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a)(1),
28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Courts <3=>660.5
Interlocutory determination that plaintiffs' motion to substitute, following defendant's death, was timely or, if untimely,
was delayed as result of excusable neglect
without any undue prejudice to defendant's
heirs or distributees, would be certified for
immediate appellate review; correctness of
decision to allow substitution was of vital
importance to progress of lawsuit, and
there was substantial ground for difference of opinion as to court's interpretation
of substitution rule. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b);
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.
C.A.; F.R.A.P.Rule 5(a), 28 U.S.C.A.

AL-JUNDI v. ESTATE OF ROCKEFELLER
Cite as 757 RSupp. 206 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)

to the plaintiffs' non-compliance with Rule
25(a)(1). Al-Jundx v. Rockefeller, supra,
at 246-247. Rende v. Kay, supra, was
cited and relied upon. In that case,
brought to recover for personal injuries
caused by an automobile accident, the defendant driver had died after the action had
commenced. The defendant's attorney of
record made the suggestion of death in
court and with notice. Subsequently and in
his own name he moved to dismiss the case
as to the decedent because the plaintiffs
had not moved to substitute. Thereupon,
the plaintiffs moved to substitute and for a
Rule 6(b) enlargement, asserting that the
suggestion of death was defective in that it
did not name the decedent's legal representative. The plaintiffs appealed from the
trial court's dismissal of the lawsuit and
the appellate court reversed and ordered
the action's reinstatement. In support
thereof the Court said:
"The Advisory Committee [on Civil
Rules], in outlining that suggestion of
death could be made by 'the representative of the deceased party' plainly contemplated that the suggestion emanating
from the side of the deceased would identify a representative of the estate, such
as an executor or administrator, who
could be substituted for the deceased as
a party, with the action continued in the
name of the representative. * * *
*

*

*

*

*

*

"In our opinion the Rule, as amended,
cannot fairly be construed * * * to make
[the defendant's attorney's] suggestion
°f death operative to trigger the 90-day
Period even though he was neither a
successor nor [a] representative of the
deceased, and gave no indication of what
Person was available to be named in substitution as a representative of the deceased. * * *
* The tactic of the defendant's
a
ttorney would place on plaintiff the bur*e&, where no conventional representative was appointed for the estate in probate court, of instituting machinery in
0r
<ter to produce some representative of
th
* estate ad litem * * *
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"No injustice results from the requirement that a suggestion of death identify
the representative or successor of an estate who may be substituted as a party
for the deceased before Rule 25(aXl) may
be invoked by those who represent or
inherit from the deceased. If the heirs
or counsel fear that delay may prejudice
the litigation they may move promptly
for appointment of a representative, perhaps a temporary representative, either
under the law of the domicile or by special order in the court wherein the litigation is pending." Id., at 985-986.
This Court's canvassing of the myriad
judicial decisions which have had concern
with rule 25(a)(1) yielded what at first appeared to be rulings made without rhyme
or reason. However, further analysis
shows such not to be true and that, while
there are aberrations, the disparate results
are explained by observing who is asking
for what relief and for what purpose in the
various litigative positions. One can gain
relief from the 90-day restriction via a
motion for enlargement made even after
the expiration of the allotted time if one
satisfies the court that the delay was the
result of excusable neglect and the opponent fails to demonstrate that such relief
would work undue prejudice. While most
of the decisions involve lapses of time
much shorter than that which occurred
here, the greater lapse in this case is explained to a substantial degree by the opposition put forth by Monahan's family and
his attorney to the plaintiffs' efforts to
have an administrator ad litem appointed.
Monahan's daughter, the Surrogate noted,
opposed the plaintiffs' efforts to have the
representative appointed while declining to
be appointed herself. She acted the role of
the "dog in the manger."
Similar obstructive efforts appeared.
Monahan's attorney tried to establish a
roadblock at the outset by alleging that
there isn't any estate and there is and will
not be anyone who can be substituted in
the decedent's place. As an important
aside, what is established clearly by such
assertion is that there is no prejudice to
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then, only if the trial proves their cause to
be meritorious. If this Court's ruling as to
defendant Monahan's estate is overturned
and its rulings as to all three of the other
defendants similarly treated, doing so now
rather than after a lengthy trial would be
most saving of the time and efforts of all.
Further, this Court opines that its Order
of August 2nd does involve controlling
questions of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.
The ruling "strays" from the literality of
Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—albeit, along a path indicated
by various judicial signposts.
The pertinent portion of Rule 25(a)(1)
reads as follows:
"Unless the motion for substitution [of
the proper parties] is made not later than
90 days after the death [of a party] is
suggested upon the record by service of
a statement of the fact of death as provided herein for the service of the motion
[to wit, as provided in Rules 4 and 5], the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party."
The present rule stems from a 1963 amendment. Theretofore it had provided a rigid
two-year post-death period during which—
and only during which—the substitution
could be made despite excusable neglect on
the party wishing to bring it about. See
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67
S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed. 436 (1947); Starnes v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 295
F.2d 704 (2d Cir.1961), cert denied, 369
U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 688, 7 L.Ed.2d 612 (1962);
Report of Judicial Conference, 31 F.R.D.
638-639. The pre-1963 inflexibility had
been emphasized by the express exception
of the time for moving to substitute from
the enlargements allowed to be granted
under Rule 6(b). This exception also was
deleted in 1963. This Court noted in an
earlier decision in this case the following:
"It has been repeatedly stated and held
that the reason rule 25(a) was amended
to its current form in 1963 was to avoid
the harsh and unfair results that the
former inflexible version of rule 25 occasionally mandated. See, e.g., Advisory
Committee Note to rule 25; Roscoe v.

Roscoe, 379 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C.Cir.1967)
'[T]he 90-day period was not intended to
act as a bar to otherwise meritorious
actions/ Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Com
pany, 359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir.1966)
Adoption of the Rende [v. Kay, 415 F.2c
983 (D.C.Cir.1969)] rule would, on the
facts of this case, promote this remedia
flexibility. See, National Equipment
Rental v. Whitecraft Unlimited, 7J
F.R.D. 507 (E.D.N.Y.1977)." Al-Jund\
v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 247 (W.D
N.Y.1980).
Rockefeller's estate's motion to dismiss foi
failure to substitute timely was denied
Id., at 248. Subsequently, this Court
granted a motion by the substituted Estate
of Rockefeller to dismiss the lawsuit as tc
it because Rockefeller as the Governor oi
the State of New York was clothed witl
qualified immunity and such dismissal was
upheld on appeal. Al-Jundi v. Estate Oj
Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir.1989)
The appellate court merely noted in passing
that, "[d]uring the pendency of the action
the Estate was substituted 'in the place anc
stead of defendant Rockefeller.' Al-Jund
v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 245 (W.D.N
Y.1980)."
This Court in the 1980 decision was pri
marily concerned with whether the motioi
to substitute the estate had been timel;
made and, if it had not been, whether ex
cusable neglect justified an enlargemen
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. rule 6(b). Whil<
it was found that there had been sue!
neglect, it had been found that there hat
not been any showing of prejudice in or U
the administration of the estate or the dis
tribution of its assets. See Anderson v
Yungkau, supra, 329 U.S. at 485-486, 6'
S.Ct. at 430-431.
The equally-relied upon support for th<
1980 decision was that the suggestion o
statement of the fact of death was insuffi
cient in that it "did not list the names o
the executors of Rockefeller's estate, a
though this information should have beei
readily available to Stewart," the attorne
who had represented defendant Rockefelle
during his lifetime and who filed the mc
tion to dismiss as to him and his estate du
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any heir, grantee, legatee, devisee or any
other type of distributee of defendant Monahan because there is no detriment to the
estate's assets by paying legal fees or satisfying any judgment because the well is
dry. There are no assets which can be
dissipated or detrimented by the action b e
ing carried forward against Monahan's representative. Monahan's attorney, when
braced by this Court with such proposition
in a recorded oral argument on August 24,
1990, staunchly asserted that this claimed
lack of prejudice to the estate was not true.
Pointedly, he did not say that there could
be any monetary or other detriment to the
estate or any holding-up of the estate's
distribution of assets. He only proclaimed,
vehemently, that what was involved was
the honor of "Major Monahan," his longtime friend. He, the attorney, was going
to do his best to see that it remained unsullied. As laudatory as such aim is, it does
not present any quantum of undue prejudice such as should bar the plaintiffs' proceeding with their claims.1
[2] A firm and conscionable rule that is
distilled from the judicial decisions is that,
when it is a defendant who has died and it
is his heirs or distributees who wish to put
an end to litigation which does not abate
because of death, the various facets of rule
25(a)(1) must be satisfied. The statement
of the fact of death must be made by a
party or by the decedent's appointed representative. Monahan's attorney was neither
and, in fact, no longer was Monahan's attorney because Monahan's death cut the
umbilical cord. Death withdrew from the
attorney every iota of authorization he had
to act for or in Monahan's behalf. The
statement must identify the person who
has been named as the representative of
the decedent's estate. The instant statement did not do so and, in fact, made it
seem that there would not and could not be
any such representative. As the required
suggestion of death the statement by Monahan's attorney was a nullity. It could not
and did not start the 90-day clock to running. Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion
1. If the attorney truly has such purpose, it
would not be out-of-line to suggest that one best
protects one's honor and reputation by remain-

to substitute, delayed as it was, was timely.
To the extent that it might be viewed as
untimely, it is readily seen that the delav
flowed from excusable neglect and without
any undue prejudice to Monahan's heirs or
distributees.
[3] Because the correctness vel non of
the decisions to deny dismissal and to allow
substitution are of vital importance to the
progressing of this lawsuit and its resolution may well advance the ultimate disposition thereof and because there admittedly
is a substantial ground for a difference of
opinion as to the rule which has been found
to be the bottoming for its Order of August
2, 1990, it is hereby
ORDERED that the whole of said Order
is incorporated herein by reference and as
if it were fully here reproduced and that
there is added thereto the findings and
statements set forth in the immediately
preceding paragraph.

UNITED STATES of America ex rel.
Charles BUTLER, Petitioner,
v.
Raymond R. BARA, Jr., Superintendent
of Arthur Kill Correctional Facility
Robert Abrams, Attorney General oi
the State of New York and Robert Mor
genthau, District Attorney of New Yorl
County, Respondents.
No. 88 Civ. 7632(SWK).
United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
Oct. 31, 1990.
In habeas corpus proceeding, the Di
trict Court, Kram, J., held that: (1) petitioi
ing to fight and not by turning tail and fleeii
the battleground.
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fendant's estate had not yet been appointed.
Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 25(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <S»363.1
For suggestion of death to be valid and
invoke 90-day limit for filing of motion for
substitution, it must identify successor or
representative who may be substituted for
decedent FedRules Civ.ProcRule 25(a), 28
U.S.C.A.
4. Federal Civil Procedure e»365
Representative of estate of party who
dies while action is pending, rather than attorney who represented that party, must
make suggestion of death; attorney is not
party to action and attorney's authority to
represent party terminates upon party's
death. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 25(a), 28
U.S.C.A.
5. Federal Civil Procedure <8=»363.1
Suggestion of death filed by attorney
who represented defendant, who died while
action was pending, was not valid, so that
suggestion of death did not trigger 90-day
period for filing of motion for substitution;
suggestion failed to identify representative
who could be substituted for defendant, and,
after defendant's death, attorney had no authority to represent defendant Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a), 28 U.S.C.A6. Federal Civil Procedure e=»849
In order to satisfy prerequisite of particularity in motion to amend, complete copy of
proposed amended complaint must accompany motion so that both court and opposing
parties can understand exact changes sought
Fed.Rules CivJProcRules 7(b), 15, 28
U.S.C.A.
7. Federal Civil Procedure e»849
Where proposed amended complaint
does not accompany motion to amend, court
may hold motion in abeyance pending filing
of that proposed complaint or deny motion
without prejudice. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules
7(b), 15, 28 U.S.CA
8. Federal Civil Procedure e»392
District court would hold plaintiffs motion to amend complaint to add defendant in
abeyance, even though no party opposed

naming of additional defendant; copy 0f
tire proposed amended complaint was
filed with motion and, therefore, neith
court nor any of parties was aware of exa
nature of proposed amendments. Fed.Rui
Civ.ProcRules 7(b), 15, 28 U.S.C.A.
Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson, New
York City by Michael T. McGrath, for defendants.
Ronnie Smith, plaintiff pro se.
OPINION AND ORDER
LOWE, District Judge.
Before the Court is a motion for reargument of this Court's Order filed July 20
1993, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3(j) of this
Court The motion has been made by Michael T. McGrath ("McGrath") of the law
firm of Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson,
who acted as counsel on behalf of defendant
Barbara Thompson ("Thompson"). Also before the Court is a motion by pro se plaintiff
Ronnie Smith ("Plaintiff) to amend his complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. For the
reasons below, McGrath's motion is granted
in part. Consideration of Plaintiffs motion
to amend is held in abeyance as stated below.
BACKGROUND
Thompson, one of several defendants to
this Title VII action, died on August 16,1992.
A document entitled "Suggestion on Record
of Party's Death" was filed by McGrath on
October 14,1992. Subsequent to the filing of
this suggestion, McGrath moved to dismiss
the action against Thompson pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a). McGrath's motion argued that Plaintiffs cause of action did not
survive Thompson's death, and that, in any
case, if no motion to substitute was timely
made under Rule 25(a) then the action
against Thompson must be dismissed. Plaintiff timely moved for substitution of Thompson pursuant to Rule 25(a).
By Order filed July 20, 1993 (the "July
Order"), McGrath's motion to dismiss was
denied, and Plaintiff's motion to substitute
was granted. The action against Thompson
was found to survive her death, and the
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tiff banks' contention that deposition should
last more than ten days or be deferred pending possible addition of parties, that they
should not pay their own costs, and that
depositions were unduly burdensome were
insufficient to establish abuse of discretion.

are insufficient to suggest that the Magistrate Judge abused her discretion.
SO ORDERED.

(o
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Michael S. Davis, Zalkin Rodin & Goodman, New York City, for Chemical Bank.
John M. Toriello, Glenn J. Winuk, Haight,
Gardner et al., New York City, for Banque
Paribas, European American Bank.
Robert S. Fischler, Winston & Strawn,
New York City, for National Westminster
Bank USA.
Paul J. Giacomo, Tenzer, Greenblatt et al.,
New York City, for Andina Coffee, Inc., Andina Trading Corp.
David G. Keyko, Maurice W. Heller, Winthrop Simpson et al., New York City, for
American Express Bank.

Ronnie SMITH, Plaintiff,
v.

Sam PLANAS, Melody Hotley, Donna
King, Barbara Thompson, and
Ray Sumaya, Defendants.
No. 90 Civ. 1732 (MJL).
United States District Court,
S.D. New York.
Dec. 2, 1993.

Plaintiff in Title VII action moved for
substitution of defendant's estate for defenFranklin M. Sachs, Podvey, Sachs et al., dant who died while action was pending and
New York City, for defendant.
to amend complaint. On reargument following granting of substitution motion, the District
Court, Lowe, J., held that: (1) plaintiff
MEMORANDUM ORDER
was not entitled to substitute estate as no
representative had yet been appointed for
BRIEANT, District Judge.
estate; (2) suggestion of death filed by attorThe plaintiff banks in this case involving
ney who had represented deceased defendant
bills of lading covering nonexistent coffee as
was not valid and, thus, did not trigger 90described in Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM
day period for filing motion for substitution;
***. Co., 815 F.Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y.1993),
and (3) plaintiffs motion would be held in
tave filed objections to a decision of United
abeyance pending filing of entire proposed
States Magistrate Judge Kathleen A- Robamended complaint.
er
ts dated October 22,1993 authorizing depo8I
Ordered accordingly.
tions of two witnesses in London for ten
% s in December 1993, and directing each
Party to pay its own expenses. Oral argument was not requested. In the interests of 1. Federal Civil Procedure <&»362
Representative of estate of party who
T^e. I overrule the objections without awaitdies
while litigation is pending must be
^ a response.
named as proper party for substitution beThe banks' contentions that depositions of fore motion for substitution may be granted.
**° witnesses should last more than ten days Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
°r be deferred pending possible addition of
IUr
ther parties, that major banks should not 2. Federal Civil Procedure e»362
1
Plaintiff was not entitled to substitute
'east initially pay their own costs, ana that
e
Po8itions in London are unduly burden- estate of defendant who died while action
m
e to the substantial institutional litigants, was pending as party; representative of de-

550

151 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS

attorney is not a party to the action and the
attorney's authority to represent the decedent terminated upon death. A representative of the deceased party, and not that
party's attorney, must make the suggestion
of death. In re Klein, 36 B.R. at 393; AhJundi, 88 F.R.D. at 246; Rende, 415 F.2d at
985; Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1955 (1986).

deny the motion without prejudice. See LiL
ly v. United States Lines Co., 42 F.Supp. 314
(S.D.N.Y.1941). But see Christiana Gen
Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 745 F.SUDD
150, 164 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (amendment aUo^d
where defendant was not unduly prejudiced)
Plaintiffs motion to amend must include a
copy of the proposed amended complaint before it will be considered.

[5] The "suggestion of death" filed in the
instant action is defective for two reasons.
First, it fails to identify a representative who
may be substituted on Thompson's behalf.
Second, it was filed by McGrath who signed
it as attorney for Thompson. Prior to his
retention by the yet to be determined estate
representative, McGrath may not suggest
Thompson's death upon the record. No valid
suggestion of death has been filed upon the
record and the 90 period in which to make a
motion to substitute has not commenced.

[8] Although no parties have opposed the
naming of Grade Square Hospital as an additional defendant, neither the Court nor anv
party is aware of the exact nature of the
proposed amendments to Plaintiffs complaint Consideration of Plaintiffs motion to
amend will be held in abeyance. Plaintiff is
directed to file a copy of the c:::re proposed
third amended complaint—including the
charges against all defendants—with the
Court and to serve the same upon all parties
on or before January 10, 1994. Proof of
service must be filed. Papers in opposition
to the motion to amend must be served and
filed on or before January 18, 1994. Plaintiff's reply papers, if any, must be served and
filed on or before January 24, 1994. The
proposed amended portion of the complaint
is limited to the joinder of Gracie Square
Hospital as a defendant and to the charges
against this proposed defendant No other
changes will be permitted pursuant to the
instant motion.

II. Motion to Amend Complaint.
Plaintiff previously requested substitution
of Thompson with her estate or her employer, Grade Square Hospital. In the July
Order, the Court made clear that joining an
employer is a matter of amendment and not
substitution. Plaintiff now moves for an order granting leave to file a third amended
complaint While Plaintiffs motion papers
do not set forth clearly the type of amendment sought, he apparently seeks to name
Grade Square Hospital as a defendant.
[6,7] Rule 7(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that motions "state
with particularity the grounds therefor, and
shall set forth the relief or order sought."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b). In order to satisfy the
prerequisite of particularity in a motion to
amend, a complete copy of the proposed
amended complaint must accompany the motion so that both the Court and opposing
parties can understand the exact changes
sought Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1485
(1990). Where the proposed amended complaint does not accompany the motion to
amend, the Court may hold the motion in
abeyance pending the filing of that proposed
complaint, see Schwab v. Nathan, 8 F.R.D.
227, 228 (S.D.N.Y.1948), or the Court may

CONCLUSION
The motion for reargument filed by
McGrath is granted in part, without costs.
The portion of the Court's Order filed July
20, 1993 which granted Plaintiffs motion to
substitute is vacated. Plaintiffs motion to
substitute is dismissed without prejudice as
stated above. Plaintiff may renew this motion by following the procedure set forth
above.
Plaintiffs motion to amend is held in abeyance as stated above. The return date of
Plaintiffs motion to amend is reset to January 26, 1994.
It is SO ORDERED.

SMITH v. PLANAS
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motion for substitution was found to be timely served. Thompson's estate was substituted as a defendant in Thompson's place.
McGrath now moves for reargument of the
portion of the July Order which substitutes
the estate in place of Thompson. The
grounds for reargument are that (1) Plaintiff failed to serve his motion for substitution
upon him as required by Rules 25 and 5 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) the Court erred in substituting the estate
as a party.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Reargument
McGrath contends that Plaintiff never
served him with a copy of the motion for
substitution. Motions for substitution must
be "served on the parties" in accordance with
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a). McGrath states
that a "review of the papers filed by the pro
se plaintiff indicates that there is no certification or other proof of service as required by
FRCP Rule 5 and Local Civil Rule 3(c)(3)."x
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
for Reargument, p. 5. Appendix 1 of
McGrath's memorandum of law contains an
incomplete copy of the papers filed by Plaintiff in support of his motion to substitute.
Plaintiff actually filed a signed, sworn affirmation of service dated November 25, 1992.
This affirmation is appended to the back of
his notice of motion and attached affidavit
McGrath's unsworn statement regarding an
absence of proof of service is patently incorrect
[1,2] Thompson's true successor to this
action is, as previously stated by the Court,
her estate. However, before a motion to
substitute may be granted, a representative
°f Thompson's estate must be named as the
proper party for substitution. See Matter of
Estate of Garfinkle, 119 A.D.2d 911, 500
N
«Y.S.2d 863, 865 (3 Deptl986) (citing Mat*• Local Civil Rule 3(c)(3) provides that improperly served motion papers will not be accepted for
filing except upon special permission for good
^use shown.
• Thompson's husband also swears that the estate contains no assets. This contention is con-
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ter of Estate of Smith, 49 Misc^d 897, 268
N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (Sur.1966)). Paul Ottens,
Thompson's husband, swears in an affidavit
dated October 4,1993 that there is no representative of Thompson's estate.2 As there is
not yet a party to be substituted on behalf of
Thompson, Plaintiffs motion is denied and
dismissed without prejudice pending appointment of a representative of Thompson's estate who may properly defend against this
action. Plaintiff may renew his motion after
a representative is appointed by following the
procedures set forth in Fe&R.Civ.P. 25(a)
and Fed.R.Civ.P. 5. Plaintiff may also contact the Pro Se Office of this Court for
assistance in seeking appointment of an executor or administrator to represent the estate
of Thompson.
See SCPA §§ 1002(1),
1402(l)(c).
[3] It must be noted that Plaintiff is not
estopped from filing a renewed motion for
substitution because of the prior filing of the
"suggestion of death" by McGrath. Rule
25(a) provides that if a motion for substitution is not made within 90 days after death is
suggested, the action shall be dismissed as to
the decedent The Court finds the "suggestion of death" filed by McGrath insufficient
to start the running of this 90 day clock,, It
is well settled that for a suggestion of death
to be valid and invoke the 90 day limit, it
must identify the successor or representative
who may be substituted for the decedent
Young v. Patrice, 832 F.Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Gronouncz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D.
624, 627 (S.D.N.Y.1986); In re Klein, 36 B.R.
390, 392-93 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1984); AUJundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246-47
(W.D.N.Y.1980); Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983,
985-86 (D.C.Cir.1969). See also Form 30,
Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
[4] Furthermore, the attorney for the decedent has no authority to suggest the death
of his or her client upon the record. The
tained in McGrath's motion. However, this does
not warrant denial of a motion to substitute
where a debt is claimed. See EPTL 11-4.5
("Want of assets not to be pleaded by personal
representative"); Matter of Estate of Smith, 49
Misc.2d 897, 268 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (Sur.1966).

TROPICANA HOTEL CORP. v. SPEER

Nev. 499

Cite as 692 P.2d 499 (Nev. 1985)

tained in NRCP 25(a)(1). We agree, and fore, the district court improperly distherefore we reverse the district court's missed appellant's action.
order.
Reversed and remanded.3
Whether the suggestion of death must
be made by, or identify, the successor or
« Y NUMBER SYSTEM
V
representative of the deceased is an issue
which we have not previously addressed.
In a similar case, the federal appellate
court in Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir.1969), interpreted the identical federal
rule, FRCP 25(a)(1), and held that a suggesTROPICANA HOTEL CORPORATION, a
tion of death "which was neither filed by
dissolved Nevada Corporation; Mitzi
nor identified a successor or representative
Stauffer Briggs, as Trustee of Tropicaof the deceased . . . was ineffective to trigna Hotel Corporation a dissolved Nevager the running of the 90-day period proda Corporation, and Mitzi Stauffer
vided by [FRCP 25(a)(1) ]." Id. at 984. In
Briggs, individually, Appellants and
examining the history of FRCP 25(a)(1), the
Cross-Respondents,
court noted that the Advisory Committee
v.
on the Rules of Civil Procedure "plainly
contemplated that the suggestion [of Nila SPEER, Executrix of the Estate of
death] emanating from the side of the deLloyd D. Speer, a/k/a Don Speer, deceased would identify a representative of
ceased, Respondent and Cross-Appelthe estate, such as an executor or adminislant.
trator, who could be substituted for the
No. 13655.
deceased as a party . . . " 2 Id. at 985. The
court also reasoned that any other conSupreme Court of Nevada.
struction ' 'would open the door to a tactical
Jan. 4, 1985.
maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the
burden of locating the representative of the
estate within 90 days." Id. at 986. The
Former employee filed suit against forcourt concluded that no injustice would be- mer employer alleging that oral employfall a defendant as a result of this require- ment contract had been breached by his
ment.
termination without cause and that the parWe agree with the reasoning in Rende, ty with whom he had negotiated regarding
and therefore reject the contrary approach his employment breached an oral stock opurged by respondent and followed by the tion agreement. The Eighth Judicial DisColorado Court in Farmers Insurance Gr. trict Court, Clark County, Howard W. Babv. District Court of Sec. J.D., 181 Colo. 85, cock, J., found that the binding oral agree507 P.2d 865 (Colo.1973). Because the sug- ments existed and that the employer had
gestion of death in the present case was breached the employment contract and
neither filed by nor identified a successor awarded former employee liquidated damor representative of the deceased, we hold ages but found that the statute of frauds
that the ninety-day limitation in NRCP rendered the stock option agreement unen25(a)(1) was never triggered, and, there- forceable. Cross-appeals were taken. The
• * ^ ^ * ^ ^ ^ i

2. The federal court of appeals also referred to
federal form 30 which provides:
A.B. [describe as a party, or as executor,
administrator, or other representative or successor of CD., the deceased party] suggests
upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1),
the death of CD. [describe as party] during
the pendency of this action.

Suggested form 30, appended to the NRCP and
approved of by NRCP 84, is identical to the
federal form 30.
3. The Honorable John Mowbray voluntarily recused himself from consideration of this case.
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Brenda BARTO, Appellant,
v.
Charles WEISHAAR, d/b/a Milex
Precision Auto Tuneup,
Respondent.
No. 15163.
Supreme Court of Nevada.
Jan. 3, 1985.
Negligence based personal injury action was brought. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Stephen L. Huffaker, J., dismissed complaint with prejudice, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme
Court held that where suggestion of defendant's death was neither filed by nor
identified successor representative the 90day limitation period for motion for substitution of party, on penalty of dismissal,
was never triggered.
Reversed and remanded.
Parties <s=>60
Suggestion of death must either be
made by successor in interest to the deceased or must identify the successor representative and absent such information
the suggestion does not trigger the 90-day
period for seeking substitution of party, on
penalty of dismissal; rejecting Farmers
Insurance Gr. v. District Court of Sec.
J.D., 181 Colo. 85, 507 P.2d 865. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 25(a)(1).
Gentile & Massi, and Gene T. Porter, Las
Vegas, for appellant.
Morse-Foley, and Kevin C. Sewell, Las
Vegas, for respondent.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from an order granting
respondent's motion to dismiss appellant's
complaint with prejudice. On December
1. NRCP 25(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order substitution
of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the
successors or representatives of the deceased
party and, together with the notice of hearing,

19, 1980, appellant filed her complaint
against respondent, seeking, in part, recovery for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of respondent's negligence. Respondent subsequently answered the complaint, and the parties pursued
discovery.
On August 14, 1982, respondent died.
Respondent's counsel filed a suggestion of
death upon the record, pursuant to NRCP
25(a)(1), on December 8, 1982. The suggestion of death did not contain the name of
respondent's
successor
representative.
Thereafter, in April of 1983, respondent's
counsel moved to dismiss appellant's complaint on the ground that she had failed to
effectuate substitution of a proper party
within the ninety days prescribed by NRCP
25(a)(1).1
Following a hearing, the district court
denied the motion to dismiss, and allowed
appellant sixty days within which to effectuate substitution. Thereafter, on the sixtieth day following the lower court's ruling,
appellant filed a motion to substitute the
public administrator of Clark County, allegedly having located no other representative. On August 15, 1983, the district
court conducted another hearing on the
matter and, having concluded that the public administrator was not a proper party for
substitution, dismissed appellant's complaint on the ground that appellant failed
to substitute timely a proper party litigant
under NRCP 25(a)(1).
Appellant contends that the district court
improperly dismissed her action because a
suggestion of death filed pursuant to
NRCP 25(a)(1) must either be made by the
successor in interest to the deceased, or
must identify the successor representative.
Absent such information, appellant contends, the suggestion of death is ineffective, and therefore cannot operate to trigger the ninety-day filing limitation conshall be served on the parties ... Unless the
motion for substitution is made not later than
90 days after the death is suggested upon the
record by service of a statement of the fact of
death as provided herein for the service of the
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the
deceased party. (Emphasis added.)
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by purchasers' suggestion of death upon the
record, absent personal service upon vendors'
successors or representatives.
Reversed and remanded.
Miller, C.J., filed opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part

1. Courts <s=*85(3)
State Supreme Court employs circuit
court procedural rules unless specific statute
or rule directs otherwise. SDCL 15-24-1.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>334(1)
Because state Supreme Court has not
adopted separate rule to govern appellate
procedure for substitution of parties, it employs circuit court procedural rules and, thus,
suggestion of death upon the record and
substitution of parties can be effected when
case is pending before supreme court.
SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l), 15-24-1.
3. Appeal and Error <S=>334(7)
Where appellants notified state Supreme
Court of appellees' deaths one week before
appeal was decided, but no personal service
was made upon decedents' successors or representatives, 90-day limitation period for motions for substitution of parties was not invoked by appellants' "suggestion of death
upon the record," even though service was
made upon decedents' counsel. SDCL 15-625(a)(1).
4. Appeal and Error ®»1146,1167
State Supreme Court may vacate, modify, or otherwise disturb judgment if refusal
to take such action appears to court inconsistent with substantial justice because parties'
substantial rights will otherwise be jeopardized.

Reed C. Richards of Richards & Richards,
Deadwood, and John J. Delaney, Sr. of
Estes, Porter & Delaney, Rapid City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
Gene N. Lebrun of Lynn, Jackson, Shultz
& Lebrun, Rapid City, for defendants and
appellees.

SABERS, Justice.
[11J Trial court granted defendants' mo*
tion to dismiss on the basis that the motion
to substitute parties for deceased plaintiff
was untimely.
FACTS
[112.] In November 1992, Lester and Maurine Ripple (Ripples) entered into a contract
for deed and a personal care agreement with
Roger and Nancy Wold (Wolds). Ripples
agreed to sell approximately eighty-seven
acres of land to Wolds for $60,000 and Wolds
agreed to personally care for Ripples. F or
each month they provided personal services,
Wolds were to receive a $250 credit against
their monthly payment on the contract for
deed. When a dispute arose under the personal care agreement, Ripples sued Wolds,
claiming breach of both agreements. Rip.
pies sought foreclosure of the contract for
deed and injunctive relief to prohibit Wolds
from living on the property.
[H3.] In August of 1994, the trial court
granted Wolds' motion for summary judgment on Ripples' foreclosure action, ruling
that Wolds had not defaulted on the contract
for deed. Ripples successfully moved to
amend their complaint to seek rescission on
the contract for deed. Wolds then moved to
dismiss the rescission claim, arguing that by
first seeking foreclosure, Ripples afiBrmed
the contract for deed and were then barred
by the "election of remedies" doctrine from
disaffirming the contract through rescission
The trial court denied Wolds' motion to dismiss the amended complaint, and this court
granted Wolds' petition to appeal from that
intermediate order. We affirmed the denial
of Wolds' motion to dismiss. See Ripple v.
Wold, 1996 SD 68, 549 N.W^d 673 (RippU
I).
[14.] Lester and Maurine Ripple both died
before Ripple I was decided. See id at n. 1:
"At the time this appeal began Lester and
Maurine Ripple were 92 and 85 years old,
respectively. Maurine died on October 19»
1995 and Lester died on March 5, 1996.*
Ripple I was decided June 5,1996.
[115.] Approximately one week before Rip
pie I was decided, Wolds informed this court

RIPPLE v. WOLD

S. D. 4 3 9

Cite as 572 N.W.2d 439 (S.D. 1997)

[118.] The decision of the circuit court is render our well-established standard of reversed with directions that it be remanded view meaningless.
to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
[H 24.] AMUNDSON, J., joins this dissent.
[119.] MILLER, C.J., and
GILBERTSON, J., concur.
[120.] SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ.,
dissent.
[121.] LOVRIEN, Circuit Judge, for KONENKAMP, J., disqualified.
SABERS, Justice (dissenting).

1997 SD 135

Lester K. RIPPLE and Maurine
H. Ripple, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

[122.] I dissent. We do not need to remand to conclude that the circuit court corv.
rectly reversed the Board. In fact, it would
ROGER WOLD and Nancy Wold,
be error to do so. The Board failed to make
Defendants and Appellees.
tfindingof fact that Brown did not comply
with the conditions of the suspended senNo. 19987.
tence requiring sex offender participation.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Therefore, Board's revocation of his suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion and
Considered on Briefs Oct 21, 1997.
an error as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
Decided Dec. 17, 1997.
Schroeder v. Department ofSoc Servs., 1996
Rehearing Granted Jan. 13, 1998.
SD 34,112, 545 N.W.2d 223, 229:
Findings of fact must support conclusions
of law. The Commission's decision to reinVendors sued purchasers, seeking forestate Schroeder was not supported by its
closure
on contract for deed and claiming
°wn factual findings, an error as a matter
breach
of
contract for deed and personal care
of law. We thus affirm the circuit court's
agreement.
The Circuit Court entered sumdecision to reverse.
mary judgment for purchasers on foreclosure
(citing Hartpence v. Youth Forestry Camp, action, granted vendors' motion to amend
^ N.W.2d 292, 297 (S.D.1982) ("A well- complaint to seek rescission of contract, and
established rule is that the findings of fact denied purchasers' motion to dismiss amendmu
st support the conclusions of law.") ed complaint. Purchasers appealed. The
freeing with the circuit court's reversal of Supreme Court, 549 N.W.2d 673, affirmed.
Career Service Commission's factually un- Approximately one week before appeal was
^Pported legal conclusion)); see also Bald- decided, purchasers informed state Supreme
**» v. National College, 537 N.W^d 14, 19 Court of vendors' deaths. Purchasers subse&D.1995) ("This court has consistently held quently moved to dismiss for failure to sub^ the conclusions of law . . . must find stitute parties within 90-day period, and moJPport in the findings."); accord State v. tion was made to substitute parties. The
N
J*> 536 N.W.2d 714, 716 n. 1 (S.D.1995); Circuit Court, Eighth Judicial Circuit, LawJ*« Dakota Nat'l Bank v. Maxon, 534 rence County, Warren G. Johnson, J., denied
N
^A137,40 (S.D.1995).
motion to substitute and granted motion to
I w 23.] The conference opinion incorrectly dismiss, and appeal was taken. The Su^ p t s to fill in the blank for the Board preme Court, Sabers, J., held that: (1) suglarding what its finding of fact must state gestion of death upon the record and substi°rder for its decision to be upheld. It is tution of parties can be effected when case is
r° kte. Allowing Board to rewrite its find- pending before the state supreme court, and
^ of fact to support its conclusion would (2) 90-day limitation period was not invoked
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ploys those rules unless a specific statute or
rule directs otherwise. See SDCL 15-24-1:
Except as otherwise indicated by statute
or rule, the statutes and rules of practice
and procedure in the circuit courts of this
state shall apply to practice and procedure
in the Supreme Court
Therefore, the argument that a suggestion of
death upon the record is not effective in a
pending appeal is without merit. Ripples'
argument that substitution of parties cannot
be accomplished before this court fails for
the same reason. Since this court has not
adopted a separate rule to govern appellate
procedure for substitution of parties,4 we employ circuit court procedural rules pursuant
to SDCL 1&-24-1.5
[111.] 2. WHETHER THE NINETYDAY LIMITATION PERIOD WAS INVOKED BY WOLDS* "SUGGESTION
OF DEATH UPON THE RECORD" IN
THE ABSENCE OF PERSONAL SERVICE UPON RIPPLES' REPRESENTATIVES.

litigation, the service required by R ^
25(a)(1) on nonparties, specifically the successors or representatives of the deceased
party's estate, must be service pursuant to
FedRCivP 4.7 See Fariss v. Lynchburq
Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir.1985)
(to satisfy Rule 25(a)(1), motion for substitution or suggestion of death must be personally served on nonparty representative
of deceased, rather than deceased's attorney)
In the instant case, because the
personal representative of decedents estate did not receive service of any purported suggestion of death, the ninety-day limitations period did not begin to run. See
[United States v. Miller Bros. Constr. Co.,
505 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir.1974)]'
913 F.2d at 837 (emphasis added); accord
Barlow v. Ground, 39 F.3d 231 (9th Cir.
1994). See also 7C Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d
§ 1956, at 551 (1986) ('Thus the procedures
of [FedRCivP] Rule 4 must be followed in
serving the motion [for substitution] on the
representative or successor of a deceased
party.") (emphasis added).

[112.] According to SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l),6
both the suggestion of death and the motion
to substitute parties must be personally
[3,4] [113.] Here, no personal service
served upon "persons not parties,,—that was made upon Ripples' successors or repreterm has been construed to mean "specifical- sentatives. According to the certificate of
ly the successors or representatives of the service appended to the suggestion of death,
deceased party's estate." Fehrenbacher v. the only persons served were the attorneys
Quackentmsh, 759 F.Supp. 1516, 1518 who had represented the decedents. Wolds
(D.Kan.1991) (citing Grandbouche v. LoveU, state in their brief that "A copy of that
913 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir.1990) (per cu- Statement of Fact of Deaths was mailed to
riam)). The Grandbouche court noted:
both attorney Reed C. Richards and attorney
While service of a suggestion of death on John J. Delaney, Sr. by first class mail,
counsel will satisfy the requirement of postage prepaid, on May 29,1996. The origiRule 25(a)(1) for service of parties to the nal of the Statement of Fact of Deaths was
4. See, e.g., NDRAppP 43 (adopting FedRAppP
43, which provides for substitution of parties
upon the death of a party at the appellate level).

7. South Dakota's parallel statute is SDCL 15-6-4
and requires personal service of the summons.
SeeSDCL15-6-4(d)(10):

5. Cf. McCormick Harvesting Much. Co. v. Snedigar, 3 S.D. 625, 626-27, 54 N.W. 814, 814
(1893):
If this cause of action had ever been properly
in our court by appeal, and one of the parties
had died or become disqualified to act pending
the appeal, then this court could exercise its
power to bring the legal representative into the
case as one of the incidents of the exercise of
its jurisdiction.

The summons shall be served by delivering a
copy thereof. Service in the following manner
shall constitute personal service:

6. SDCL 15-6-25(a)(1) is virtually identical to FedRCivP 25(a)(1).

(10) In all other cases, to the defendant personallyfj
See also subdivision (9): "Whenever the manner
of service of process is specified in any statute or
rule relating to any action, remedy or special
proceedings the manner of service so specified
shall be followedf.]" (Emphasis added).
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of the deaths of Ripples by a document dated
May 29, 1996. The Clerk's office acknowledged receipt by return letter dated May 30,
1996. On September 3, 1996, Wolds moved
to dismiss for failure to substitute parties
within the ninety days of SDCL 15-625(a)(1), which provides the procedure for
substitution of parties when a party dies:
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion
for substitution may be made by any party
or by the successors or representatives of
the deceased party and, together with the
notice of hearing, shall be served on the
parties as provided in § 15-6-6 and upon
persons not parties in the manner provided
in § 15-6-4 for the service of a summons.
Unless the motion for substitution is made
not later than ninety days after the death
is suggested upon the record by service of
a statement of the fact of the death as
provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the
deceased party.
Ripples* made a motion to substitute parties
on September 5, 1996; assuming the ninetyday rule was properly invoked, the last day
the motion could have been timely filed was
September 2, 1996.2 Ripples' motion to substitute parties was denied and Wolds' motion
to dismiss granted.
[116.] Ripples appeal, claiming that since
SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l) prescribes the procedure for substitution of parties at the circuit
court level, the ninety days did not begin to
run until the settled record was returned to
the Lawrence County Clerk of Courts. They
claim that while the case was on appeal to
this court, "the record was set and was not
*• Since the appeal was taken in their name, we
will continue to refer to Ripples, even though
they are no longer parties.
*• This takes into account SDCL 15-6-6(e):
Whenever a party has the right or is required
to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a
notice or other paper upon him, or whenever
such service is required to be made a prescribed period before a specified event, and the
notice or paper is served by mail, three days
shall be added to the prescribed period
3

- SDCL 15-26A-56 provides:
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modifiable*1 and therefore, Wolds' "efforts to
suggest the deaths on the record were futile." We disagree but reverse and remand
because the ninety-day rule was not properly
invoked.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[f 7.] This appeal requires us to construe
SDCL 15-&-25(a)(l), which provides for service of notice and substitution of parties upon
the death of a party. The construction of
that statute and its application to these facts
present questions of law, which we review de
novo. Kern v. City of Sioux Falls, 1997 SD
19, 14, 560 N.W.2d 236, 237 (citing Johnson
v. Rapid City Softball Ass'n, 514 N.W^d 693,
695 (S.D.1994)).

[18] 1. WHETHER THE SUGGESTION
OF DEATH UPON THE RECORD OR
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES CAN BE
EFFECTED IN THE SOUTH DAKOTA
SUPREME COURT.
[19.] Ripples argue that suggestion of
death "upon the record" cannot be effected
when a case is pending before this court.
They claim that SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l) has no
application to Supreme Court procedure, and
that the settled record can only be modified
on appeal in accordance with SDCL 15-26A56.3 Therefore, they argue, the ninety-day
provision of SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l) was not
triggered by Wolds' suggestion of death and
the motion to substitute parties was timely
made.
[1,2] [110.] SDCL 15~6-25(a)(l) is part
of SDCL ch. 15-6 "Rules of Procedure in
Circuit Courts." However, this court emIf anything material to either party is omitted
from the record, is misstated therein, or is
improper, the parties by stipulation, or the
trial court, before the record is transmitted to
the Supreme Court, or the Supreme Court, on
motion by a party or on its own initiative, may
direct tine record be corrected and if necessary
require a supplemental record be approved
and transmitted.
Because the suggestion of death does not constitute omitted, misstated, or improper material,
this statute has no application to this case; it
does, however, demonstrate this court's authority
to modify the record.
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cessor or representative, who must decide
whether to pursue the claim, is aware of the
substitution requirement" Fariss, 769 F.2d
at 962. Under these circumstances, allowing
this case to be dismissed against Ripples'
estates would cause prejudice to their substantial rights. Tollman, 1997 SD 49 at 114,
562 N.W.2d at 897. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
[1118.] AMUNDSON, KONENKAMP, and
GILBERTSON, JJ., concur.
[H 19.] MILLER, C.J., concurs in part and
dissents in part
MILLER, Chief Justice (concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
[1120.] I agree that SDCL 15-6-25(a)(l)
applies to this Court, and therefore the ninety-day provision of that statute was triggered
by Wolds' suggestion of death upon the record. However, the principle of judicial restraint dictates that I must respectfully dissent from the rest of the majority opinion.
The issue of ineffective service was not properly before this Court and should not be
considered.9
[121.] Ripples never argued ineffective
service to the trial court or tc this Court
SDCL 15-6-12(h)(l) provides:
A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if
omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in § 15-6-12(g), or (B) if
it is neither made by motion under § 156-12 nor included in a responsive pleading
or an amendment thereof permitted by
§ 15-6-15(a) to be made as a matter of
course. (Emphasis added).
See also Matter ofRP., 498 N.W.2d 364, 367
(S.D.1993); WUliams Ins. v. Bear Butte
9. While the majority holds that Ripples were not
personally served, the fact remains that it is
raising an issue sua sponge *nd I fee! that is
inappropriate. No matter what the maiority
states, it cannot be denied that the issue of ineffective service of process was never argued to the
trial court nor this court.
10. The majority relies on In re Estate of Tollman,
1997 SD 49, 114, 562 N.W.2d 893, 897, and
SDCL 15-6-61, to hold that this Court has the

Farms Partnership, 392 N.W.2d 831, 834
(S.D.1986). It seems clear that in past cases
this Court has not chosen to make an argument for a party as to insufficiency of service
of process, so why start now?
[f 22.] While the present case raises the
issue of when the ninety-day period begins to
run and not a jurisdictional issue as was the
case in Williams Ins. and Matter of R.P.,
there is our general rule that u[w]e will not
address issues raised for the first time on
appeal." Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W^d 642,
648 (S.D.1992) (citations omitted). The issue
was never raised to the trial court and should
therefore be deemed waived. See Gesinger
v. Gesinger, 531 N.W2d 17, 22 (S.D.1995)
(citing Fullmer v. State Farm Ins. Co., 514
N.W.2d 861 (S.D.1994); Hepper v. Triple U
Enterprises, Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525, 527 n. 3
(S.D.1986)). Further, the issue was never
raised to this Court and should also be
deemed waived. See Id. (citing Zens v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St Paul & Pac, 479
N.W.2d 155, 159 (S.D.1991)). Ripples had
two strikes at this issue and failed to raise it;
this Court should not now pinch hit for Ripples' attorneys. We are a reviewing court
and should not consider matters not properly
before us or matters not determined by the
trial court Schull Constr. Co. v. Koenig, 80
S.D. 224, 229, 121 N.W.2d 559, 561 (1963).
[H23.] The majority argues that to hold
other than it does would be to prejudice the
substantial rights of Ripples. But cannot the
same be said for all the countless parties in
the p:^t whose arguments we have not addressed because they were not properly before us? Were the situations of these other
parties different because they actually tried
to present their issues to us? It is not the
responsibility, nor the duty of this Court to
make an argument for a party because that
party's attorney failed to make it 10 As to
power to disturb a judgment for the sake of
promoting substantial justice. While we do have
such power, it should be used cautiously. Tallman involved this Court recognizing that a party
had made a judicial admission and should be
bound by it lest another party be required to pay
twice on a debt. In Tollman, we were not making arguments for the parties. What the majority
is attempting to do in the present case is to play
a more affirmative role in disturbing the lower
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mailed on the same day to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court for filing." Even if the successor or representative had actual knowledge of Ripples' deaths, the ninety-day rule
is not invoked absent formal suggestion of
death upon the record, and "formal suggestion" includes personal service on those nonparties. Grandbouche, 913 F.2d at 836-37.
[114.] The rationale for requiring personal
service on the representative or successor is
explained as follows:
Personal service of the suggestion of
death on the representative achieves a salutary litigation function. It alerts the
nonparty to the consequences of death for
a pending suit, signaling the need for action to preserve the claim if so desired.
In addition to insuring that the decedent's representative has notice of the litigation, a supplemental reason for rejecting
service on decedent's attorney alone is
based on the law of agency. Because the
attorney's power to act ceases with the
client's death, counsel has no power to
continue or terminate an action on behalf
of a dead client.
6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 25.10[3][e], at
25-21 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) (citations and
internal quotation omitted); accord Federal
Practice & Procedure, supra, § 1955, at 545
& n. 12:
[The attorney for the deceased] is not himself a party to the action and, since his
authority to represent the deceased terminated on the death, he is not a "representative of the deceased party" of the sort
contemplated in the rule.
(Citations omitted) (noting also that the decei t ' s attorney may not suggest the death on
toe record).
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While the service can be waived by appearance where a summons has been actually issued and later filed, the failure to
issue, file, or serve a summons, as in this
case, deprives the court of jurisdiction.
Black v. Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial
Circuit, 78 S.D. 302, 101 N.W^d 520
(1960); Ayers, Weatherwax & Reid Co. v.
Sundback, 5 S.D. 31, 58 N.W. 4 (1894);
SDCL 15-2-30,15-2-31,15-6-3, and 15-65(d). We conclude by noting that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any
time and even by the reviewing court's
own mation. Medley v. Salvation Army,
Rapid City Corps, 267 N.W.2d 201 (S.D.
1978).
(Emphasis added).
[f 16.] In addition, we may "vacate," "modify," or "otherwise disturb" a judgment if
"refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice"
because "substantial rights of the parties"
will otherwise be jeopardized. In re Estate
of Tollman, 1997 SD 49, 114, 562 N.W^d
893,897. See SDCL 15-6-61:
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything
done or omitted by the court or by any of
the parties is ground for granting a new
trial or for setting aside a verdict or for
vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to
take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding
mast disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
(Emphasis added).

[U15.] Ineffective service was not avgued
y Ripples, but it was not necessary to Jo so.
*ne statute expressly provides that dismissal
18
Conditioned upon proper service of the
Cedent's representatives.8 See SDCL 156-25(a)(l), reproduced supra 115. See also
0e
«o v. Oveson, 307 N.W.2d 862, 863 (S.D.
1981);

[1117.] Here, the limitation period would
impose upon Ripples' successors or representatives an obligation which had to be fulfilled
within ninety days—even though they were
not personally served as required by SDCL
15-6'-25(a)(l). "Absent personal service,
there is no reason to presume that the suc-

Contrary to the dissent, we are not raising an
^ditional issue or argument as to "ineffective"
^rvice of process. There was no service of
Process made on Ripples' heirs or representa-

tives. Therefore, under SDCL 15-6-2 5 (a)(1), the
trial court cannot dismiss the lawsuit as against
the heirs. It is a simple matter of statutory
construction.

b
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tbe majonty raising the issue of ineffective
grvice, all that can be said is: T h e point
ippears here in its virgin state, wearing all
as maiden blushes, and is therefore out of
place" Cleveland v Chambliss, 64 Ga. 352,
359(1879)

I KEY NUMBER $YSTIM>
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3. Husband and Wife G»279(l)
Where property settlement agreement
did not provide clear obligation as to money
set-aside, and agreement had been given different meaning from plam meaning of words,
it was necessary and proper for trial court to
consider all circumstances surrounding execution of agreement as well as subsequent
acts of spouses,
4. Husband and Wife e=>281

1997 SD 137

Diane R. CRAMER, formerly known
as Diane R. Smith, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Murray T. SMITH, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 19994.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Bnefs Sept 11, 1997.
Decided Dec. 23, 1997.
Former wife sought to have former husband held in contempt for alleged violation of
divorce and property settlement agreement.
The Circuit Court, Second Judicial Circuit,
Minnehaha County, Gene Paul Kean, J., decked, and former wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Amundson, J., held that former
husband was not m contempt.
Affirmed.

Former wife, having signed agreement
stipulating that "$152,182 has been paid" toward tax liabilities, was conclusively presumed to know its contents and to assent to
them, in absence of fraud, misrepresentation,
or other wrongful act by another contracting
party
5. Husband and Wife <3=>279(2)
Taxes resulting from "draw down" distributions intended to reduce book value of
company, a marital asset, to agreed upon
book value before actual sale closmg, were
"taxes resulting from the sale" of the asset,
and thus, husband's payment of those taxes
from funds set aside for tax obligations arising from the sale did not violate property
settlement agreement.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and def
mitions

Mark F. Marshall and Scott N. Heidepnem of Johnson, Heidepnem, Miner &
Marlow, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

1

Husband and Wife <S>279(1)
Richard A. Johnson of Strange, Farrell,
Court applies contract principles when Johnson & Casey, Sioux Falls, for defendant
^terpretmg property settlement agreement and appellee.
tocorporated into divorce decree, and interpretation of these agreements is a matter of
AMUNDSON, Justice.
kwforcourts to decide.
[H1 ] Diane R. Cramer (Cramer) appeals
2
- Contempt <s=>20
the circuit court's decision declining to hold
Contempt requires showing of willful Murray T. Smith (Smith), her former hus^obedience of vahd court order with knowl- band, m contempt for an alleged violation of
^ge of contents of order and ability to com- their divorce stipulation and property settle% with terms of order
ment agreement We affirm
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SOIL the majority holds that there must always be a showing of prejudice. As authority, Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d
187 (Okla.1992) is cited. But Dutsch did not
deal with a situation where the entire theory
of recovery was omitted from the jury's consideration. In Dutsch we were faced with
the question of whether the instructions adequately presented the defense of the defendants. We held that they did. Unlike
Dutsch, here the plaintiffs theory of recovery was not given to the jury. Contrary to
the majority's position, Dutsch did not require a showing of prejudice for a theory
wholly omitted by the instructions.
Prejudice is implicit when a party's basis
for recovery or defense is not explained to
the jury. The court gave a one line instruction defining "ordinary care", another defining "direct cause/' and a third explaining
Brandy's incapacity for negligence due to her
age. But the jury was not told of the consequences of the lack of "ordinary care", or
what "direct cause" had to do with the case,
or even what "negligence" was in the eyes of
the law. In other words, the plaintiffs theory on which she sought to recover was never
explained. No other showing of prejudice
need be demonstrated. I would reverse and
remand as to the defendants Okeene Public
Schools and Okeene Public Works Authority.

I concur in the Court's affirmance of the
directed verdict for the City of Okeene.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice
HODGES, Justice WILSON and Justice
KAUGER join in these views.
[O
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Former husband sought modification of
child custodv. reauestine sole custodv. After

death of former wife, the District Court,
Cleveland County, Preston A. Trimble, J.,
granted wife's motion to reduce child support
arrearage to judgment and deemed motion
for modification moot. Husband appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Certiorari
was granted. The Supreme Court, Lavender, V.C.J., held that: (1) upon death of
former wife, trial court lost its authority to
proceed pending filing of suggestion of death;
(2) former wife's oral motion was sufficient to
commence action for arrearage so that it
remained pending after her death; (3) former wife's attorney had no authority to appear on her behalf after her death; and (4)
failure of former husband to file suggestion
of death did not waive his right to raise on
appeal necessity for such suggestion.
Court of Appeals' judgment vacated; reversed and remanded.
Opala, Alma Wilson, and Kauger, JJ.,
concurred in result.

1. Divorce e=>83
Upon death of former wife, authority of
court to rule on her motion to reduce child
support arrearage to judgment, in proceedings initiated by former husband for modification of custody, became suspended pending
filing of statutorily required suggestion of
death by either party to litigation or representative of decedent.
12 Okl.St.Ann.
§ 2025, subd. A, par. 1.
2. Parties <s=>61
Pending filing of suggestion of death of
litigant substantially in form prescribed by
statute, action remains pending. 12 Okl.St.
Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 1.
3. Divorce c=>83
Former wife's oral motion for judgment
for child support arrearage made during
hearing on former husband's motion to modify child custody order was sufficient commencement of action for such arrearage, so
that action remained pending after former
wife's death. 12 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 2007, subd.
B. oar. 1. 2025. subd. A. nar. 1.
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4. Divorce O=>70
Upon death of former wife, her attorney
no longer had authority to appear on her
behalf with respect to her motion to reduce
child support arrearage to judgment, in proceedings initiated by former husband for
modification of custody; attorney was not
party, was not person who could be made
party, and was not representative of former
wife as contemplated by rule governing substitution of party upon death of party. 12
Okl.St.Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 1.

record. 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par.
1.

5. Divorce €=>179
Failure of former husband to file, in
proceedings which he initiated to modify custody, suggestion of former wife's death did
not waive his right to raise necessity for such
suggestion on appeal from order, entered
after wife's death, reducing child support arrearage to judgment on wife's motion. 12
Okl.St.Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 1.

After death of party, either remaining
part}- or deceased party's representatives
may suggest death, but it is not mandatory
on either party to make initial suggestion of
death. 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par.
1.

6. Motions <3=>1
Written motion may be orally or informally supplemented and broadened in scope
at time of its presentation.
7. Abatement and Revival <3=>59.1, 62.1
With some exceptions, upon death of
party to litigation, pending action in any
court does not abate. 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 1052.
8. Courts C=>97(1)
As rule governing substitution of party
upon death of party is taken from Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, court may look to
federal courts for guidance in interpretation
and application of rule. 12 Okl.St.Ann.
§ 2025, subd. A, par. 1; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.

11. Parties e=>59(l)
Attorney is not legal "representative"
for purpose of rule governing substitution of
party upon death of party. 12 Okl.StAnn.
§ 2025, subd. A, par. 1.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

12. Parties <s=>61

13. Divorce <3=»83
Former husband did not have burden, in
proceedings on his motion to modify custody,
to suggest former wife's death to trial court
in order to suspend proceedings. 12 Okl.St.
Ann. § 2025, subd. A, par. 1.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division No. 4, Appeal from the District Court of
Cleveland County; Preston A. Trimble, Trial
Judge.

9. Attorney and Client o=>78
Power of attorney terminates upon
death of his client and attorney does not act
for deceased client's representatives or successors until those successors are officially
appointed and after they retain deceased's
attorney.

Appellant non-custodial parent sought
modification of child custody in district court.
During the pendency of the action Appellee
custodial parent's attorney made an oral motion before the court to reduce child support
arrearage Appellant owed Appellee to judgment. Appellee died subsequent to the making of the oral motion. At the hearing, two
months later, the court granted Appellee's
motion and declared Appellant's request for
custody modification moot. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. Held: Where the right of
action survives the death of a party to pending litigation, the action may only proceed
upon proper application of 12 O.S.1991,
§ 2025(A)(1), Substitution of Parties.

10. Attorney and Client <3=>S8
Attorney, after death of client, has no
authority either to move for substitution of
party or to suggest death of his client upon

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT REVERSED.
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William H. Campbell, Oklahoma City, for
appellant.
Peggy Stockwell, Daye Stockwell, Stockwell Law Offices, Norman, for appellee.
LAVENDER, Vice Chief Justice.
[1,2] This matter presents the issue of
the effect of 12 O.S.1991 § 2025(A)(1) upon a
pending motion to reduce unpaid child support to a judgment in favor of the mother of
the children where the mother dies before
the judgment is rendered. We hold that
upon the death of the mother the trial court
lost its authority to proceed except in the
manner prescribed by the statute. We further hold that pending the filing of the suggestion of the death of the litigant substantially in the form prescribed by the statute,
the action remains pending.
[3] The court further holds that the
mother's oral motion for a judgment for the
arrearage made during the hearing on the
father's motion to modify the child custody
order, was a sufficient commencement of the
action for such arrearage so that the action
remained pending.
[4] We further hold that upon the death
of his client the attorney for the mother no
longer had the authority to appear on her
behalf.
We further hold that upon such death the
authority of the court became suspended
pending the filing of the statutorily required
suggestion of the death and that such suggestion of death is required to be filed by
either a party to the litigation or by the
representative of the decedent.

custodial parent of the couple's son. The
court ordered Campbell to pay monthly child
support. Due to Appellee's health problems
Campbell sought modification of custody in
1989, requesting sole custody. During the
pendency of the custody action several continuances were requested by both parties,
some due to the poor health and hospitalization of Appellee. Appellee's counsel moved
for another continuance on April 6, 1990 because Appellee was hospitalized in the intensive care unit at a local hospital. The court
continued the hearing to June 22, 1990.
At the time of the continuance request.
April 6, Appellee, through her counsel made
an oral motion before the court to reduce
child support arrearage owed by Campbell to
Appellee to judgment. Later that same day
Appellee's counsel prepared and filed a written motion to the same effect. That motion
stated that Campbell owed Appellee $3,000 in
child support. Sometime on April 6 after the
making of the oral motion and before the
filing of the written motion, Appellee died.
The hearing was held on June 22, 1990.
Appellee's motion to reduce child support
arrearage to judgment was granted. The
trial court deemed Campbell's motion to
modify the custody order was mooted by the
death of the appellee.

Campbell appealed the arrearage judgment claiming the court had acted without
authority because there was no party to the
action following Appellee's death and Appellee's counsel could not act in Appellee's
stead. Campbell also argued the arrearage
judgment wTas made without evidence or verification of an amount owed to Appellee.
Campbell stated in his appeal brief that he
[5] We also find that the failure of the
made all these objections to the trial court.
husband to file the statutory suggestion of
However, there is no transcript of the hearthe death of his ex-wife did not work a
ing in the record. The court minute simply
waiver of his right to raise the necessity for
states that Appellee's motion to reduce arsuch a suggestion upon the power of the
rearage to judgment is sustained and Campcourt to enter the judgment appealed here. bell's motion to modify custody is moot. On
appeal Campbell further ?/ rued that the trial
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY court wras awrare of Appeaee's death at the
William H. Campbell, Appellant, (Camp- time of the June 22, 1990 hearing and its
bell) and Donna M. Campbell, (Appellee) knowledge formed the basis for the court
1
were divorced in 1986. Appellee was made deeming the modification action moot.
1- Campbell relied on Turley v. Turley, 638 P.2d

469 (Okla.1981) for the proposition that legal
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, holding that Campbell did not inform
the trial court that Appellee had died prior to
the court's action and Campbell made no
objection to Appellee's motion regarding the
arrearage. The Court of Appeals in its
memorandum concluded that Appellee died
at or around the time of the judgment and
stated that Campbell may not remain silent
on an issue and then attempt to raise it for
the first time on appeal. Campbell's request
for rehearing was denied. Certiorari has
previously been granted and the matter is
now before us.

and cannot raise it for the first time on
appeal. Appellee also maintains Campbell
did not file an objection to Appellee's arrearage motion and cannot do so for the first
time on appeal.
ANALYSIS
A.
Campbell argues that the written motion
regarding arrearage was made after Appellee's death and therefore a nullity in that an
action cannot be brought by a dead person.

This action was not howrever, commenced
by a dead person as Campbell alleges, but
Campbell argues that the April 6 written rather, by Campbell himself when he filed his
motion regarding arrearage was filed after motion to modify custody provisions on July
Appellee's death by Appellee's counsel. 25, 1989. It is true that Appellee's written
Campbell asserts that because the motion motion regarding arrearage wras filed after
was not filed until after Appellee's death the1 Appellee's death. However, under 12 O.S.
court was without authority to enter judg- 1994, § 2007(B)(1.) "[a]n application to the
ment herein. He also argues in the alterna-\ court for an order shall be by motion which,
tive that because the trial court was aware of unless made during a hearing or trial shall
Appellee's death at the time of the June 22 be made in writing, shall state with particuhearing its judgment for Appellee was void. larity the grounds therefore, and shall set
He relies on Hambright v. City of Cleveland forth the relief or order sought...." (Emwherein we held that the court's authority is* phasis added). At the hearing on the motion
suspended at the death of a party.2 Camp- to continue held the morning of April 6th,
bell argues that whether or not he raised Appellee's counsel made an oral motion to
objection to the court's proceeding after the
' reduce child support payments to judgment.
death is of no consequence since a court or
Campbell does not dispute that there was an
reviewing court can question at any time its3 oral motion before the court, regarding this
jurisdiction over a matter.
Therefore, issue prior to Appellee's death however,
Campbell argues, the Court of Appeals5 Campbell argues that "[i]t is a fundamental
should have questioned the trial court's juris- concept that an action is not commenced until
diction over the matter regardless of any1 it is filed."
objection Campbell did or did not make.
Campbell also contends that Appellee's coun[6] As stated, this "action" was already
sel presented no evidence to show proof of commenced prior to the April 6th hearing,
arrearage and has shown no authority thatt
permits an attorney to proceed in an action Appellee's counsel merely made an oral mo1
tion regarding an arrearage to the court as
absent a client.
provided for during a hearing under 12 O.S.
Appellee's counsel contends in opposing
g 1994, § 2007(B)(L). Case law also holds that
Campbell's petition for certiorari that Camph [o]ral motions are acceptable in this jurisdicbell failed to raise the issue of the trial
il tion. A written motion may be orally or
court's lack of jurisdiction at the trial level
>1 informally supplemented and broadened in
ARGUMENTS

custody of a minor transfers to the noncustodiald
parent upon the death of the custodial parent.
This is Campbell's explanation as to why the trial
court rendered his motion for custody modification moot.

2. 360 P.2d 493 (Okla.1960).
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scope at the time of its presentation.3
Campbell's argument that this matter was
not commenced pnor to Appellee's death either by Campbell's own motion to modify
custody or by the motion to continue and oral
motion to reduce arrearage to judgment presented by Appellee prior to her death is
without merit.
B.
Campbell also maintains that this court
was without jurisdiction to proceed in this
case after Appellee's death. Appellee's counsel argues that since Campbell did not object
to lack of jurisdiction, service or evidence, at
the trial court level, Campbell cannot object
to it on appeal. Appellee's counsel further
maintains that Campbell, by failing to deny
the Request for Admission according to 12
(XS § 3236 A has admitted owing Appellee
the $3000.00 arrearage and that therefore,
pursuant to 43 O.S. § 1374 there was already
a valid judgment in existence. Hence, all
Appellee requested on April 6, 1990 when the
oral motion was made, was to reduce this
existing judgment to writing. Therefore,
Appellee argues, in that the judgment was in
e>astence prior to Appellee's death at approximately noon on April 6, 1990, the Court had
jurisdiction to merely order the judgment
reduced to writing.
As we have already determined, the cause
of action was commenced prior to Appellee's
death. The question becomes, what was the
result of her death as to this cause of action?
3. John Deere Plow Co v Owens, 194 Okla 96,
100, 147 P2d 149, 154 (1943)
4. The relevant portion of 43 O.S
states

199 § 137

A Anv pavment or installment of child support ordered pursuant to any order, judgment
or decree of the district court or administrative
order of the Department of Human Services is
on and after the date it becomes past due a
judgment by operation of law (Emphasis added)
5.

12 O S 1991, § 1052 states
No action pending in any court shall abate by
the death of either or both the parties thereto,
except an action for libel, slander or malicious
prosecution, which shall abate b> the death of
the defendant

[7,8] With certain exceptions not applicable here, the law m Oklahoma is that upon
the death of a party to litigation a pending
action in any court does not abate.5 Ho\ve\ er, pursuant to 12 O.S.1991, § 2025(A)(1)
[i]f a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any
party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together
with the notice of hearing, shall be served
on the parties as provided m Section [2005
of this title] and upon persons not parties
m the manner provided m Section [2004 of
this title] for the service of a summons.
During the pendency of an action any party may file with the court a statement of
the death of another party conforming substantially to Form 22 of Section [2027 of
this title] along with proof of death and
serve the statement of death and proof of
death on all other parties in the manner
provided m Section [2005 of this title].
Unless the motion for substitution is made
within ninety (90) days of service of the
statement of death, the action shall be
dismissed without prejudice as to the deceased party.6
Oklahoma case law is sparse regarding the
application
and
interpretation
of
§ 2025(A)(1). In that § 2025(A)(1) is taken
from Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.CApp. Rule 25(a)(1)
(1988), we may look to the federal courts for
The current version of 12 O S § 1052 remains
the same as that during the time of the 1990
hearing As to this particular cause of action, see
Abrego v Abrego, 812 P 2d 806 808 (Okla 1991),
"Insofar as accrued payments remain unpaid at
death, an action for child support does not abate
on the death of a parent " In Ah ego, it was the
noncustodial parent that died owing the unpaid
payments In our case, it is the custodial parent
who died, however, the principal holding of Abiego, that the debt survives, is unaffected by this
fact In any event, this issue is not raised by
Campbell
6. The current version of this statute remains the
same as that during the 1990 hearing Section
2025 was added b\ Law 1984, c 164 § 27, eff
Nov 1, 1984 replacing 12 O S 1981, § 1080
which was repealed in 1984
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guidance in interpretation and application of
the rule.7
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 25(a)(1)
(Rule 25), authorizes a representative of the
deceased party to mov~ for substitution for
the action to continue when the claim is not
extinguished by the death.8 In Landry v.
Landry,3 the mother filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus directing the father to relinquish the physical custody of the child and a
rule for contempt and past due child support.
Both were continued indefinitely. The mother filed a second rule for past due child
support and a rule to increase child support.
These were also continued indefinitely. The
mother died and a testamentary executor of
the estate filed suit for contempt and past
due child support and attorney's fees. The
court in Landry stated, "[a] custodial parent
has the right to enforce an obligation for past
due support. That right does not abate upon
death. The succession representative is the
proper party\ and the only party, to enforce
that right"10

[T]here was subject matter jurisdiction in
the instant case. However, there was no
party-defendant before the court.
The authority of defense counsel to act for
the decedent was terminated by the decedent's death.
Likewise in Matthews v. Matthewsn
where the wife died during post divorce proceedings, the Alabama Court of Appeals held,
"because a proper party wras not substituted
for the wife ... we conclude that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment
for the wife."
Based on federal application of Rule 25
and the interpretation and application given
it by persuasive state law, we conclude that
the trial court's authority in the instant case
was suspended by Appellee's death and any
subsequent action taken by the court could
only follow the substitution of Appellee by
her representative pursuant to the procedure
outlined in 12 O.S.1991, § 2025(A)(1).

In Wells v. Wells n the trial court decided
the case on the merits regarding a modification of a divorce decree, even though the wife
C.
died while the husband's petition was pending. In reversing and remanding the AlaGiven the facts of this case, we also considbama Appeals Court explained
er whether a substitution was made such as
[t]he issue before this court, although not would satisfy § 2025 so that the court's acraised by either party . . . is whether the tions thereafter were not void. The record
trial court had jurisdiction to act where a before us shows that no one other than Apparty before the court dies and proper pellee's counsel continued to press Appellee's
substitution of parties under Rule 25(a) claim after her death. The question becomes
... was not made. We determine that the whether Appellee's attorney was or could be
trial court did not have authority to pro- her representative pursuant to § 2025 or
ceed ... and reverse and remand. The Rule 25 so that § 2025 was at least substanquestion of jurisdiction is always funda- tially complied with and the court's judgment
mental, and if there is an absence of juris- was properly made. We conclude however,
diction over either the person or the sub- that Appellee's counsel lost authority to repject matter, a court has no power to act. resent Appellee upon the client's death and
7. See 12 O.S.A.1993, Ch. 39 Oklahoma Pleading
Code (Application of the Oklahoma Pleading
Code in Oklahoma state courts will be facilitated
by reference to the appellate decisions from federal and state courts construing the Federal
Rules.... Where the text of the Federal Rules
has been adopted in the Oklahoma Pleading
Code, the construction placed on it by federal
and state courts should be presumed to have
been adopted as well.); Laubach w Morgan, 588
P.2d 1071, 1073 (Okla.1978).

8. Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 901 (3d
Cir.1976).
9.

516 So.2d 217 (La.Ct.App.1987).

10. Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
11. 376 So.2d 750, 751 (Ala.Civ.App.1979) (emphasis in original).
12.

599 So.2d 1218, 1222 (Ala.Civ.App.1992).
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therefore, no substitution could have occurred.

or to file the motion regarding arrearage
following her death.

[9,10] Under Oklahoma law we have held
that the authority of a deceased party's attorney ceases upon the death of that party.13
"[T]he attorney cannot represent a dead person; and, upon such death, the real party in
interest is the personal representative or
heirs." 14 Federal courts hold likewise. "It
is well settled that for a suggestion of death
to be valid and invoke the 90 day limit, [for
substitution of party] it must identify the
successor or representative who may be substituted for the decedent." 15 Although an
attorney is retained to represent his client,
the attorney is not a party, is not a person
who could be made a party, and is not the
representative of the deceased party as contemplated by Rule 25.16 The power of an
attorney terminates upon the death of his
principal and that attorney does not act for
the deceased's representatives or successors
until those successors are officially appointed
as representatives and after they then retain
the deceased's attorney.17 Under Rule 25
the decedent's attorney has no authority either to move for substitution or even to
suggest the death of his client upon the
record.18 "Such action could clearly prejudice the rights of a successor party to whom
that attorney bears no legal relationship." 19

By so concluding we distinguish Sivick v.
Swick20 and that line of cases wherein we
held the attorney had standing after the
client's death to bring a claim in the attorney's name for attorney fees. In Swick, for
example, the trial court had. while the client
was still alive, expressly reserved the issue of
fees for a later hearing and we held that the
client's death did not "oust the trial com! of
jurisdiction over the divorce action."21 In
the instant case Appellee's counsel is not
acting in her own right in that she is seeking
an attorney's lien on an amount of unpaid
child support that has not yet been reduced
to judgment. The result being with Appellee's death there is no party to carry the
claim forward until a representative is substituted.

[11] Clearly, the use of the term "representative" in § 2025 refers to the legal representatives of the deceased party made so by
or after the death of that party. The party's
attorney is not the legal representative for
purpose of § 2025. We therefore conclude in
the instant case that Appellee's counsel's authority to represent Appellee ceased at Appellee's death and Appellee's counsel had no
authority to represent a deceased client at
the hearing before the trial court on June 22
13. Hambnght, 360 P.2d at 495.
14.

547,

19.

Id.

20.

864 P.2d 819 (Okla.1993).

21.

Id. at 823.

22.

Id. at 496.

549

16. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C.Cir.
1969).
17. In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390, 392 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.
\QZA\

While we have already determined no substitution as would satisfy § 2025 was accomplished, we must also address the issue as to
whether Campbell had the burden to suggest
the death of Appellee and by failing to do so,
waived his right to argue on appeal, lack of
jurisdiction in the trial court. Appellee's
counsel contends that Campbell had the burden of suggesting Appellee's death to the
court under our ruling in Hambright
In
Hambright, which was decided under our old
revival statutes, we stated that to require the
defendant to make the suggestion of death
would be placing the burden "on the defendant to diligently protect the rights of the
plaintiff." n However, we also held that "the
situation [notice of death of a party] is analogous to an affirmative defense such as the
statute of limitations—it must be pleaded
18. Id. at 393.

Id.

15. Smith v. Pianos, 151 F.R.D.
(S.D.N.Y.1993) (citations omitted).

D.

and brought to the attention of the court,
such death not ordinarily being a matter of
record in the case."23
As to this second ruling of Hambright, we
herein distinguish our holding for we have
found no cases wherein the court held the
defendant waived the right to later argue the
court's authority was not suspended (and
therefore the court's actions were valid) upon
the death of a party for failing to make a
suggestion of death upon the record under
§ 2025.24 Neither did we find any federal
cases to that effect. Although, there are
numerous federal cases dismissed for failing
to comply with the 90 days limit for substitution once the suggestion of death was made
on the record in accordance with the statutory requirements, we did not find any cases
where the court found that the defendant had
waived the right to argue the court's authority was not suspended because the defendant
had not filed a suggestion of death.

In applying Rule 25, federal courts have
held that service of statement of death may
be made either by representatives of the
deceased party or by any other party to the
action, but may not be made by the deceased
party acting through counsel.25 It is not
however, a remaining party's burden to suggest the death of the party. We further note
[a] motion to substitute may be made by
any party or by the representative of the
deceased party without awaiting the suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion will
usually be so made. / / a party or the
representative of the deceased party desires to limit the time within which another may make the motion, he may do so by
suggesting the death upon the record ...
thus triggering the 90-day period which
begins with suggestion of death.26

[12] Furthermore, a plain reading of the
statute affirms that it was not Campbell's
burden to make the suggestion of death although, he could have done so. Section 2025
states
[djuring the pendency of the action any
party may file with the court a statement
of the death of another party ... along
with the proof of death and serve the
statement of death and proof of death on

In other words, a remaining party may
suggest the death following the procedure of
§ 2025 or a deceased party's representatives
may suggest the death. It seems logical
that whoever is more interested in the furtherance of the action would be the one to
suggest the death and trigger the remaining
procedure of § 2025, but under the statute, it
is not mandatory on either party to make the
initial suggestion of death.27

23.

25. Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246
(W.D.N.Y.1980). See also Smith v. Pianos. 151
F.R.D. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (decedents attorney has no authority to suggest the death of his
client upon the record).

Id.

24. However, if in fact it is not jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the person that the court
loses at the death of one of the parties, but the
court's authority to proceed, in other words, if
jurisdiction and authority, are not one and the
same, then there is an argument to be made that
in fact Hambright correctly decided that the right
to raise this defense is an affirmative defense that
can be waived by failing to do so. At least, this
would be true under the old revival statutes that
Hambright was interpreting. In any event, we
do not see that this issue has been presented or
argued for determination. Campbell argues that
jurisdiction can be raised at any time, however, it
is, more precisely subject matter jurisdiction that
can be raised at any stage of the litigation and
Campbell does not argue that he is raising lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. And while Appellee's
counsel cites us Hambright for the proposition
that Campbell has waived his right to argue lack
of jurisdiction on appeal, counsel presents no
legal basis for so arguing jurisdiction has been
waived under § 2025 nor what type of jurisdiction has been waived.

all other parties in the manner provided
(Emphasis added).

26. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C.C:r.
1969) (emphasis in original). Cf. National
Equip. Rental v. Whitecraft Unlimited, 75 F.R.D.
507, 509 (E.D.N.Y.1977) (The burden of suggesting the party's death is that of the deceased
party's representative if he desires to delimit the
period during which substitution may be made.).
27. While our research did reveal at least one
federal case wherein the court stated the proper
procedure to be followed was for the defendant
to suggest the death of the plaintiff, whereupon
the plaintiff would then file its motion to substitute, (see Roberts v. Rowe, 89 F.R.D. 398. 400
(S.D.W.Va.1981)) the court gave no legal basis
for its statement and we find other federal cases
(see Tolliver v. Leach, 126 F.R.D. 529. 531
(W.D.Mich. 1989)) that would suggest it is a discretionary procedure as so stated in the federal
rule.
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E.

by proper application of 12 O.S.1991, § 2025,
Appellee's counsel had no authontv to proFinally, we address Appellee's counsel's ^
^fter A p p e l l e e « s d e a t h , ^ * w a s n o t
contention, relied on by the Court of Appeals c
^ ^ W < u to ^ < ^ A^ltatf*
25
affirm
the
trial
court
that
Campbell
w
death t0 the ^
c o m t in o r d e r t0 s u s p e n d
cannot raise the issue of Appellee's motion the proceedings. For the reasons stated
regarding arrearage for the first time on herein the judgment of the Court of Appeals
appeal since he did not file such objection
is VACATED and the judgment of the trial
tfith the trial court. We conclude that coun- court as to the arrearage is REVERSED
sel's contention is, if anything, premature, and REMANDED in accordance with the
•fhe instant action was suspended with Ap- views expressed herein.
pellee's death. There is no authority under
u'hich any further proceedings could have
HODGES, C.J.. and SIMMS,
t^ken place until a substitution was made HARGRAVE, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ.,
following the suggestion of Appellee's death concura£ outlined in § 2025. The action halts at
OPALA, ALMA WILSON and KAUGER,
tfie party's death and can only be reactivated
JJ.,
concur in result.
by the proper application of § 2025. Since
proper application was not made, the action
remams halted (suspended) with Appellee's
death.29
2>
CONCLUSION
In closing we emphasize that we are not
addressing the question nor do we make a
finding as to who would be the proper party
in the instant case to substitute for Appellee
or to pursue the motion for child support
arrearage.30 We simply conclude that the
action in the instant case cannot proceed
without proper substitution pursuant to
§ 2025.
[13] We hold that this action was properly commenced prior to Appellee's death, that
the proceedings were suspended on her
death and could only have been reactivated

David W. ROUT, Appellant,
v.
CRESCENT PUBLIC WORKS
AUTHORITY, Appellee.
No. 78903.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
July 12, 1994.
Writ of certiorari was granted after
Court of Appeals affirmed decision of District

may he made Since there was no suggestion of
2& The Court of Appeals relies on Jones v. Alpine
death under § 2025 there is no need for us to
Investments, Inc., 764 P.2d 513 (Okla.1987), Cor
the rule that parties on appeal are limited to the
consider the 90 day component, other than to sa>
issues presented at the trial level in holding
based on the record before us the 90 day period
Campbell could not raise the issue on appeal of
has not been triggered
Appellee's motion for arrearage because he had
not raised the objection before the trial court
Under the circumstances of this case however, 30. See Rende v Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986 (D C Cir.
1969) ("No injustice results from the requirethe death of Appellee occurred after the motion
ment that a suggestion of death identify the rep^as oralh made by Appellee's counsel and beresentative or successor of an estate who may be
fore the hearing was held over two months later.
substituted as a party for the deceased before
*he proceedings became dormant following Appellee s death Whether Campbell filed an objecRu^ 25(a)(1) may be invoked by those who repfcon to the motion is immaterial in that no action
resent or inherit from the deceased If the heirs
should have been taken subsequent to the death
or counsel fear that delay may prejudice the
"^til the proceedings were reactivated bv proper
litigation the> may move promptl} for appointapplication of Section 2025.
ment of a representative, either under the law of
the domicile or by special order in the court
4 • We do not address application of the 90 day
wherein the litigation is pending.")
Period under Section 2025 by which substitution

1096

Del

-

538

ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Pamela J. HOFFMAN and Warren S.
Hoffman, her husband, Plaintiffs
Below, Appellants,
v.
Roland F. COHEN, Defendant
Below, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: Nov. 17, 1987.
Decided: March 4, 1988.
Plaintiffs brought action against defendant for damages arising out of automobile accident. Following death of defendant, the Superior Court, New Castle County, Vincent J. Poppiti, J., dismissed complaint, determining that plaintiffs filed untimely motion for substitution of party, and
plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court,
Holland, J., held that: (1) defendant's attorney was not authorized to suggest defendant's death upon record and, thus, 90-day
provision for moving to substitute party
was not triggered, and (2) attorney's being
retained originally to represent defendant
by insurance carrier did not authorize attorney to move for suggestion of death
upon record.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Attorney and Client *=76(2)
Parties *=>60
Deceased defendant's attorney was not
authorized to suggest defendant's death on
record and, therefore, such suggestion of
death did not trigger 90-day period for
making motion for substitution; thus, motion of plaintiffs' counsel to substitute defendant's estate as party defendant was
timely. Superior Court Civil Rules 25,
25(aXD, DeLCAnn.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rules 26, 25(aXD, 25 note, 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Attorney and Client <*»76(2)
Attorney was not authorized to suggest defendant's death upon record as result of his having been retained originally
to represent defendant by defendant's insurance carrier; neither insurance carrier
nor attorney was party or successor or

representative of deceased defendant
in meaning of substitution rule s ****
Court Civil Rule 25(aXD, D e l . C . A n n ^
CtRules, Rule 31(a, b), DeLCAnn/' **

Sidney Balick, Wilmington, on behalf
plaintiffs below, appellants.
°*
James B. Ropp (argued) and RichjlM
Galperin of Morris, James, Hitcheni71
Williams, Wilmington, on behalf of defe J
n
ant below, appellee.
*
Before HORSEY, WALSH and
HOLLAND, JJ.
HOLLAND, Justice:
In this appeal, the appellants-plaintiffc
below, Pamela J. Hoffman and Warren 8,
Hoffman ("the Hoffmans"), argue that the
Superior Court erred in dismissing their
complaint. The basis for the Superior
Court's dismissal was its conclusion that
the Hoffmans had filed an untimely mo.
tion, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule
25, for the substitution of a party following
the death of the appellee-defendant below,
Roland F. Cohen ("Cohen"). In reaching
its decision, the Superior Court expressly
declined to follow the line of federal cases
interpreting Rule 25 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure upon which the Superior
Court Rule 25 is modeled. We find the
reasoning of the federal cases persuasive
and reverse the decision of the Superior
Court.
Pertinent Facts
The Hoffmans filed a lawsuit against
Cohen on July 10, 1984, in the Superior
Court, for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Discovery and settlement
negotiations proceeded following the Smf
of Cohen's answer to the complaint 0i
October 23,1985, Cohen's attorney wrote s
letter to the Hoffmans'attorney. This*
ter stated that his client, Cohen, had <W
on August 27,1985, and that he was m At
process of preparing trie necessary
work" to have the estate substituted •• *
party for Cohen.
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However, on November 19, 1985, instead
of receiving a stipulation for substitution
of the estate, the attorney for the Hoffmans was served with a "Suggestion of
Death Upon the Record," which was filed
with the Superior Court by Cohen's attorney. A letter, sent simultaneously from
Cohen's attorney to the Hoffmans' attorney, stated that he understood suggesting
Cohen's death upon the record was "the
extent of [his] burden in this situation."
The depositions of the Hoffmans were taken three days later by Cohen's attorney, on
November 22, 1985, as previously scheduled.
A request for a pretrial conference was
made by the Hoffmans' attorney on June 2,
1986. On June 13, 1986, Cohen's attorney
filed a motion to dismiss the action because
of the Hoffmans' failure to substitute Cohen's estate as a party in accordance with
Superior Court Civil Rule 25. Upon receipt
of the motion to dismiss, the Hoffmans'
attorney contacted Cohen's attorney to
ascertain the name of the personal representative of Cohen's estate or the name of
the attorney handling the estate. Cohen's
attorney gave him the name of another
Delaware attorney that he believed Claire
Cohen, the widow of Cohen, had retained to
represent the estate of Roland F. Cohen.
The Hoffmans' counsel then contacted that
attorney to determine if he was handling
the estate and, if so, the name of the personal representative of the estate. The
Hoffmans' attorney was advised that the
estate had not yet been opened.
The estate was opened on June 20, 1986,
and letters testamentary were granted
unto Claire Cohen. On June 24, 1986, the
Hoffmans' attorney filed a motion for substitution of Cohen's estate as a party defendant. On August 15, 1986, the Hoffmans filed a motion for enlargement of
time under Superior Court Civil Rule 6.
The Superior Court granted Cohen's motion
to dismiss, denied the Hoffmans' motion
for an enlargement of time under Superior
Court Civil Rule 6, and denied the Hoffmans' motion for the substitution of Cohen's estate as a party defendant under
Rule 25(a). The Superior Court's ruling
was based upon its decision not to follow

the line of federal cases that had interpreted Federal Rule 25, i.e., Rende v. Kay, 415
F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.1969), and its progeny.
The Superior Court acknowledged that, according to Rende, the suggestion of death
by Cohen's attorney would have been a
nullity and the motion for substitution by
Hoffmans' attorney would have been timely.
History of Superior Court Rules
We begin our review with an examination of the correlation between the Superior
Court Civil Rules and the corresponding
federal rules. The rules of the Superior
Court of the State of Delaware were
changed substantially as of January 1,
1948. The publisher of the Superior Court
Rules noted at that time that Rules 1-86 of
the Civil Rules of the Superior Court were
patterned upon the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that had been in effect since
1938. Preface to Vol. 13A DeLC, Superior Court Rules at vi (West 1971). To the
extent that the Superior Court did not
adopt a particular federal rule or subdivision of a rule, this fact was identified by
the publishers in an analysis that preceded
the text of the rules. The publishers also
noted that the many court decisions construing the federal rules "should be of
considerable interest and value to the
Bench and Bar of Delaware when considering the interpretation of corresponding
State court rules." Id. at vii. See also
Superior Court Rules analysis at 2-13
(West 1971).
In 1948, one of the first reported cases
which interpreted the newly adopted Superior Court Civil Rules was written by
Judge, later Justice, Carey. Justice Carey,
who had joined in promulgating those rules
only a few months earlier, wrote:
In those instances where our present
rule is exactly the same as the Federal
rule, it is desirable to follow the interpretation placed upon it by the Federal
Courts, especially where those Courts
have been so nearly unanimous in their
rulings, unless some good reason appears for adopting a contrary construction.
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Patterson v. Vincent, DeLSuper., 61 A.2d
416, 417 (1948). This Court has also held
that because the 1948 Superior Court Civil
Rules are basically the 1938 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the construction of
these latter rules by the federal judiciary is
of "great persuasive weight in the construction of the present Superior Court
Rules." Canaday v. Superior Court, Del.
Supr., 119 A.2d 347, 352 (1956).

in Federal Rule 25(a)(1) along the lines
proposed by Professor Moore. Id. at 199 n
1.

Amendment of Delaware and
Federal Rule 25
The two year provision remained in Federal Rule 25 and continued to be strictly
applied until 1963. In 1961, the Federal
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules suggested that Rule 25(a)(1) be made more
History of Delaware Rule 25
flexible. In 1963, the United States SuSuperior Court Civil Rule 25 received its preme Court completely rewrote Federal
first careful examination in 1959 by then Rule 25(a)(1) and also made1 concurrent
Judge, now Chief Justice, Christie. Tiffa- changes in Federal Rule 6(b).
ny v. OToole Realty Co., DeLSuper., 153
The 1963 amendment to Federal Rule 25
A.2d 195 (1959). At that time, Superior provides that any party to the action or any
Court Civil Rule 25(a)(1) provided in part successor or representative of a deceased
that "[i]f a party dies and the claim is not party can file a motion for substitution
thereby extinguished, the court within 2 within ninety days after the death of a
years after the death may order substitu- party is suggested upon the record. Theretion of the proper parties." Super.Ct. fore, instead of limiting the ability for subCiv.R. 25(a)(1), quoted in Tiffany v. stitution to two years from the death of a
OToole Realty Co., 153 A.2d at 196. In party, the new limit upon substitution is
Tiffany, the defendants moved to dismiss tied to the suggestion of the death of the
the plaintiffs case because more than two party upon the record. Once the death of a
years had elapsed since the death of Harold party has been suggested upon the record,
E. Tiffany without the substitution of a the 1963 amendment to Federal Rule 25
proper party in his place. 153 A.2d at 196. provides that if a substitution is not made
In analyzing the defendants' motion in within ninety days, the action is to be disTiffany, the court found that since Superi- missed as to the deceased party. 3B J.
or Court Civil Rule 25 was virtually identi- Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal
cal to Federal Rule 25 "the reasoning in the Practice 11 25.06[2.-l] (2d ed. 1987).
federal cases must be given great weight
Since the time limit for making a substiin interpreting the rule." Id. at 199. The tution as a result of the 1963 amendment is
Tiffany court followed the interpretation in now measured from the suggestion of
the federal cases which had construed Rule death on the record, the ability to suggest
25 and granted the defendants' motion to a death is uniquely important. The Federal
dismiss. However, the Tiffany court ob- Advisory Committee anticipated this. The
served that Professor Moore had described Committee Notes explaining the 1963
Federal Rule 25 as "easily the poorest rule amendments state:
of all Federal Rules." Id. at 199 (quoting 4
Present Rule 25(a)(1), together with
J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
present Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible
requirement that an action be dismissed
1125.01[7] (2d ed. 1950)). The Tiffany court
as to a deceased party if substitution is
also noted that the advisory committee for
not carried out within a fixed period meathe federal courts had suggested changes
1. Professor Moore's treatise states:
Rule 6(b) was amended in 1963, to remove
Rule 25 from the list of exceptions to the
applicability of Rule 6. [Rule 6] provides for
the enlargement of time for the taking of an
act required by the Civil Rules, in the court's
discretion for cause shown. Thus, even the

ninety-day time limit of amended Rule 25(a)
is now subject to enlargement pursuant to
Rule 6 if good cause can be shown as to why
substitution could not have been made within
the time limit for substitution.
3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal
Practice, H 25.06[2.-2] (2d ed. 1987).
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sured from the time of death. The hardships and inequities of this unyielding
requirement plainly appear from the
cases.
The amended rule establishes a time
limit for the motion to substitute based
not upon the time of the death, but rather upon the time information of the death
is provided by means of a suggestion of
death upon the record
A motion to substitute may be made
by any party or by the representative of
the deceased party without awaiting the
suggestion of death. Indeed, the motion
will usually be so made. If a party or
the representative of the deceased party
desires to limit the time within which
another may make the motion, he may
do so by suggesting the death upon the
record.
28 U.S.C.A., Fed.R.Civ.P. 25 advisory committee notes at 121 (1972) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), quoted in Rende v.
Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C.Cir.1969). It
was clearly the view of the Federal Advisory Committee that the amendments to Rule
25(a)(1) would limit entities who may suggest death upon the record to those who
may move for substitution.
The Delaware Superior Court amended
its own Civil Rules 6(b) and 25(a)(1) to
conform completely with the 1963 amendments to Federal Rules 6(b) and 25(a)(1).
Superior Court Civil Rule 25(a)(1) now
reads:
If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the Court may order substitution of the proper parties.
The motion for substitution may be made
by any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing,
shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons, and may be served
in any county. Unless the motion for
substitution is made not later than 90
days after the death is suggested upon
the record by service of a statement of
the fact of the death as provided herein
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for the service of the motion, the action
shall be dismissed as to the deceased
party in all cases except those in which
an application for an interlocutory appeal
has been made.
Super.CtCiv.R. 25(a)(1). The interaction of
Superior Court Civil Rules 6 and 25, as
amended, was discussed by this Court in
Doherty v. Straughn, DeLSupr., 407 A.2d
207, 210-11 (1979).
Federal Construction of Rule 25
As Amended
The seminal federal case interpreting the
1963 amendments to Federal Rule 25 was
written in 1969. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d
983 (D.C.Cir.1969). The facts in the Rende
case are strikingly similar to the facts in
this case. In Rende, the defendant Kay
(here Cohen), died during the course of the
litigation. The defendant's attorney suggested the defendant's (Kay's) death on the
record and subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss when the plaintiffs (there Rende,
here the Hoffmans) made no motion for
substitution within ninety days. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia granted Kay's motion to dismiss.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed that
decision. Id. at 986.
In reversing the District Court, the D.C.
Circuit reviewed the history of Federal
Rule 25 and the commentary from the Advisory Committee Notes, which we have
already quoted. Id. at 984-85. The D.C.
Circuit concluded that under Federal Rule
25 as amended in 1963:
[E]ither a party or "the successors or
representatives of the deceased party"
may avoid delay in effecting substitution
for the deceased party either by filing a
motion for substitution or by suggesting
death on the record and thus triggering
the 90-day period which begins with suggestion of death.
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d at 985. The D.C.
Circuit then held:
Although the attorney for the defendant
was retained to "represent" the deceased
as his counsel, he is not a person who
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could be made a party, and is not a
"representative of the deceased party" in
the sense contemplated by Rule 25(a)(1).
In our opinion the Rule, as amended,
cannot fairly be construed, as the defendant's attorney argues, to make his suggestion of death operative to trigger the
90-day period even though he was neither a successor nor representative of
the deceased, and gave no indication of
what person was available to be named
in substitution as a representative of the
deceased. Counsel's construction would
open the door to a tactical maneuver to
place upon the plaintiff the burden of
locating the representative of the estate
within 90 days.
Id. at 985-86 (footnote omitted).2
Federal Construction Adopted for
Superior Court Civil Rule 25
[1] The Delaware Superior Court originally adopted Rule 25 in a form that was
identical to the corresponding federal rule.
The Delaware Superior Court adhered to
the federal courts' interpretation of Rule
25 in Tiffany despite its apparent harshness. See 153 A.2d at 198-200. Thereafter, the Delaware Superior Court amended Rule 25(aXD and Rule 6(b), adopting
verbatim the 1963 amendments to the same
federal rules.
The Superior Court's amendment to Rule
25(a) was effective July 1, 1970. This ef2. The D.C. Circuit also pointed out that:
The Advisory Committee, in outlining that
suggestion of death could be made by "the
representative of the deceased party" plainly
contemplated that the suggestion emanating
from the side of the deceased would identify a
representative of the estate, such as an executor or administrator, who could be substituted
for the deceased as a party, with the action
continued in the name of the representative.
The addition of "successor" in the Rule would
take care of the case of, say, the distributee of
an estate that had been distributed, but would
not make a material difference in the aspect
under consideration.
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C.Cir.1969)
(emphasis added). Noting that it was "pro Jed
in order to expedite and facilitate implementation" of the 1963 amendment to Federal Rule
25, the D.C. Circuit quoted Form 30 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

fective date was one year after the Rende
decision. Therefore, in 1970, the Superior
Court had access to the federal amendment
to Rule 25, the Federal Advisory Committee's Notes explaining the reasons for the
amendment, and the Rende decision construing the amendment. The record does
not support a conclusion that the Superior
Court adopted an amendment that was
identical to the federal changes but rejected the Federal Advisory Committee's commentary and the subsequent construction
of amended Rule 25(a) by the federal
courts.
We find the reasoning of Rende and its
progeny3 not only persuasive but compelling in this case. We hold, for the reasons
stated in Rende, that the deceased's (Cohen's) attorney was not authorized to suggest Cohen's death pursuant to Superior
Court Civil Rule 25(a)(1). This conclusion
is entirely consistent with the general rule
that upon the death of a client, a pre-existing attorney-client relationship is completely severed and any action taken on behalf
of the deceased client by his former attorney is a nullity. In re Cakoonfs Will,
Del.Super., 82 A.2d 920, 922 (1951). See
also 7 AmJur.2d Attorneys at Law § 171
(1980); 7A CJ.S. Attorney and Client
§ 224 (1980).
Since the suggestion of death by Cohen's
attorney was a nullity and ineffective to
trigger the ninety-day provision in Rule 25,
the motion by the Hoffmans' attorney to
A.B. [describe as a party, or as executor,
administrator, or other representative or successor of CD., the deceased party] suggests
upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1),
the death of CD. [describe as party] during
the pendency of this action.
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d at 985 (emphasis omitted). However, the surviving party need not
identify a representative of the estate in a suggestion of death. Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362
F.Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D.N.Y.1973).
3. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 97-99
(D.CCir.1985) (per curiam), cert denied, 474
U.S. 1005, 106 S.Ct. 525, 88 L.Ed.2d 457 (1985);
Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 90(M)1 (3d
Cir.1976); Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.RJX
244, 245-48 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Gronowicz v.
Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 624, 626-27 (S.D.N.Y.1986);
In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390, 392-93 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.
1984).
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substitute Cohen's estate as a party defendant was timely.4 Therefore, the decisions of the Superior Court dismissing the
Hoffmans' complaint and denying the Hoffmans' motion for substitution are reversed.
No Insurance Company Exception
[2] At oral argument in this case, Coben's attorney raised a new theory for authorizing his suggestion of Cohen's death
upon the record. The attorney represented
to this Court that he had been retained
eriginally to defend Cohen in the Superior
Court by Cohen's insurance carrier. Since
this argument was not presented to the
Superior Court, it cannot be properly raised
at this time. Supr.CtR. 8. However, in
the interest of justice and for the guidance
of future cases, we will address this contention. Our conclusion would be the same
if this issue had been properly raised and
presented.
This Court has previously recognized
that representation pursuant to a contract
of insurance, when the client does not r e
tain or control the attorney in the performance of his services, falls within an exception to the general rule that the death of a
"client" terminates the relationship and revokes the authority of the attorney to act.
Coleman v. Durden, Del.Supr., 338 A.2d
570, 570-71 (1975) (per curiam). In Coleman, the defendant had died after the Superior Court entered judgment against him.
A personal representative was not appointed for the estate within the statutory time
period. The deceased defendant's attorney
subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal
to this Court. Id. at 570. Relying on the
general rule enunciated in In re Cahoon's
Will, 82 A.2d at 922, the plaintiff moved to
dismiss the appeal, arguing that the attorney-client relationship had been completely
severed upon the death of the defendant.
4. A suggestion of death upon the record is not a
prerequisite to a motion for substitution.
5. The ability to perfect an appeal to protect the
interest of a deceased client has since been
extended to all attorneys by this Court. Supr.Ct.
R. 7(e).
6. In this case, the attorney retained by Cohen's
insurance company took the depositions of the
Hoffmans subsequent to Cohen's death. With-

The attorney for the deceased defendant
had been retained by an insurance company
pursuant to a contract with the decedent
That contract authorized and required the
company to defend the decedent's interests
in the lawsuit This Court denied the motion to dismiss and held that the attorneyclient relationship of the deceased defendant and his counsel, through the insurance
carrier, fit within the exception to the general rule outlined above.6 Coleman v.
Durden, 338 A.2d at 570-71.
In this case, at oral argument, "Cohen's"
attorney argued that he was capable of
suggesting Cohen's death to protect the
interest of his client—the insurance carrier.
We continue to recognize that, in some
instances, an attorney retained by an insurance company may act to protect the interest of that company in pending litigation
subsequent to the death of the insured
party.6 However, the ability to act to protect the interests of the insurance company
is subject to limitation.
This action was commenced by the Hoffmans against Cohen pursuant to 10 DeLC.
§ 3703. That statute provides that such
actions do not abate at death. However,
this Court has held that 10 DeLC § 3703
"does not preclude [the] imposition by Rule
25(a)(1) of a time limitation on a motion for
substitution of parties
" Dokerty v.
Straughn, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d 207, 210
(1979). Just as Superior Court Civil Rule
25 can impose a limitation (ninety days)
upon the time for filing a motion to substitute a party following a proper suggestion
of death, it can impose a limitation upon
who can suggest a death on the record.
There is no provision in Rule 25 for the
suggestion of death by a deceased party's
attorney even if that attorney was engaged
pursuant to a contract of insurance. Cf.
out ruling upon that action, we note that if an
insured pairty dies, the attorney selected by his
insurance carrier to represent him can protect
the carrier, e.g., when there is a fear that a delay
may prejudice the litigation, by moving for the
appointment of a personal representative or perhaps a temporary representative, either under
the probate law or by special order of the trial
court. Cf. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d at 986.
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id. The construction of Rule 25 by the
federal courts, which we adopt, limits entities who may suggest death upon the
record to those who may move for substitution. In fact, the rules of this Court provide for a suggestion of death only by the
personal representative of the deceased
party or by another party in interest.
Supr.CtR. 31(aHb).
Neither the insurance company nor the
attorney it had retained was a party or the
successor or representative of the deceased
defendant within the meaning of Rule
25(a)(1) and, therefore, was not qualified to
file a suggestion of death. Cf. Rende v%
Kay, 415 F.2d at 985-86. Moreover, the
corollary of finding that the insurance company was a representative of the deceased
who is qualified to suggest death upon the
record would be to find that the insurance
company could be substituted for the deceased insured as a party. This would be
contrary to the long-established practice ir\
Delaware that the existence of insurance
coverage is not to be disclosed to the trier
of fact. Catalfano v. Higgins, Del.Supr.*
188 A.2d 357, 359 (1962) (quoting Steen*
burg v. Harry Braunstein, Inc., Del.S^
per., 77 A.2d 206, 208 (1950)). See also
Murray v. James, Del.Super., 326 A.2d
122, 123 (1974); DeVincentis v. Maryland
Casualty Co., Del.Super., 325 A.2d 610,
612 (1974).
Conclusion
The decisions of the Superior Court
granting Cohen's motion to dismiss and
denying the Hoffmans' motion for substitu^
tion are both REVERSED, This case is
remanded to the Superior Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion,

STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff,
v.
William J. LeCOMPTE, Defendant
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted: Nov. 17, 1987.
Decided: Feb. 18, 1988.
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, New Castle County, of first-degree robbery and possession of deadly
weapon during commission of that robbery,
and he appealed imposition of consecutive
sentences. The Supreme Court, 516 A.2d
898, upheld imposition of separate sentences for offenses, and remanded matter
for determination of retroactive application
of its decision. The Superior Court certified question whether decision should be
applied retroactively. The Supreme Court
held that its decision should not be given
retroactive effect.
Question answered.
Courts <s=*100(l)
Decision of Supreme Court that defendant could be separately sentenced for
first-degree robbery and possession of
deadly weapon during commission of that
robbery, which expressly overruled prior
decision, did not apply retroactively to
crimes committed before appellate decision
and intervening decision which eroded prior
decision; although defendant was technically on notice that law was changing, relative foreseeability of change was diminished by timing and character of intervening
decision, and retroactive application of separate sentence rule would not meet concept
of fairness which due process embraced.
11 Del.C. §§ 832(a)(2), 1447; U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr., Chief of Appeals Div., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington,
for plaintiff.
Nancy Jane Perillo, Asst. Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant.
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Judi KISSIC
v.

LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
et al.
1930272.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 15, 1994.

Insured and his wife brought suit
against insurer, one of its agents, and insured's father. Plaintiffs sought damages
based on allegations that defendants fraudulently induced insured to make his father
rather than his wife the designated beneficiary. Insurer and agent filed cross-claim
against father. Wife filed motion for joinder
to add her two minor children as plaintiffs.
In both cross-claim and motion for joinder,
reference was made to death of insured.
The Circuit Court, Talladega County, No.
CV-89-209, William C. Sullivan, J., dismissed
decedent's claims for noncompliance with
rule governing substitution, and appeal was
taken. The Supreme Court, Houston, J.,
held that neither passing reference to death
of insured contained in cross-claim, nor similar reference contained in motion for joinder,
was sufficient to start running of six-month
period in which to file motion for substitution.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Abatement and Revival ®=>59.1, 62.1
Rule providing for dismissal of action as
to deceased party, unless motion for substitution is made not later than six months after
death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of death,
requires that statement suggesting death of
party, in addition to being properly served,
provide sufficient notice that the time period
has begun for substituting proper party for
deceased party. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
25(a)(1).

2. Abatement and Revival 0=59.1
Neither passing reference to plaintiff
death contained in defendants* eross-c]^
nor similar reference contained in survive
plaintiffs motion for joinder, was sufficient r!
start running of six-month period in which u
file motion of substitution to preclude d^
missal of action as to deceased plaintiff.
overruling Matthews v. Matthews, 599 So^i
1218. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 25(a)(1).
3. Abatement and Revival 059.1, 62.1
Although service of suggestion of death
on an attorney will satisfy requirement of
substitution rule for service on parties to
litigation, service required by substitution
rule on interested nonparties, specifically
successor or representative of deceased par.
ty's estate, must be pursuant to personal
service rule. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 4
25(a)(1).
G. Gregory White, Birmingham, for Judi
Kissic.
R. Blake Lazenby of Wooten, Thorton.
Carpenter, O'Brien, Lazenby & Lawrence.
Talladega, for Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., Inc.
and Robert Daniel Bice, Jr.
G. Rod Giddens of Ghee & Giddens, Anniston, and J. Stanton Glasscox, Oneonta, for
Onnie Leon Kissic.
HOUSTON, Justice.
On June 9, 1989, Ronnie Kissic and his
wife, Judi Kissic, sued Liberty National Life
Insurance Company, Inc. ("Liberty National"); one of its agents, Robert Daniel Bice,
Jr.; and Ronnie Kissie's father, Onnie Leon
Kissic, seeking damages based on allegations
that thevdefendants had fraudulently induced
Ronnie Kissic to change the designated beneficiary under his life insurance policy from
Judi Kissic to Leon Kissic. The record indicates that Ronnie Kissic and Judi Kissic were
represented by the same attorney and that
Ronnie Kissic died sometime after September 6, 1990, but before February 25, 1991.
On February 25, 1991, Liberty National and
Bice filed a crossclaim against Leon Kissic
which in the second paragraph referred to
"the death of plaintiff Ronnie Kissic." The
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grossclaim, which was served on Leon Kissic (Emphasis added.) Our research has dismd Judi Kissic's attorney, stated a claim closed little Alabama caselaw interpreting
ggainst Leon Kissic for the amount of life the emphasized language above. In Big Red
insurance proceeds paid to him under the Elephant v. Bryant 477 So.2d 342 (Ala.1985),
policy, in the event that it was determined this Court held that a statement suggesting
that the payment of those proceeds was im- death does not have to include the date of the
proper. (The authority of Judi Kissic's attor- party's death, and in Winter v. Cox, 553
ney to act on behalf of Ronnie Kissic had So.2d 60 (Ala. 1989), we held that a notation
ceased upon Ronnie Kissic's death. See on a case action summary sheet as to a
Brown r. Wheeler, 437 So.2d 521 (Ala.1983),party's death is not a sufficient statement to
overruled on other grounds, Hayes v. Brook- initiate the running of the period for filing a
uwd Hospital 572 So.2d 1251 (Ala.1990).) motion for substitution under Rule 25(a)(1),
On May 3, 1993, Judi Kissic filed a "motion at least where there is no evidence that a
for joinder" to add her two minor children as copy of the case action summary sheet was
plaintiffs in the action. This motion was served in accordance with the rule. Alserved on the three defendants. In the sec- though Winter v. Cox is not determinative of
ond paragraph of that motion, Ronnie Kissic the issue presented in the present case, it
was referred to as "now deceased," and in does suggest that Rule 25(a)(1) requires that
the fourth paragraph reference was made to a statement suggesting the death of a party,
"the death of Ronnie Kissic." On October in addition to being properly served, must
13, 1993, 31 months and 18 days after the provide sufficient notice that the time period
crossclaim was filed and 5 months and 10 has begun for substituting a proper party for
days after the motion for joinder was filed, a deceased party.
and after a hearing on August 11, 1993,
[2] We note that that part of Rule 25
during which the parties stipulated that Ron- requiring service of a "statement of the fact
nie Kissic was, in fact, deceased, the trial of death" is identical to its federal countercourt dismissed Ronnie Kissic's claims for part, and, as we have stated many times, we
noncompliance with Rule 25, A.R.Civ.P. It is look to the federal courts' interpretation of
undisputed that a proper party was never the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when
substituted for Ronnie Kissic following his those rules are similar to our own. Our
death.
research indicates that the federal courts
require a formal statement suggesting death
u] The dispositive issue is whether ei- on the record in order to initiate the running
ther the crossclaim filed by Liberty National of the time period for substituting the proper
^d Bice against Leon Kissic or the motion party. See 3B Moore's Federal Practice,
f
°r joinder filed by Judi Kissic was sufficient § 25.06(3) (2d ed. 1991); 7C C. Wright, A.
10
constitute a suggestion of death on the Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
^ord, s o a s t 0 commence the running of the Procedure, § 1955 (1986); Grandbouche u
sl
*-month period for substituting a proper Lovell 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir.1990) (mere
reference in court proceedings or pleadings
^ y under Rule 25.
to a party's death is not sufficient to start the
Rule 25(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as running of the limitations period for filing a
follows:
motion for substitution; a formal suggestion
Unless the motion for substitution is of death on the record is required, regardless
m
ade not later than six months after the of whether the parties have knowledge of a
tooth is suggested upon the record by ser- party's death); United States v. Miller
Vlce
of a statement of the fact of the death Brothers Construction Co., 505 F.2d 1031
«°ft the parties as provided in Rule 5, (10th Cir.1974) (the plaintiffs knowledge of
Ak.R.Civ.P„ and on nonparty successors the defendant's death was insufficient to
t* representatives as provided in Rule 4 start the running of the 90-day time period
•w the service of a summons], the action for substitution; a formal suggestion of death
s
hall be dismissed as to the deceased par- was required); Kaldawy v. Gold Service
Movers Inc, 129 F.R.D. 475 (S.D.N.Y.1990)
ty/'
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(court's order noting the plaintiffs death and
placing the case on the suspended calendar,
which was mailed to the attorneys for all of
the parties, including the decedent's attorney, was insufficient to start the running of
the 90-day limitations period); Blair v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 104 F.R.D. 21 (W.D.Pa.
1984), affirmed, 787 F.2d 580 (3rd Cir.1986)
(a passing reference to a party's death in a
pleading was not the equivalent of a formal
suggestion of death on the record); ACRI v.
International Association of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 595 F.Supp. 326
(N.D.Cal.1983), affirmed, 781 F.2d 1393 (9th
Cir.1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107
S.Ct. 73, 93 L.Ed^d 29 (1986) (incidental
reference to a party's death in answers to
interrogatories was not sufficient to start the
running of the 90-day period under Rule 25);
National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Whitecraft Unlimited, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507
(E.D.N.Y.1977) (a formal statement suggesting death on the record and served on all the
parties is required to conform to Rule 25);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Leflcowitz, 454 F.Supp. 59
(D.C.N.Y.1977) (90-day period begins to run
only after a formal statement of the fact of
death is filed); Dolgow v. Anderson, 45
F.R.D. 470 (E.D.N.Y.1968) (oral statement
made in passing during a deposition was not
a "statement of the fact of death" within the
meaning of Rule 25; a formal, written statement was required). See, also, Official Form
30, Fed.R.Civ.P., entitled "Suggestion of
Death Upon the Record Under Rule
25(a)(1)." All of these cases make it very
clear that the federal courts place great emphasis on formality when reviewing cases of
this kind and that they do not consider an
incidental or passing reference in a pleading
or during discovery to be the equivalent of a
"statement of the fact of death" under Federal Rule 25. The rationale underlying the
federal courts' interpretation of Federal Rule
25 was succinctly stated by the district court
in Dolgow v. Anderson at 471:
"Attorneys are sometimes so harassed
during the course of a litigation that they
may well overlook an informal suggestion
of death. When the consequences to the
client of a slightly delayed reaction may be
severe and the burden of providing formal

notice is slight, insistence on the observ
ance of procedural ritual is justified."
We find the rationale of the federal coim
persuasive. It is quite simple under Ruje 9to start the running of the time period for
substituting a proper party for a deceased
party by filing a clearly designated "state
ment of the fact of death" or "suggestion of
death" and by serving that statement in ac%
cordance with the requirements of the rule
Rule 1, A.R.Civ.P., states that our rules of
civil procedure should be construed so as t0
secure the just determination of even* action
It is not the purpose of our rules to foreclose
or bar potentially meritorious claims. Hai^
v. Brookivood Hospital supra. Any construction of Rule 25 on our part that could
under certain circumstances, create a trap
for an unwary attorney would surely violate
the spirit, if not the letter, of our rules of
civil procedure. Therefore, we conclude, as
the federal courts have, that requiring adherence to the simple procedure contemplated
by Rule 25(a)(1) is preferable to embarking
on a case-by-case review to determine under
what circumstances the filing and service of a
document during litigation would be sufficient to start the running of the six-month
limitations period. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that neither the passing reference to Ronnie Kissic's death contained in
the crossclaim, nor the one contained in the
motion for joinder, was sufficient under Rule
25 to start the running of the six-month
period.
[3] Furthermore, we note that a suggestion of death must be served in accordance
with Rule 25(a)(1). The record indicates that
the crossclaim filed by Liberty National and
Bice, although personally served on Leon
Kissic, was served on Judi Kissic's attorney
following Ronnie Kissic's death. As previously stated, Judi Kissic's attorney, at the
time he was served with the crossclaim, no
longer represented Ronnie Kissic, and the
record does not indicate that a personal representative was ever appointed to represent
Ronnie Kissic's estate or that, if one was in
fact appointed, the personal representative
was served with the crossclaim in accordance
with Rule 4. Although service of a suggestion of death on an attorney will satisfy d*

COMPASS POINT CONDO. v. FIRST FED. SAV.
Cite as 641 So^d

requirement of Rule 25(a)(1) for service on
parties to the litigation, the service required
by Rule 25(a)(1) on interested nonparties,
specifically the successor or representative of
the deceased party's estate, must be served
pursuant to Rule 4. Therefore, even if the
crossclaim had been sufficient to constitute a
proper suggestion of death in this case, because the personal representative of Ronnie
Kissic's estate was never served with it the
six-month limitations period would not have
begun to run. See Grandbouche v. Lovell
supra; Kaldatvy supra.
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COMPASS POINT CONDOMINIUM
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al.
v.

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION OF
FLORENCE, et al.
1921555.
Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 15, 1994.
We further note that the record does not
show whether Judi Kissic's attorney also represented the personal representative of RonPurchasers of units in condominium
nie Kissic's estate, or whether the motion for
joinder filed by Judi Kissic was served on the complex filed complaint asserting fraud
personal representative of Ronnie Kissic's against vendor for failing to disclose engiestate in accordance with the requirements neering report concerning water intrusion
of Rule 4, if a personal representative was mto complex. The Circuit Court, Baldwin
ever appointed. Therefore, even if that mo- County, No. CV-90-506, Charles C. Partin,
tion had been sufficient to constitute a prop- J., entered summary judgment in favor of
er suggestion of death, we could not hold vendor, and purchasers appealed. The Suthat the time period for substituting the preme Court, Maddox, J., held that purchasproper party for Ronnie Kissic would have ers failed to show that suppression of report
commenced to run. In any event, the trial prevented them from discovering water incourt dismissed Ronnie Kissic's claims less
trusion before closing, that failure to disclose
than six months (specifically, 5 months and
report induced them to act or refrain from
10 days) after the motion for joinder was
acting, or that they suffered damage as refiled and served; therefore, even if the motion for joinder had met the specificity and sult of failure to disclose report.
service requirements of Rule 25(a)(1), the
Affirmed.
dismissal of Ronnie Kissic's claims would
Hornsby, C.J., concurred specially with
have been premature.
opinion.
To the extent that Matthews v. Matthews,
599 So.2d 1218 (Ala.CivApp.1992), is inconKennedy and Ingram, JJ., dissented.
sistent with our holding in this case, it is
hereby overruled.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's
judgment of dismissal is due to be reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX,
ALMON, INGRAM and COOK, JJ., concur.
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1. Fraud e=16
In order to establish fraudulent concealment, plaintiff must show: that defendant
had duty to disclose material fact; that defendant either failed to disclose or concealed
that material fact; that defendant's failure to
disclose, or concealment of, that material fact
induced plaintiff to act or to refrain from
acting; and that plaintiff suffered damage as
result of the action, or inaction, induced by
defendant's failure to disclose, or concealment of, the material fact.

Pagel

681 P.2d 1193, Russell v. Martell, (Utah 1984)
*1193 681 P.2d 1193
David RUSSELL and Eileen Russell, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
Sterling B. MARTELL, dba Martell Holding
Company, Grant C.
Mills, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
No 18160.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 30, 1984.
Defendant sought reversal of an order by the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, *G. Hal Taylor, J.,
denymg defendant's motion to set aside a default
judgment which had been entered against him. The
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) even
assuming that subparagraph of the Rule of Civil
Procedure providing for relief from judgment for "(7)
any other reason justifying rehef from the operation of
the judgment" was available to defendant, his
undenied statements that he felt no legal obligation to
respond to plaintiffs' claims supported the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment entered against him; those statements of
defendant evmced a complete indifference by him and
negated any diligence on his part in pursuing the
opportunity to defend, but (2) the default judgment
had to be reversed because of the trial court's failure
to follow the applicable Rule of Civil Procedure
providing that, when plaintiffs' claim is for other than
a sum certain or an amount that by computation can
be made certain, judgment by default may not be
entered by the clerk of court but must be entered by
the court, which may conduct such hearings and take
such evidence as is necessary to determine the
damages.
Affirmed m part; reversed and remanded m part.
1. APPEAL AND ERROR <®=^982(1)
30
—
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k982
Vacating Judgment or Order
30k982(l)
In general.
[See headnote text below]
1. JUDGMENT <§=>344
228 —
228K Op - Jig or Vacating
228k344 Discretion of court.
Copynght (c) West Group 2000

Utah 1984.
Broad discretion is accorded the trial court in ruling
on rehef from a judgment, and the Supreme Court
will reverse that ruling only if it is clear that the trial
court abused its discretion. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
60(b).
2. JUDGMENT @=>345
228 —
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k345
Judgments which may be opened or
vacated.
Utah 1984.
Subparagraph 7 of the civil procedure rule providing
for rehef from judgment for "any other reason
justifying rehef from the operation of the judgment"
may not be resorted to when the ground asserted for
rehef falls within subparagraph 1, allowing rehef on
the basis of "mistake, indvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect";
otherwise, the three-month
limitation imposed on rehef under subparagraph 1
would be averted. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b)(l, 7).
3. JUDGMENT ® ^ 138(2)
228 —
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl38
Right to Rehef m General
228kl38(2)
Neghgence m suffering default.
Utah 1984.
Even assuming that subparagraph of the Rule of
Civil Procedure providing for rehef from judgment
for "(7) any other reason justifying rehef from the
operation of the judgment" was available to defendant,
his undenied statements that he felt no legal obligation
to respond to plaintiffs' claims supported the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to set aside the
default judgment entered against him;
those
statements of defendant evmced a complete
indifference by him and negated any diligence on his
part in pursuing the opportunity to defend. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(7).
4. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT ®=*77
45
—
45D Retainer and Authority
45k77
Scope of authority in general.
Utah 1984.
Any neglect by defendant's attorney was attributable
to defendant through principles of agency.
5. JUDGMENT @=>131
228 —
228IV By Default
claim to onginal U.S. Govt, works

681 P.2d 1193, Russell v. Martell, (Utah 1984)
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity
228kl31
Entry of judgment in general.
Utah 1984.
Default judgment entered against defendant had to
be reversed because of the trial court's failure to
follow the applicable Rule of Civil Procedure
providing that, when plaintiffs' claim is for other than
a sum certain or an amount that by computation can
be made certain, judgment by default may not be
entered by the clerk of court but must be entered by
the court, which may conduct such hearings and take
such evidence as is necessary to determine the
damages Rules Civ.Proc , Rule 55(b)(2), U.C.A
1953, 61-l-22(l)(b)
6 JUDGMENT ®=> 131
228 —
228IV By Default
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity
228kl31
Entry of judgment m general.
Utah 1984.
Courts are not at liberty to deviate from the Rules of
Civil Procedure governing entry of judgment against a
defaulting party just because one party is in default
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the
case
*1194 Ralph J. Marsh, David B. Boyce, Salt Lake
City, for defendants and appellants.
Earl D. Tanner, David Eccles Hardy, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
Appellant Grant C. Mills seeks the reversal of the
trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a default
judgment which had been entered against him.
On July 7, 1981 Mills was served with a summons
and a copy of the plaintiffs' complaint. When he did
not file an answer in response, his default was entered
by the court. After an ex parte hearing on a motion
made by plaintiffs for judgment, judgment was
granted for $63,200, attorney's fees of $5,000 and
costs of the action. In December of 1981 Mills filed a
motion to set aside the default judgment supported by
affidavits.
Plaintiffs, David Russell and Eileen
Russell, also filed affidavits m opposition to the
motion.
In his affidavit, Mills claimed to have sent tus
summons and copy of the complaint to his attorney to
be handled by him. He was located m another city
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and was also representing other co-defendants m this
case. The attorney, because of confusion in his
office, failed to file an answer m Mills' behalf. After
a writ of execution was issued against his property in
November, Mills retained another attorney who filed
the motion to set aside the judgment. Mills claimed
that he had not taken action more quickly because he
had relied upon representations of the clerk of the
court who he telephoned that no judgment had been
entered against him.
On the other hand, Mr Russell swore that on July
15 Mills informed him that he intended to take no
action on the summons and complaint. In an affidavit
by Russell's attorney, he stated that on August 18 he
informed Mills m a telephone conversation that a
default judgment had been taken against him. Mills
replied that he felt no legal obligation to Russell and
did not feel motivated by the lawsuit to address
Russell's claims. Neither of these statements was
demed by Mills.
Upon review of the affidavits, the trial court demed
Mills' motion to set aside the judgment. An order to
stay the execution of Mills* property pending this
appeal was entered thereafter.
I.
Mills' first point is that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to set aside the default
judgment.
Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for relief from a judgment,
states in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or
excusable neglect;
... or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for [reason] (1)
... not more than three months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
Mills claims that the circumstances here do not fall
within subparagraph (1), with whose three month time
limitation he did not comply. Rather, he argues, the
judgment should have been set aside under
subparagraph (7) smce despite his diligence he failed
to timely answer the complaint.
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681 P.2d 1193, Russell v. Martell, (Utah 1984)
[1] Broad discretion is accorded the trial court m
ruling on relief from a judgment; and, this Court will
reverse that ruling only if it is clear the trial court
abused its discretion. Valley Leasing v. *1195
Houghton, Utah, 661 P.2d 959 (1983); Heath v.
Mower, Utah, 597 P.2d 855 (1979); Airkem
Intermoumain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513
P.2d 429 (1973).
[2] We have held that subparagraph 7 may not be
resorted to for relief when the ground asserted for
relief falls within subparagraph 1.
Pitts v.
McLachlan, Utah, 567 P.2d 171 (1977); Colder
Bros Co v Anderson, Utah, 652 P.2d 922 (1982);
Laub v South Central Telephone Ass'n, Utah, 657
P.2d 1304 (1982); Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v.
Swapp, Utah, 656 P.2d 429 (1982). Otherwise, the
three month limitation imposed on rehef under
subparagraph 1 is averted.
[3] [4] However, even assuming that subparagraph 7
is available to Mills, his undenied statements that he
felt no legal obligation to respond to the plaintiffs'
claims support the trial court's denial of his motion.
Those statements evince a complete indifference by
him and negate any diligence on his part in pursuing
the opportunity to defend. Further, any neglect by
Mills' attorney is attributable to Mills through
principles of agency. Gardiner & Gardiner Builders
v. Swapp, supra We find under these facts no abuse
of discretion by the trial court m denying rehef from
the judgment.

n.
[5] [6] Although we will not disturb the default of
Mills, we do hold under the authority of Pitts v. Pine
Meadow Ranch, Inc., Utah, 589 P.2d 767 (1978), and
J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, Utah, 604 P.2d 486
(1979), that the judgment agamst Mills must be
reversed because of the failure of the trial court to
follow Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 54(c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the
procedure to be followed by trial courts m entering
judgments against defaultmg parties. Courts are not
at liberty to deviate from those rules just because one
party is m default and is not entitled to be heard on
the merits of the case. For example, Rule 54(c)(2)
provides that a judgment by default may not be
different in kind from or exceed in amount that
specifically prayed for m the demand for judgment.
See Hayes v. Towles, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105
(1973). Another rule governing the entry of default
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judgments is Rule 55(b)(2), which is applicable m the
instant case. It provides that when the plaintiffs
claim is for other than a sum certain or an amount that
by computation can be made certain judgment by
default may not be entered by the clerk of the court,
but must be entered by the court, which may conduct
such hearings and take such evidence as is necessary
to determine the damages. In the instant case,
plaintiffs seek damages under U.C.A., 1953, §
61-l-22(l)(b), part of die Utah Uniform Securities
Act, which provides that an aggrieved party may
[RJecover the consideration paid for the security,
together with interest at 8% per year from the date
of payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees,
less the amount of any mcome received on the
security, upon the tender of the security or for
damages if he no longer owns the security.
According to the plaintiffs' complaint, Mills acted as
a securities agent without having been registered, and
he made untrue representations to the plaintiffs
concerning the security pledged to secure the note m
violation of our Securities Act. The promissory note
that he sold the plaintiffs was for $48,000 principal.
It was due m six months at which tune $7,200 m
interest would accrue, making a total of $55,200 due.
However, it is not alleged m the complaint that
$48,000 was paid for the note and under the statute
plaintiffs are limited to the recovery of the
consideration paid for the security. That being the
case, the plaintiffs' claims for damages against Mills
were not for sums certain and under Rule 55(b)(2) a
hearing should have been conducted by the trial court
to ascertain the amount of the damages to which the
plaintiffs were entitled.
Furthermore, under §
61-l-22(l)(b), evidence should have been adduced as
to the amount of mcome, if any, the plaintiffs had
received on the security (which Mills claims was
$16,800) so that it *1196. could be deducted m the
calculation of the plaintiffs' damages. Although it
appears that a hearing was held, it dealt only with the
reasonableness of the attorney's fees to be awarded
the plaintiffs.
The judgment below is reversed on this point, and
the case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion. No costs
on appeal are awarded.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART,
DURHAM, JL, concur.
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WICK v. WATERMAN

Wis. 873

C1UU421 N.W.2d 173 (WlaJfcpp. IMS)

tion of law. Mogilka v. Jeka, 181 Wis.2d
459, 471, 389 N.W.2d 859, 864 (CtApp,
1986). We owe no deference to the trial
court's views on a question of law. Rivera
v. Safford, 126 Wis.2d 462, 465, 877 N.W.
2d 187, 188 (CtApp.1985).
In Wheeler v. General Tire & Rubber
Co., 142 Wis.2d 798, 807, 419 N.W.2d 881,
334 (Ct.App.1987), we noted that sec. 803.10(lXa), Stats., is almost identical to and is
based on Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Federal precedents
may have value when we construe a Wisconsin procedural rule based on a federal
rule. Id. We therefore looked to federal
cases for guidance in construing sec. 803.10(l)(a). We again do so.
Relying on the history of the federal
rule, Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.
1969), held that a suggestion of death
which failed to identify a proper party to
substitute for a deceased defendant did not
trigger the running of the 90-day period.

Accord, Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D.
244, 24ft-47 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Yonofiky v.
Wernick, 862 F.Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D.
N.Y.1978). We agree with the Rende court
that a contrary construction 4<would open
the door to a tactical maneuver to place
upon the plaintiff the burden of locating
the representative of the estate within 90
days/' 415 F.2d at 986.1 Here that same
burden led to the absurd result of Wick
having himself appointed as the representative of the estate of the very person he had
sued, no other person having been appointed or having sought the appointment
Judgment reversed.

1. Three state courts have rejected the Rende
rationale: Farmers Insurance Gr. v. District
Court of Sec. J.D., 507 P.2d 865, 867-68 (Colo.
1973), cert, denied, 414 VS. 878, 94 S.Ct. 156, 38
L.Ed.2d 123 (1973) (party who receives notice of
death must inquire to determine identity of person to be substituted); Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.

2d 748, 750, 143 GaApp. 407, (1977) (Georgia
rule allows 180 days, twice as long as the federal rule, to substitute and may be extended);
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. KimbrelU 343 So.2d
107, 109 (Fla-Dist.CtApp.1977) (to follow Rende
would engraft exception to state rule but other
relief from failure to comply available).
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only allows federally authorized deductions
to be used in computing state taxable income if these deductions are reflected on
Line 30 of Federal Income Tax Form 1120New Mexico does not permit a revised
wage deduction to decrease the Line 30
amount A taxpayer, therefore, cannot
claim the federal credit on its federal return then add in the wage deduction it
forfeited on its federal return when calculating state taxable income.
[3,4] A taxpayer has the burden of
showing that it comes within the terms of £
statute permitting a tax deduction. Mobil
Oil Corp. v. State Tax Commission of
Missouri, 513 S.W.2d 319 (Mo.1974). Federal or state deductions are a matter of
legislative grace and a way of achieving
policy objectives. New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 54 S.Ct 788, 78

[5] A taxpayer's claim to a higher wage
deduction must be denied in the absence of
a showing of clear legislative intent to permit the deduction. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 77 IlLApp.3d 90, 32
IlLDec. 786, 395 N.E.2d 1167 (1979), affirmed, 84 I11.2d 102, 49 IlLDec. 329, 417
N.E.2d 1343 (1981). A taxpayer who
makes an election for federal purposes i£
bound by that election in calculating the
amount of its state taxes. Id.
The order denying the tax refund is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
HENDLEY and MINZNER, JJ.t concur.

104 N.M. 636

Fred T. JONES, et aL,
Plaintiffs-Appellant*,
•.

MONTGOMERY WARD & COMPANY,
INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 7450.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Oct 10, 1985.

The District Court, Dona Ana County,
Joe H. Galvan, D J., granted motion to dismiss personal injury action for failure to
prosecute and failure to substitute parties.
The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon grant of certiorari,
the Supreme Court, Sosa, S J., 103 N.M. 45,
702 P.2d 990^ reversed and remanded. Thft
Court of Appeals, Alarid, J., held that plaintiffs former attorney was not proper party
to receive effective notice of suggestion of
plaintiffs death so as to trigger 90-day
period for substitution of parties.
Order dismissing complaint set aside.

1. Attorney and Client «=>76(2)
General rule is that death of a party
terminates power of his attorney to act in
his favor.
2. Parties *»61
Former attorney of plaintiff, who died
before case had gone to trial, was not proper party to receive effective notice of plaintiffs death so as to commence running of
the 90-day substitution of parties period,
either under procedural rule governing process or procedural rule governing service
and filing of pleadings and other papers.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 4, 5, 25(aXl).
3. Courts *»85(3)
Procedural rule pertaining to service
and filing of pleadings and other papers is
applicable only after court has acquired in
personam jurisdiction over person to be
served. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 5.

JONES v. MONTGOMERY WARD & CO., INC
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4. Court* *=>mZ)
If court has not acquired personal jurisdiction over person to be served with suggestion of death of party, procedural rule
governing process is proper mechanism to
effectuate proper notice. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 4.

Alejandro Duran, Jr., Salvador Ramirez,
£1 Paso, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.
John R. Gerbracht, Martin, Cresswell &
Hubert, P.A., Las Cruces, for defendant-appellee.
OPINION
ALARID, Judge.
This case comes before this court on
remand from the supreme court, 103 N.M.
45, 702 P.2d 990 after that court reversed
our first opinion, which sustained the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiffs action under
NMSA 1978, Civ.P.R. 41(e) (RepLPamp.
1980). In its opinion, the supreme court
directed this court to consider the remaining issue which challenges the district
court's dismissal under NMSA 1978, Civ.
P.R. 25(a) (Repl.Pamp.1980). We hold that
dismissal was not proper under Rule 25(a)
and reverse the trial court
PACTS
This action arose out of a one-vehicle,
tractor-trailer accident which occurred on
July 11,1974. Plaintiff (Fred T.Jones), the
driver of the rig, filed suit pro se on July 8,
1977 to recover damages for personal injury and property damage. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant (Montgomery Ward and
Company, Inc.), through its employees,
negligently installed a new inner tube on
his vehicle without inspecting the tire's flap
for creases. It is alleged that there were
creases when the tire was installed. The
creases caused a pinhole leak and a subsequent blowout of the tire months later,
causing plaintiffs tractor-trailer to overturn, which resulted in his injuries.
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint
July 19, 1977 with the aid of counsel. He

filed a second amended complaint May 5,
1978.
Defendant moved on June 18, 1981 to
dismiss for failure to prosecute, but the
district court denied this Rule 41(e) motion
because plaintiff had been diligent in pursuing concurrent litigation in Texas against
alleged joint tortfeasors.
The case had not yet gone to trial on
June 25,1982 when plaintiff died. Defendant filed a suggestion of death on February
2, 1983, after learning of plaintiffs death.
Rule 25(a). Notice of the suggestion was
served upon decedent's former counsel,
Alejandro Duran, Jr.
On August 16, 1983, the district court
dismissed plaintiffs action for failure to
prosecute under Rule 41(e) and for failure
to substitute parties within ninety days of
the suggestion of death as required under
Rule 25(a). Deceased plaintiffs former
counsel filed the notice of appeal.
We consider only the propriety of dismissal under Rule 25(a).
DISCUSSION
WHETHER DEFENDANT PROPERLY
SUGGESTED PLAINTIFFS DEATH SO
AS TO COMMENCE THE RUNNING OF
THE NINETY DAY SUBSTITUTION OF
PARTIES PERIOD UNDER NMSA 1978,
CIV.P. RULE 25(a) (Repl.Pamp.1980).
Rule 25(aXl) provides as follows:
If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties.
The motion for substitution may be made
by any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing,
shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after the death is suggested
upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
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The rule's own terms require a death, nonextinguishment of decedent's claim by the
fact of death, and a motion by a party or
successor or representative of the deceased
for substitution. Such motion must be
filed within ninety days of the proper filing
of a suggestion of death.
[1,2] It is undisputed that plaintiff
died, and that his cause of action survives
his death, see Rodgers v. Ferguson, 89
N.M. 688, 556 P.2d 844 (CtApp.1976). No
substitution of parties was proposed, but
defendant, it is argued, forced substitution
within ninety days when it suggested plaintiffs death on February 2, 1983. Before
the ninety day period will commence, however, notice of suggestion of death must be
served on all parties (under Rule 5) and
interested nonparties (under Rule 4). Only
decedent's attorney here was notified of
the suggestion. The general rule is that
the death of a party terminates the power
of his attorney to act in his favor. Mubi v.
Broomfield, 108 Ariz. 39, 492 P.2d 700
(1972); Fountas v. Breed, 118 IU.App.3d
669, 74 IU.Dec. 170, 455 N.E.2d 200 (1983);
State v. Dickens, 214 Kan. 98, 519 P.2d 750
(1974); Hamilton v. Hughey, 284 Or. 739,
588 P.2d 38 (1978); Vincent v. Vincent, 16
Wash.App. 213, 554 P.2d 374 (1976). The
question is whether decedent's former attorney here can receive effective Rule
25(a)(1) notice, either under NMSA 1978,
Civ.P. Rule 4 or 5, as would properly trigger the ninety day period. We hold that he
cannot
[3,4] Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d
513 (5th Cir.1971), considered whether the
method prescribed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 or 5
must be followed to fulfill the Rule 25(aXD
notice requirement Rule 5 is clerical and
administrative in nature; it pertains only to
papers "subsequent to the original complaint" The rule is applicable only after
the court has acquired in personam jurisdiction over the person to be served. Ransouu If the party is represented by counsel, these papers are served only on such
counsel unless otherwise directed by the
court Rule 5(b). If the court has not
acquired personal jurisdiction over the per-

sons to be served with a Rule 25(a)(1) suggestion of death, then Rule 4 is the proper
mechanism to effectuate proper notice, because this latter rule is jurisdictionally
rooted. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 66 S.Ct 242, 90
LEd. 185 (1946); Ransom. Notice in the
present case was defective and did not
start the ninety day period running either
under Rule 4 or 5.
Assuming that Mrs. Jones was properly
made her deceased husband's representative and that the district court had jurisdiction over Mrs. Jones, Rule 5 requires that
she be served, through her attorney, with
papers of legal import A Rule 25(a)(1)
suggestion of death requires such service.
One problem under Rule 5 is that Mrs.
Jones was not directly served with the suggestion, and there is no evidence that attorney Duran (the actual recipient of the suggestion) was her counsel or that he was
authorized to receive service for her at the
time service was given.
If the assumptions on jurisdiction and
naming of Mrs. Jones as representative are
not correct, then the court cannot rely on
Rule 5 service because Mrs. Jones is not a
"party" and has not been brought within
the court's authority. No record evidence
suggests Mrs. Jones or anyone else had
been chosen as representative for decedent's estate when defendant filed its February 2, 1983 suggestion of death. If so,
there would have been no one legally empowered to receive valid service under Rule
5. "It is elementary that one is not bound
by a judgment in personam resulting from
litigation in which he is not designated as a
party or to which he has not been made a
party by service of process." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 89 S.Ct 1562, 1569, 23 LEd.2d
129 (1969). Decedent's attorney is not a
person who could be made a party, he is
not a representative of the deceased under
Rule 25(a)(1), and therefore, he could not
himself receive effective suggestion of
death notice. Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983
at 985.
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Furthermore, Ransom rejected the idea
that a court acquires automatic jurisdiction
over a decedent's legal representative by
virtue of its authority over the deceased.
The new party to be substituted must be
served with process and notice of suggestion under Rule 4. See Mercer v. Morgan,
86 N.M. 711, 526 ?J2d 1304 (CtApp.1974).
Because the estate of Fred T. Jones (if in
fact it now exists) never received Rule
25(aXl) notice under Rule 4, the district
court here was without authority over the
estate to determine its rights, and therefore, the ninety day substitution of parties
was not triggered.
The case of Yonofsky v. Wernick, 862
F.Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y.1973), suggests that
notice to plaintiffs former counsel is sufficient for purposes of Rule 25(aXl). The
court pointed out that "it would be difficult
for defendant to know whom else to serve
beside [sic] plaintiffs former counsel." Id.
at 1012. We do not dispute the potential
difficulty for a defendant, who may not
know whom to serve with the suggestion
other than the plaintiffs former counsel.
Yonofsky, however, ignores the important
jurisdictional problem noted in Ransom.
Rule 25(aXl) at this point leaves us in a
quandry. The rule was tailored to permit
parties or successors or representatives of
the deceased to avoid delay in effecting
substitution. Rende, 415 F.2d at 985. Yet,
the rule's notice requirements as explained
above appear to impede defendant in quickening the substitution process. Plaintiff
decedent's former counsel need only footdrag in seeking appointment of a representative to evade defendant's suggestion
of death triggering of the ninety day period. Fred T. Jones died June 25, 1982, so
under the Probate Code, plaintiff could conceivably delay appointment three or more
years.
NMSA 1978, § 4&-3-108(A).
Therefore, one of Rule 25(aXl)fs crucial
purposes appears to be frustrated.
However, there are counterbalancing incentives upon interested survivors of a decedent to get on with the process of settling the estate. See generally 1 Uniform
Probate Code Practice Manual 289-65 (R.

Wellman 2d ed. 1977). Foot-dragging in
legal proceedings may in the proper case
be visited with dismissal of plaintiffs action for failure to proceed. Rule 41(e).
Moreover, a motion to substitute is granted
in the discretion of the trial court, and if a
party has unreasonably delayed filing such
a motion, it may be denied and the case
dismissed SB J. Moore and J. Kennedy,
Moore's Federal Practice § 25.01[15] (2d
ed. 1985). In any case, parties in defendant's position may petition a court for appointment of a personal representative or
special administrator of the estate upon
whom they might properly serve a suggestion of death in full compliance with Rule
25(aXl) notice requirements. See, eg.,
NMSA 1978, § 45-S-414 to -618. Defendant here did not do so and should not now
be permitted to rely on its service of a
defective suggestion of death upon decedent's former attorney to save its dismissal.
The order of the district court dismissing
plaintiffs complaint is set aside and the
trial court is instructed to reinstate the
case on its docket for trial on the merits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
HENDLEY and MINZNER, JJ., concur.
UYMIMIftSVSTl*>
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STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

Kenneth DURANTE,
Defendant-Appellant
No. 8765.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.,
March 4, 1986.
Certiorari Denied March 26, 1986.
Defendant was convicted in the District 'Court, McKinley County, Louis E. De-
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Arizona Groundwater Management Act
specifies the factors to be considered
when drawing basin and sub-basin
boundaries; that such factors are exclusive in nature in that no other factors
should be considered under the auspices
of the Public Trust Doctrine; and that
the Department of Water Resources was
therefore correct in not considering any
factors under such doctrine.
The ranchers' constitutional and public
trust doctrine arguments are based upon
their claim that since A.R.S. § 45-544(1)
permits transportation of groundwater
within a basin where there are no sub-basins without payment of damages, Salt River Project has no incentive to conserve
water from its wells for use in its St Johns
generating plant and will pump the Little
Colorado River Plateau Basin dry, resulting in a decrease in the value of the state's
school trust lands leased for grazing.
The simple answer to that complex argument is found in other sections of the comprehensive Groundwater Management Act
of 1980. The ranchers can request and
present evidence to the Department in support of the creation of subsequent active
management areas, A.R.S. § 45-412,
and/or take steps to comply with the provisions of § 45-415 which permits local residents in Apache County to initiate an active
management area. Within an active
management area the Groundwater
Management Act provides for strict control
over most groundwater through a statutory scheme of rights for users. A.R.S.
§ 45-451. The ranchers cannot require nor
will the courts permit a designation of
boundaries for basins and sub-basins that
do not meet the statutory definitions of
those terms provided by the legislature in
A.R.S. § 45-402(12) and (28).
In addition, if and when the ranchers
acquire evidence which could establish the
existence of sub-basins within the Little
Colorado River Basin as defined by statute,
they can present that evidence to the Department pursuant to A.R.S. § 45-404(D)
and request further hearings on the issue.
A refusal to grant a hearing to consider
such evidence could then be reviewed by

the trial court pursuant to §§ 45-405 and
12-901.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part as
stated above.
HOWARD, PJ., and HATHAWAY,
J., concur.

156 Ariz. 476

Raymond N. VARELA, and Edna Varela,
individually and as husband and wife,
Nadine Varela, Debbie Varela, Janice
Varela, and Rachel Varela, Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
Jane ROMAN, Defendant/Appellee.
No. 2 CA-CV 87-0126.
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2, Department A.
Nov. 17, 1987.
Reconsideration Denied Dec. 15, 1987.
Review Denied May 3, 1988.
Tenants appealed from an order of the
Superior Court, Pima County, Cause No.
217666, Robert B. Buchanan, J., denying a
motion for substitution of parties. The
Court of Appeals, Hathaway, J., held that
filing by landlord's counsel of motion to
withdraw mentioning fact of landlord's
death was not sufficient to trigger rule
requiring motion for substitution to be
made within 90 days of suggestion of
death.
Reversed with directions.
1. Parties *=>61
Rule providing for substitution of party upon party's death contemplates that
suggestion of death be filed by a party or
representative of deceased party in accordance with rule governing service and filing

VARELA v. ROMAN
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of pleadings and other papers. 16 A.R.S.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 5, 25(a).

2. Parties <s=>60
Statement by landlord's counsel in motion to withdraw as counsel mentioning
death of landlord was insufficient to trigger rule requiring motion for substitution
of parties to be made within 90 days of
suggestion of death of party; rule plainly
required that suggestion of death be filed
by a party or representative of deceased
party, and landlord's counsel was neither at
time he filed his motion to withdraw. 16
A.R.S. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 5, 25(a).
Lionel F. Larriva, Tucson, for plaintiffs/appellants.
Bury, Moeller, Humphrey & O'Meara by
David Bury, Tucson, for defendant/appellee.
OPINION
HATHAWAY, Judge.
This appeal is taken from the trial
court's denial of a motion for substitution
of parties.
Appellants were tenants in a residence
owned by appellee. After a house fire in
which appellants' property was destroyed,
they filed suit against appellee alleging
faulty wiring as the cause of the fire. Suit
was filed July 3, 1984. Appellee died July
3, 1985. Co-personal representatives were
appointed January 16, 1986. Appellants
filed a motion for substitution of parties on
January 6,1987. The trial court denied the
motion and granted summary judgment for
appellee.
Appellants argue that the requirements
of Rule 25(a), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A..R.S., were
not complied with by appellee and therefore their motion was timely. The rule
states:
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court may or*
der substitution of the proper parties,
The motion for substitution may be made
by any party or by the successors or
representatives of the deceased party
and, together with the notice of hearing,
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shall be served on the parties as provided
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the
service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later
than 90 days after the death is suggested
upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided
herein for the service of the motion, the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
Appellants maintain that no suggestion of
death was made upon the record and therefore the 90-day period specified in the rule
had not begun to run. We agree and reverse.
[1,2] The rule clearly states that the
suggestion of death must be made "upon
the record by service of a statement of the
fact of the death as provided herein for the
service of the motion." The motion referred to is the motion for substitution
which must be served pursuant to Rule 5,
which governs the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers. Rule 5, Ariz.
R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S. Appellants correctly
claim that no suggestion of appellee's
death was ever made upon the record and
served as required by Rule 5.
Appellee's attorney argues that the
record indicates that appellants' attorney
was aware of the fact of appellee's death.
In correspondence between attorneys,
which is part of the record, appellee's death
is mentioned. Based upon this, it is argued
that appellants had actual notice of the
death no later than October 3, 1986, there
fore the motion, filed January 6, 1987, was
untimely. The problem with appellee's argument is that the requirements of Rule
25(a) are specific, and we believe they have
not been fulfilled.
This case is one of first impression in
Arizona. Because Arizona has substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, great weight is given to federal interpretations of the rules. Edwards v.
Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 486 P.2d 181 (1971).
In Gronowicz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D.
624 (S.D.N.Y.1986), the court addressed a
situation similar to that before us. There,
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as here, there was an exchange of correspondence between attorneys in which the
fact of the death of one of the parties was
mentioned. The court there stated: "...
nor is there any indication that the letters
were served and filed pursuant to Rule 5.
Thus, no valid suggestion of death has
been made and the 90 day period did not
commence based on the letters." Id. at
627. A similar result should obtain here.
Even though appellee's counsel mentioned the fact of appellee's death in a
motion filed with the court wherein he
moved to withdraw as counsel, we do not
believe that was sufficient to trigger the
90-<iay period of Rule 25(a)(1).
We believe the rule plainly contemplates
that the suggestion of death be filed by a
party or the representative of the deceased
party. Appellee's counsel was neither at
the time he filed his motion to withdraw.
He clearly was not a party to the action
and the record reveals that others were
appointed as personal representatives of
the deceased's estate. Furthermore, his
motion failed to identify the personal representatives. We agree with the holding in
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.1969),
where the court, dealing with the identical
federal rule, Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1), held that
a suggestion of death which was neither
filed by nor identified by a successor or
representative of the deceased, thereby giving no indication of who was available or
who was to be named in substitution,
opened the door to "... a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden
of locating the representative of the estate
within 90 days." 415 F.2d at 986. The
court in Rende v. Kay observed that the
90-day period was not intended as a bar to
meritorious actions. The court also noted
that:
No injustice results from the requirement that a suggestion of death identify
the representative or successor of an estate who may be substituted as a party
for the deceased before Rule 25(a)(1) may
be invoked by those who represent or
inherit from the deceased. If the heirs
or counsel fear that delay may prejudice
the litigation they may move promptly
for appointment of a representative, per-

haps a temporary representative, either
under the law of the domicile or by special order in the court wherein the litigation is pending.
Id.
In the instant case no suggestion of
death was placed on the record by a successor or representative of the deceased, nor
did it identify such individual, and it was
therefore ineffective to trigger the 90-day
period. See also Barto v. Weishaar, 101
Nev. 27, 692 P.2d 498 (1985).
There having been no proper suggestion
of death as required by Arizona's Rule
25(a), the order denying appellants' motion
for substitution of parties is reversed. The
motion having been timely made, the trial
court is directed to permit the substitution.
Reversed with directions.
LACAGNINA, CJ., and HOWARD,
PJ., concur.
( O | « Y NUMBER SYSTEM>

156 Ariz. 478

Claude R. GIPSON and Isabel Gipson,
husband and wife, d/b/a Gipson's Towing Service; and Joe and Angela Estrada, husband and wife, d/b/a Joe Estrada's Body Shop, Petitioners,
v.
The Honorable Robert R. BEAN, Judge
of the Superior Court, Pinal County,
Respondents,
and
Frank R. Reyes, Sheriff of Pinal County;
John Pogue, Deputy Sheriff, Pinal
County Sheriffs Office; and Pinal
County, a political subdivision, Real
Parties in Interest
No. 2 CA-SA 87-4)105.
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2, Department B.
Nov. 19, 1987.
Review Denied May 3, 1988.
Contractors seeking payment of claims
from county brought special action to re-
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143 Wis.2d 676
Wilbert WICK, Personal Representative
of the Estate of Henry Wick,
deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Dale WATERMAN, individually, and
Eleanor Waterman, husband and wife,
and in relation to their marital property, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 87-1232.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
Submitted on Briefs Dec. 9,1987.
Opinion Released Feb. 25, 1988.
Opinion Filed Feb. 25, 1988.
Personal representative of estate
brought action against former personal
representative alleging wrongful acquisition of estate assets. The Circuit Court,
La Crosse County, Michael J. Mulroy, J.,
dismissed complaint for failure to timely
serve notice of substitution for defendant
within 90 days of suggestion of his death
on record. On appeal the Court of Appeals, Gartzke, PJ., held that suggestion
cf death of party, v/hich failed to identify
proper substitute pcrty, was insufficient to
trigger Tanning- of 90-day period in which
upponem was required to move to substitute.
Reversed.
Parties <&=>60
Suggestion of death of party, which
failed to identify proper substitute party,
was insufficient to trigger running of 90day period in which opponent was required
to move to substitute. W.S.A. 803.10(lXa).
James H. Mathis and Schechter and
Mathis, La Crosse, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bryant Klos and Steele, Klos & FlynnChartered, and Al-s: Cameron and Cameron, Nix. Collins & <uillan, Ltd., La Cror.se.
for defendants-respondents.
Before GARTZKE, PJ., and
DYKMAN and SUNDBY, JJ.

GARTZKE, Presiding Judge.
Wilbert Wick is the personal representative of the estate of Henry Wick. He appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint against Dale Waterman. Waterman
died during the litigation. The trial court
dismissed the complaint because Wilbert
Wick failed to serve notice of substitution
for Waterman within 90 days of the suggestion of his death on the record. Sec.
803.10(lKa), Stats.
The dispositive issue is whether under
sec. 803.10(lXa), Stats., a suggestion of
death of a party which fails to identify a
proper substitute party triggers the running of the 90-day period to move to substitute. We hold that the suggestion of
death is insufficient and therefore does not
trigger the 90-day period. For that reason, we conclude that the trial court should
not h^ve dLmissed the corr.pLini, and v-e
reverse.
The complaint alleges that Wilbert Wick
succeeded to Dale Waterman as personal
representative of the Estate of Henry Wick
and that Waterman wrongfully acquired
estate assets. After the act?cn "\.s ccrimerrced. Waterman died. Waieriiun's attorney of record, in his own name, mailed a
formal "Suggestion of Death of One of ihe
Parties Defendant" to the trial court and to
Wilbert Wick. The "suggestion" states the
place and date of Waterman's death and
his residence but does not identify a person
who could be substituted for Waterman.
Ninety days later, even though he had
not yet been appointed, Wilbert Wick
moved to substitute himself as special administrator of Watennan's estate. It is
undisputed that no other person had been
appointed or had petitioned to appoint a
persona] representative of Waterman's estate. Wick petitioned to appoint himself
and was later appointed special administrator. Trie trial court dismissed \> ick s complaint because he had not been appointed
until after the 90-day period provided in
sec. 803.10(lXa), Stats., had run.
The construction and application of a
statute to the established facts is a ques-
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tion of law. Mogilka v. Jeka, 131 Wis.2d Accord, Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D.
459, 471, 389 N.W.2d 359, 364 (CtApp. 244, 246-47 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Yonofaky v.
1986). We owe no deference to the trial Wernicke 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D.
courts views on a question of :aw. Rivcrz X.Y.1973). Vt e agree with the Reside court
v. Sufford, 126 Wis.2d 462, 465, 377 N.V\ that a contrary construction "would open
2d 1?7. 188 (CtApp 1955).
the door to a tactical maneuver to place
In Wneeler v. General Tire & Rubes- upon the plaintiff the burden of locating
Co., 142 Wis.2d 79S, 807, 419 X.W.2d 331, the representative of the estate within 90
334 (CtApp. 1987), we noted that sec. 803.- days." 41-5 F.2d at 9S6.1 Here that same
10{1)< a). Slats., is almos: identical to and is burden lee io the absurd result of Wick
based on Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules having himself appointed as the representaof Civil Procedure. Federal precedents tive of the estate of the very person he had
may have value when we construe a Wis- sued, no other person having been appointconsin procedural rule based on a federal ed or having sought the appointment
rule. Id. We therefore looked to federal
Judgment reversed.
cases for guidance in construing sec. 803.10(l)(a). We again do so.
Relying on the history of the federal
rule, Re?ide v. Kay. 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.
1969), held that a suggestion of death
which failed to identify a proper party to
substitute for u deceived d?feno?nt d.n not
trigger ihe running of the 90-d<*y period.
i. Three *:atc cv^r.s r i » : rejected :he Fcr.dt
rationale. Farmers hiswance G~. i. Ihsinc:
Court of Sec. J.D, 507 P.2d 865, 867-68 (Colo.
1973), cert, denied, 414 US. 878, 94 S.Ct. 156, 38
L.Ed.2d 123 (1973) (party who receives notice of
death must inquire to determine identity of person to be substituted); Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.

2u 74? 7'C. 1-3 Ga.Arp. 4^7. tlTT) (CK . Y»;njie aiious 180 cays, twice as long zz the federal rule, to substitute and ma\ be extended);
Sew Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Kimb^ell 343 So.2d
107, 109 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977) (to follow Rende
would engraft exception to state rule but other
relief from failure to comply available).
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31 Ed. Law Rep. 1014
TERRACOR, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
The UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS &
FORESTRY, George Buzianis,
Chairman of the Utah Board of State Lands &
Forestry, the
Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry, Ralph
Miles,
Director of the Division of State Lands & Forestry,
Utah
Department of Natural Resources, Temple A.
Reynolds,
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Natural
Resources, Bloomington Knolls Association, a Utah
nonprofit
association, Joseph E. Jones, Roy Hardy, principals
of
Bloomington Knolls Association, Defendants.
No. 20270.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 7, 1986.
Firm which had sought to exchange property it held
for school lands held by Board of State Lands and
Forestry sought mandamus following Board's decision
to lease the property to another firm, alleging that the
lease procedures were contrary to state law. The
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that the firm lacked
standing.
Petition demed.
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion in which
Durham, J., concurred.
1. PARTIES <@=>76(3)
287 —
287VI Defects, Objections, and Amendment
287k76 Want of Capacity or Interest
287k76(3) Answer.
Utah 1986.
Supreme Court could raise issue of a party's
standing to bring a petition to challenge legahty of
lease of property by state land board sua sponte,
regardless of parties' failure to raise or address the
question.
2. MANDAMUS <®=>22
250 —

2501 Nature and Grounds in General
250k21 Persons Entitled to Relief
250k22
In general.
Utah 1986.
Petitioner for extraordinary relief must
standing, just as any other litigant must.

Pagel

have

3. ACTION <S=*13
13
—
131
Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13kl3
Persons entitled to sue.
Utah 1986.
Supreme Court will not lightly dispense with
requirement that litigant have a personal stake in
outcome of a specific dispute. Const. Art. 5, § 1
4 ACTION <®=>13
13
—
131
Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13k 13
Persons entitled to sue.
Utah 1986.
General standards for determining whether a litigant
has standing are: that plaintiff be able to show that he
has suffered some distinct and palpable injury, that, if
plaintiff does not have standing under this criterion,
he may have standing if no one else has greater
interest in outcome and issues are unlikely to be
raised at all unless that particular plaintiff bad
standing to raise issue and, even if standing is not
found under the first two criteria, plaintiff may
nonetheless have standing if issues are unique and of
such great public importance that they ought to be
decided in furtherance of pubhc interest. Const. Art.
5,§1.
5. MANDAMUS ®^23(1)
250 —
2501 Nature and Grounds m General
250k21 Persons Entitled to Relief
250k23
Interest in Subject-Matter
250k23(l)
In general.
Utah 1986.
Firm which had sought to exchange property with
Board of State Lands and Forestry for purpose of
developmg it lacked standing to seek mandamus to
challenge Board's subsequent decision to lease the
property due to existence of potential plaintiffs with a
more direct interest where firm specifically conceded
that challenge was not based on failure to accept the
proposal, but on procedures used. Const. Art. 5;
U.C.A.1953, 65-1-68;
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
65B(b)(3); Rules App.Proc., Rule 19.
*797
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Rosemary J. Beless, Michelle Mitchell, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Anne M. Stirba,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Clark Arnold, Salt Lake City, for
defendants.
STEWART, Justice:
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Board to lease the same 10.9 acres, with the intention
of subdividing the parcel for development as
homesites. The Board notified Terracor of the
competing proposal and explained that to make the
land exchange acceptable Terracor would have to
offer more land m exchange, or land of a greater
value, smce the land Terracor had offered would not
be developable for several years. The Board also
notified Terracor that approval of the lease to
Bloomington Knolls would, m effect, constitute a
rejection of Terracor's proposal.
Terracor did
nothing more toward negotiating an exchange. In
May, 1984, the Board leased the 10.9 acres of school
trust land to Bloomington Knolls.

Pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, (FN1) the plaintiff, Terracor,
petitions this Court for extraordinary relief in the
nature of a wnt of mandamus, directmg the Board of
State Lands and Forestry and the Division of State
Lands and Forestry to rescind a special use lease
(MSULA 593 ") issued by the Board to Bloomington
Knolls Association. Terracor alleges that (1) the
Board violated U.C.A., 1953, § 65-1-68, (FN2) which
permits the Board to sell subdivided school trust lands
by public auction but does not allow the Board to
dispose of such lands by negotiated leases; and (2)
the Board breached its fiduciary responsibility to
obtain the highest possible return from school trust
lands by issuing SULA 593 without competitive
bidding. Terracor claims that extraordinary relief is
necessary because it has no plain and adequate
remedy at law smce section 65-1-9, (FN3) which
provides for appeals from some kinds of Board
decisions, does not expressly state that appeals should
be to the district court and that under decisions of this
Court it is not clear whether this Court or the district
court is the proper forum for an appeal in the first
instance. Terracor also claims extraordinary relief is
appropriate because the language of section 65-1-68 is
clear and mandatory, and under Archer v. Utah State
Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321 392 P.2d 622, 623
(1964), and Hamblin v. State Board of Land
Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 187 P. 178 (1919), as
well as Rule 65B, mandamus is an appropriate remedy
where a public agency or official has violated a clear
duty mandated by statute. The defendants counter that
extraordinary relief *798
is improper because
Terracor only seeks clarification of an unclear statute
and that Terracor had a plain and adequate legal
remedy by means of an appeal under section 65-1-9.
Smce we deny Terracor's petition for an
extraordinary wnt because it lacks standing, we do
not decide these issues.

Terracor then filed this petition for extraordinary
relief directly m this Court. Terracor does not assert
in this action that the Board erred in refusing
Terracor's proposed exchange.
Indeed, m its
"Petition for Relief Under Rule 65B(b)(3)" filed m
this Court, Terracor admits that it does not now
challenge the granting of the lease to Bloomington
Knolls rather than to it. Thus, the action in this Court
is not based on Terracor's losmg out to Bloomington
Knolls for the parcel m question. Rather, Terracor
asserts only that the Board violated state law by
leasmg rather than selling the parcel m question and
violated its fiduciary duty to maximize the return on
all school trust lands by negotiating a lease of a
portion of those lands rather than requiring
competitive bidding. It is noteworthy that Terracor's
aborted efforts to acquire the land were based on the
same type of negotiated procedure that it now alleges
is illegal.

In late 1983 or early 1984, Terracor approached the
State Land Board and sought to acquire the 10.9-acre
parcel of land at issue by exchanging an equivalent
amount of property that Terracor owned. Some time
after that, Bloomington Knolls applied to the Land

[1] [2] The parties have not raised or addressed the
question of Terracor's standing to bring this petition
to challenge me legality of the Land Board's lease.
However, this Court may address that issue sua
sponte. Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County

Terracor protested the Land Board's leasing
procedure on the ground that it was contrary to state
law and that it would result m unfair competition. On
September 18, 1984, the Board ruled that Terracor
had waived its right to protest by domg nothing to
indicate a continuing interest m the land after bemg
informed of Bloomington Knolls' proposal. The
Board also ruled that its procedures were m
compliance with state law and that it had not violated
its fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the
administration of state school trust lands by leasmg
the disputed parcel pursuant to a negotiated lease
rather than by auction.
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Board of Health, Utah, 709 P.2d 1159 (1985); Heath
Tecna Corp. v. Sound Systems International, Inc.,
Utah, 588 P.2d 169, 170 (1978). A petitioner for
extraordinary relief must have standing, just as any
other litigant must have. See, e.g., Startup v.
Harmon, 59 Utah 329, 336, 203 P. 637, 640-41
(1921); Crockett v. Board of Education, 58 Utah 303,
309, 199 P. 158, 160 (1921).
[3] The doctrine of standing is intended to assure the
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by
requiring that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient
interest in the subject matter of the dispute and
sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual issues
which must be resolved will be thoroughly explored.
Unlike federal law where standing doctrine is related
to the "case or controversy" language of Article IH of
the United States Constitution, our standing law arises
from the general precepts of the doctrine of separation
of powers found in Article V of the Utah Constitution.
Under Utah law, the doctrine of standing operates as
gatekeeper to *799 the courthouse, allowing in only
those cases that are fit for judicial resolution.
Important jurisprudential considerations dictate that
courts confine themselves to resolution of those
disputes most effectively resolved through the judicial
process, i.e., crystalized disputes concerning specific
factual situations. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88
S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); Jenkins v. Swan,
Utah, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (1983). Thus, the
doctrine of standing limits judicial power so that there
will not "be a significant inroad on the representative
form of government, cashing] the courts in the role of
supervising the coordinate branches of government ...
[and converting] the judiciary into an open forum for
the resolution of political and ideological disputes
about the performance of government." Baird v.
State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (1978). See also
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-92,
94 S.Ct. 2940, 2952-54, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring). For this reason, this Court
will not lightly dispense with the requirement that a
litigant have a personal stake in the outcome of a
specific dispute. Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at
1150; see also Stromquist v. Cokayne, Utah, 646
P.2d 746, 747 (1982); Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah,
607 P.2d 289, 290 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Utah,
585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978); Sears v. Ogden City,
Utah, 572 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1977). Nevertheless, it
is difficult to make useful, all-inclusive generalizations
that determine whether standing exists in any given
case, since the issue often depends on the tacts of
each case. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, Utah, 702 P.2d 451, 453 (1985); Association
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of Data Processing Sendee Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25
L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).
[4] This Court has referred to three general
standards for determining whether a litigant has
standing. (FN4) Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at
1150; see also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, supra, 702 P.2d at 454. The premise upon
which these standards have been constructed is that
issues should generally be litigated by those parties
with the most direct interest in resolution of those
issues, although in some cases a party who does not
have the most immediate or direct interest may have
standing.
The first general criterion is that the "[p]laintiff must
be able to show that he has suffered some distinct and
palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the
outcome of the legal dispute." Jenkins v. Swan,
supra, 675 P.2d at 1148. See also Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Salt Lake County, supra, 702 P.2d at 454;
Stromquist v. Cokayne, supra, 646 P.2d at 747; Sears
v. Ogden City, supra, 572 P.2d at 1362; Main
Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d
866 (1975); Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17
Utah 2d 337, 342 n.7, 411 P.2d 831, 834 n.7 (1966);
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 504, 94 P.2d 414, 420
(1939) (must be personally affected by operation of
statute to attack its validity).
Second, if a plaintiff does not have standing under
the first criterion, he may have standing if no one else
has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and
the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, supra,
702 P.2d at 454; Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P.2d at
1150. See also Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah 329,
336, 203 P. 637, 640-41 (1921); Crockett v. Board of
Education, 58 Utah 303, 309, 199 P. 158, 160 (1921).
Third, even though standing is not found to exist
under the first two criteria, a plaintiff may nonetheless
have standing if the issues are unique and of such
great public importance that they ought to be decided
in furtherance of the public interest. Jenkins v. Swan,
supra, 675 P.2d at 1150; Jenkins *800 v. Finlinson,
supra, 607 P.2d at 290; Jenkins v. State, supra, 585
P.2dat443.
[5] Terracor meets none of these requirements. It
has not alleged any "particularized injury to [itself! by
virtue of the claimed wrong/ Jenkins v. Swan,
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supra, 675 P.2d at 1151 (emphasis m original).
Terracor's proposed exchange of land for the tract
which was subsequently leased to Bloomington Knolls
by SULA 593 does not provide a valid basis for
standing smce Terracor has specifically conceded in
its pleadings that its challenge is not based on the
Board's failure to accept that proposal. Indeed,
Terracor does not assert that its proposal was of
greater value or advantage to the State than
Bloomington Knolls' proposal. In fact, Terracor's
own proposal for a negotiated exchange was wholly
inconsistent with the position it now asserts that such
lands can only be disposed of by public auction.
Terracor fares no better under the second part of
the Jenkins analysis. There are others who could
raise the same challenges raised by Terracor, and
who would have a greater, more direct interest in
domg so. For example, one who attempts to purchase
the same school lands as another and loses out to the
other would have standing if the basis of the action
was the failure of the Board to lease to that particular
person rather than the competition to one's business
or a result of a lease to another party. Furthermore,
beneficiaries of the school trust land would no doubt
have standing to assert a violation of the Board's
fiduciary responsibility to maximize the return from
school trust lands. Thus, the State Treasurer, who
receives 20% of all momes collected by the Division
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 65-1-13, and possibly the
Attorney General, would have standing to assert a
violation by the Board of its legal and fiduciary
responsibilities.
Smce there are "other potential plaintiffs with a
more direct interest" m the issues m this case, we
decline to reach the third test, whether the public
importance of the issues raised is so great that they
ought to be litigated m any event. Jenkins v. Swan,
supra, 675P.2dat 1151.
Smce Terracor does not have standing, we do not
address the question whether Terracor has an
adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal under
section 65-1-9.
Petition demed. No costs.
HALL, C.J., and SCOTT DANIELS, District
Judge, concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate herein.
SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge, sat.
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HOWE, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent from what I perceive to be a very narrow
application of the rules of "standing" to the plaintiff.
The Land Board had before it two competing
proposals. Terracor's proposal was to exchange
land. Bloomington Knolls' proposal was to lease the
state land and subdivide it for home sites. The Board
rejected Terracor's proposal and accepted the
proposal of Bloomington Knolls'. Terracor protested
to the Board, and now protests to this Court, that the
Board has no statutory authority to lease state lands
and that in so domg unfair competition resulted
The majority concedes that "one who attempts to
purchase the same school lands as another and loses
out to the other person, would have standing." Yet
the majority holds that Terracor has no standing even
though it was attempting to acquire the same lands as
its competitor Bloomington Knolls but proposed to do
so by exchange rather than by leasing. Why that
difference should destroy Terracor's standing
completely eludes me. The majority seems to find
comfort m the fact that Terracor declined the Board's
invitation to make its proposal more attractive.
Terracor, thereafter, the majority argues, had no
interest and lacked standing to question what the
Board did with the land. 1 cannot subscribe to this
reasoning. In the first place, Terracor's rejection
came simultaneous with Bloomington Knolls'
acceptance. The rejection and the acceptance *801.
were not separated by a period of time. Secondly, the
interest of a competitor does not necessarily dissipate
when its proposal is rejected. It remains interested m
what the Board does thereafter with the land,
especially when, as alleged here, the Board disposes
of it m an alleged unlawful transaction which should
be set aside and the land restored to the Board.
The majority endeavors to find support for its
holding that Terracor lacks standing because "
Terracor does not assert m this action that the Board
erred m refusing Terracor's proposed exchange."
That argument leads nowhere. Of course, the Board
has discretion m choosmg proposals before it.
Neither Terracor nor any other competitor could
validly argue that the Board was obliged to accept its
proposal. However, what Terracor is contending for
is that the Board accepted a proposal which it could
not lawfully do.
When unlawful proposals are
removed from consideration by the Board, the Board
is left to reconsider the remaining proposals.
Furthermore, as long as the land remains m the hands
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of the Board, a competitor is afforded the continuing
opportunity to "sweeten" his proposal.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of
HOWE, J.
FN1. Terracor's petition was filed with this Court
October 29, 1984. A petition for extraordinary writ
to a judge or agency filed with this Court after
January 1, 1985, would be governed by Rule 19 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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FN3. Section 65-1-9 states:
(1) Where contests arise as to the preference rights
of claimants for lands under the control of the board,
it shall have full power to hold a hearing thereon and
to direct the taking of evidence concerning the
questions involved, which hearing shall be reported
in full. The board shall make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, enter its order with respect
thereto, and notify the parties to such hearing of its
findings, conclusions and order.

FN2. Section 65-1-68 states:
Any portion of the public lands of this state not
occupied by bona fide settlers having preference
right of purchase, may be subdivided into lots, and
sold as provided in this chapter, the board first being
satisfied that by a subdivision of any tract into lots a
sale of the same can be made for a greater amount
than if sold in legal subdivisions. The board may
survey such tracts and direct their subdivision. A
plat of the survey shall be filed in the office of the
county recorder of the county wherein the land is
situated, and a copy in the office of the board.
Tracts so subdivided shall not be subject to lease,
but each lot shall be sold at public auction at such
times as the board may direct. The manner of
appraisement and sale of such subdivided lands shall
be in all respects the same as in the case of other
lands sold.

(2) No claimant for lands under control of the board
can appeal for judicial review of a decision of the
board involving any sale, lease, or disposition of
state lands, or any action relating thereto, unless
such claimant files a written protest with respect
thereto with the board within ninety days after the
final decision of the board relating to such matter;
or, with respect to decisions rendered prior to the
effective date of this act, within ninety days after
such effective date. This provision shall not relate
to disputes between the board and any party as to the
ownership or title to any lands.
FN4. In addition, taxpayers may have standing to
challenge an illegal expenditure. E.g., Lyon v.
Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 (1951);
Tooele Building Association v. Tooele High School
District, 43 Utah 362, 134 P. 894 (1913).
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*130 733 P.2d 130
MINI SPAS, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, Defendant.
No. 860212.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 3, 1987.
Employer appealed a decision of the Board of
Review that its former employee was eligible for
unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court held
that: (1) the Department of Employment Security did
not abuse its discretion m refusing to consider
employer's untimely protest to benefits awarded, and
(2) administrative law judge's refusal to consider
untimely protest did not contravene claimed public
policy to relieve party of default for "mistake" or
"excusable neglect."
Affirmed.
Howe, J., concurred in the result.
1. SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
<®=*620.10
356A —
356AVIH Unemployment Compensation
356AVm(G) Proceedings
356AVm(G)6 Administrative Review
356Ak620.5 Review by Board or Commission
356Ak620.10
Proceedings for review; time for
proceedings.
Utah 1987.
Department of Employment Security did not abuse
its discretion m refusing to consider employer's
untimely protest to unemployment compensation
benefits awarded where, after employer withdrew
prior appeal by agreement, it had another opportunity
to timely request relief and knew, or should have
known, that a notice of potential liability would be
forthcoming, yet employer failed to act for over three
weeks after due date, and employer's only excuse for
untimely response was that notice was "inadvertently
stuck together m the employer's drawer."
U.C.A.1953, 35-4-7(c)(3)(E).
2. SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
@=*620.10
356A —
356AVHI Unemployment Compensation
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356AVm(G) Proceedings
356AVIEI(G)6 Administrative Review
356Ak620.5 Review by Board or Commission
356Ak620.10
Proceedings for review; time for
proceedings.
Utah 1987.
Administrative law judge's refusal to consider
employer's untimely protest
to award of
unemployment compensation benefits did not
contravene claimed public policy to relieve party of
default for "mistake" or "excusable neglect" where
employer had knowledge that notice of potential
liability was forthcoming and a response was
necessary, yet it failed to act timely.
Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b), (b)(1),
U.C.A.1953,
35-4-7(c)(3)(E).
*131 W. Andrew McCullough, Orem, for plaintiff.
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-employer Mini Spas, Inc., appeals a
decision of the Board of Review that its former
employee is eligible for unemployment benefits. That
determination of eligibility affirmed the ruling of the
administrative law judge that the employer had failed
to timely protest a determination of benefits by the
Department of Employment Security. (FN1)
The two issues on appeal, as framed by the
employer, are: (1) whether the Department abused its
discretion m refusing to consider the employer's
protest to the benefits awarded because the protest
was not filed within ten days; and (2) whether the
administrative law judge's refusal to consider the
untimely protest contravenes a claimed public policy
to relieve a party of default for "mistake" or
"excusable neglect." Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). We
reject both contentions and affirm the Board of
Review.
The facts material to the employer's untimely protest
are not disputed. In any event, we are bound by the
factual findings of the administrative tribunal. (FN2)
In December 1985, the employer withdrew its
appeal from an audit determination by the Department
of Employment Security that the employee-claimant
performed services "in employment."
The appeal
was withdrawn under its agreement with the
Department that the employer would have another
opportunity to protest the benefit determination and to
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request relief from the charge for those benefits.
As a result of the agreement, the Department again
sent to the employer Form 607, "Employer Notice of
Claim Filed and Potential Benefit Costs."
At the
request of the employer, the notice was mailed
directly to its attorney at his office address on
December 18, 1985. The notice advised the employer
of its potential liability and cautioned that relief from
the benefits charged against it could not be granted
unless the employer's protest was submitted in writing
by December 28, 1985. This ten-day limit for the
filing of a protest of benefit charges is required by
section 35-4-7(c)(3)(E). (FN3)
The employer did not file any written protest until
after January 20, 1986. It claims that its delay may
have been due to the fact that the notice had to be
forwarded from the attorney to the employer.
However, any such delay was the direct result of its
insistence that the notice be sent directly to the
attorney. The attorney acknowledged receipt and,
purportedly, forwarded it to his client. Whether prior
communications from the Department were received
*132, by the employer is irrelevant when timely
receipt on this occasion is acknowledged by the
employer's designated agent.
[1] After the employer withdrew its prior appeal by
agreement, it had another opportunity to timely
request relief of the charges and knew, or should have
known, that the notice would be forthcoming. Yet the
employer failed to act for over three weeks after the
due date. This delay in filing a written protest was
not due to circumstances beyond the employer's
control, and the finding below of lack of "good cause"
to excuse the default is affirmed. In view of the
employer's admissions that the only excuse for
untimely response was that the notice was
"inadvertently stuck together in the employer's
drawer," we find no abuse of discretion. (FN4)
Mini Spas, Inc., further contends that under Rule
60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
defendant must excuse its neglect to timely file its
protest of the charges. It claims that the standard of
"good cause," as applied by
defendant's
administrative rules to excuse default, is contrary to
an implied public policy in Rule 60(b). It appears to
us that the more pertinent public policy to be applied
in this case is found in section 35-4-2, section
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35-4-10(e) (permitting the Department to prescribe its
own procedural rules), and sections 35-4-7, -6, and
-10 (imposing various ten-day filing requirements).
[2] Rule 60(b)(1) confers discretion upon a trial
court judge to set aside a judgment for "excusable
neglect."
We have heretofore defined "excusable
neglect" as the exercise of "due diligence" by a
reasonably
prudent
person
under
similar
circumstances. (FN5) Even if we were to consider
any argued distinction between "good cause" and
"excusable neglect," which we expressly decline to
do, the undisputed facts here do not support any claim
that the employer diligently acted in a reasonably
prudent manner in failing to file its response until
three weeks after it was due. With knowledge that the
notice was forthcoming and a response was necessary,
the employer's neglect or mistake was not excusable.
Cf. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). The
Department's refusal to consider it was reasonable
and rational under sections 35-4-7 and 35-4-10.
We find the arguments on appeal to be without
merit, and the decision of the Board of Review is
affirmed.
HOWE, J., concurs in the result.
FN1. § 35-4-7(c)(3)(E); all statutory citations herein
are to U.C.A., 1953 (1974 ed., Supp. 1986).
FN2. § 35-4-10(i);
Utah Department of
Administrative Services
v.
Public Service
Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608-09 (Utah 1983).
FN3. Section 35-4-7(c)(3)(E) provides, in part:
Any employing unit that receives a notice of the
filing of a claim may protest payment of benefits to
former employees or charges to the employer if the
protest is filed within ten days after the date the
notice is issued.
FN4. See Kirkwood v. Department of Employment
Security, 709 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1985); Wood v.
Department of Employment Security, 680 P.2d 38
(Utah 1984);
Thiessens v. Department of
Employment Security, 663 P.2d 72 (Utah 1983).
FN5. Airkem v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429
(1973).
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Developer brought action against supplier of airconditioning units for breach of contract and negligent
misrepresentation. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., dismissed the action
with prejudice but extended time for filing notice of
appeal, and the parties cross-appealed. The Supreme
Court, Hall, C.J., held that District Court abused its
discretion in determining that inadvertent mistake of
counsel in failing to enclose requisite docketing fee
with notice of appeal was excusable neglect and,
therefore, the appeal would be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
Howe, J., concurred in part and dissented in part
and filed opinion in which Oaks, J. concurred.
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Utah 1984.
Failure to pay, within requisite period, docketing fee
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for appeal could not be excused by reason of court
clerk's improvident filing of notice of appeal without
such fees. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 17(a).
3. APPEAL AND ERROR ®=^370
30
—
30VH Transfer of Cause
30VH(C) Payment of Fees or Costs, and Bonds
or Other Securities
30k370
Payment of fees on appealing.
Utah 1984.
District court abused its discretion in determining
that inadvertent mistake of counsel in failing to
enclose requisite docketing fee with notice of appeal
was excusable neglect and, therefore, the appeal
would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 17(a).
Bill Thomas Peters, Michael Z. Hayes, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Robert S. Campbell, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and respondent.
HALL, Chief Justice:
These consolidated appeals arise out of an action
commenced by Prowswood Corporation (hereinafter "
Prowswood") against Mountain Fuel Supply
Company (hereinafter "Mountain Fuel") for damages
resulting from the alleged breach of an oral contract
and the alleged negligent misrepresentation made in
connection with the promotion and sale of gas air
conditioning. Following a dismissal of the action with
prejudice, Prowswood filed an appeal based on the
following contentions: (1) the lower court's dismissal
for failure to prosecute the action in the name of the
real party in interest violated the purpose and
language of Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(2) incorporation of Prowswood's
negligent misrepresentation cause of action in the final
pretrial order precluded the dismissal of said claim on
the first day of trial; (3) the lower court disregarded
statutory procedural safeguards in dismissing
Prowswood!s tort claim on the basis of Mountain
Fuel's motion in limine;
(4) Mountain Fuel's
circumvention of statutory procedural rules through
improper implementation of the motion in limine had
a prejudicial impact upon Prowswood; and (5) the
lower court erroneously dismissed Prowswood's
claim for negligent misrepresentation as not being a
judicially recognized cause of action.
Mountain Fuel subsequently filed a response in the
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Prowswood appeal and in *953 addition filed a
separate appeal from an order of the lower court
granting Prowswood's motion for an extension of
time to file its notice of appeal. As the basis for this
appeal, Mountain Fuel contends that the timely
payment of the docketing fee and filing fee is required
to perfect an appeal and that failure to perfect an
appeal due to mere inadvertence or oversight does not
constitute excusable neglect.
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Pines Apartments developed serious operational
problems.
When called upon to service the
malfunctioning units, Mountain Fuel demed having
made the alleged warranties and promises and
ultimately refused to repair the units. Consequently,
Prowswood brought this action against Mountain Fuel
for
breach
of
contract
and
negligent
misrepresentation.
Facts Pertinent to the Prowswood Appeal

The facts that precipitated Prowswood's cause of
action and that pertain equally to both appeals are set
forth immediately hereafter.
Following this, the
specific procedural facts givmg rise to the
Prowswood appeal and those giving rise to the
Mountain Fuel appeal are stated separately.
Prowswood is a closely held corporation engaged in
the development of real estate. It is presently owned
by Richard Prows and Robert Wood and then*
families. (FN1) During the years 1969 through 1974,
Messrs. Prows and Wood, serving m their official
corporate capacities as president and vice-president
respectively, were approached by sales representatives
of Mountain Fuel with the prospect of installing gas
air-conditiomng units m their apartment projects. It is
alleged by Prowswood that the sales representatives,
particularly one Riley, made the following oral
representations with respect to the gas air-conditionmg
proposal:
(A) The initial costs would be greater with gas air
conditioning, but there would be no maintenance cost
because Mountain Fuel would perpetually service and/
or maintain all the units.
(B) Mountain Fuel would guarantee the airconditiomng units if they were installed according to
the sizing recommendations and instructions furnished
by Mountain Fuel.
(C) Mountain Fuel would maintain a complete parts
inventory to provide for rapid replacement of parts for
the units.
Prowswood further contends that it relied upon
these representations when it purchased gas airconditiomng equipment and installed such equipment
m a large apartment complex known as Lake Pines
Apartments.
According to the allegations of Prowswood's
amended complaint, as well as Mr. Prows' testimony
at trial, the air-conditioning units installed m the Lake

This action, although commenced on March 10,
1977, did not proceed to trial until January 20, 1982
Prior to the trial, a final pretrial order was prepared,
approved as to form by both parties and filed pursuant
to the court's order.
The order sets forth
Prowswood's claim for damages based on both
breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation
theories.
On January 19, 1982, the day before the scheduled
trial, counsel for Mountain Fuel served upon counsel
for Prowswood a motion m limine to dismiss
plaintiffs fraud claim. On the next day, January 20,
prior to commencement of the trial, counsel for
Prowswood served upon opposmg counsel a reply and
objection to the motion m limine. Argument was then
heard by the court on this motion (prior to trial),
resulting m the dismissal of Prowswood's claim for
negligent misrepresentation. The court concluded that
although the allegations of the amended complaint
were legally sufficient to state a cause of action for
breach of contract, the allegations were insufficient to
state a claim for misrepresentation.
After the jury was impaneled and during the
presentation of Prowswood's case in chief, it was
discovered through testimony given by Mr. Prows
that the owner of the *954 Lake Pines Apartments at
the time the alleged oral contract was entered into was
a partnership entity known as Lake Pines
Development Company (hereinafter "Lake Pines")
and not Prowswood, the plaintiff m the action.
Counsel for Mountain Fuel therefore made a motion
to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute in the name
of the real party m interest. (FN2) Argument on this
motion was then heard outside the presence of the
jury. Counsel for Prowswood, while conceding its
mistake as to the legal ownership of the Lake Pines
Apartments, offered to have the partnership (Lake
Pines Development) ratify the action or be substituted
therein pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Prowswood argued that the
ownership composition of both Prowswood and Lake
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Pines is the same with the exception of the children of
Messrs. Prows and Wood. It further argued that
Prowswood Corporation was a managing entity with
respect to the subject apartments and that m its
managerial capacity it had entered into the oral
agreement with Mountain Fuel for the benefit of the
owner/principal,
Lake
Pines
Development.
Notwithstanding Prowswood's arguments, the court
dismissed the action with prejudice, reasoning that a
substitution or ratification of the action by Lake Pines
would not solve or reconcile the factual dilemma of
Prowswood's having privity of contract with
Mountain Fuel but no damages and Lake Pines'
having damages but no privity of contract.
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(a) When an appeal is permitted from a district
court to the Supreme Court, the time within which
an appeal may be taken shall be one month from the
date of the entry m the Register of Actions of the
judgment or order appealed from unless a shorter
tune is provided by law, [1] except that upon a
showing of excusable neglect, the district court may
extend the time for filing the nonce of appeal not
exceeding one month from the expiration of the
onginal time herem prescribed. Such an extension
may be granted by the district court before or after
the expiration of the original time herem prescribed;

Facts Pertinent to the Mountain Fuel Appeal
A final judgment m this matter, together with
findings of fact and conclusions of law, was entered
on March 18, 1982. A notice of appeal was then
prepared by counsel for Prowswood and filed by way
of a "runners" service on April 14, 1982.
On April 23, 1982, some five days after the
expiration of the statutory thirty-day period for filing
an appeal, (FN3) Prowswood received notice from
the district court clerk's office that neither the filing
fees nor the docketing fees had been received on the
date the notice of appeal had been filed. Prowswood
immediately filed an ex parte motion for an extension
of time for filing notice of appeal, which motion was
summarily granted, extending the time for completing
the filing to April 28, 1982.
Counsel for Mountain Fuel became apprised of
Prowswood's motion for extension on April 28, 1982.
Thereafter, on May 7, 1982, Mountain Fuel filed a
motion to set aside the order that extended the tune
for filing the notice of appeal. At the May 14 hearing
on the motion, the court set aside the April 23 order
on the basis of Prowswood's failure to give proper
notice, which demed Mountain Fuel an opportunity to
be heard. However, upon further hearing it was
determined that Prowswood's inadvertent failure to
accompany the notice of appeal with the requisite fees
was excusable neglect, and the time for paymg such
fees was extended to May 17, 1982. From this order,
Mountain Fuel appeals.
The focus of this appeal is upon two provisions of
Rule 73(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
These two provisions, as they appear m the text of
said rule, are as follows:

A party may appeal from a judgment by filing with
the district court a notice of appeal, together with
sufficient copies *955 thereof for mailing to the
Supreme Court and all other parties to the judgment,
[2] and deposinng therewith the fee required for
dockeang the appeal m the Supreme Court. The
clerk of the district court shall forthwith transmit
one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of
filing, together with the required fee, to the Supreme
Court where the appeal shall be duly docketed.
Failure of the appellant to take any of the further
steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed
from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is
ground only for such remedies as are specified m
this rule or, when no remedy is specified, for such
action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate,
which may include dismissal of the appeal.
[Emphasis added.]
[1] The first issue raised with regard to this rule is
whether the provision requiring the payment of a
docketmg fee constitutes a jurisdictional requirement
that, if not satisfied within "one month from the date
of the entry ... of the judgment," would render an
appeal invalid. We conclude that failure to pay the
docketmg fee within the requisite period is a defect of
jurisdictional magnitude.
It is axiomatic m this jurisdiction that failure to
timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure
requiring dismissal of the appeal. (FN4) The plain,
unambiguous language of Rule 73(a) requires two
steps to perfect an appeal, both of which must be
performed within the requisite thirty-day period: (1) a
notice of appeal must be filed with die district court,
and (2) a docketmg fee must be deposited therewith.
This interpretation draws support no* only from the
clear language of the statute itself, but also from
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judicial precedent in this jurisdiction, as well as many
other jurisdictions.
This Court has had occasion to mle on the
importance of the filing fee m several cases. In the
case of In Re Estate of Ratliff, (FN5) die appellant
sent his notice of appeal to the clerk's office withm
one month after the denial of his motion for a new
trial However, he did not pay the statutory filing fee
until one week after the deadline had passed.
Consequently, the clerk did not file the notice at the
tune it was received; rather, she filed it on the date
the filing fees were paid. This Court ruled that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal due to the
appellant's failure to comply with the statutory filing
requirements In so holding, the Court quoted the
following language from a former opinion, Jacobsen
v Jeffries: (FN6) "Leaving a paper with a filing
officer, a fee for the filing of which is by the statute
required to be paid m advance, is not a filing." (FN7)
The events that precipitated the Court's statement in
Jacobsen, supra, and the further reasoning applied
therein are also apropos to this issue. There, the
appellant made arrangements with the clerk to have
his notice of appeal filed and his filing fees paid later.
Before the notice of appeal was filed, however, a new
clerk took over and did not file the notice until the
fees were received, which was after the penod for
filing had expired. This Court dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning, as stated above,
that the delivery of a notice of appeal without the
requisite filing fee does not constitute a filing. Thus
rationale was based upon an earlier decision, Gee v.
Smith, (FN8) mvolvmg the validity of the filing of a
trial transcript with the Supreme Court without the
requisite filing fee. The Court m that case articulated
the following rule:
Under our law the filing of the record consists of
two acts, one of which is payment of the fee, and the
other of which is delivering the record to the cleik.
Neither act standing alone is a *956 filing, or a
half filing, or of any avail as a filing. (FN9)
We note that at the time the Gee and Jacobsen
decisions were handed down, the rules of appellate
procedure, particularly those respecting the payment
of filing fees, were not precisely as they are now nor
as they were at the tune Ratliff was decided.
Notwithstanding, however, the Court in Ratliff applied
the same interpretation and analysis of the filing fee
requirements as it had in Gee and Jacobsen.
Inasmuch as those requirements are the same at
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present as they were at the time RatUff was decided,
we likewise consider the rule articulated in Gee,
supra, and followed in Jacobsen and Ratliff,
applicable here.
As a rejoinder to the principles stated in Ratliff and
Jacobsen, Prowswood avers that those cases are
distinguishable on then- facts and therefore inapropos
to the present issue. The major distinction pointed out
by Prowswood is that the nouce of appeal m Ratliff
and Jacobsen, although timely delivered, was not filed
by the clerk within the statutory penod, while in the
instant matter, the nouce of appeal was not only
delivered timely, but also filed by the clerk within the
requisite penod. Thus, Prowswood claims that the
Court's statements in Ratliff and Jacobsen do not
support the proposition urged by Mountain Fuel that
the payment of the filing fees widun the statutory
penod is necessary and jurisdictional, rather, they
support the proposition that only the actual filing of
the notice of appeal within said penod is necessary
and jurisdictional.
Akhough we concede that the factual distinction
drawn by Prowswood exists, we do not countenance
Prowswoodfs position that the scope of application of
the rule stated m the Ratliff and Jacobsen decisions is
limited by virtue of that distinction. The rule clearly
articulates the consequence of failure to pay filing fees
within the statutory penod; it does not condition such
consequence, as Prowswood suggests, upon the
clerk's refusal or failure to actually file the notice of
appeal. The rule states unequivocally that the delivery
of the notice of appeal wuhout the required filing fees
is ineffectual.
In further justification of Prowswoodfs position that
the payment of filing fees is not jurisdictional, it
alleges that the legal duty to insure compliance with
the filing fee requirement rests m the clerk of the
court rather than in the parties themselves. This
proposition is purportedly supported by both the
Jacobsen and Ratliff decisions. However, we do not
find such support m Uiose cases. In Ratliff, the Court
merely noted that the clerk's refusal to file the nouce
of appeal without the filing fee was proper inasmuch
as U.C.A., 1953, § 21-2-2 requires the clerk to
receive the proper filing fee before filing the notice of
appeal. (FN10) The Court did not hold, nor did it
even imply, that the clerk's duty under § 21-2-2 (or §
21-2-1) supersedes or vitiates or m any way lessens
the party's responsibility to pay said fees pursuant to
Rule 73(a).
Similarly, in Jacobsen the Court
recognized the clerk's responsibility with respect to
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filing fees and made the following hypothesized
observation:
Should such officers inadvertently or otherwise file a
paper for which a fee is required to be paid, he is
forthwith bound to account for such fee whether or
not he collected the fee at the tune the paper was left
for filing. (FN11)
We do not interpret this observation, as Prowswood
does, to mean that the inadvertent filing of the notice
of appeal by the clerk without the appropriate filing
fees validates or perfects the appeal. The statement
was not intended to extend the clerk's accountability
into the realm of the party's responsibility. Indeed,
such an interpretation would run squarely against the
rule of law laid out m that case, to wit: "fljeaving
*957 a paper with a filing officer, a fee for the filing
of which is by the statute required to be paid m
advance, is not a filing," supra.
Prowswood's argument with respect to the court
clerk's duty goes a step further. It alleges that the
clerk had an opportunity to discover the mistake (i.e.,
inadvertent filing of the notice of appeal without the
fees) prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period
and failed to do so inasmuch as counsel for
Prowswood allegedly contacted the clerk the day after
the notice of appeal had been dehvered (which was
approximately three days before the thirty-day
deadline) and was assured by the clerk that the appeal
had been filed. Prowswood complains that at that
point m time, had the clerk recognized the error m
filing the notice without fees or refused to file the
notice without payment of said fees imposed by
statute, Prowswood would have had time to pay the
fees before the deadline, and no extension would have
been necessary.
Again, this argument is an attempt to transfer the
duty to perfect an appeal from the movmg litigant (to
whom the duty legally belongs) to the clerk of the
court.
That the clerk is not responsible for
discovering and rectifying the procedural mistakes
made by the litigants is illustrated m the case of Gee
v. Smith, supra.
There, the appellant sought to
excuse his failure to timely remit filing fees by
showmg that the clerk of the district court had
received a letter from the clerk of this Court
indicating that the filing fees had not been received
and that the transcript could not be filed until such
fees were received, and that the clerk failed to
communicate the contents of the letter to the appellant
m tune for him to pay the fees. The Court rejected
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this excuse, placing the burden of compliance with the
procedural rules upon the movmg litigant: "We must
hold that appellant and his attorneys knew that the
record would not be filed unless the filing fee was
paid/ (FN 12) The Court went on to articulate the
rule stated above respecting the consequence of failure
to timely remit filing fees.
Consistent with the conclusion reached m Gee with
respect to the clerk's responsibility are the
pronouncements of the Missouri Supreme Court m a
case mvolvmg almost identical circumstances as those
present here. In Keeney v. State, (FN 13) the court
clerk lmprovidently filed a notice of appeal without
having received the required filing fee of $20. The
Missouri court held widi respect to that improvident
filing: "The filing of the notice of appeal by the
circuit clerk was invalid and ineffective." (FN 14)
[2] Accordingly, we hold that Prowswood cannot
have its inadvertence m failing to remit the requisite
filing fee excused by reason of the court clerk's
improvident filing of the notice of appeal without such
fees.
A division of authority exists in other jurisdictions
upon the question presently before us. The principal
authority for the position urged by Prowswood, to
wit:
that the filing fee requirement is not
jurisdictional, is a U.S. Supreme Court case entitled
Panssi v. Telechron, Inc. (FN15) In that case, the
petitioner failed to include with its notice of appeal the
$5 filing fee required by the pertinent federal statute,
(FN 16) and the clerk consequently refused to file the
notice. The tune for filing the appeal then lapsed
before the payment was made. The Court reversed
the circuit court's dismissal, stating:
*958 We think that the clerk's receipt of the notice
of appeal within the thirty (30) day period satisfied
the requirement of Section 2107, and that untimely
payment of the Section 1917 fee did not vitiate the
validity of petitioner's notice of appeal. (FN 17)
Yet another federal decision relied upon by
Prowswood with respect to this issue is the case of
Gould v. Members of New Jersey Division of Water
Policy & Supply. (FN18) There, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, on its own motion, raised the issue
of an untimely fee payment and held, citmg Parissi:
It is thus clear that the filing fee requirement cannot
operate to render untimely a notice of appeal that is
timely received m the clerk's office. (FN 19)

Copynght (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

676 P.2d 952, Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., (Utah 1984)
This Court accords considerable weight to decisions
that interpret federal procedural rules identical or
substantially similar to the procedural rules of this
state.
However, such similarity does not exist
between the federal rules respecting filing fees and
this state's Rule 73(a).
The language of Rule 73(a) differs from the federal
rules at issue m Panssi and Gould (to wit: 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1917 & 2107), as well as the more current Rule
3(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, in
one important regard. Rule 73(a) sets forth the
requirements of delivery of the notice of appeal and
payment of the docketing fees within the statutory
penod and then continues:
Failure of the appellant to take any of the further
steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed
from does not effect the validity of the appeal ....
[Emphasis added.]
We believe the manifest intent of the underscored
language is to make jurisdictional the two steps for
securing the appeal which precede that language (i.e ,
filing the notice of appeal and paymg the docketmg
fees). Only the steps which follow that language are
nonjunsdictional.
The federal niles interpreted m Panssi and Gould do
not include a provision such as that stated above,
separating the jurisdictional requirements from the
nonjunsdictional. Rule 3(a) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure does, however, contain a similar
provision. The Rule begins by stating the single
requirement that a notice of appeal be filed with the
clerk of the court; it does not also mclude at that
point, as our Rule 73(a) does, the requirement that the
filing fees be paid. It then continues:
Failure of an appellant to take any step other ttain
the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect
the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for
such action as the court of appeals deems
appropriate, which may mclude dismissal of the
appeal....
In the Advisory Committee's notes on appellate
rules, the following statement appears with respect to
the importance of this provision m determining what
is and what is not a jurisdictional requirement:
In view of the provision in Rule 3(a) that "[flailure
of an appellant to take any step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
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validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the court of appeals deems appropriate,
which may mclude dismissal of the appeal," the case
law indicates that the failure to prepay the statutory
filing fee does not constitute a jurisdictional defect.
See Panssi v. Telechront 349 U.S. 46 [75 S.Ct.
577, 99 L.Ed. 867] (1955); Gould v. Members of
NJ. Division of Water Policy <fc Supply, 555 F.2d
340 (3d Cir. 1977). [Emphasis added.] (FN20)
*959 This Court does not stand alone in its
conclusion that filing fees rise to the level of
jurisdictional magnitude.
Under circumstances
similar to those before us, other state courts have
articulated the same conclusion. The Washington
State Supreme Court has held:
The timely filing of a proper written notice of appeal
and the timely payment of the required filing fee are
jurisdictional prerequisites in the appeal of all civil
cases.... (FN21)
The Supreme Court of the state of Missouri has
held:
This notice of appeal was not timely filed because
the docket fee, without which the notice of appeal is
ineffective, was not deposited ...; therefore we do
not have jurisdiction of the appeal. (FN22)
And the Nebraska Supreme Court has observed:
The Supreme Court has no power to exercise
appellate jurisdiction ... unless the appellant shall
have filed a notice of appeal and deposited a docket
fee ... within the tune fixed .... (FN23)
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the timely
payment of a filing fee, like the timely delivery of a
notice of appeal, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
perfection of an appeal before this Court.
We turn now to the final issue raised m connection
with Rule 73(a). This issue arises out of the following
provision of the Rule: "except that upon a showing of
excusable neglect, the district court may extend the
time for filing the notice of appeal ...." By virtue of
this provision, notwithstanding the jurisdictional
nature of the filing fee requirement, if the appellant
can show that its failure to timely pay said fees was
due to "excusable neglect/ the tune for paymg the
fees and perfecting the appeal may be extended. The
pivotal issue is, therefore, whether the district court
abused its discretion m determining that the excuse
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offered by Prowswood for its failure to timely remit
the fees constitutes "excusable neglect."
The excuse proffered by Prowswood at the hearing
on May 14, 1982, for the failure to pay the docketing
fee was that counsel for Prowswood was mvolved m
"another matter" on the day of the attempted filing
and "inadvertently" failed to include a check for the
fees with the notice of appeal, which was sent through
a runner service Counsel further informed the Court
that he telephoned the district court the next day
(which was three days prior to the expiration of the
thirty-day deadline) and was assured by an
unidentified deputy clerk that the appeal was filed.
When the question of "excusable neglect" arises m a
jurisdictional context {e.g., Utah R.Civ.P. 73(a)), as
opposed to a nonjunsdictional context {e.g., Utah
R Civ.P 60(b)), the standard contemplated thereby is
necessarily a strict one. (FN24) This strict standard
was recognized and explained relative to the parallel
federal rule (i.e., Federal Appellate Rule 4(a)) as
follows.
The Committee intended that the standard of
excusable neglect remain a strict one, however. We
did not want lawyers to be taking advantage of this
extra thirty (30) days as a matter of course; it is not
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is
too busy, which can be used, perhaps truthfully, in
almost every case.
It is hoped that the bar will
mvoke and the courts give effect *960 to this less
stringent standard m the spirit m which it was
wntttn-that is to take care of emergency situations
only. [Emphasis added.] (FN25)
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, m the
case of Maryland Casualty Company v. Conner,
stated that the rule was not intended to permit an
extension "in the absence of circumstances that are
unique or extraordinary." (FN26) Inadvertence or
mistake of counsel does not constitute the type of
unique or extraordinary circumstances contemplated
by this strict standard. (FN27)
The application of this rule is well illustrated m the
following cases In Feltch v. General Rental Co.,
(FN28) appellants sought to excuse the untimely filing
of their notice of appeal on the basis of a mistake they
had made m interpreting a rule of appellate procedure.
In rejectmg this excuse, the court noted the strict
construction given the "excusable neglect" concept m
federal forums, supra, and held:

Page 7

A flat mistake of counsel about the meaning of a
statute or rule may not justify relief: relief is not
extended "to cover any kind of garden variety
oversight.m (FN29) [Emphasis added.]
In the case of Maryland Casualty Company v.
Conner, supra, the nonce of appeal was filed late
because the senior partner responsible for the
litigation passed away suddenly, and another partner,
who was unfamiliar with the litigation and absent from
the office, was required to take over the litigation In
the motion for extension, counsel referred to the
volume of matters he had inherited as a result of his
partner's death, indicating that through inadvertence
and preoccupation with other matters, he neglected to
file the notice within the statutory period The Tenth
Circuit held that counsel's involvement m other
matters did not show excusable neglect within the
meamng of the rule.
In Selph v. Council of City of Los Angeles, (FN30)
the excuse given for the late filing was that counsel
had been preoccupied with a change of employment
and had been unusually busy. The court rejected his
excuse and dismissed the appeal.
Counsel for Prowswood have openly admitted that
the failure to timely remit the filing fees was due to
their own neglect and inadvertence occasioned by the
press of business. Notwithstanding, they claim thenneglect was excusable simply because they received
assurances over the telephone from an unidentified
deputy court clerk that the appeal had been filed and
because Mountain Fuel was not prejudiced by the
untimelmess of the payment of filing fees.
The assertion that prejudice or the lack thereof has a
bearing upon the determination of the excusable
neglect question is erroneous. This point is well
illustrated in the case of United States v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, (FN31) where the
appellant attempted, as does Prowswood here, to shift
the focus from "excusable neglect" to "injustice."
The court rejected appellant's position upon the
following reasoning:
It is always just that one should have an appeal from
a trial court and it would seem that it would always
be an injustice to deny such an appeal merely
because *961 of the inadvertent missing of an
arbitrarily drawn deadline.... Surely what is just on
the 30th day does not become unjust on the 31st
merely because the 31st day has come. Thus, if the
justice or injustice of the question is to be the basis
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for granting or denying a motion for an extension,
the Court should not look to the acts or omissions ol
appellant but, instead, to any prejudice that mighi
accrue to appellee from a granting of the extension.
This is clearly and explicitly not what the rule
requires. The rule requires that the conduct of the
appellant only be looked to and that only if
excusable neglect be shown on appellant's part
should an extension be granted. [Emphasis added.]
(FN32)
As to the excuse that the clerk's assurances over the
telephone misled counsel for Prowswood and thus
justified counsel's late payment of the fee, it is again
to be observed that the clerk of the court is noit
responsible for discovering and rectifying procedural
errors committed m the first instance by the litigants
The dissent's position on this particular question is
contradictory. It agrees that the payment of the filing
fee is the responsibility of the appellant alone and is m
no way that of the court clerk. It then, however,
shifts that responsibility, or at least part thereof, to the
court clerk by suggesting that the clerk's failure to
mention die appellant's omission of the filing fee is a
factor in determining the excusabihty of appellant's
neglect. We note that the oversight and inadvertence
of counsel m this case preceded and occurred whoDy
independently of the purported error of the deputy
court clerk.
This excuse did not support
Prowswood's argument, supra, with respect to the
nature of the filing fee requirement, and it likewise
does not support Prowswood's argument regarding
"excusable neglect."
[3] We hold that the district court abused its
discretion m finding the inadvertent mistake of
counsel to be "excusable neglect" within the
recognized meaning of that term. Our resolution of
this appeal makes it unnecessary to address the merits
of the issues set forth m the Prowswood appeal.
The appeal of Prowswood is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I concur with the conclusion of the majority opinion
that the timely payment of the filing fee is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the perfection of an
appeal before this Court. However, I dissent from the
conclusion of the majority that the district court
abused its discretion in finding the neglect of counsel
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in this case to be "excusable" within the meaning of
Rule 73(a), and therefore that Prowswood was not
entitled to an extension of time to perfect its appeal
The majority opinion states that "the standard
contemplated by the term 'excusable neglect' is
universally considered to be a very strict one." The
only cases which support that statement, however, are
cases from federal courts. The term "excusable
neglect" appears not only in our rules m Rule 73(a),
but also in Rule 60(b) providing for the setting aside
of judgments (usually default judgments) obtained
when a party or his counsel has been guilty of
"excusable neglect." In interpreting Rule 60(b) we
have given the district courts wide discretion in
determining what constitutes "excusable neglect," and
only m rare cases have we overruled their decisions
that have set aside default judgments after finding
"excusable neglect." Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 123
Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). I see no reason why
the same broad interpretation should not apply to the
meaning of "excusable neglect" as used m Rule 73(a).
The majority opinion states "inadvertence or mistake
of counsel does not constitute the type of unique or
extraordinary *962. circumstances contemplated by
this strict standard." That statement imposes a much
higher test than we have heretofore required under
Rule 60(b). Under the latter rule we have required
only reasonable justification or excuse for the
defendant's failure to appear. Mayhew v. Standard
Glsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962).
See also Wesnnghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen
Contractor Inc., Utah, 544 P.2d 876 (1975), where
we said only a reasonable excuse need be shown to
merit the vacatmg of a default judgment.
I agree that the payment of the filing fee so that the
appeal is properly "filed" is the responsibility of the
appellant. However, I think that the trial court, in
determining whether the neglect of counsel for
Prowswood was excusable, might well consider the
fact that the clerk accepted the filing of the notice of
appeal without mentioning the omission of die
necessary fee. This silence itself is very unusual
(FN1) and compounded the neglect of counsel. That
fact, coupled widi die fact that counsel later called die
clerk's office and received assurance that the notice of
appeal had been filed with no mention bemg made of
the lack of the filing fee, would seem to me to give a
basis m reason for concluding that the neglect of
counsel was excusable. I have no quarrel with the
committee note to Federal Appellate Rule 4(a) to the
effect that the committee did not want lawyers to be
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taking advantage of the extra thuty days as a matter of
course, and that it was not meant to cover the usual
excuse that the lawyer is too busy. That is not the
instant case. Here, counsel for the appellant was not
too busy. He filed his notice of appeal well ahead of
the onginal one-month deadline. By oversight he
neglected to pay the fee, which ordinarily would be
detected by the clerk of the court. Counsel used
further diligence in checking with the court to make
sure that the appeal was filed and he received that
assurance. The diligence, care and effort expended
by the appellant m attempting to properly file its
appeal bears on whether its neglect of one step should
be excused.
I would not disturb the district court's determination
that counsel's neglect was excusable.
OAKS, J., concurs m the concurring and dissenting
opinion of HOWE, J.
FN1 The record indicates that Prowswood was
formerly owned by Messrs. Prows and Wood and
that their families became shareholders sometime
after 1970.
FN2. Pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 17(a).
FN3. Utah R.Civ.P. 73(a).
FN4. See Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., Utah,
619 P.2d 340 (1980); Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah
2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Anderson v.
Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955).
FN5. 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967).
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FN13. Mo., 556 S.W.2d 514 (1977).
FN 14. Id. at 515. It is noted that Missouri also has a
statute requiring the clerk to receive the filing fees
in advance of filing the notice of appeal.
Notwithstanding this statute, however, the court held
as it did with respect to the improvident filing.
FN15. 349 U.S. 46, 75 S.Ct. 577, 99 L.Ed. 867
(1955).
FN 16. The five-dollar filing fee requirement is found
m 28 U.S.C. § 1917 and reads thus:
Upon the filing of any separate or joint notice of
appeal or application for appeal or upon the receipt
of any order allowing, or notice of the allowance of,
an appeal or of a writ of certiorari $5 shall be paid
to the clerk of the district court, by the appellant or
petitioner.
FN17. 349 U.S. at 47, 75 S.Ct. at 577.
FN18. 555 F.2d 340 (3d Cir.1977).
*962_ FN 19. Id. at 341. Prowswood also cites the
following cases from two state jurisdictions wherein
the rule articulated in Panssi was followed: City of
Gainesville v. nomas, Fla., 229 So.2d 833 (1969);
Williams v. State, Fla., 324 So.2d 74 (1975);
Kalauli v. Dim, 57 Hawaii 168, 552 P.2d 355
(1976).
FN20. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 3(a), Notes of Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules, note to subdivision
(e).

FN6. 86 Utah 587, 47 P.2d 892, 893 (1935).
FN7. Supra n. 5, 431 P.2d at 573.
FN8. 52 Utah 602, 176 P. 620 (1918).
FN9. Supra n. 6, 47 P.2d at 893, quoting from Gee v.
Smith, 52 Utah at 621, 176 P. 620.
FN10. To be more specific, the requirement that
clerks collect fees m advance is found m § 21-2-1.
Section 21-2-2 enumerates the fees to be collected
by the county clerk.
FN11. Sap/ran. 6.
FN12. Supra n. 8, 176 P. at 621.

FN21. Myers v. Harris, 82 Wash.2d 152, 509 P.2d
656, 657 (1973).
FN22. State v. Brookshire, Mo., 400 S.W.2d 61
(1966). See also Kattering v. Franz, 360 Mo. 854,
231 S.W.2d 148 (1950); Keeney v. State, supra n.
13.
FN23. American Legion Leo Brinda Post No. 90 v.
Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 199 Neb. 429,
259 N.W.2d 36 (1977).
FN24. Varnum v. Grady, 90 Nev. 374, 528 P.2d
1027 (1974); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383
Mass. 603, 421 N.E.2d 67, 73 (1981); State of Or.
v. Champion Intern. Corp., 680 F.2d 1300 (9th
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Cir.1982); Selph v. Council of City of Los Angeles,
593 F.2d 881 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting Advisory
Committee Notes to 1966 amendment to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the predecessor of Fed.R.App.P.
4(a)).
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382 Mass. 181, 414 N.E.2d 998 (1980)).
FN30. Supra n. 24.

FN26. 382 F.2d 13, 16-17 (10th Cir.1967). See also
United States v. Kallevig, 534 F.2d 411 (1st
Cir.1976).

FN31. 508 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.Va.1981). See also
Spound v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 534 F.2d 404
(1st Cir.1976), where the appellant made the same
argument advanced by Prowswood.
It was
summarily rejected, the court declaring that the
"rule makes no provision for plaintiffs contention
that the defendant was not prejudiced. Such an
exception would be limitless." /rf. at 411.

FN27. 9 Moore's Federal Practice T 204.13 at 4-97 to
4-98, Sprout v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 681
F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1982).

FN32. United States v. Commonwealth of Virgima,
supra n. 31, at 192.

FN25. R. Stern, Changes m the Federal Appellate
Rules, 41 F.R.D. 297, 299.

FN28. Supra n. 24.
FN29. Id. at 74 (quoting from Goldstein v. Barron,

FN1. U.C.A., 1953, § 21-2-1 requires county officers
to collect fees in advance for the use and benefit of
the county.
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887 P.2d 878, Haro v. Haro, (Utah App. 1994)
*878 887P.2d878
Estate of Martm HARO, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Maria Guadalupe HARO and Everardo Haro,
Defendants and Appellees.
No 930702-CA.
Coun of Appeals of Utah
Dec 20, 1994
Estate of guest who died as result of carbon
monoxide poisoning while staying m defendants'
home sued defendants for wrongful death. The
Second District Court, Davis County, W. Brent West,
J., dismissed action. Estate appealed. The Coun of
Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) estate was proper
plaintiff, and (2) decedent's heirs could not be
substituted as real parties in interest.
Affirmed.
1. DEATH @=*31(1)
117 —
117in Actions for Causing Death
117111(A) Right of Action and Defenses
117k31
Persons Entitled to Sue
117k31(l)
In general.
Utah App 1994
Decedent's estate was neither "heir*' nor his
"personal representative" and, thus, could not
maintain action under Utah's wrongful death statute.
U.C.A 1953,78-11-7.
See pubhcation Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
2. DEATH <§=>44
117 —
117in Actions for Causing Death
117m(E) Parties
117k44
Intervention, addition, or substitution
of parties.
Utah App. 1994.
Because decedent's estate had no capacity to bring
action for wrongful death, complaint was nullity, and
there remained no cause of action m which to
substitute decedent's heirs as real parties m interest.
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 17(a).
Scott Holt, Layton, for appellant.
Robert H. Henderson and Richard A. Van Wagoner,
Salt Lake City, for appellee Maria Haro.
Copynght (c) West Group 2000

J. Kent Holland, Salt Lake City, for appellee
Everardo Haro.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and WILKINS, JJ.
*879 OPINION
BENCH, Judge
Plaintiff estate appeals from the trial court's
dismissal of its wrongful death action We affirm
FACTS
On February 24, 1991, Martm Haro died as a result
of carbon monoxide poisoning he had sustained while
staying in the home of his ex-wife, Maria Haro On
January 12, 1993, plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action against Maria Haro and Juan Haro, claiming
that then* negligence caused Martm Haro's injuries
and eventual death. On February 26, 1993, plaintiff
filed an amended complaint naming Maria Haro and
Everardo Haro as defendants.
Defendants brought a motion to dismiss plaintiffs
amended complaint on the ground that Martin Haro's
estate was neither an hen- nor his personal
representative and therefore could not maintain an
action under Utah's wrongful death statute. Plaintiff
then brought a motion to substitute the real parties m
interest, pursuant to rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The trial court ruled that because
the "Estate of Martm Haro is not an hen* and did not
have the capacity to sue, the Complaint and Amended
Complaint are nullities." The trial court therefore
granted defendants' motion and demed plaintiffs
motion with prejudice. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Proper Plaintiff m Wrongful Death Action
[1] Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by
ruling that it did not have the capacity to sue.
Specifically, plaintiff argues that an estate has an
interest m recovering for the decedent's wrongfiil
death. We disagree.
Utah's wrongful death statute provides that "when
the death of a person not a minor is caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or his
personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs,
may maintain an action for damages against the
claim to onginal U.S. Govt, works
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person causing the death." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7
(1992) (emphasis added). The underlying purpose of
this statute is "to provide compensation to those who
were dependent upon the decedent as a sole or
supplemental means of economic and emotional
support." Dennis C. Farley, Note, Decedent's Heirs
Under the Utah Wrongful Death Act, 1979 Utah
L.Rev. 77, 80.
In In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657
(1950), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the
separate identities of a decedent's heirs and a
decedent's estate under the wrongful death statute.
(FNl) The court held that a claim for wrongful death
isa
separate and independent cause of action and is not a
continuation of the right of action of the injured
party for personal injuries. The death creates a new
cause of action for the loss suffered by the hen's by
reason of the death, and only comes into existence
upon the happening of the death.
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Rule 17(a) provides, m pertinent part:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. An executor, administrator,
guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party
with whom or m whose name a contract has been
made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue m that person's name
without joining the party for whose benefit the action
is brought....
This rule contemplates that the party bringing suit
has the capacity to sue on behalf of the "real party m
interest.H If the suit is brought by a party that does
not have the capacity to sue on behalf of the "real
party m interest," the suit is a nullity. Because
Martin Haro's estate had no capacity to bring an
action for wrongful death, the complaint was a nullity
and there remained no cause of action m which to
substitute parties. Therefore, the trial court did not
err m denymg plaintiffs motion to substitute real
parties m interest.

Id. 213 P.2d at 660-61. The court also held that die
proceeds from a wrongful death award may not be
intermingled with the res of the estate.
[T]he legislature intended that the proceeds obtained
from the wrongdoer would not be intermingled with
other assets of the estate of the deceased.
Otherwise, the cause of action would have been
vested m the personal representative alone and the
amount would have been subjected to administration
by him m the same manner as other estate assets.
Id. 213 P.2d at 660.
Section 78-11-7 clearly delineates that the decedent's
heirs or his or her personal representative (on beteilf
of the heirs) are the only parties that may maintain an
action for wrongful death. Section 78-11-7 does not
allow for the decedent's estate to bring and maintain a
wrongful death action. We therefore conclude that the
trial court was correct *880. m ruling that plaintiff m
the present case lacked the necessary capacity to sue.
(FN2)
Plaintiffs Rule 17(a) Motion
[2] Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by
not allowing it to amend its complaint to substitute
decedent's heirs as the real parties m interest pursuant
to rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
We disagree.

CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiffs
cause of action. Additionally, the trial court did not
err m denymg plaintiffs motion to substitute parties.
Affirmed.
BILLINGS and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
FNl. The 1924 version of Utah's wrongful death
statute, like the current version, provided that suit
could only be brought by decedent's heirs or
decedent's personal representative.
FN2. The trial court also ruled that plaintiffs action
against Everardo Haro was not initiated within the
two-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-28 (1992). Plaintiff contends that the statute
of limitations for wrongful death actions violates
article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution,
which provides that "[t]he right of action to recover
damages for injuries resulting m death, shall never
be abrogated/
In light of our holding that the
estate is not a proper plaintiff, we need not reach
plaintiffs constitutional argument.
We note,
however, that statutes of limitations do not abrogate
rights to sue, but merely proscribe the time in which
those rights must be asserted. See Lee v. Gauftn,
867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993) (statutes of
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limitations "do not abolish a substantive right to sue,
but simply provide that if an acaon is not filed
within the specified time, the remedy is deemed to
have been waived.... [T]he barring of the remedy is
caused by a plaintiffs failure to take reasonable
steps to assert the cause of action within the time
afforded by statute").
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*369 611P.2d369
INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC., Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.

AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16599.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 18, 1980.
Defendant appealed from an order of the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E. Banks, J.,
which demed its motion to stt aside a default
judgment rendered against it for labor and materials
furnished m construction of water and sewer system.
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held that where
defendant did not receive notice of trial date from its
attorney after attorney's withdrawal from case and
where, upon receipt of notice of default judgment,
defendant immediately contacted its present counsel
who thereafter proceeded with diligence to attack
default judgment, interests of justice would be best
served by setting aside the default judgment.
Judgment vacated; case remanded.
Hall, J., filed dissenting opinion m which Wilkins,
J., jomed.
1. JUDGMENT <@=>92
228 —
228IV By Default
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity
228k92
Nature of judgment by default.
Utah, 1980.
In appropriate circumstances, default judgments are
justified, and when so justified, they are invulnerable
to attack.
2. JUDGMENT ®=^92
228 —
228IV By Default
228IV(A) Requisites and Validity
228k92
Nature of judgment by default.
Utah, 1980.
Default judgments are not favored m the law,
especially where a party had timely responded with
challenging pleadings.
3. JUDGMENT <@=>135
228 —
228IV By Default
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228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl35
Nature and scope of remedy.
Utah, 1980.
Policy of the law is to accord litigants the
opportunity for a hearing on the merits where that can
be done without serious injustice to other party; thus,
courts are generally indulgent toward setting aside of
default judgments where there is reasonable
justification or excuse for defendant's failure to
appear and where timely application is made to set it
aside. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b).
4. JUDGMENT®^ 135
228 —
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl35
Nature and scope of remedy.
Utah, 1980
Where there is doubt about whether a default
judgment should be set aside, doubt should be
resolved m favor of domg so. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 60(b).
5. JUDGMENT «»143(11)
228 —
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl43
Excuses for Default
228kl43(l 1) Mistake or neghgence of counsel as
to tune or place of appearance or trial.
[See headnote text below]
5. JUDGMENT * » 153(1)
228 —
228IV By Default
228IV(B) Opening or Setting Aside Default
228kl53
Tune for Application
228kl53(l)
In general.
Utah, 1980.
Where defendant did not receive notice of trial date
from its attorney after attorney's withdrawal from
case and where, upon receipt of notice of default
judgment, defendant immediately contacted its present
counsel who thereafter proceeded with diligence to
attack default judgment, interests of justice would be
best served by setting aside the default judgment.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b).
*370 Robert M. McRae of McRae & DeLand, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
E. H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.
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CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Defendant Agla Development Corporation seeks
reversal of the denial of its motion based on Rule
60(b), U.R.C.P., (FN1) to set aside a default
judgment for $46,101.70 for labor and materials
furnished in construction of water and sewer systems
in two subdivisions being developed by the defendant
in Salt Lake County.
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 16, 1978.
Defendant responded with an answer asserting
defenses and a counterclaim. A pre-trial conference
was held on April 16, 1979, at which defendant's
counsel Robert J. Haws requested that he be allowed
to withdraw, which request the court granted. The
court instructed plaintiffs attorney to notify the
defendant to obtain new counsel, and that the case was
set for trial on May 7, 1979. Plaintiffs attorney
certifies that on April 16, such a notice was mailed to
the defendant addressed to its business office. The
record also contains a certification by defendant's then
counsel, Mr. Haws, that he mailed to the defendant a
notice of the trial setting and of his withdrawal as
counsel. As opposed to the foregoing stands the
defendant's denial that it ever received such notices.
On the day set for trial, May 7, no one appeared on
defendant's behalf; and upon the basis of evidence
presented, judgment was entered for the plaintiff and
defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.
In support of its motion to set aside the default
judgment, defendant avers that its former counsel,
Mr. Haws, withdrew from a number of cases
simultaneously; and that the notice to appoint counsel
may have been misplaced with numerous papers
served upon the defendant's office by mail. And
further, that it had no notice of the trial until it
received the notice of the judgment dated May 14,
whereupon it immediately *371 contacted present
counsel, who proceeded with diligence to prepare the
motion (he avers it was prepared within four days)
and filed the motion May 31, 1979 (17 days after
receiving the notice of judgment).
[1][2] It is not to be questioned that in appropriate
circumstances default judgments are justified; and
when they are, they are invulnerable to attack.
However, they are not favored in the law, especially
where a party has timely responded with challenging
pleadings. When that has been done some caution
should be observed to see that the party is not taken
advantage of.
Speaking generally about such
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problems, it is to be kept in mind that access to the
courts for the protection of rights and the settlement of
disputes is one of the most important factors in the
maintenance of a peaceable and well-ordered society.
(FN2) This of course must be done in obedience to
rules; and it is to be conceded that there is a
possibility that the defendant was less than diligent in
attending to its interest in this lawsuit. But no
evidence was taken, nor did the court make any
findings other than the order denying defendant's
motion.
This is admittedly a perplexing case. From the
standpoint of the plaintiff and its counsel, they appear
to have proceeded without any impropriety, including
appearing on the trial date and presenting their case.
Defendant counters with the averments that it received
no such notice.
Supportive or the defendant's
position, are the facts that the justification for its
default rests upon the assertion of service of notice by
ordinary mail; and that immediately upon learning of
the judgment, it proceeded diligently with efforts to
set it aside and contest the issues on the merits.
[3] [4] The uniformally acknowledged policy of the
law is to accord litigants the opportunity for a hearing
on the merits, where that can be done without serious
injustice to the other party. (FN3) To that end, the
courts are generally indulgent toward the setting aside
of default judgments where there is a reasonable
justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to
appear, and where timely application is made to set it
aside. (FN4) Consistent with the objective just
stated, where there is doubt about whether a default
should be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of doing so, to the end that each party may have
an opportunity to present his side of the controversy
and that there be a resolution in accordance with law
and justice. (FN5)
[5] Application of the principles discussed herein to
the instant situation leads us to the conclusion that the
interests of justice will best be served by setting aside
the default judgment and giving the parties that
opportunity. In that connection, we call attention to
the prefatory clause of Rule 60(b) that "upon such
terms as are just" a party may be relieved from a
judgment. This authorizes the trial court to impose
such terms as may be just as a condition to setting
aside the default.
The default judgment is vacated and the case
remanded for further proceedings. No costs awarded.
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MAUGHAN and STEWART, JJ., concur.

of a manifest abuse of discretion. (FN7)

HALL, Justice (dissenting):

This Court has previously stated that neglect, to be
excusable, must occur despite the exercise of due
diligence. (FN8) Other jurisdictions have defined
excusable neglect as "such as might have been the act
of a reasonably prudent person under the same
circumstances." (FN9) It has also been held that
simple carelessness does not rise to the statutory
standard, (FN 10) nor do simple business difficulties
which allegedly prevent the dedication of adequate
attention to the litigation m question.
(FN 11)
Moreover, this Court has held that the failure of a
party to appear in court, allegedly occasioned by
failure of notice due to withdrawal of counsel, does
not constitute such "excusable neglect" as to justify
rehef from judgment where the evidence was that
ample notices of the procedures were mailed, and the
defaulting party was well aware of the withdrawal of
counsel in advance of the proceedings from which he
was absent. (FN 12)

I respectfully dissent.
In denying defendant's motion to vacate judgment,
the trial court was applying a specific statutory
standard' "On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may m the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; . . . ." (FN1) It is not to be
questioned that the policy of the law favors the
granting of *372 such relief m the case of a default
judgment (FN2) and that the remedy should be
liberally administered m order to grant the defaulting
party his day in court. (FN3) It is likewise beyond
dispute, however, that such judicial policy remains
coexistent with the broad latitude of discretion
accorded the trial court m ruling upon such motions.
(FN4) Indeed, the implementation of the policy is a
matter which this Court has specifically committed to
the trial court as follows:
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude
of discretion m granting or denying a motion to
relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule
60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and this
court will reverse the trial court only where an
abuse of this discretion is clearly established . . .
(t)he rule that the courts will incline toward granting
relief to a party, who has not had the opportunity to
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial
court level, and this court will not reverse the
determination of the trial court merely because the
motion could have been granted. For this court to
overturn the discretion of the lower court m refusing
to vacate a valid judgment, the requirements of
public policy demand more than a mere statement
that a person did not have his day in court when full
opportunity for fair hearing was afforded him or his
legal representative. (FN5)
Such trial court discretion has, m fact, been given
the widest berth by reviewmg courts m the area of
motions to vacate judgment which are based on
allegations of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable
neglect. (FN6) As such, a determination at the trial
level that a given course of conduct did or did not
constitute such "mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect" as should justify rehef of a default judgment
will hence be disturbed on appeal only in the presence

*373. It is to be noted that, in the present case,
defendant bases his claim for rehef from judgment on
the allegation that he did not receive notice of the trial
date. It is defendant's assertion that this lack of notice
was occasioned by the withdrawal of defendant's
counsel. The majority opinion makes no reference to
the fact that this "withdrawal" was occasioned by
defendant's personal dismissal of counsel due to
intractable differences.
Such being the case,
defendant can hardly claim to have been unaware that
it was without legal counsel, and that some further
action would be necessary in order adequately to
protect its interests in the pending lawsuit.
Furthermore defendant does not deny receiving the
mailed notices. In its motion to vacate judgment,
defendant alleged that "notice to appoint counsel was
misplaced with numerous pleadings served upon
defendant's office by mail." It is thereby implicitly
admitted that the mailed notice did reach defendant's
offices. The trial court unquestionably took such facts
into consideration m arriving at its decision to deny
the motion to vacate judgment. I cannot agree that,
given such circumstances, this Court may properly
usurp the lower court's disposition of the present
matter, and rule that, as a matter of law, defendant's
conduct constituted "excusable neglect." To do so
deprives the trial court of its discretionary function.
I would affirm the decision of the trial court denymg
defendant's motion to vacate judgment.
WILKINS, J., concurs m the dissent of HALL, J.
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FN1. The rule provides that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
coun may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party . . . from a final judgment . . . for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect . . . . The motion
shall be made . . . not more than three months after
the judgment. . . was entered . . . .
FN2. Sec. 11, Art. I, Utah Constitution.
FN3. Locke v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d
11U (1955).
FN4. See Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company,
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962).
FN5. See Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897
(1907); Locke v. Peterson, footnote 3 above.
FN1. Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
FN2. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larson Contractor, Inc., Utah, 544 P.2d 876 (1975).
FN3. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416,
260 P.2d 741 (1953); Board of Educ. of Granite
School Dist. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806
(1963); Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897
(1907).

FN4. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra, footnote 3;
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52,
376P.2d951 (1962).
FN5. Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah
2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973).
FN6. Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Cox,
supra, footnote 3; Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite
Co., supra, footnote 4; Swauger v. Lawler, 116
Utah 347, 209 P.2d 930 (1949); see also ManhattanWaid, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 490 F.2d 1183 (2nd
Cir. 1974).
FN7. Heath v. Mower, Utah, 597 P.2d 855 (1979).
FN8. Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra,
footnote 5.
FN9. Kromm v. Kromm, 84 Cal.App.2d 523, 191
P.2d 115 (1948); see also Elms v. Elms, 72
Cal.App.2d 508, 164 P.2d 936 (1946).
FN 10. Doyle v. Rice Ranch Oil Co., 28 Cal.App.2d
18, 81P.2d980(1938).
FNll. Usery v. Weiner Bros., Inc., 70 F.R.D. 615
(D.C.1976).
FN12. Heath v. Mower, supra, footnote 7.
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